大乘義章 18.6

18.6

次第三門定其體性。涅槃體中德別無量，要唯有三：一是色法、二是心法、三非色心法。言色法者，如《涅槃》說「滅無常色獲得常色，離苦色獲得樂色，乃至滅於不寂靜色獲得真實寂靜之色。」故知涅槃用色為體。又《涅槃》云「言不空者，謂有善色常樂我淨。」又《涅槃》中說大涅槃以為解脫。迦葉白佛：「如是解脫，為色為非色？」佛言：「二乘解脫非色，諸佛如來解脫是色。」以斯驗求，明知涅槃體性是色。又如六卷《泥洹》之中，純陀嘆佛「妙色湛默常安隱，不隨時節劫數遷。大聖曠劫行慈悲，獲得金剛不壞身。」故知是色。又《勝鬘》中嘆佛色身世無與等，又嘆如來妙色無盡，明知是色。色相云何？佛有三身：一是應身、二是報身、三是法身，此三身中皆悉有色。應身色者，現化隨物，或時似天、或復似人，如是一切。隨其所現，同世色像，是故亦名共世間身。報身色者，於彼應身一一相處，各有無量塵數相好。如《華嚴經．相海品》說「雖具眾相而不可見，如梵天王頂上寶珠有而叵見。」雖不可見而實有之，名字不同作業各異。如《華嚴》說「法身色者，如來藏中色性法門顯成佛體。體雖是色而無色相。」如似比丘無作戒法，亦如陰陽五行等法雖無色相而是色性。諸佛證得成就法界諸根相好即法身故，又此法中出生法界無盡色故名像色法。有人說言：涅槃無色，唯一靈智。設言色者，是應非真。何故非色？色性質礙，為是無之。若色質礙全佛無者，心是攀緣慮知之法，佛亦應無。佛無緣心而有無緣覺知之心，色亦應爾。佛無礙色，而有無礙自在之色，何為不得？人復為難：礙故名色，佛身無礙，云何名色？此應返質。緣義為心，佛智無緣，何得名心？人復釋言：無緣而照故得名心。此應類之，無礙是身、無礙是形，何為非色？又雖無礙，而有光明諸根相好，何得非色？又若無礙即全無色，若言有色即令礙者，此應並報：如來無緣即應是癡、即應無知；佛若有知，即是攀緣。可如是不？此既不可，彼亦同然，何勞致疑。又若說言色皆是應都無真實者，此應並難：真處亡情，有覺有知，應悉是應。應化之知，從真知生，真中立知。應化之色從真色起，真中存色，竟有何妨？又經宣說「滅無常色獲得常色。」云何是應？經復宣說「真實善色常樂我淨。」云何是應？又經嘆佛「妙色湛然常安穩，不隨時節劫數遷。大聖曠劫行慈悲，故得金剛不壞身。」云何名應？又《地經》中說佛相好為實報身。云何是應又若相好悉是應者，經中宣說相好之業，應是應修，非是實修；修得是實，果寧不真？人復釋言：滅無常色獲常色等，此實是心。心法顯現，義說為色。此應反難：若心顯現義說為色，實無色者，色法不顯，義說為心，實應無心。又若心現，義說色者，他亦應言色光照明，義說為心，佛實無心。色光照明，不得名心；心法顯現，何得名色？以斯驗求，佛真有色，不得言無。色義如是。次論心義。經中宣說「滅無常識獲得常識，受想行等亦復如是。」明知涅槃以心為體。又說彼若成大涅槃，明知涅槃用心為體。心相云何？如前八識章中具辯。今略論之，心有三種：一是事識，謂六識心，向外取緣。二是妄識，謂七識心，內迷真性，妄取自心所起境界，如人昏夢迷覆實事，妄取自心所起境界。三是真識，謂八識心，如來藏中過恒沙法緣起集成覺知心事，以此真心覺知性故，與無明合便起妄知，息去無明便為正知。如人報心與昏睡合便起夢知，息去昏睡便為寤知。始覺真心說之以為一切種德，今此就其涅槃門說，故說此心以為涅槃。妄事兩心，情有體無，未窮似有，研之即盡，不成涅槃。故《楞伽》云「妄想爾炎慧，彼滅我涅槃。」又彼經言「滅七種識，唯有藏識。」唯藏識故，真識之心得成涅槃，非六非七。有異論，如前八識章中廣破。問曰：真心是知非滅，云何得說為涅槃乎？釋言：此心體是知性，而無分別。無分別故，照而常寂；是知性故，寂而恒照。以恒照故，能滅癡闇；以常寂故，能滅妄想。癡妄既除，不復隨緣集起生死，以不起故無為體寂，故名涅槃。心法如是。次明非色非心之義。如經中說「菩提不可身得心得，涅槃亦爾。」故非色心。相狀如何？分別有二：一數滅無為。斷離一切色心等相，名非色心。如《涅槃》說「滅無常色名為非色，滅於無常受想行識名曰非心。」如是一切。又如《涅槃．梵行品》說「入於無色大般涅槃，名為非色。」又無諸大陰界入等，亦是非色。意滅識亡心亦寂等，名為非心。又滅妄想爾炎慧等，亦是非心。二真法體如。色即無色、心即無心，名非色心。如經中說「大般涅槃實非有色，隨世說有。」又經中說「菩提涅槃一切皆空。」又《地經》說「自體本空，智自空等。」皆是真空非色心義。彼云何空？義如上解，離相離性。言離相者，佛雖有色而無色相，如無作戒，雖復是色而無形相。佛雖有心而亦無心相，如鏡照物無分別相。言離性者，大涅槃中諸德同體緣起相成，無有一德別守自性，故名為空。以是空故，色無色性，名為非色；心無心性，稱曰非心。問曰：若此皆無自性，即是自性不成無常，與生死法有何差別？釋言：緣起無性空義，生死涅槃其理齊等，是故經中說生死空乃至涅槃，生死無我乃至涅槃。所言異者，生死之法一向無常，以其性相俱無常故，生滅流轉名相無常，虛集無性名性無常。涅槃之體亦常無常，而非一向。故涅槃經初德中說「涅槃非常亦非無常。」是義云何？大涅槃中萬德同體，分相論之，各守自相無為不動，故非無常。攝相言之，互以相成，相成不壞亦非無常，非無常故經說為常。將別分總，總相不立，以不立故無空性常，無性常故名為無常。涅槃體性其理定爾。有人宣說：一苦滅諦，顯成涅槃。苦滅唯空，顯此空理以成涅槃，是故涅槃一向唯空無色無心。此外道空，不應受持。若說苦滅唯是空者，佛自對破。如《涅槃經．四諦章》說「修苦滅者，逆於一切諸外道等。若說空法為苦滅諦，諸外道等悉皆修空，應有真諦。又若宣說無我空寂為如來藏，當知此人久在生死，長受長諸苦不得解脫。若有說言有如來藏雖不可見，破煩惱已定必得之。若發是心，一念因緣於諸法中悉得自在。」以斯驗求，明知苦滅不唯是空。如《勝鬘》說「一苦滅諦是如來藏。如來藏具過一切恒沙佛法，名不空藏。」何得唯空？若言涅槃一向空者，經說「涅槃常樂我淨真實善有。」那得言空？又經說言「空者，所謂一切生死。言不空者，謂大涅槃。」又經說言「殺空得實。殺無常已，得常涅槃。」云何是空？又《涅槃經》第七德中，七法相異，空與涅槃義門各別，何得唯空？又若空者，無想天喻無想實有，竟何所況？又經宣說「大般涅槃能建大義種種示現。」若唯空者，依何起義？又經宣說「汝不應言滅是法性。若法性者，實無滅也。」何得唯空？有人復言：如來藏性色心為體，都無空義。復言空者，無相名空。藏性既爾，顯成涅槃，涅槃唯有一向不空。說言空者，空無萬相，不空涅槃。此亦是其外道之有，不應受之。若說藏性實不空者，是義不然。如《楞伽》說「依法無我說如來藏。」云何不空？又復如彼《起信論》說「有人聞說如來藏中具一切法，便說色心各別有體。對治此執，說一切法依真如說。」如者是其空之別稱，依之宣說一切佛法，云何不空？又如經說「如來藏中具過恒沙一切佛法，不離不斷、不脫不異。」既言不離，明無別性。法無別性，何為不空？又同體法必互相成，相成之法則有總別，攝別成總諸法可有，將別分總總相不立。何為不空？若別分總，總義不空，五陰分生，生應不空；藏性如是。若言涅槃實有不空，是義不然。如經中說「涅槃非有，隨世說有。」涅槃非有，云何不空？又《地經》說「自體本空，名為性淨同相涅槃。」云何不空？又經中說「菩提涅槃一切皆空。」云何實有？又若涅槃實有不空，取著涅槃正見非邪，佛何故破，說空無我？又若涅槃實常非空，常見者不應是患。若言涅槃空，無妄情心取之相故名為空，而涅槃體定不空者，此應並反經說涅槃非有非無。是則有者，能有他故名之為有，體應非有。人即救言：我言無者，己無他相，何得有他？此應更徵。經中宣說「依如來藏故有生死，依大涅槃能建大義起種種化。」即是有他。若言無者，己無他故不得有他，是則有者已有他故不得無他。此是一難。又若無者一向無他，而體非無，是則有者一向有他而體非有。有雖有他，不妨體有，是則無者雖復無他，何妨體無？偏有偏無佛法大患，理須廣破。體性如是。

Next, the third section determines its essence. Among the essences of nirvāṇa, the distinct virtues are immeasurable; essentially, there are only three: first, physical phenomena; second, mental phenomena; third, phenomena that are neither physical nor mental. Regarding physical phenomena: as the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "By extinguishing impermanent form, one attains eternal form; by freeing oneself from painful form, one attains pleasurable form; up to extinguishing unquiet form, one attains genuinely quiet form." Therefore we know that nirvāṇa takes physical form as its essence. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "What is termed 'not empty' refers to having good form, the eternal, bliss, the self, and purity." Again, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] explains great nirvāṇa as liberation. Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: "Is such liberation physical or non-physical?" The Buddha said: "The liberation of the two vehicles is non-physical; the liberation of the Buddhas and Tathāgatas is physical." Examining and seeking by this, we clearly know that the essence of nirvāṇa is physical. Furthermore, as in the six-fascicle Niyuan [Jing], Cunda praised the Buddha: "The wonderful form is serene, silent, and ever secure, not shifting with seasons or numbers of kalpas. The Great Sage practiced compassion for vast kalpas, thereby attaining the adamantine, indestructible body." Hence we know it is physical. Again, the Śrīmālā[devī-sūtra] praises the Buddha's physical body as peerless in the world, and praises the Tathāgata's wonderful form as inexhaustible; we clearly know it is physical. What is the characteristic of this form? The Buddha has three bodies: first, the response body; second, the reward body; third, the dharmakāya; all three of these bodies possess form. As for the form of the response body, it manifests transformations following [sentient] beings, at times resembling a deity, at other times resembling a human, and so on. In accordance with what it manifests, it is identical with worldly forms and images; therefore it is also called the "body common to the world." As for the form of the reward body, at each and every characteristic of that response body, there are immeasurable marks and signs as numerous as dust motes. As the "Chapter on the Ocean of Marks" in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says, "Although endowed with manifold marks, they cannot be seen, like the jewel atop the head of King Brahmā, which exists yet cannot be seen." Although they cannot be seen, they truly exist, their names differing and their activities each distinct, as the Avataṃsaka says. As for the form of the dharmakāya, the dharma-gate of the nature of form within the tathāgatagarbha becomes apparent to constitute the Buddha's essence. Although the essence is form, it lacks the characteristics of form. It is like a monk's unmanifest precept-phenomenon, or like yin-yang, the five elements, and other such phenomena which, though devoid of physical marks, possess the nature of form. Because the Buddhas realize and achieve all the faculties, marks, and signs of the dharmadhātu, which are precisely the dharmakāya; and because within this dharma, the inexhaustible forms of the dharmadhātu are produced, it is called a form-like phenomenon. Some people say: "Nirvāṇa has no form; it is solely numinous cognition. If it is said to have form, that is the response [body], not the true [body]. Why is it not form? The nature of form is obstruction; it is non-existent because of this." [We reply:] If obstructive form is entirely absent in a Buddha, then mind—being an object-grasping, calculating cognitive phenomenon—should also be absent in a Buddha. The Buddha lacks an object-grasping mind, yet has a cognitive mind devoid of an object; form should be likewise. The Buddha lacks obstructive form, yet has unimpeded, sovereign form; why could this not be? Some raise another objection: "It is called form because of obstruction; if the Buddha's body is unimpeded, how can it be called form?" One should counter-question this: If grasping objects is the meaning of mind, and the Buddha's wisdom does not grasp objects, how can it be called mind? They then explain: "Because it illumines without grasping objects, it can be called mind." One should analogize this: If it is an unimpeded body and an unimpeded shape, why is it not form? Furthermore, although it is unimpeded, it possesses radiance, faculties, marks, and signs; how could it not be form? Moreover, if being unimpeded means having no form at all, and saying it has form necessarily makes it obstructive, then by the same token: since the Tathāgata does not grasp objects, he should be ignorant and lack cognition; if the Buddha has cognition, it must be object-grasping. Could this be so? Since this is untenable, the other is likewise; why labor to raise doubts? Furthermore, if one says that all form is merely responsive and has no reality whatsoever, one should counter-challenge: In the locus of truth, passions are gone; if there is sentience and cognition, they should all be responsive. Responsive and transformed cognition arises from true cognition, establishing cognition within the true. Responsive and transformed form arises from true form, retaining form within the true; what objection could there ultimately be? Moreover, the sūtra proclaims, "Extinguishing impermanent form, one attains eternal form." How could this be responsive? The sūtra also proclaims, "Truly good form is eternal, bliss, the self, and pure." How could this be responsive? Again, the sūtra praises the Buddha: "The wonderful form is serene and ever secure, not shifting with seasons or numbers of kalpas. The Great Sage practiced compassion for vast kalpas, thereby attaining the adamantine, indestructible body." How could this be called responsive? Moreover, the Daśabhūmika-sūtra states that the Buddha's marks and signs are the real reward body. How could they be responsive? Furthermore, if the marks and signs were all responsive, then the practices of marks and signs proclaimed in the sūtras would be responsive cultivation, not real cultivation; but if the cultivation attained is real, could the fruit fail to be true? Others further explain: "'Extinguishing impermanent form and attaining eternal form' and so on actually refers to mind. When mental phenomena become manifest, they are figuratively called form." One should counter this: If the manifestation of mind is figuratively called form while form is really absent, then when physical phenomena are unmanifest, they would figuratively be called mind while mind is really absent. Furthermore, if the manifestation of mind is figuratively called form, others could also say that the illumination of physical radiance is figuratively called mind, and the Buddha really has no mind. The illumination of physical radiance cannot be called mind; how could the manifestation of mental phenomena be called form? Examining and seeking by this, the Buddha truly has form; it cannot be said to be absent. Such is the meaning of form. Next, we discuss the meaning of mind. The sūtra proclaims: "Extinguishing impermanent consciousness, one attains eternal consciousness; sensation, perception, formations, and so forth are also likewise." We clearly know that nirvāṇa takes mind as its essence. It also says that if one realizes great nirvāṇa, one clearly knows that nirvāṇa takes mind as its essence. What is the characteristic of mind? As fully distinguished in the previous chapter on the eight consciousnesses, we now discuss it in brief. There are three kinds of mind: First is phenomenal consciousness, referring to the mind of the six consciousnesses, which grasps externally at conditions. Second is deluded consciousness, referring to the mind of the seventh consciousness, which internally is confused about true nature and deludedly grasps at spheres of experience arising from its own mind, like a person in a stuporous dream who is confused about and veiled from real matters, deludedly grasping at the spheres arising from their own mind. Third is true consciousness, referring to the mind of the eighth consciousness, where within the tathāgatagarbha, dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges assemble through dependent origination into a cognitive mental affair. Because of the cognitive nature of this true mind, when conjoined with ignorance it gives rise to deluded cognition; when ignorance ceases, it becomes correct cognition. Just as a person's retributive mind, when conjoined with deep sleep, gives rise to dream cognition, and when deep sleep ceases, becomes waking cognition. The initially enlightened true mind is spoken of as the virtues of all kinds; now, speaking of it in terms of the gateway of nirvāṇa, this mind is therefore spoken of as nirvāṇa. The two minds of delusion and phenomena exist conceptually but lack essence; before being penetrated they appear to exist, but upon scrutiny they vanish entirely, not constituting nirvāṇa. Thus the Laṅkāvatāra says, "Discriminating conceptual prajñā—when that is extinguished, that is my nirvāṇa." That sūtra also says, "Extinguishing the seven kinds of consciousness, there is only the storehouse consciousness." Because there is only the storehouse consciousness, the mind of true consciousness is able to constitute nirvāṇa, not the six or seven. There are divergent treatises, as extensively refuted in the previous chapter on the eight consciousnesses. Question: The true mind is cognition, not extinction; how can it be spoken of as nirvāṇa? Explanation: The essence of this mind is cognitive nature, yet it is free of conceptual discrimination. Because it is free of discrimination, it illumines while being constantly serene; because it is of a cognitive nature, it is serene while ever illumining. Because it ever illumines, it can extinguish the darkness of ignorance; because it is constantly serene, it can extinguish deluded conceptualization. When ignorance and delusion are removed, it no longer aggregates and gives rise to saṃsāra in accordance with conditions; because it does not arise, it is unconditioned and serene in essence, and is therefore called nirvāṇa. Such are mental phenomena. Next, the meaning of neither physical nor mental is clarified. As the sūtra says, "Bodhi cannot be attained by the body or attained by the mind; nirvāṇa is also like this." Therefore it is neither physical nor mental. What are its characteristics? In distinction there are two: First, the unconditioned [attained by] analytical cessation. Extinguishing and leaving behind all characteristics of form, mind, and so forth is termed neither physical nor mental. As the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "Extinguishing impermanent form is called non-physical; extinguishing impermanent sensation, perception, formations, and consciousness is called non-mental"; and so on with everything. Furthermore, as the "Chapter on Pure Practices" in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "Entering into non-physical great parinirvāṇa is called non-physical." Also, the absence of the great elements, aggregates, realms, sense fields, and so forth is likewise non-physical. The mind-sense being extinguished, consciousness vanished, and the mind being serene, and so on, is called non-mental. Furthermore, extinguishing discriminating conceptual prajñā and so forth is also non-mental. Second, the reality of the true dharma. Form is precisely non-form, and mind is precisely non-mind; this is called neither physical nor mental. As the sūtra says, "Great parinirvāṇa is truly not physical; it is spoken of as existing in accordance with the world." The sūtra also says, "Bodhi and nirvāṇa are entirely empty." Furthermore, the Daśabhūmika-sūtra says, "Its own essence is fundamentally empty; wisdom is naturally empty," and so forth; these are all the meaning of true emptiness being neither physical nor mental. How are they empty? The meaning is as explained above: free of characteristics and free of nature. As for being free of characteristics: although the Buddha has form, it lacks the characteristics of form, like the unmanifest precept, which, although form, lacks physical shape. Although the Buddha has a mind, it also lacks the characteristics of mind, like a mirror reflecting objects without the characteristic of conceptual discrimination. As for being free of nature: in great nirvāṇa, all virtues share the same essence, mutually establishing one another through dependent origination; no single virtue separately maintains its own intrinsic nature; therefore it is called empty. Being empty in this way, form lacks the nature of form, which is called non-physical; mind lacks the nature of mind, which is called non-mental. Question: If these all lack intrinsic nature, that means their intrinsic nature is not established and is impermanent; what difference is there between this and the dharmas of saṃsāra? Explanation: In the meaning of emptiness as dependent origination devoid of intrinsic nature, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are identical in principle. For this reason, the sūtra speaks of saṃsāra being empty up to nirvāṇa [being empty], and saṃsāra being non-self up to nirvāṇa [being non-self]. As for their difference: the dharmas of saṃsāra are uniformly impermanent, because their characteristics and nature are both impermanent. Arising, ceasing, and transmigration are called impermanence of characteristics; false aggregation lacking intrinsic nature is called impermanence of nature. The essence of nirvāṇa is both permanent and impermanent, but not uniformly so. Thus in the first virtue of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra it says, "Nirvāṇa is neither permanent nor impermanent." What does this mean? In great nirvāṇa, the myriad virtues share the same essence. Discussing them by distinguishing their characteristics, each maintains its own characteristic, unconditioned and unmoving; therefore it is not impermanent. Speaking of them by subsuming their characteristics, they mutually establish one another; mutually established and indestructible, it is also not impermanent. Because it is not impermanent, the sūtra speaks of it as permanent. When applying the particular to divide the general, the general characteristic is not established; because it is not established, it lacks a permanent empty nature; lacking a permanent nature, it is called impermanent. The principle of nirvāṇa's essence is definitely like this. Some declare: "The single truth of the cessation of suffering manifests and constitutes nirvāṇa. The cessation of suffering is solely emptiness; manifesting this principle of emptiness constitutes nirvāṇa. Therefore nirvāṇa is uniformly solely empty, devoid of form and devoid of mind." This is the emptiness of non-Buddhists; it should not be accepted and held. If one says that the cessation of suffering is solely emptiness, the Buddha himself directly refuted this. As the "Chapter on the Four Truths" in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says, "One who cultivates the cessation of suffering goes contrary to all non-Buddhists and the like. If one says that empty dharmas are the truth of the cessation of suffering, then all non-Buddhists cultivate emptiness and should possess the true truth. Furthermore, if one declares that non-self, emptiness, and serenity are the tathāgatagarbha, know that this person will long remain in saṃsāra, enduring vast suffering for a long time without attaining liberation. If there is someone who says that the tathāgatagarbha exists, though invisible, and having destroyed afflictions one is certain to attain it—if one gives rise to this mind, by the conditions of a single thought-moment one will attain sovereignty among all dharmas." Examining and seeking by this, we clearly know that the cessation of suffering is not solely empty. As the Śrīmālā says, "The single truth of the cessation of suffering is the tathāgatagarbha. The tathāgatagarbha is endowed with Buddha-dharmas exceeding all the sands of the Ganges; it is called the non-empty womb." How could it be solely empty? If one says that nirvāṇa is uniformly empty, why does the sūtra say, "Nirvāṇa is eternal, bliss, the self, pure, real, good, and existent"? How could it be called empty? Furthermore, the sūtra says, "What is empty refers to all saṃsāra; what is not empty refers to great nirvāṇa." The sūtra also says, "By slaying emptiness, one attains the real; having slain impermanence, one attains permanent nirvāṇa." How could it be empty? Again, in the seventh virtue of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the seven dharmas are mutually distinct, and the doctrinal gates of emptiness and nirvāṇa are each separate; how could it be solely empty? Furthermore, if it were empty, what would the simile of the Heaven of Non-conception—where non-conception truly exists—actually illustrate? Furthermore, the sūtra proclaims, "Great parinirvāṇa can establish great purposes, manifesting various transformations." If it were solely empty, upon what could purposes arise? Furthermore, the sūtra proclaims, "You should not say that cessation is the dharmatā. If it were the dharmatā, there would truly be no cessation." How could it be solely empty? Others further say: "The nature of the tathāgatagarbha takes form and mind as its essence, entirely lacking the meaning of emptiness. If it is also called empty, it is named empty because of lack of characteristics. Since the nature of the storehouse is such, it manifests to constitute nirvāṇa; nirvāṇa exists only as uniformly non-empty. When it is spoken of as empty, it is empty of the myriad characteristics, while nirvāṇa is not empty." This too is the existence of non-Buddhists; it should not be accepted. If one says that the nature of the storehouse is truly not empty, this meaning is incorrect. As the Laṅkāvatāra says, "Relying on the selflessness of dharmas, the tathāgatagarbha is taught." How could it be not empty? Furthermore, as the Awakening of Faith says, "Someone, hearing it taught that within the tathāgatagarbha all dharmas are fully present, then says that form and mind each have separate essences. To counter this attachment, it is taught that all dharmas are explained relying on tathatā." 'Suchness' is another name for emptiness; relying on it, all Buddha-dharmas are proclaimed; how could it be not empty? Furthermore, as the sūtra says, "Within the tathāgatagarbha, all Buddha-dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges are fully present, neither separate nor severed, neither disjointed nor different." Since it says "not separate," it clearly lacks a distinct nature. Since dharmas lack a distinct nature, why would it not be empty? Furthermore, dharmas of the same essence must mutually establish one another; dharmas that mutually establish each other possess general and particular aspects. Subsuming the particulars to form the general, the various dharmas may exist; applying the particulars to divide the general, the general characteristic is not established. Why would it not be empty? If dividing the general by the particulars left the general meaning not empty, then when the five aggregates divide into life, that life should be not empty; the nature of the storehouse is just like this. If one says that nirvāṇa really exists and is not empty, this meaning is incorrect. As the sūtra says, "Nirvāṇa is not existent; it is spoken of as existent in accordance with the world." Nirvāṇa is not existent; how could it be not empty? Furthermore, the Daśabhūmika-sūtra says, "Its own essence is fundamentally empty; this is called naturally pure identical-characteristic nirvāṇa." How could it be not empty? Furthermore, the sūtra says, "Bodhi and nirvāṇa are entirely empty." How could it really exist? Moreover, if nirvāṇa really existed and were not empty, clinging to nirvāṇa would be right view, not wrong [view]; why did the Buddha refute it, teaching emptiness and non-self? Furthermore, if nirvāṇa were really eternal and not empty, holding an eternalist view would not be an affliction. If one says that nirvāṇa is empty because it lacks the characteristics grasped by the mind of deluded passion and is therefore called empty, while the essence of nirvāṇa is definitely not empty, one should counter this with the sūtra saying that nirvāṇa is neither existent nor non-existent. In that case, what exists would be called existent because it can have others, and its essence should not exist. They then rescue [their position] by saying: "When I say non-existent, it means that oneself lacks the characteristics of others; how could there be others?" One should question this further. The sūtra proclaims: "Relying on the tathāgatagarbha, there is saṃsāra; relying on great nirvāṇa, one can establish great purposes and give rise to various transformations." This means there are others. If one says that it is non-existent because oneself lacks others and cannot have others, then what exists, already having others, could not lack others. This is one objection. Furthermore, if what is non-existent is uniformly devoid of others while its essence is not non-existent, then what is existent would be uniformly endowed with others while its essence is not existent. Although existence possesses others, this does not prevent its essence from existing; likewise, although non-existence lacks others, what prevents its essence from being non-existent? Unilateral existence and unilateral non-existence are great afflictions in the Buddha-dharma; they must be extensively refuted by principle. Such is its essence.