大乘義章 3.88

3.88

次就真識對治邪執。依如論中，邪執有二：一者凡夫人著我執、二者二乘法著我執。問曰：凡夫亦著諸法，何故偏名人著我執？釋言：細分亦著諸法，今對二乘，凡夫著我及著我所，通名人執，諸法皆是我所攝故。就凡執中，隨義具論，略有二種：一者執有、二者執無。執有之中，別有四種：一執實同神。有人聞說藏識是我，謂同外道所取神我。對治此執，說如來藏非我非眾生非命非人。二執真中具足真染。如馬鳴言「有人聞說生死二法是如來藏，便謂真中具有生死。」對治此執，說如來藏自性清淨，從本已來唯有清淨恒沙佛法，無有染污。若言真中實有生死，而使證會永離生死，無有是處。若言有修緣起作用，隨世法門，非無此義。三執有淨相。如馬鳴言「有人聞說如來藏中備有一切諸功德法不增不減，即謂真中有色心等自相差別。」對治此執，說如來藏雖具諸法，依真如說無彼此相、無自他相，乃至亦無離自他相。翻對染故，說彼真中具一切法。又彼真中恒沙等法，同體緣集無有差別，不得別取差別之相。四執始終。如馬鳴說「有人聞說依如來藏始起生死，又復聞說如來之藏起生死故，雖得涅槃還起生死，起生死故涅槃有終。」對治此執，說如來藏無始無終。以無始故，依起生死，生死無始。是以論言「若有宣說三界之外更有眾生初始起者，是外道說，非正佛法。」以無終故，依成涅槃，涅槃無終。有執如是。言執無者，有人宣說諸法空義以為真識。對治此執，說真不空。於此識中具過恒沙一切佛法，云何名空？故《勝鬘》中說為不空如來藏矣。《涅槃》亦云「有如來藏，雖不可見。破煩惱已，定必得之。」彼文復言「若有人說無我空寂為如來藏，當知是人久在生死，長受諸苦不得解脫。」而《楞伽》中言依無我說如來藏者，於此藏中無妄所計，故名為空，非無真法。故《唯識論》言「為破外道著我我所，故說色等一切法空，非離言說如實境空。如實境者，諸佛如來所行之處，唯有藏識更無餘識。」對治凡夫邪執如是。次明對治二乘妄執。於中有二：一者執有。二乘之人未得法空，見有生死涅槃之相。以此見故，深畏生死、趣求涅槃，迷覆真如。對治此執，說如實空，離一切相，生死本寂，涅槃亦如。二執定無。二乘之人分見生空，利根之者小見法空，便取此空以為究竟，覆障真實。對治此執，說實不空，具過恒沙一切佛法。八識如是。

Next is countering erroneous attachments with respect to true consciousness. According to the treatise, erroneous attachments are of two kinds: first, ordinary persons' attachment to the self of persons; second, the two vehicles' attachment to the self of dharmas. Question: Ordinary persons also attach to dharmas; why are they specifically said to be attached to the self of persons? Explanation: In a detailed analysis, they also attach to dharmas. Here, contrasted with the two vehicles, ordinary persons attach to the self and what belongs to the self, and this is generally called attachment to persons, because all dharmas are subsumed under what belongs to the self. Within the attachments of ordinary persons, when discussed comprehensively according to meaning, there are briefly two kinds: first, attachment to existence; second, attachment to non-existence. Within the attachment to existence, there are specifically four kinds: First, attachment [to the true consciousness] as being identical to a real spirit. Some people hear that the storehouse consciousness is the self, and consider it identical to the spiritual self grasped by non-Buddhists. To counter this attachment, it is explained that the tathāgatagarbha is neither self, nor sentient being, nor soul, nor person. Second, attachment to the true nature containing both purity and defilement. As Aśvaghoṣa said, "Some people hear that the two dharmas of saṃsāra are the tathāgatagarbha, and then consider that saṃsāra is fully contained within the true." To counter this attachment, it is explained that the tathāgatagarbha is intrinsically pure; from the very beginning it contains only pure Buddha-dharmas numerous as the sands of the Ganges, without any defilement. If one claims that saṃsāra truly exists within the true, yet causes [one] to realize and permanently abandon saṃsāra, there is no such possibility. If one speaks of cultivating the function of dependent origination according to worldly gates of the Dharma, this meaning is not absent. Third, attachment to pure characteristics. As Aśvaghoṣa said, "Some people hear that the tathāgatagarbha is replete with all dharmas of merit, neither increasing nor decreasing, and then consider that within the true there are distinct individual characteristics of form, mind, and so forth." To counter this attachment, it is explained that although the tathāgatagarbha is replete with all dharmas, spoken of according to tathatā, there is no characteristic of this or that, no characteristic of self or other, nor even the characteristic of being free from self and other. It is in contrast to defilement that the true is said to contain all dharmas. Furthermore, the dharmas numerous as the sands of the Ganges within that true nature are identically assembled in dependent origination without distinction; one must not falsely grasp differentiated characteristics among them. Fourth, attachment to a beginning and an end. As Aśvaghoṣa said, "Some people hear that saṃsāra begins by relying on the tathāgatagarbha, and again hear that because the tathāgatagarbha gives rise to saṃsāra, even though one attains nirvāṇa, saṃsāra arises again; because saṃsāra arises, nirvāṇa has an end." To counter this attachment, it is explained that the tathāgatagarbha is without beginning and without end. Because it is without beginning, saṃsāra arises in reliance on it, and saṃsāra is without beginning. Therefore the treatise says: "If someone proclaims that outside the three realms there are sentient beings who have a first beginning, this is a non-Buddhist teaching, not the correct Buddha-Dharma." Because it is without end, nirvāṇa is accomplished in reliance on it, and nirvāṇa is without end. Such is the attachment to existence. As for attachment to non-existence: some people proclaim the emptiness of all dharmas to be true consciousness. To counter this attachment, it is explained that the true is not empty. Replete within this consciousness are all Buddha-dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges; how could it be called empty? Therefore in the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra it is called the non-empty tathāgatagarbha. The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra also says: "There is a tathāgatagarbha, though it cannot be seen. Having destroyed the afflictions, one will definitely attain it." That text further says: "If someone says that selfless, empty quiescence is the tathāgatagarbha, one should know that this person will remain long in saṃsāra, suffering all kinds of pain for an extended time without attaining liberation." As for the statement in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra that the tathāgatagarbha is spoken of in reliance on selflessness: because what is falsely conceptualized does not exist within this garbha, it is called empty, not because true dharmas do not exist. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: "In order to refute the non-Buddhists' attachment to self and what belongs to the self, all dharmas such as form are taught to be empty, but the real realm beyond verbal expression is not empty. The real realm is the sphere traversed by all Buddhas, the Tathāgatas: there is only the storehouse consciousness and no other consciousness." Such is countering the erroneous attachments of ordinary persons. Next, explaining the countering of the false attachments of the two vehicles. Within this there are two: First, attachment to existence. Persons of the two vehicles have not yet attained the emptiness of dharmas and see the characteristics of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as existing. Because of this view, they deeply dread saṃsāra and aspire to nirvāṇa, thereby obscuring tathatā. To counter this attachment, it is explained that it is truly empty, free from all characteristics, that saṃsāra is fundamentally quiescent, and that nirvāṇa is likewise tathatā. Second, attachment to definite non-existence. Persons of the two vehicles partially see the emptiness of sentient beings, and those of sharp faculties slightly see the emptiness of dharmas, whereupon they grasp this emptiness as ultimate, obscuring the true reality. To counter this attachment, it is explained that the real is not empty, being replete with all Buddha-dharmas exceeding the sands of the Ganges. Such are the eight consciousnesses.