大乘義章 1.77

1.77

第三門中，約就時類彰假差別。因生假中，差別有四：一者同類同時因生。如天上日生水中日、如面生像、如聲發響、如因香樹生孤遊香，如是一切色聲香等，當分相生，故名同類一時相起，稱曰同時。二者同類異時因生，如麥生麥、穀生穀等。三者異類同時因生，如從眼色生於眼識、如鐘生聲、如巖發響，如是一切。四者異類異時因生，如過去世業與煩惱生今苦樂。斯乃緣生，同名因生。緣成假中，亦有四種：一者同類同時緣成，如以細色成於麁色、眾多小聲成於大聲，如是一切。二者同類異時緣成，如十二時合成一日，如是一切。以時成時，故名同類；前後合成，稱曰異時。三者異類同時緣成，如大乘中五陰成人，毘曇亦爾，所謂四大成諸根等。四者異類同時異時和合緣成，如《成實》中五陰成人，陰與人別，名為異類；色心並故稱曰同時，四心前後故云異時。若依餘論，五陰成人一向同時。斯乃因成，通名緣成。相待假中，亦有四種：一者同類同時相待，如現在世人人相形、天天相比，如是一切。二者同類異時相待，如以今人比劫初人，如是一切。三者異類同時相待，如現在世色心相形、空有相待，如是一切。四者異類異時相待，如對過因宣說今果，如是一切。相續假中，亦有四種：一者同類同時相續，如現在世同類色物互相接續，以繩相接，如是一切。二者異類同時相續，如現在世異色物迭相接續，以梨接杜，如是一切。三者同類異時相續，如從前色生於後色，如是一切。四者異類異時相續，如從過因續生今果，如是一切。時類同異，略之云爾（此三門竟）。

In the third gate, the distinctions among the provisionalities are revealed in terms of time and kind. Within the provisionality of conditioned production, there are four distinctions: First is conditioned production of the same kind at the same time: like the sun in the sky producing the sun in the water, like a face producing a reflection, like a sound generating an echo, like a fragrant tree producing wandering fragrance—all such matters, matter, sound, fragrance, and so forth, producing one another within their own domain; hence it is called the same kind, arising simultaneously, which is termed the same time. Second is conditioned production of the same kind at different times: like wheat producing wheat, grain producing grain, and so forth. Third is conditioned production of different kinds at the same time: like visual consciousness arising from the eye and form, like a bell producing sound, like a cliff generating an echo, and all such cases. Fourth is conditioned production of different kinds at different times: like karma and afflictions from a past life producing present suffering and pleasure. These are instances of condition-dependent production, universally called conditioned production. Within the provisionality of condition-dependent constitution, there are also four kinds: First is condition-dependent constitution of the same kind at the same time: like using subtle matter to constitute coarse matter, or many small sounds constituting a loud sound, and all such cases. Second is condition-dependent constitution of the same kind at different times: like twelve hours constituting one day, and all such cases. Constituting time by means of time is called the same kind; combining before and after is termed different times. Third is condition-dependent constitution of different kinds at the same time: like the five aggregates constituting a person in the Mahāyāna, and likewise in the Abhidharma, namely the four great elements constituting the various sense faculties, and so forth. Fourth is condition-dependent constitution combining different kinds at both the same time and different times: like the five aggregates constituting a person in the Tattvasiddhi; the aggregates are distinct from the person, hence called different kinds; form and mind are concurrent, hence called the same time; the four minds occur before and after, hence called different times. If one relies on other treatises, the five aggregates constituting a person are exclusively at the same time. These are instances of conditioned constitution, broadly called condition-dependent constitution. Within the provisionality of mutual dependence, there are also four kinds: First is mutual dependence of the same kind at the same time: like people comparing with each other or devas comparing with each other in the present world, and all such cases. Second is mutual dependence of the same kind at different times: like comparing present humans with humans of the initial kalpa, and all such cases. Third is mutual dependence of different kinds at the same time: like form and mind comparing with each other, or emptiness and existence depending on each other in the present world, and all such cases. Fourth is mutual dependence of different kinds at different times: like explaining a present fruit in contrast to a past cause, and all such cases. Within the provisionality of continuity, there are also four kinds: First is continuity of the same kind at the same time: like material things of the same kind connecting with one another in the present world, joining with a rope, and all such cases. Second is continuity of different kinds at the same time: like material things of different forms connecting with one another in the present world, grafting a pear onto a wild russet pear, and all such cases. Third is continuity of the same kind at different times: like former matter producing subsequent matter, and all such cases. Fourth is continuity of different kinds at different times: like subsequent present fruit arising from a past cause, and all such cases. The sameness and difference of time and kind are briefly like this. (These three gates are concluded.)