大乘義章 3.86

3.86

第十門中對治邪執顯示正義。先就事識對治邪執，次就妄識，後就真識。就事識中，邪執有八：一執定一。有人宣說：六識之心隨根雖別，體性是一，往來彼此。如一猨猴，六窓俱現，非有六猴。心識如是，六根中現，非有六心。對此邪執，說心非一，識無別體，緣知為義。六識之心所依根異，所緣亦異，云何定一？若定是一，常了一塵無有轉異。又復心法無往來義，隨有知處即彼處生，不得說言一而往來。又彼所引猨猴為喻證心一者，是義不然。凡夫愚人謂猴定一，六窓中現，然實猨猴念念生滅，此窓現者不至彼窓。心識如是，依眼生者不至餘根，如是一切皆爾。二執定異。有人宣說：六識之心，體性定異。對此邪執，說心不別，於事分齊。相續一慮，非全別體。如一猨遊泆六窓，非有六猴。若言六識各別有體，別體之法不相干預，眼識還應從眼識生，乃至意識還從意生，不得相起。現見五識從意識生，意識從於五識而生，明非別體。又若六識各別有體，有體之法不相妨礙，不相妨故六識之心常應並有，若常並有常應並用。不常並故，明非別體。三執定常。有人聞說三世之中業果不斷，謂心定常。生死往來常是一識，用雖興廢，心體不變。對治此執，說識無常，人中心異，天中亦異，六道之心各各別異，云何是常？又如經說「苦相應異，樂相應異，不苦不樂相應亦異。」如是一切各各別異，云何是常？但諸凡夫不知心相，妄謂是常，猶如小兒見旋火輪謂不斷絕。若心常者，善應常善、惡應恒惡，無有變異；以變異故，定知無常。四執定斷。有人聞說心識無常，便謂定斷。對治此執，說心不斷。現世造業，後必得果，云何定斷？譬如乳酪轉變雖異，置毒乳中酪則殺人。心亦如是，造惡於中，必受苦報，明非是斷。五執定有。如《毘曇》說「十八界等，各住己性，是有不空。設言空者，但空陰上橫計我人，不空法體。法不空故，心識定有。」對此邪執，說識是空。空相云何？識者正以別知為義。如一念識則具四相，初生、次住、終異、後滅。於此四中，何者是知？為初相知？為中為後？若初相知，餘應不知；餘若不知，則不名識。若餘相知，初應不知；初若不知，初不名識。若言四相各別是知，便是四念各別知法，何關一念具足四相？若言四相別非是知，和合之中方有知者，非知共合，云何有知？如百盲聚，豈有所見？又復四相都無合理。云何無合理？生相現時，餘相未有，與誰共合？乃至第四滅現之時，餘相已謝，復與誰合？進退推求都無合義，云何說言和合有知？知義既然，焉有定識？是故經中說色乃至受想行識一切皆空。六執定無。有人聞說五陰空寂，便謂世諦因緣亦無。對治此執，說識非無。若無心識，云何而得見聞覺知？現見六識各具作用，明知不無。又若無識則無善惡，若無善惡亦無苦樂，則入邪見斷善根中，不宜受之。經言空者，就真為論，於世諦中不無心識。七執心識獨立無數。如《我實》說。對治此執，說有同時心心數法。故《涅槃》云「諸弟子不解我意，唱言：『佛說定無心數。』」又《涅槃》說十大地中心數之定，明非無數。又龍樹云「譬如池水，珠在則清，象入便濁。水喻心王，珠象喻數。」於彼喻中，不可說言水珠象一。心法如是，寧無別數？八執心外定有別數，如《毘曇》說。對治此執，明非定別。故《涅槃》云「我諸弟子不解我意，唱言：『佛說定有心數。』」若使心外定有別數，無預心事。無心之時，何不別起？又若心外定有別數，識從意生，諸數亦應別有所依。若別有依，是義不然。云何不然？於彼宗中說三性心相應各異，如欲界地善心起時，二十二數相應共生。不善起時，二十二數相應共生。無記時，有十二數相應共生。從無記心起善之時，十二同數，可有所依；自餘別數，除意何依？若無依生，是則心法無次第緣，經論不許。若無別依，依意生者，與識同依，明非心外道理。云何？即彼心體同時，具有受想行等諸義差別，不同《成實》前後建立。就一心體隨義別分，不同《毘曇》異體建立。兩義兼通，故非諍論（此一門竟）。

In the tenth section, counteracting erroneous attachments and revealing the correct meaning. First, counteracting erroneous attachments in terms of phenomenal consciousness; next, in terms of deluded consciousness; and lastly, in terms of true consciousness. Within phenomenal consciousness, there are eight erroneous attachments: First, grasping at being definitely one. Some people proclaim: "Although the minds of the six consciousnesses differ according to the sense-faculties, their essential nature is one, passing back and forth between this and that. It is like a single monkey appearing simultaneously at six windows; there are not six monkeys. The mind-consciousness is like this: it appears within the six sense-faculties, but there are not six minds." Counteracting this erroneous attachment, we say that the mind is not one. Consciousness has no separate substance; its meaning is conditioned knowing. The sense-faculties upon which the minds of the six consciousnesses rely are distinct, and their cognitive objects are also distinct; how could they be definitely one? If it were definitely one, it would constantly cognize a single dust-mote without changing. Moreover, mental phenomena have no meaning of passing back and forth; wherever there is cognition, it arises in that very place, and one cannot say that it is one yet passes back and forth. Furthermore, as for their citing the monkey as an analogy to prove that the mind is one, that meaning is not so. Ignorant worldlings claim that the monkey is definitely one and appears in the six windows; yet in truth, the monkey arises and ceases moment by moment, and that which appears at this window does not reach that window. Mind-consciousness is like this: that which arises relying on the eye does not reach the other sense-faculties; all are entirely like this. Second, grasping at being definitely distinct. Some people proclaim: "The minds of the six consciousnesses are definitely distinct in their essential nature." Counteracting this erroneous attachment, we say that the mind is not distinct. Regarding the demarcation of phenomena, they form a single continuous consideration and are not entirely distinct substances. It is like a single monkey roaming freely among six windows; there are not six monkeys. If one were to say that the six consciousnesses each have a separate substance, then things of separate substance would not concern one another: eye-consciousness would have to arise again from eye-consciousness, and so on up to mind-consciousness having to arise again from mind, without being able to give rise to one another. We presently see that the five consciousnesses arise from the mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness arises from the five consciousnesses; this clearly shows that they are not separate substances. Moreover, if the six consciousnesses each had a separate substance, things having substance would not obstruct one another. Because they would not obstruct one another, the minds of the six consciousnesses should constantly coexist; and if they constantly coexisted, they should constantly function together. Because they do not constantly coexist, this clearly shows that they are not separate substances. Third, grasping at being definitely permanent. Some people, hearing that karma and its fruit are uninterrupted throughout the three periods of time, claim that the mind is definitely permanent: passing back and forth through birth and death, it is constantly a single consciousness; though functions may wax and wane, the mind's substance does not change. Counteracting this attachment, we say that consciousness is impermanent. The mind among humans is distinct, that among devas is also distinct, and the minds in the six destinies are each distinct; how could it be permanent? Furthermore, as a sūtra says: "That associated with suffering is distinct, that associated with pleasure is distinct, and that associated with neither-suffering-nor-pleasure is also distinct." Since all such things are each distinct, how could it be permanent? It is merely that worldlings do not know the characteristics of the mind and falsely claim it to be permanent, just as a small child seeing a whirled firebrand claims it is unbroken. If the mind were permanent, the good would always be good, and the evil would constantly be evil, without any alteration; because there is alteration, we definitely know it is impermanent. Fourth, grasping at being definitely annihilated. Some people, hearing that mind-consciousness is impermanent, then claim it is definitely annihilated. Counteracting this attachment, we say that the mind is not annihilated. Having created karma in the present life, one will certainly obtain the fruit later; how could it be definitely annihilated? For example, although the transformation of milk into curds is distinct, if one places poison in the milk, the curds will kill a person. The mind is also like this: if one creates evil within it, one will certainly receive a painful retribution; this clearly shows it is not annihilated. Fifth, grasping at being definitely existent. As the Abhidharma says: "The eighteen realms and so forth each abide in their own nature; they are existent and not empty. Even if one speaks of emptiness, it is only that the 'I' and person falsely conceptualized upon the aggregates are empty, not that the substance of dharmas is empty. Because dharmas are not empty, mind-consciousness is definitely existent." Counteracting this erroneous attachment, we say that consciousness is empty. What is the characteristic of emptiness? Consciousness precisely takes distinct cognition as its meaning. A single thought-moment of consciousness possesses the four characteristics: first arising, then abiding, followed by change, and lastly ceasing. Among these four, which one is the cognition? Is the initial characteristic cognition? Is it the middle, or the last? If the initial characteristic is cognition, the others should not be cognition; if the others are not cognition, they would not be called consciousness. If the other characteristics are cognition, the initial one should not be cognition; if the initial one is not cognition, the initial one would not be called consciousness. If one says that each of the four characteristics is separately cognition, then there would be four thought-moments separately cognizing dharmas; how would that pertain to a single thought-moment possessing all four characteristics? If one says that the four characteristics individually are not cognition, but that there is cognition only within their combination: when non-cognitions are combined together, how could there be cognition? Just as when a hundred blind people gather together, how could there be any sight? Furthermore, there is no principle of combination among the four characteristics whatsoever. Why is there no principle of combination? When the characteristic of arising appears, the other characteristics do not yet exist; with what could it combine? And so on up to: when the fourth, ceasing, appears, the other characteristics have already passed away; with what could it combine again? Examining forwards and backwards, there is no meaning of combination at all; how can one say that there is cognition in combination? The meaning of cognition being like this, how could there be a definite consciousness? Therefore, the sūtra states that form, and so on up to feeling, conception, formations, and consciousness, are all empty. Sixth, grasping at being definitely non-existent. Some people, hearing that the five aggregates are empty and quiescent, then claim that conventional causes and conditions are also non-existent. Counteracting this attachment, we say that consciousness is not non-existent. If there were no mind-consciousness, how could there be seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing? We presently see that the six consciousnesses each possess functions; this clearly shows it is not non-existent. Furthermore, if there were no consciousness, there would be no good or evil; if there were no good or evil, there would also be no suffering or pleasure, and one would fall into erroneous views that cut off the roots of goodness—one should not accept this. When sūtras speak of emptiness, it is discussed in terms of the true; within conventional truth, mind-consciousness is not absent. Seventh, grasping that mind-consciousness stands alone without mental factors. As the Tattvasiddhi says. Counteracting this attachment, we say that there are simultaneous mind and mental factors. Therefore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "The disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: 'The Buddha said that there are definitely no mental factors.'" Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] explains the concentration among the mental factors of the ten universal mental grounds, which clearly shows that it is not without factors. Moreover, Nāgārjuna said: "For example, as with pond water: when a gem is present, it is clear; when an elephant enters, it becomes turbid. The water illustrates the mind-king; the gem and elephant illustrate mental factors." In that analogy, one cannot say that the water, gem, and elephant are one. Mental phenomena being like this, how could there be no separate factors? Eighth, grasping that definitely separate factors exist outside the mind, as the Abhidharma says. Counteracting this attachment, we clarify that they are not definitely separate. Therefore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: 'The Buddha said that there definitely are mental factors.'" If there were definitely separate factors outside the mind, with no connection to mental matters: when there is no mind, why do they not arise separately? Furthermore, if there were definitely separate factors outside the mind, then since consciousness arises from the mind [faculty], the factors should also have a separate basis to rely on. If they had a separate basis, that meaning would not be so. Why would it not be so? In that school, it is said that the associations of minds of the three natures are each distinct: for instance, when a good mind arises in the desire realm, twenty-two factors arise together in association; when an unwholesome [mind] arises, twenty-two factors arise together in association; and when an indeterminate [mind arises], twelve factors arise together in association. When a good [mind] arises from an indeterminate mind, for the twelve shared factors there may be a basis to rely on; but for the remaining distinct factors, other than the mind, what would they rely on? If they arose without a basis, then mental phenomena would lack the immediately antecedent condition, which is not permitted by sūtras and treatises. If they have no separate basis and arise relying on the mind [faculty], then they share the same basis with consciousness, which clearly shows that theoretically they are not external to the mind. How so? It is that this very substance of the mind simultaneously possesses all the distinct meanings of feeling, conception, formations, and so forth; it is not established as sequential as in the Tattvasiddhi. In terms of the single substance of the mind, it is distinguished according to meanings; it is not established as distinct substances as in the Abhidharma. Both meanings are accommodated, and therefore it is not a matter for dispute (this one section ends).