大乘義章 19.23

19.23

次第三門約時分別。時別有三：一是凡時，善趣已前。二是聖時，種性已上。亦此地前通名凡時，初地已上名為聖時。三是果時，在於後際。約此三時以辨三佛。就初釋中，先敘異說、次辨過非、後顯正義。異說如何？有人宣說：三佛之體悉是本有。何故如是？三佛皆悉就實而辨。據實佛論，本來無因。因本不有，如何待對而令三佛偏在果時？設言在果，乃是世俗凡情所見，非正道理。又如經說「如來藏中具一切法。」明知三佛悉是本有。此是一論。有人復言：報應兩佛，生因所生，偏在果時；法佛之體，非生因生，一向本有。此是兩論。有人復言：三佛是果，偏在果時；因中設有，但可名性，不得名佛。此是三論，異說如是。次辨過非。初言三佛皆悉本有。是義不然。若言就實本來無因，欲令三佛悉本有者，本來無因，酬何名報？今若就實，本來無因亦無眾生，隨何名應？此言文壞，何待多難？若言經說如來之藏具一切法令三本有，此言亦非。如《勝鬘》說「過恒沙法，隱時名藏，顯為法身。」是則就彼法身法中說具一切，何開報應？若使三佛皆悉本有，是則三佛皆了因顯，非生因生，如彼《金剛般若》中說「受持經功德，於實名了因，亦為餘生因。」彼論自解「於實了因，望於法佛；為餘生因，望於報應。」望於報應既言生因，云何本有？又《涅槃》云「若說菩提是本有者，犯波羅夷，謗佛法僧。」菩提猶是報應兩佛，云何本有？又《涅槃》中廣就乳酪樹子等譬破其本有。若便報應二佛本有，彼何所破？又《涅槃》云「本有今無、本無今有，三世有法，無有是處。」若使報應二佛本有，云何得言本有今無、本無今有？三世有法無有是處，便有是處，云何而言無有是處？此之偈義，彼經具解，不得異釋。又《涅槃》中說四種性：或有佛性，闡提人有、善根人無，謂闡提人有不善性。或有佛性，善根人有、闡提人無，謂善根人有善根性。或有佛性，二人俱有，俱有理性。或有佛性，二人俱無，無某果性。若使報應二佛本有，云何得說二人俱無？二人俱無，經說難非。三佛本有，何須更立？報應本有，佛法大過，宜速捨離，無宜強立。此是一非。第二家說法佛一種一向本有。是亦不然。如《勝鬘》說「過恒沙法，隱時名藏、顯為法身。」是則法身彰名在顯，那得本有？又法佛因即是佛性，涅槃經言「眾生佛性，不名為佛。」云何而言法佛本有？此是兩非。第三家說三佛在果因中定無。是亦不然。若言法佛一向本無，如《維摩》說「一切眾生即菩提相、即涅槃相。」《涅槃》亦云「大般涅槃本自有之，非適今也。」菩提涅槃，法佛別稱。菩提涅槃既得本有，法佛云何一向本無？又如經說「眾生身中具如來智如來眼等。」何所乏少不名法佛？若言報應一向本無，是亦不然。如《涅槃》說「若有人問：是菓子中有樹無耶？應正答言：亦有亦無。從子生樹故得名有，即未有樹故得言無。」乳酪等譬，類亦同然。所說如是，若有人問：眾生身中有佛無邪？應正答言：亦有亦無。從此生彼故得言有，即未有佛故得名無。有無合說名為中道，云何而言一向定無？此是三非。辨非如是。次顯正義。三佛之義在果圓備，聖時分有，凡時不定。若論法佛亦有無。是義云何？分別有三：第一約緣就實分別。約緣論實，實為緣隱，而後顯時，淨德為本，但名佛性不得名佛。故經說言「眾生佛性不名為佛。」就實論實，實外無緣，無緣覆真，更何所待而不名佛？故經說言「一切眾生即菩提相、即涅槃相，佛亦如之。」二約一人始終分別。據始論之，實為情隱，在隱未了不得名佛；至佛返望，從來無情，由來是佛。故經說言「凡夫成佛前，菩提為煩惱性。聖若成佛時，煩惱是菩提。」又經亦言「佛知眾生即菩提相，不復更滅。」不更滅故，本是涅槃，佛亦如之。三約凡佛二人分別。凡佛相異，真體不殊，莫不皆以如來藏性佛之為體。據凡論體，體為惑隱，而後顯時，淨德為本，故但名性不得名佛。就佛以望，凡夫之體由來常淨本來是佛。故《涅槃》云「有苦有諦有實，乃至有道有諦有實。」是實諦者，即是如來虛空佛性。約法論真，真名實諦。據凡論之，實為情隱說為佛性。就佛而辨，實本常淨，故苦等實即是如來。據實論實，實體離相，即名虛空。其義既然，定有定無理然須捨。報應兩佛，有無不定。真義體上從本已來，有可從緣出生之義，名之為有。如有乳酪說言有蘇，有胡麻者說言有油。即未有體，說之為無。義既如是，若言定有是則執著，若言定無即是妄語，有無合說得名中道。約時如是。

Next, the third gate distinguishes [the three Buddha-bodies] according to time. There are three distinctions of time: First is the time of the ordinary being, prior to the wholesome destinies. Second is the time of the noble one, from the disposition (gotra) upward; alternatively, prior to the stages is collectively called the time of the ordinary being, and from the first bhūmi upward is called the time of the noble one. Third is the time of fruition, situated at the final limit. In terms of these three times, the three Buddhas are distinguished. Within the primary explanation, first different views are recounted, next their flaws and errors are distinguished, and finally the orthodox doctrine is revealed. What are the different views? Some people declare: The substances of the three Buddhas are all fundamentally existent. Why is this? The three Buddhas are all distinguished in terms of reality. When discussed in terms of the real Buddha, originally there are no causes. Since causes fundamentally do not exist, how could one depend on an opposite such that the three Buddhas are made to reside solely in the time of fruition? To propose that they reside in fruition is merely what is perceived by mundane, ordinary sentiment, not the correct principle. Moreover, as the sūtra says: 'Within the tathāgatagarbha all dharmas are fully present.' Thus one clearly knows that the three Buddhas are all fundamentally existent. This is the first thesis. Some people also say: The two Buddhas of retribution and response are produced by generative causes (janaka-hetu) and reside solely in the time of fruition; the substance of the Dharma Buddha is not produced by generative causes, but is categorically fundamentally existent. This is the second thesis. Some people also say: The three Buddhas are fruitions and reside solely in the time of fruition; even if they were present in the cause, they could only be called nature and cannot be called Buddha. This is the third thesis. Such are the different views. Next, their flaws and errors are distinguished. The first asserts that the three Buddhas are all fundamentally existent. This meaning is incorrect. If one says that in terms of reality there is originally no cause, wanting to make the three Buddhas all fundamentally existent—if there is originally no cause, in recompense for what could it be called 'retribution' (vipāka)? Now if, in terms of reality, there are originally no causes and also no sentient beings, in accordance with what could it be called 'response' (nirmāṇa/saṃbhogakāya)? This statement ruins the text; what need is there for many refutations? If one says that because the sūtra states that the tathāgatagarbha is replete with all dharmas, the three are fundamentally existent, this statement is also wrong. As Śrīmālā says: 'Dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges, when concealed, are called the garbha, and when revealed, are the dharmakāya.' Thus, it is in reference to the dharmas of that dharmakāya that it is said to be replete with everything; how could this include retribution and response? If the three Buddhas were all fundamentally existent, then all three Buddhas would be revealed by elucidating causes (vyañjaka-hetu) and not produced by generative causes (janaka-hetu), as stated in the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā: 'The merit of upholding the sūtra is, in relation to reality, called an elucidating cause, and is also a generative cause for the rest.' That commentary itself explains: 'In relation to reality, it is an elucidating cause with respect to the Dharma Buddha; as a generative cause for the rest, it is with respect to retribution and response.' Since it speaks of a generative cause with respect to retribution and response, how could they be fundamentally existent? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'If one says that bodhi is fundamentally existent, one commits a pārājika and slanders the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha.' Bodhi is still precisely the two Buddhas of retribution and response; how could they be fundamentally existent? Moreover, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] extensively refutes fundamental existence in terms of the analogies of milk and curds, tree seeds, and so forth. If the two Buddhas of retribution and response were fundamentally existent, what would that sūtra be refuting? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: '"Fundamentally existent, now non-existent; fundamentally non-existent, now existent"—that dharmas exist across the three times is impossible.' If the two Buddhas of retribution and response were fundamentally existent, how could one say 'fundamentally existent, now non-existent; fundamentally non-existent, now existent'? If that dharmas exist across the three times were possible, then how could it say that it is impossible? The meaning of this verse is fully explained in that sūtra and must not be interpreted otherwise. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] speaks of four kinds of nature: There is a Buddha-nature which icchantikas have and those with wholesome roots lack—namely, icchantikas have the nature of unwholesomeness. There is a Buddha-nature which those with wholesome roots have and icchantikas lack—namely, those with wholesome roots have the nature of wholesome roots. There is a Buddha-nature which both have—both have the nature of the principle. There is a Buddha-nature which both lack—they lack a certain nature of fruition. If the two Buddhas of retribution and response were fundamentally existent, how could it be said that both lack it? That both lack it is spoken by the sūtra, which is difficult to negate. Since the three Buddhas are fundamentally existent [in that view], why would there be any need to establish anything further? That retribution and response are fundamentally existent is a great fault in the Buddha's Dharma; one should quickly abandon it, and it should not be forcibly maintained. This is the first error. The second proponent says that the Dharma Buddha alone is categorically fundamentally existent. This is also incorrect. As Śrīmālā says: 'Dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges, when concealed, are called the garbha; when revealed, they are the dharmakāya.' Thus the dharmakāya takes its name from being revealed; how could it be fundamentally existent? Moreover, the cause of the Dharma Buddha is precisely Buddha-nature, and the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The Buddha-nature of sentient beings is not called Buddha.' How then can one say that the Dharma Buddha is fundamentally existent? This is the second error. The third proponent says that the three Buddhas reside in fruition and are definitely non-existent in the cause. This is also incorrect. If one says that the Dharma Buddha is categorically fundamentally non-existent, as Vimalakīrti says: 'All sentient beings are precisely the characteristic of bodhi, precisely the characteristic of nirvāṇa.' The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] also says: 'Great parinirvāṇa fundamentally exists of itself; it is not just now [arisen].' Bodhi and nirvāṇa are alternative names for the Dharma Buddha. Since bodhi and nirvāṇa can be fundamentally existent, how could the Dharma Buddha be categorically fundamentally non-existent? Furthermore, as the sūtra says: 'Within the bodies of sentient beings, the Tathāgata's wisdom, the Tathāgata's eye, and so forth are fully present.' What does it lack that it should not be called the Dharma Buddha? If one says that retribution and response are categorically fundamentally non-existent, this is also incorrect. As the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'If someone asks: "Is there a tree within this fruit seed or not?" one should properly answer: "It is both existent and non-existent. Because a tree is produced from the seed, it can be called existent; yet because there is not yet a tree, it can be called non-existent."' The analogies of milk and curds and so on are likewise the same. As it is thus stated, if someone asks: 'Is there a Buddha within the bodies of sentient beings or not?' one should properly answer: 'It is both existent and non-existent. Because the latter is produced from the former, it can be called existent; yet because there is not yet a Buddha, it can be called non-existent.' Explaining existence and non-existence together is called the Middle Way; how could one say that they are categorically and definitely non-existent? This is the third error. Such is the distinction of errors. Next, the orthodox doctrine is revealed. The meaning of the three Buddhas is completely fulfilled in fruition, partially present at the time of the noble one, and indeterminate at the time of the ordinary being. If one discusses the Dharma Buddha, it is also both existent and non-existent. What is the meaning of this? There are three distinctions: First, distinguishing according to conditions and with reference to reality. Discussing reality according to conditions, reality is concealed by conditions, and when later revealed, pure virtue is the basis, so it is merely called Buddha-nature and cannot be called Buddha. Therefore, the sūtra says: 'The Buddha-nature of sentient beings is not called Buddha.' Discussing reality with reference to reality, outside of reality there are no conditions; with no conditions covering the real, what else is there to wait for that it should not be called Buddha? Therefore, the sūtra says: 'All sentient beings are precisely the characteristic of bodhi, precisely the characteristic of nirvāṇa, and so too is the Buddha.' Second, distinguishing according to the beginning and end of a single person. Discussing it from the beginning, reality is concealed by ordinary sentiment; while concealed and unrevealed, it cannot be called Buddha. When one reaches Buddhahood and looks back, from the very beginning there has never been ordinary sentiment, and it has all along been Buddha. Therefore, the sūtra says: 'Before an ordinary being achieves Buddhahood, bodhi is the nature of defilement. When the noble one achieves Buddhahood, defilement is bodhi.' The sūtra also says: 'The Buddha knows that sentient beings are precisely the characteristic of bodhi and do not undergo further cessation.' Because they do not undergo further cessation, they are fundamentally nirvāṇa, and so too is the Buddha. Third, distinguishing according to the two persons of ordinary being and Buddha. Ordinary being and Buddha differ in characteristics, but their real substance is not distinct; none fail to take the tathāgatagarbha-nature as the substance of the Buddha. Discussing substance from the standpoint of the ordinary being, substance is concealed by delusion, and when later revealed, pure virtue is the basis, so it is merely called nature and cannot be called Buddha. Looking at it from the standpoint of the Buddha, the substance of the ordinary being has all along been constantly pure and fundamentally Buddha. Therefore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'There is suffering, there is truth, there is reality... up to: there is the path, there is truth, there is reality.' That truth of reality is precisely the Tathāgata's empty-space Buddha-nature. Discussing the real in terms of dharmas, the real is called the truth of reality. Discussing it from the standpoint of the ordinary being, reality is concealed by ordinary sentiment and spoken of as Buddha-nature. Distinguishing it from the standpoint of the Buddha, reality is fundamentally ever-pure, so the reality of suffering and so forth is precisely the Tathāgata. Discussing reality with reference to reality, the real substance is free from characteristics, which is precisely called empty space. Since its meaning is such, definite existence and definite non-existence must reasonably be abandoned. The two Buddhas of retribution and response are indeterminate as to existence and non-existence. Upon the substance of the real principle, from the beginning there has been the sense of being able to arise from conditions, which is called existent. Just as when there are milk and curds, one says there is clarified butter; and where there is sesame, one says there is oil. Yet because there is not yet the substance, it is spoken of as non-existent. Since the principle is like this, if one says it is definitely existent, that is attachment; if one says it is definitely non-existent, that is false speech. Explaining existence and non-existence together attains the name Middle Way. Such is the distinction according to time.