大乘義章 5.93

5.93

第六約對二種著我共相收攝。何者二我？一眾生著我，於彼諸陰集用之中謬計我人。二法著我，於陰法中妄取定性。二我如是。今以此二約倒分別，先對有為四倒以論。依名以定，二種著我是四倒中我倒所攝。隨義通論，二種我中各具四倒。若於五陰集用之中建立我人，是眾生我，即計此我為常樂淨。此常樂等雖非我見，相從判屬眾生著我。故龍樹言「若計神常，是眾生我。樂淨亦然。」若於陰法建立定性，是法著我，即取此我為常樂淨。此常樂等雖非我見，相從判屬法著我中。故龍樹言「若計法常，是法著我。樂淨亦然。」問曰：如是法著我者，與彼三倒所取何別？通釋三倒亦是法我，於中別分三倒之心。迷性立相，此法著我。迷相立性，相狀如何？情相諸法，以無為性。三倒之心，迷此無性，立因緣相。我倒之中法著我者，迷向所立因緣之相，立為定性。有斯別耳。有為麁爾。次辨無為。無為倒者，迷覆真法，橫計無我無常樂淨。此是邪見，非二我攝。

Sixth, explaining their mutual subsumption in relation to the two kinds of attachment to self. What are the two selves? The first is the attachment to the self of sentient beings, which erroneously posits an individual person (pudgala) amidst the agglomerated functions of the aggregates. The second is the attachment to the self of dharmas, which deludedly grasps at a fixed intrinsic nature within the dharmas of the aggregates. Such are the two selves. Now, using these two to differentiate according to the inversions, we first discuss them in relation to the four conditioned inversions. Determining [them] by name, the two kinds of attachment to self are subsumed under the inversion of self among the four inversions. Broadly discussing them according to their sense, each of the two selves possesses all four inversions. If one posits an individual person amidst the agglomerated functions of the five aggregates, that is the self of sentient beings, and one forthwith conceives this self to be permanent, blissful, and pure. Although these [conceptions of] permanence, bliss, and the like are not the view of self, by association they are judged to belong to the attachment to the self of sentient beings. Thus Nāgārjuna says: "If one conceives the soul (ātman) to be permanent, that is the self of sentient beings; bliss and purity are also like this." If one posits a fixed intrinsic nature amidst the dharmas of the aggregates, that is the attachment to the self of dharmas, and one forthwith grasps this self to be permanent, blissful, and pure. Although these [conceptions of] permanence, bliss, and the like are not the view of self, by association they are judged to belong to the attachment to the self of dharmas. Thus Nāgārjuna says: "If one conceives dharmas to be permanent, that is the attachment to the self of dharmas; bliss and purity are also like this." Question: If so, what is the difference between this attachment to the self of dharmas and what is grasped by those three inversions? Explanation: Broadly speaking, the three inversions are also [forms of the attachment to] the self of dharmas, but within them the mind of the three inversions is distinctively differentiated. Confusing the nature to establish characteristics—this is the attachment to the self of dharmas. Confusing characteristics to establish a nature—what are its features? All dharmas of subjective characteristics take non-existence as their nature. The mind of the three inversions confuses this absence of nature and establishes the characteristics of causes and conditions. The attachment to the self of dharmas within the inversion of self confuses the just-established characteristics of causes and conditions and establishes them as a fixed intrinsic nature. There is just this difference. So it roughly is for the conditioned [inversions]. Next, we distinguish the unconditioned. The unconditioned inversions confuse and obscure the true dharma, falsely conceiving non-self, impermanence, non-bliss, and non-purity. This is wrong view and is not subsumed under the two selves.