大乘義章 19.41

19.41

次第二門辨其體相。先就小說，後就大論。小乘法中，羅漢辟支佛所得四智，有體有相，無學聖慧是其體也。盡無生智是無學慧，正說此慧為四智體。後出觀已，世俗心中自緣向前所得聖慧，生其四智究竟之想。是四智相，彼四智體具足四義而無四緣，彼四智相具足四緣而無四義。云何彼體具足四義而無四緣？無學聖慧一念現前，能斷無始生死因果，說之以為我生已盡不受後有。此智現時，即是道圓證滅已極，說之以為梵行已立所作已辦。是故此體具足四義。雖具此義，無心分別我生已盡、梵行已立、所作已辦、不受後有，是故此體不具四緣，以此聖慧正觀諦理無異緣故。云何彼相具足四緣而無四義？無學聖人出彼理觀，世俗心中自緣向前所得聖慧，生其四智究竟之想，我向得此聖慧之時，我生已盡、梵行已立、所作已辦、不受後有，故有四緣。雖作此緣，世俗之心不能令其我生已盡，乃至不能令不受後，以是義故不具四義。小乘如是。大乘法中如來四智亦有體相。證如實慧，是其體也。世諦心中，緣已所得生究竟相，是其相也。此體與相麁同小乘，但小乘中體相前後，入觀名體、出觀是相；大乘法中體相同時，佛於二諦雙觀現前無出入故。就同時中，真諦之智說以為體、世觀名相，於彼體中亦具四義而無四緣，於彼相中亦具四緣而無四義。云何體中具足四義而無四緣？彼如實慧一念現時，能絕無窮生死因果，說之以為我生已盡不受後有。得此慧時，道行已圓證滅已極，說之以為梵行已立所作已辦，以是義故得具四義。雖具此義，證如之心正與理混，無心分別我生已盡、梵行立等，以是義故而無四緣。云何彼相具足四緣而無四義？諸佛如來於世諦中，自緣已寂所得聖慧，生其四智究竟之想，我生已盡至不受後，故有四緣。然此世心，不能令其我生已盡至不受後，故無四義。體相如是（此二門竟）。

Next, the second gate distinguishes their substance and aspect. First we explain according to the Hīnayāna, and later discuss according to the Mahāyāna. Within Hīnayāna doctrine, the four knowledges attained by arhats and pratyekabuddhas possess both substance and aspect: the untainted noble prajñā is their substance. The knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising are untainted prajñā, and this prajñā is specifically stated to be the substance of the four knowledges. Later, after emerging from contemplation, within the conventional mind one cognizes the previously attained noble prajñā on one's own, generating the conception of finality concerning these four knowledges. This is the aspect of the four knowledges. The substance of those four knowledges is endowed with the four meanings but lacks the four conditions (cognitive objects), whereas the aspect of those four knowledges is endowed with the four conditions (cognitive objects) but lacks the four meanings. How is that substance endowed with the four meanings but lacks the four conditions? When the untainted noble prajñā appears in a single thought-moment, it can sever the causes and effects of beginningless saṃsāra, which is spoken of as 'my births are exhausted' and 'I shall not receive further existence'. When this knowledge manifests, it is the perfection of the path and the consummation of the realization of cessation, which is spoken of as 'the brahma conduct has been established' and 'what was to be done has been accomplished'. Therefore, this substance is endowed with the four meanings. Although it possesses these meanings, it has no mind that conceptually discriminates that 'my births are exhausted', 'the brahma conduct has been established', 'what was to be done has been accomplished', and 'I shall not receive further existence'. Therefore, this substance does not possess the four conditions, because this noble prajñā correctly contemplates the truth principle without diverse conditions. How is that aspect endowed with the four conditions but lacks the four meanings? When the noble person of no-more-learning emerges from that contemplation of the principle, within the conventional mind he takes the previously attained noble prajñā as object on his own, generating the conception of finality concerning these four knowledges: 'When I just attained this noble prajñā, my births were exhausted, the brahma conduct was established, what was to be done was accomplished, and I shall not receive further existence.' Hence there are the four conditions. Although he forms these conditions, the conventional mind cannot cause his births to be exhausted, nor can it cause him not to receive further [existence]; for this reason, it does not possess the four meanings. Such is the Hīnayāna. Within Mahāyāna doctrine, the Tathāgata's four knowledges also possess substance and aspect. The real prajñā that realizes suchness is their substance. Within the mind of conventional truth, taking what has already been attained as object to generate the aspect of finality is their aspect. This substance and aspect are broadly similar to the Hīnayāna; however, in the Hīnayāna, substance and aspect are sequential—entering contemplation is called the substance, and emerging from contemplation is the aspect. In Mahāyāna doctrine, substance and aspect are simultaneous, because for a Buddha, the dual contemplation of the two truths is present together without entering and emerging. Within this simultaneity, the knowledge of the ultimate truth is spoken of as the substance, and the conventional contemplation is called the aspect. Within that substance, the four meanings are also complete while lacking the four conditions, and within that aspect, the four conditions are also complete while lacking the four meanings. How is it that the substance is endowed with the four meanings but lacks the four conditions? When that prajñā of reality appears in a single thought-moment, it can cut off the causes and effects of endless saṃsāra, which is spoken of as 'my births are exhausted' and 'I shall not receive further existence'. When this prajñā is attained, the practice of the path has been perfected and the realization of cessation has been consummated, which is spoken of as 'the brahma conduct has been established' and 'what was to be done has been accomplished'. For this reason, it is endowed with the four meanings. Although it possesses these meanings, the mind realizing suchness is directly fused with the principle and has no mind that discriminates that 'my births are exhausted', 'the brahma conduct has been established', and so forth; for this reason, it lacks the four conditions. How is that aspect endowed with the four conditions but lacks the four meanings? The Buddhas, Tathāgatas, within conventional truth, take the noble prajñā attained upon their own quiescence as object, generating the conception of finality concerning these four knowledges: from 'my births are exhausted' up to 'not receiving further [existence]'. Hence there are the four conditions. However, this conventional mind cannot cause their births to be exhausted up to not receiving further [existence]; hence it lacks the four meanings. Such are the substance and aspect. (This completes the two gates.)