大乘義章 15.12

15.12

次辨其同。法智、比智與四諦智，同體義分。依如《毘曇》，前四諦智在欲界者名為法智，在上二界名為比智。若依《成實》，知現在者亦為法智，知過未者亦為比智。盡、無生智，與前六智同體義分，彼前六智至無學果，名盡、無生。依如《成實》，盡、無生智同體義分，無學聖慧能盡惑因名為盡智，能令當果永更不起名無生智。大乘亦爾。他心智者，與彼道智、法智、比智及與等智同體義分，其有漏者與彼等智同體義分，其無漏者與彼道智、法智、比智同體義分，知法智品無漏他心即名法名智，知比智品無漏他心即名比智，知前二品通名道智。問曰：知彼無漏他心即名道智、法智、比智，知彼有漏他心之者何故不名苦集智乎？釋言：有漏他心智者知有漏事，苦集二智知有漏理，事淺理深，是故雖知有漏他心，非苦集智；無漏他心知彼道如跡乘等理淺深麁同，是故知彼無漏他心即名道智。問曰：何故有漏他心麁於苦集，無漏他心不麁於道？釋言：有漏他心之者緣事而生，是故麁於苦集之理；無漏他心緣理而起，是故與彼道如等理麁細相似。問曰：無漏他心智者，為當知他無漏心事？為當知於道如等理？釋言：方便觀於道如跡乘等理，究竟終成知他心事。問曰：論說雖十六行，但是除誾而非無漏；知他心事既非無漏，云何得與道智同體？釋言：從始說為道智，先觀道理，後就道上測知他心。剋論終成，近道似道名為道智，非正道體。問曰：若使無漏他心理觀後起，從始方便得名道智，有漏他心何故不然？釋言：無漏他心智者，必從無漏道觀後起，故從方便得名道智；有漏他心不必要從苦集觀起，為是不同。何故而然？無漏法中，道如等理從煗等來，常學觀察，久觀純熟，凝心即見。無漏他心，那含果後方始學觀，始觀難成，故先觀道就上測心。有漏法中，苦集之理煗等已上方始學觀，有漏他心本來數見，不假苦集二智開導方始能見，故不從初為苦集智。同義如是（此二門竟）。

Next, their identity is explained. Dharma knowledge and inductive knowledge are of the same entity as the four noble truths' knowledges, divided by sense. According to the Abhidharma, when the former knowledges of the four noble truths are in the desire realm, they are called dharma knowledge; when in the upper two realms, they are called inductive knowledge. According to the Tattvasiddhi, that which knows the present is also dharma knowledge, and that which knows the past and future is also inductive knowledge. The knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising are of the same entity as the former six knowledges, divided by sense: when those former six knowledges reach the fruit of non-learning, they are called [the knowledges of] exhaustion and non-arising. According to the Tattvasiddhi, the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising are of the same entity, divided by sense: the noble wisdom of non-learning, when able to exhaust the causes of delusion, is called the knowledge of exhaustion; when able to make future fruits never arise again, it is called the knowledge of non-arising. The Mahāyāna is also like this. Knowledge of the minds of others is of the same entity as path knowledge, dharma knowledge, inductive knowledge, and conventional knowledge, divided by sense: its untainted part is of the same entity as conventional knowledge, divided by sense; its untainted part is of the same entity as path knowledge, dharma knowledge, and inductive knowledge, divided by sense. Knowing the untainted mind of another within the category of dharma knowledge is called dharma knowledge; knowing the untainted mind of another within the category of inductive knowledge is called inductive knowledge; and knowing these two categories is generally called path knowledge. Question: If knowing another's untainted mind is called path knowledge, dharma knowledge, or inductive knowledge, why is knowing another's tainted mind not called knowledge of suffering or of the origin? Explanation: Knowledge of another's tainted mind knows tainted phenomena, whereas the two knowledges of suffering and the origin know tainted principles. Phenomena are shallow while principles are deep; therefore, although it knows another's tainted mind, it is not knowledge of suffering or of the origin. Untainted [knowledge of] another's mind knows such principles as the path, correctness, the trail, and the vehicle; the shallowness and depth, coarseness and subtlety are alike, so knowing another's untainted mind is called path knowledge. Question: Why is tainted [knowledge of] another's mind coarser than [knowledge of] suffering and origin, while untainted [knowledge of] another's mind is not coarser than [knowledge of] the path? Explanation: Tainted [knowledge of] another's mind arises by taking phenomena as its object, and is therefore coarser than the principles of suffering and origin; untainted [knowledge of] another's mind arises by taking principles as its object, and therefore resembles the principles of the path, correctness, and so forth in coarseness and subtlety. Question: Does the untainted knowledge of another's mind know the phenomenon of another's untainted mind, or does it know such principles as the path and correctness? Explanation: Through expedient means it contemplates such principles as the path, correctness, the trail, and the vehicle; in its ultimate culmination, it knows the phenomenon of another's mind. Question: The treatises say that although there are sixteen aspects, these merely eliminate ignorance and are not themselves untainted; since knowing the phenomenon of another's mind is not untainted, how can it be of the same entity as path knowledge? Explanation: From its beginning it is said to be path knowledge: first one contemplates the principle of the path, and then upon the path one infers and knows another's mind. Conclusively determined in its culmination, being close to the path and resembling the path, it is called path knowledge; it is not the actual entity of the path. Question: If untainted [knowledge of] another's mind arises following the contemplation of principle and is named path knowledge from its initial expedient, why is tainted [knowledge of] another's mind not so? Explanation: Untainted knowledge of another's mind necessarily arises after the untainted contemplation of the path, and is therefore named path knowledge from its expedient; tainted [knowledge of] another's mind does not necessarily arise from the contemplation of suffering and origin, and for this reason they are not the same. Why is this so? Among untainted dharmas, such principles as the path and correctness have been continually trained in and contemplated from the [stage of] heat onward; through long and thoroughly ripened contemplation, one sees them as soon as the mind is concentrated. Untainted [knowledge of] another's mind is only first trained in and contemplated after the fruit of anāgāmin; being difficult to accomplish at first contemplation, one first contemplates the path and thereupon infers the mind. Among tainted dharmas, the principles of suffering and origin are only first trained in and contemplated from the stage of heat upward, whereas another's tainted mind has originally been repeatedly seen and does not depend on the guidance of the two knowledges of suffering and origin before it can be seen; hence it is not called knowledge of suffering or of origin from its beginning. The sense of identity is like this (this completes the second section).