大乘義章 3.87

3.87

次就妄識對治邪執。邪執有六：一執定無。有人聞說但有六識無第七情，便言一向無第七識。對治此執，說有七識。如《楞伽》中說八識義，《勝鬘》亦云「七法不住」。若無妄識，說何為八？說何為七？又六識外無妄識者，聲聞緣覺入涅槃時事識都滅，即應是佛，無別明妄識心故。入涅槃時，雖滅事識，癡妄猶在。所有癡妄識，何得言無？經中所言無七情者，事識之中無第七情，非無妄識。二執定有。有人聞說有第七識，便謂七識別有體性。對此邪執，明妄無體。當知如來就心法中，分取虛妄分別之義為第七識，何得於中別立體性？如似世人見繩為蛇，繩是實事喻彼真識，蛇是妄情喻彼妄識。蛇依繩有，蛇無別體。妄依真立，云何有體？迷夢等喻，類亦同然。又經中說「若無真識，七法不住。」若自有體，云何不住？又若妄識自有體性，便是實有，何得言妄？三執事識以為妄識。有人聞說真識名心、妄識名意、事名意識，便言小乘七心界中意根界者是第七識。對治此執，宣說妄識不同事識。七心界中意根界者即是六識，生從義邊說為意根，更無別法。妄識與彼分齊條異，云何言一？異相如何？如馬鳴說，妄識有六，始從無明乃至相續，廣如上辨。事識有四，從執取相乃至第四業繫苦相，亦如上辨。分齊各異，何得說言意根界者是第七識？又《楞伽》云「第七妄識，唯佛如來、住地菩薩所能覺知，餘皆不覺。」云何說言意根界者是第七識？又若妄識是七心界，聲聞緣覺入涅槃時滅七心界，妄識應滅；若滅妄識，即應是佛。入涅槃時滅七心界，妄識猶在，未得同佛，明知全別。問曰：妄識若非意根，何故《楞伽》馬鳴論說為意乎？釋言：彼乃借名顯示，非即意根。如《楞伽》中說第七識以之為心，馬鳴論中宣說真識以之為心，豈可名同便是一物？心名雖同，真妄兩別；意名雖一，何妨差別。四執麁為細。有人宣說：眼見色時不知色空，即是七識迷惑之心，餘亦如是。若解色空，即是七識明解之心，餘亦如是。對治此執，須顯其異。言見色時不知空者，是六識中取性無明，非第七識。此之取性，猶是向前事識之中初執取相。問曰：若此是六識中無明心者，與七識中無明何別？此如上辨，以於心外事相法中執性迷空，故非妄識。又於心外事相法中解知無性，是事識中分別之解，非七識知。五執不滅。有人宣說：七識之心未見理時生滅無常，見理即常，究竟不滅。對治此執，說妄終滅。七識妄心，體唯癡闇、相唯分別。得聖會如捨其分別，見實明照盡其癡闇，更有何在而言不滅？道理如是，須以文證。如《楞伽》說「滅七種識，名出佛身血。」云何不滅？又彼經言「妄想爾涅槃識，此滅我涅槃。」明知妄滅。又《唯識》「諸佛如來所行之處，唯有藏識更無餘識。」云何不滅？又《大智論》解釋如義，彼云「實相如水性冷，觀智如大水隨火熱，若火滅已，水冷如本，故名為如。如是實相，隨觀轉變。是觀滅已，實相如本，故名為如。」明知妄解終竟滅盡。若觀不滅，水冷之時火應不滅。有人說言：經中說滅，但滅智中無明闇障，不滅智體。是義不然，《寶性論》中自有誠文，不但滅闇亦滅智解。故彼論中說「有四障不得如來淨我樂常：一者緣相，謂無明地障佛真淨，斷離彼故得佛真淨。二者因相，謂無漏業障佛真我，斷除彼故得佛真我。三者生相，謂意生身障佛真樂，斷除彼故得佛真樂。四者壞相，謂變易死障佛真常，斷除彼故得佛真常。」無明等外，別說無漏以之為障，別說斷除。云何而言不滅無漏？人言：智體不滅盡者，不滅之體即是真心，非第七識。問曰：若使七識滅者，誰得菩提？誰證涅槃？釋言：心相雖滅盡，心性猶在，心性在者即是真識，是故就之說得證。六執定滅。有人聞說妄心終滅，便言定滅無熏習義。何故如是？於真識中具過恒沙淨法滿足，更無所少，何用妄熏？對治此執，說妄有熏，如《起信論》說妄熏真。云何不熏？若言真中淨法滿足不假熏者，法佛之性本有，法體可言滿足。報佛之性本來但有可生之義，未有法體，如子無樹，何得稱滿？報佛本無，假修方有，何為不熏？熏力在真，故非定滅。問曰：真妄其性各別，云何相熏？此如上辨，一切所修真妄共起，攝修從妄悉是妄為，攝修從真皆是真作。真雖能作，作必隨妄；妄雖能為，為必依真。由真妄作，名真熏妄；由妄真作，名妄熏真。妄識之中，對治如是（此二門竟）。

Next, countering wrong attachments regarding the deluded consciousness. There are six wrong attachments: First, holding that it definitely does not exist. Some people, hearing it said that there are only six consciousnesses and no seventh feeling, thereupon claim that there is absolutely no seventh consciousness. To counter this attachment, it is explained that there is a seventh consciousness. For example, the meaning of the eight consciousnesses is taught in the Laṅkāvatāra, and the Śrīmālā also says that 'the seven dharmas do not abide.' If there were no deluded consciousness, what would be spoken of as eight? What would be spoken of as seven? Furthermore, if outside the six consciousnesses there were no deluded consciousness, then when śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas enter nirvāṇa and their phenomenal consciousnesses are entirely extinguished, they would immediately be Buddhas, because there would be no distinct, clear deluded-consciousness mind. When they enter nirvāṇa, although the phenomenal consciousness is extinguished, ignorance and delusion still remain. Given that there is an ignorant and deluded consciousness, how can it be said not to exist? What the sūtras say regarding there being no seventh feeling means that within phenomenal consciousness there is no seventh feeling, not that there is no deluded consciousness. Second, holding that it definitely exists. Some people, hearing it said that there is a seventh consciousness, then suppose that the seventh consciousness has an independent substance and nature of its own. To counter this wrong attachment, it is clarified that delusion has no substance. One should understand that when the Tathāgata deals with mental dharmas, he singles out the sense of false conceptualization as the seventh consciousness; how could one establish an independent substance and nature within it? It is like people in the world seeing a rope and taking it to be a snake. The rope is an actual object, illustrating the true consciousness; the snake is a false notion, illustrating the deluded consciousness. The snake exists dependent on the rope; the snake has no separate substance. Delusion is established dependent on the true; how could it have a substance? Analogies such as delusion and dreams are also of the same kind. Furthermore, a sūtra says: 'If there were no true consciousness, the seven dharmas would not abide.' If it had its own substance, why would they not abide? Moreover, if the deluded consciousness had its own substance and nature, it would be truly existent; how could it be called deluded? Third, holding phenomenal consciousness to be deluded consciousness. Some people, hearing it said that the true consciousness is called 'mind' (citta), the deluded consciousness is called 'intellect' (manas), and the phenomenal is called 'mental consciousness' (manovijñāna), then claim that the intellect-faculty realm (manendriya-dhātu) among the seven mind-realms of the Hīnayāna is the seventh consciousness. To counter this attachment, it is declared that the deluded consciousness is not identical to the phenomenal consciousness. The intellect-faculty realm among the seven mind-realms is precisely the six consciousnesses; in terms of the meaning of generation, it is called the intellect-faculty, and there is no separate dharma besides them. The deluded consciousness and that [faculty] have entirely different scopes and characteristics; how can they be called one? What are these differences in characteristic? As Aśvaghoṣa said, there are six kinds of deluded consciousness, beginning with ignorance down through continuity, as explained in detail above. There are four kinds of phenomenal consciousness, from the characteristic of grasping down to the fourth, the characteristic of suffering bound by karma, also as explained above. Their scopes and characteristics are each different; how can one say that the intellect-faculty realm is the seventh consciousness? Furthermore, the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'The seventh, deluded consciousness can be awakened to and known only by the Buddha, the Tathāgata, and bodhisattvas residing on the bhūmis; none of the rest are aware of it.' How can one say that the intellect-faculty realm is the seventh consciousness? Moreover, if the deluded consciousness were the seven mind-realms, then when śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas enter nirvāṇa and extinguish the seven mind-realms, the deluded consciousness should also be extinguished; and if the deluded consciousness were extinguished, they would immediately be Buddhas. But when they enter nirvāṇa and extinguish the seven mind-realms, the deluded consciousness still remains and they have not yet become equal to a Buddha; clearly we know they are completely distinct. Question: If the deluded consciousness is not the intellect-faculty, why do the Laṅkāvatāra and Aśvaghoṣa's treatise call it 'intellect'? Explanation: They merely borrow the name to reveal it; it is not the intellect-faculty itself. Just as in the Laṅkāvatāra the seventh consciousness is spoken of as 'mind' (citta), and in Aśvaghoṣa's treatise the true consciousness is declared to be 'mind' (citta), can it be that because the names are identical, they are one and the same thing? Although the name 'mind' is the same, the true and the deluded are two different things; although the name 'intellect' is one, what prevents there being a distinction? Fourth, holding the coarse to be the subtle. Some people declare: 'When the eye sees form and does not know that form is empty, this is the deluded mind of the seventh consciousness; and so on with the rest. If one understands that form is empty, this is the clearly understanding mind of the seventh consciousness; and so on with the rest.' To counter this attachment, one must show their difference. The statement that upon seeing form one does not know emptiness refers to the ignorance of grasping at intrinsic nature within the six consciousnesses, not to the seventh consciousness. This grasping at intrinsic nature is still the first characteristic, the characteristic of grasping, within the phenomenal consciousness discussed earlier. Question: If this is the mind of ignorance within the six consciousnesses, how does it differ from the ignorance in the seventh consciousness? As explained above, because it grasps at intrinsic nature and is confused about emptiness with respect to phenomenal dharmas external to the mind, it is not the deluded consciousness. Furthermore, understanding and knowing that there is no intrinsic nature with respect to phenomenal dharmas external to the mind is a conceptual understanding within the phenomenal consciousness, not the knowledge of the seventh consciousness. Fifth, holding that it is unextinguished. Some people declare: 'Before seeing principle, the mind of the seventh consciousness is impermanent through arising and ceasing; upon seeing principle, it becomes permanent and ultimately unextinguished.' To counter this attachment, it is said that delusion is ultimately extinguished. The deluded mind of the seventh consciousness has as its substance only ignorance and darkness, and as its characteristic only conceptualization. Attaining the noble state and according with tathatā, one relinquishes its conceptualizations; seeing the real with luminous clarity, one exhausts its ignorance and darkness. What else could remain that one should say it is not extinguished? Such is the principle, and it must be verified by textual testimony. As the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'Extinguishing the seven kinds of consciousness is called shedding the Buddha's blood.' How could it not be extinguished? Furthermore, that sūtra says: 'Deluded conceptualization is such nirvāṇa-consciousness; when this ceases, I [enter] nirvāṇa.' Clearly we know that delusion is extinguished. Furthermore, the Treatise on Consciousness-Only (Weishi) says: 'In the domain of practice of the Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, there is only the storehouse consciousness and no other consciousness.' How could it not be extinguished? Furthermore, the Great Prajñāpāramitā Treatise (Da zhidu lun) explains the meaning of tathatā, saying: 'True reality is like the nature of water being cold; contemplative wisdom is like great water becoming hot following fire. When the fire has been extinguished, the water is cold as originally; hence it is called tathatā. In this way, true reality transforms following contemplation; when this contemplation is extinguished, true reality is as originally, and hence it is called tathatā.' Clearly we know that deluded understanding is ultimately completely extinguished. If contemplation were not extinguished, then when the water is cold, the fire should not be extinguished. Some people say: 'When the sūtras speak of extinction, they only mean extinguishing the darkness and obstruction of ignorance within wisdom, not extinguishing the substance of wisdom.' This assertion is not correct. The Ratnagotravibhāga itself contains an authoritative passage stating that not only is darkness extinguished, but cognitive understanding is also extinguished. Therefore, that treatise says: 'There are four obstacles due to which one does not attain the Tathāgata's purity, self, bliss, and permanence: First is the characteristic of conditions, meaning the ground of ignorance obstructs the Buddha's true purity; because one severs and abandons it, one attains the Buddha's true purity. Second is the characteristic of cause, meaning untainted karma obstructs the Buddha's true self; because one cuts off and eliminates it, one attains the Buddha's true self. Third is the characteristic of birth, meaning the mind-made body obstructs the Buddha's true bliss; because one cuts off and eliminates it, one attains the Buddha's true bliss. Fourth is the characteristic of destruction, meaning inconceivable transformation-death obstructs the Buddha's true permanence; because one cuts off and eliminates it, one attains the Buddha's true permanence.' Apart from ignorance and the like, the untainted is separately spoken of as an obstacle and separately spoken of as being severed. How can one say that the untainted is not extinguished? If people say: 'The substance of wisdom that is not completely extinguished is itself the true mind, not the seventh consciousness.' Question: If the seventh consciousness is caused to be extinguished, who attains bodhi? Who realizes nirvāṇa? Explanation: Although the marks of the mind are completely extinguished, the mind-nature still remains; and that the mind-nature remains is precisely the true consciousness. Therefore, it is with reference to it that attainment and realization are spoken of. Sixth, holding that it is definitely extinguished. Some people, hearing it said that the deluded mind is ultimately extinguished, then say that it is definitely extinguished and has no function of perfuming (vāsanā). Why is this? Within the true consciousness, pure dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges are fully present and complete, lacking nothing at all; what need is there for deluded perfuming? To counter this attachment, it is said that delusion does have perfuming, as the Treatise on Awakening of Faith says that delusion perfumes the true. How could it not perfume? If one says that because pure dharmas are complete within the true, it does not depend on perfuming, [the answer is:] The nature of the Dharma-Buddha is originally existent, and the substance of its dharmas can be said to be complete. But the nature of the Reward-Buddha originally only has the sense of being capable of being produced; it does not yet have a substance of dharmas, just as a seed does not have a tree—how could it be called complete? The Reward-Buddha is originally non-existent and comes to exist only dependent upon cultivation; why would there be no perfuming? The power of perfuming resides in the true, and therefore it is not definitely extinguished. Question: The true and the deluded are distinct in nature; how can they perfume each other? As explained above, all cultivation arises jointly from the true and the deluded. If one subsumes cultivation under delusion, it is all the doing of delusion; if one subsumes cultivation under the true, it is all the action of the true. Although the true can act, its action necessarily accords with delusion; although delusion can do things, its doing necessarily relies upon the true. Because the true acts [through] delusion, it is called 'the true perfuming delusion'; because delusion acts [through] the true, it is called 'delusion perfuming the true.' Countering [wrong attachments] regarding the deluded consciousness is like this (these two sections are concluded).