大乘義章 10.66

10.66

第一釋名。三量之義，出於《相續解脫經》中。慧心取法各有分限，故名為量。量別不同，一門說三：一是現量、二是比量、三是教量。《地持》、《成實》亦有此相。《地持》說言：現智、比智及從師同聞。《成實論》言：見、聞及比，猶此三矣。言現量者，現知諸法，名為現量。又知現法，亦名為現。於中分別，有其二種：一者知事、二者知理。言知事者，隨在何時何處法中，不因比度、不藉他言而能知者，同名現量。事相麁近，隨在何時何處之中能現知故。言知理者，毘曇法中就處分別，知欲界法名之為現。以何義故知欲界法偏名為現？《毘婆沙》云「得正決定必在欲界。要先見於欲界苦等，後見上界。」良以欲界法麁易見，故先見之。先見分了，故偏名現。上界不爾，故知上界不名為現。又復行者於欲界苦有二現見：一離欲現見，以離欲道現照知故。二自身現見，欲界之苦身現覺故。於上界苦但有一種離欲現見，身不在彼，不覺知故。如兩擔物，一則自擔、二使人擔。於自所擔有二現見，一知是物、二知輕重。知欲界苦，其狀似此。於他所擔，但有一種，知物現見，不知輕重，上界如是。以知欲界其二現故，偏名為現；上界唯一，故不名現。成實法中約時分別。彼現有二：一據修始，見諦已前現在時中觀假無性，名之為現。二據修成，見諦已上三世法中現見空理，同名為現。大乘通就時處分別，義釋有四：一據修始，唯於欲界現在法中見諸法如，名為現量，欲界現法易觀察故。二者修次，或於欲界見三世如，或於三界見現在如，同名現量。三者修成，於自分中現見三世一切法如，悉名現量。四據修息，到菩提時現見三世一切諸法，皆名現量，不簡自分他分之別。故《地持》言「諸佛如來於一切法現知見覺。」現量如是。言比量者，譬度知法，名之為比。於中分別，亦有二種：一者知事、二者知理。言知事者，隨在何時何處法中，比度而知，悉名比量。言知理者，毘曇法中約處分別，知上二界四諦之理，名為比量。成實法中約時分別，見諦已前過未法中觀假無性，名為比量。大乘通就時處分別，義釋有三：一據修始，以彼欲界現在法如，比知他界他世法如，名為比量。二據修次，或以欲界三世法如比上二界，或以三界現在法如比知過未，名為比量。三據修成，以自分中所知三界三世法如，比他分中未所見處三界三世一切法如，名為比量。以何義故不說修息？到菩提時無復比故。然此比量，經中亦名譬喻量也。通釋是一。於中分別同類相比名為比量，異類相比名譬喻量。言教量者，有法玄絕，自力不知，藉教以通，名為教量。於中分別亦有二種：一者知事、二者知理。於世諦中藉教知者，名為知事。二諦理中藉教知者，名為知理。此之教量，法中亦名信言量也。通釋是一。於中分別，法隣自分藉言入者，名信言量。法大玄絕，依教知者，名為教量。有人就此分量為四：現量為一、比量為二、教量為三、信言為四。此亦無傷，但非經論。名義如是（此一門竟）。

First, explaining the names. The doctrine of the three epistemic instruments (pramāṇa) comes from the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*. The cognitive mind apprehends dharmas, each having its boundary and limit; hence it is called an epistemic instrument (pramāṇa). As the epistemic instruments are distinct and not uniform, one approach states three: the first is direct perception (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa), the second is inference (anumāna-pramāṇa), and the third is authoritative testimony (āgama-pramāṇa). The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Tattvasiddhi* also contain these characteristics. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* states: "knowledge of the present [direct perception], knowledge through inference, and conforming hearing from a teacher." The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* states: "seeing, hearing, and inferring," which are identical to these three. As for "direct perception" (pratyakṣa), directly knowing dharmas is called direct perception. Furthermore, knowing present dharmas is also called direct. Differentiating within this, there are two kinds: the first is knowing phenomena, and the second is knowing principle. As for knowing phenomena: in whatever time or place, among dharmas, being able to know without relying on inference and without depending on another's words is universally called direct perception. Phenomenal characteristics are coarse and immediate, because in whatever time or place, they can be directly known. As for knowing principle: in the Abhidharma doctrine, it is distinguished according to realm—knowing the dharmas of the desire realm is designated as direct. For what reason is knowing the dharmas of the desire realm specifically designated as direct? The *Vibhāṣā* states: "Attaining the right determination (samyaktva-niyāma) must occur in the desire realm. One must first see the suffering and so forth of the desire realm, and subsequently see the higher realms." Because the dharmas of the desire realm are coarse and easy to see, one sees them first. Having seen them first with distinct clarity, it is specifically designated as direct. The higher realms are not like this, so knowing the higher realms is not designated as direct. Furthermore, a practitioner has two direct visions regarding the suffering of the desire realm: first, the direct vision of detachment from desire, because the path of detachment from desire directly illuminates and knows it; second, the direct vision of one's own body, because the suffering of the desire realm is directly experienced by the body. Regarding the suffering of the higher realms, there is only one kind, the direct vision of detachment from desire, because one's body is not there and does not experience it. It is like two carried loads: one carries one oneself, and the other one has another carry. Regarding what one carries oneself, there are two direct visions: first, knowing it is an object; second, knowing its weight. Knowing the suffering of the desire realm is similar to this. Regarding what another carries, there is only one kind: the direct vision of knowing it is an object, but not knowing its weight. The higher realms are like this. Because knowing the desire realm possesses these two direct [visions], it is specifically designated as direct; the higher realms have only one, so they are not designated as direct. In the *Tattvasiddhi* doctrine, it is distinguished in terms of time. Its "direct" has two aspects: first, based on the beginning of practice, contemplating the lack of own-nature in designations during the present time prior to the vision of the truths is designated as direct; second, based on the completion of practice, directly seeing the principle of emptiness among the dharmas of the three times from the vision of the truths onward is universally designated as direct. The Mahāyāna distinguishes across both time and place, and its doctrinal explanation has four [aspects]: First, based on the beginning of practice, seeing the suchness (tathatā) of dharmas solely among the present dharmas of the desire realm is called direct perception, because the present dharmas of the desire realm are easy to observe. Second, in the progression of practice, either seeing the suchness of the three times in the desire realm, or seeing the suchness of the present in the three realms, is universally called direct perception. Third, upon the completion of practice, directly seeing the suchness of all dharmas of the three times within one's own sphere is entirely called direct perception. Fourth, based on the culmination of practice, at the time of reaching bodhi, directly seeing all dharmas of the three times is entirely called direct perception, without distinguishing between one's own sphere and others' spheres. Therefore, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* states: "All Buddha-Tathāgatas have direct knowledge, vision, and awakening regarding all dharmas." Such is direct perception. As for "inference" (anumāna): knowing dharmas by comparison and deliberation is called inference. Differentiating within this, there are also two kinds: the first is knowing phenomena, and the second is knowing principle. As for knowing phenomena: in whatever time or place, among dharmas, knowing through deliberation and comparison is entirely called inference. As for knowing principle: in the Abhidharma doctrine, it is distinguished according to realm—knowing the principle of the four truths of the upper two realms is called inference. In the *Tattvasiddhi* doctrine, it is distinguished in terms of time—contemplating the lack of own-nature in designations among past and future dharmas prior to the vision of the truths is called inference. The Mahāyāna distinguishes across both time and place, and its doctrinal explanation has three [aspects]: First, based on the beginning of practice, by means of the suchness of present dharmas in the desire realm, inferring and knowing the suchness of dharmas in other realms and other times is called inference. Second, in the progression of practice, either inferring the upper two realms by means of the suchness of the dharmas of the three times in the desire realm, or inferring and knowing the past and future by means of the suchness of present dharmas in the three realms, is called inference. Third, upon the completion of practice, by means of the suchness of the dharmas of the three realms and three times known within one's own sphere, inferring the suchness of all dharmas of the three realms and three times not yet seen within others' spheres is called inference. For what reason is the culmination of practice not discussed? Because at the time of reaching bodhi, there is no longer any inference. However, this inference is also called the instrument of analogy (upamāna-pramāṇa) in the sūtras. Interpreted generally, they are one. Differentiating within this: comparing things of the same kind is called inference; comparing things of different kinds is called the instrument of analogy. As for "authoritative testimony" (āgama-pramāṇa): there are dharmas that are profoundly transcendent and cannot be known by one's own power, but are penetrated by relying on teaching; this is called authoritative testimony. Differentiating within this, there are also two kinds: the first is knowing phenomena, and the second is knowing principle. Relying on teaching to know within conventional truth is called knowing phenomena. Relying on teaching to know within the principle of the two truths is called knowing principle. This authoritative testimony is also called the instrument of trustworthy words (āptavacana-pramāṇa) in the teachings. Interpreted generally, they are one. Differentiating within this: when a dharma is adjacent to one's own sphere and one enters it by relying on words, it is called the instrument of trustworthy words; when a dharma is greatly transcendent and one knows it by depending on teaching, it is called authoritative testimony. Some people, based on this, divide the epistemic instruments into four: direct perception as the first, inference as the second, authoritative testimony as the third, and trustworthy words as the fourth. This also does no harm, but it is not from the sūtras and treatises. Such are the names and meanings (this completes the first section).