大乘義章 10.67

10.67

次辨其相。現量可知。比量有三：一同類相比，相似之法以此比餘。如《百論》中，義別有三：一者如殘，如人海中取一滴水，甞之知醎，則知餘者一切皆醎。亦如有人於一法中見苦無常空無我等，知餘皆爾，如是一切。二者如本，如人先曾見火有煙，後見餘煙，必知有火。亦如有人曾見諸法無常故苦，後見法苦，必知無常，如是一切。三共相比知，如似人見從東至西，人有行動，類天上日從東至西，當知亦動。亦如有人見色生滅色性無常，後見其餘想受行等有生滅故，性亦無常，如是一切。此三合為同類比也。二以劣比勝。如國無金，用鍮比之。亦如經中，以世虛空不生不滅，比況佛性，如是一切。三以勝比劣。如國無鍮，將金比之。亦如經中，以大涅槃非有非無，譬王殺罪，如是一切。此後兩門，通釋亦是共相比也，少分同故。比量如是。次辨教量，義別有三：一異時法藉教以知，如過未法不現見故，因說方知。二異處法藉教以知，如他方事不現見故，因說乃知。三者同時同處之法藉教以知，如說身中如來性等。教量如是。此教量中所知不定，或深勝法藉教方知，如彼佛性涅槃道等；或中間法藉教方知，如苦集等；或麁淺法藉教方知，如世間中難識事等（此二門竟）。

Next, distinguishing their characteristics. Direct perception is understandable. Inference has three types: First, comparison of the same kind, where similar dharmas are used to infer others. As in the *Śata-śāstra*, the meanings are distinct into three: The first is "like the remainder": as when someone takes a drop of water from the ocean and tastes it, knowing it is salty, they then know that all the rest is salty. It is also like someone seeing suffering, impermanence, emptiness, and non-self in one dharma, and knowing that the rest are all like this; and so on for all. The second is "like the root": as when someone previously saw that fire has smoke, and later sees other smoke, they definitely know there is fire. It is also like someone having previously seen that because dharmas are impermanent, they are suffering, and later seeing that a dharma is suffering, they definitely know it is impermanent; and so on for all. The third is "knowing by inference through common characteristics": as when someone sees a person moving from east to west and that the person has movement, they assimilate it to the sun in the sky moving from east to west, and understand that it also moves. It is also like someone seeing the arising and ceasing of form and that the nature of form is impermanent, and later seeing that because the other [aggregates of] conception, sensation, formations, and so forth have arising and ceasing, their nature is also impermanent; and so on for all. These three combine to form comparison of the same kind. Second, using the inferior to infer the superior. As when a country has no gold, brass is used to infer it. It is also like the sūtras using the unarisen and unceasing nature of worldly space to illustrate by comparison the Buddha-nature; and so on for all. Third, using the superior to infer the inferior. As when a country has no brass, gold is taken to infer it. It is also like the sūtras using the great nirvāṇa being neither existent nor non-existent to illustrate a king's sin of killing; and so on for all. These latter two approaches, when explained generally, are also inference through common characteristics, because they share a small fraction of similarity. Such is inference. Next, distinguishing authoritative testimony, the meanings are distinct into three: First, dharmas of a different time known by relying on teaching: because past and future dharmas are not directly seen, they are only known through explanation. Second, dharmas of a different place known by relying on teaching: because events in other regions are not directly seen, they are only known through explanation. Third, dharmas of the same time and same place known by relying on teaching: such as the teaching that the Tathāgata-nature is within the body. Such is authoritative testimony. What is known within this authoritative testimony is indeterminate: either profound and superior dharmas are known only by relying on teaching, such as the Buddha-nature and the path of nirvāṇa; or intermediate dharmas are known by relying on teaching, such as suffering, origination, and so forth; or coarse and shallow dharmas are known by relying on teaching, such as things difficult to recognise in the world (this completes the second section).