大乘義章 19.42

19.42

次第三門約對盡智及無生智而為分別。於中先辨盡無生智，後約四智而為分別。盡無生智，經論不同。依如《毘曇》，現斷一切生死因果，悉名盡智。此之盡智，利鈍俱得，一切無學無不現在，有所斷故。無生智者，於前所斷生死因果，決定自能永更不起，名無生智。此無生智，唯利人得，鈍人不得。彼說鈍人有退轉義，隨其所斷，容便更起，以是義故無無生智；利人不退，隨其所斷，永更不起，以是義故有無生智。其義如是。體相云何？鈍根之人，無學心起多念相續，悉名盡智。利根之人，無學心起初念名盡，第二念後即名無生。然盡智正緣諦理，能有所盡，故名盡智，非緣其盡。無生亦爾，正緣諦理，能令所斷後更不起，故名無生，非緣無生。問曰：此二緣於何諦？《毘婆沙》中說有種種。一家說云：唯緣苦諦。何故而然？初入聖時先緣苦諦，故後出時還緣於苦。如人服藥，初入之者最後出之。一家宣說：攝於集諦。何故如是？初入聖時先緣於果，後出聖時須緣其因，故緣集諦。一家宣說：苦集不定。一家宣說：四諦不定。《毘曇》如是。若依《成實》，一切無學都無退理，不可約就利鈍別之。但知斷除生死之因，名為盡智。斷生死果，永更不受，名無生智。大乘亦爾，佛無退故。盡無生智，相別麁爾。次約四智而分別之。若依《成實》，宣說四中我生已盡以為盡智，不受後有為無生智。大乘亦爾。亦可大中，說我生盡為無生智，《勝鬘》說為斷苦智故。說不受後以為盡智，《勝鬘》說為斷集智故。若依《毘曇》，盡智之中別具四智，無生亦爾。若齊是四，云何得分盡無生別？如龍樹說「宣示自證，我生已盡、梵行已立、所作已辦、不受後有，是其盡智。利根之人，於前所得起決定意，我生已盡永更不生，梵行已立不須更修，所作已辦永更不作，不受後有永更不受。生起如是等決定之意，名無生智。」四智如是。

Next, the third gate distinguishes them in relation to the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising. Therein, we first distinguish the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising, and afterwards distinguish them in relation to the four knowledges. Regarding the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising, the sūtras and treatises differ. According to the Abhidharma, the present severing of all causes and effects of saṃsāra is entirely called the knowledge of exhaustion. This knowledge of exhaustion is attained by both the sharp and the dull; among all those of no-more-learning, none fail to manifest it, because there is something severed. The knowledge of non-arising means that with respect to the causes and effects of saṃsāra severed previously, one is definitively and naturally able to ensure that they will never arise again; this is called the knowledge of non-arising. This knowledge of non-arising is attained only by those of sharp faculties, not by those of dull faculties. That [system] states that those of dull faculties have the sense of retrogressing: in accord with what they have severed, it is possible for it to arise again; for this reason, they do not possess the knowledge of non-arising. Those of sharp faculties do not retrogress: in accord with what they have severed, it will never arise again; for this reason, they possess the knowledge of non-arising. Such is its meaning. What are their substance and aspect? When the mind of no-more-learning arises in a person of dull faculties, continuing over multiple thought-moments, it is entirely called the knowledge of exhaustion. When the mind of no-more-learning arises in a person of sharp faculties, the first thought-moment is called exhaustion, and from the second thought-moment onward it is called non-arising. However, the knowledge of exhaustion directly takes the truth principle as its cognitive object and can exhaust something; hence it is called the knowledge of exhaustion, not that it takes its exhaustion as the cognitive object. Non-arising is also like this: it directly takes the truth principle as its cognitive object and can cause what has been severed not to arise again afterwards; hence it is called non-arising, not that it takes non-arising as its cognitive object. Question: Which of the truths do these two take as their cognitive object? Diverse explanations are stated in the Mahāvibhāṣā. One school says: They take only the truth of suffering as their cognitive object. Why is this so? When first entering nobility, one initially takes the truth of suffering as one's cognitive object; therefore, when finally emerging, one again takes suffering as one's cognitive object. It is like a person taking medicine: what enters first comes out last. One school proclaims: They are subsumed under the truth of origin. Why is this so? When first entering nobility, one initially takes the fruit as one's cognitive object; later, when emerging into nobility, one must take its cause as cognitive object; hence they take the truth of origin as their cognitive object. One school proclaims: Whether it is suffering or origin is indeterminate. One school proclaims: All four truths are indeterminate. Such is the Abhidharma. If one relies on the Tattvasiddhi, all those of no-more-learning have no principle of retrogressing at all, and one cannot differentiate them according to sharp and dull faculties. Simply knowing the eradication of the causes of saṃsāra is called the knowledge of exhaustion; severing the fruits of saṃsāra so that they are never received again is called the knowledge of non-arising. The Mahāyāna is also like this, because a Buddha does not retrogress. The distinctions between the aspects of the knowledges of exhaustion and non-arising are roughly like this. Next, we distinguish them in relation to the four knowledges. If one relies on the Tattvasiddhi, it proclaims that among the four, 'my births are exhausted' is taken as the knowledge of exhaustion, and 'I shall not receive further existence' is taken as the knowledge of non-arising. The Mahāyāna is also like this. Alternatively, in the Mahāyāna, 'my births are exhausted' may be spoken of as the knowledge of non-arising, because the Śrīmālā-sūtra explains it as the knowledge of severing suffering; and 'not receiving further [existence]' may be taken as the knowledge of exhaustion, because the Śrīmālā-sūtra explains it as the knowledge of severing origin. If one relies on the Abhidharma, within the knowledge of exhaustion the four knowledges are individually complete, and non-arising is also like this. If both equally comprise these four, how can the distinction between exhaustion and non-arising be differentiated? As Nāgārjuna says: 'Proclaiming and indicating one's own realization—"my births are exhausted, the brahma conduct has been established, what was to be done has been accomplished, and I shall not receive further existence"—is the knowledge of exhaustion. A person of sharp faculties gives rise to a definitive resolve regarding what was previously attained: "my births are exhausted and will never arise again; the brahma conduct has been established and need not be cultivated again; what was to be done has been accomplished and will never be done again; I shall not receive further existence and will never receive it again." Giving rise to such definitive resolves is called the knowledge of non-arising.' Such are the four knowledges.