大乘義章 5.94

5.94

第七門中，約對十使分別諸倒。言十使者，一是身見、二是邊見、三是邪見、四是戒取、五是見取、六疑、七貪、八瞋、九癡、十名為慢。於身見我，名為身見。取斷立常，名為邊見。謗無因果一切諸法，名為邪見。非真對治，妄謂能淨，名為戒取。取劣為勝，名為見取。於道猶豫，稱之為疑。染境名貪。忿怒名瞋。愚闇曰癡。自高凌物，名之為慢。十使之中，前五是其利使，後五是鈍。此義廣釋，如十使章。今對此十，分別諸倒。於中先對有為四倒分辨其相。經論不同，所明亦異。如彼毘婆闍婆提說，常等四倒，是十使中三使少分，不盡三使。就我見中分取我見以為我倒，我所見者不說為倒。邊見之中分取常見以為常倒，不取斷見。就見取中分取樂淨二種見取為樂淨倒，自餘一切取劣為勝皆悉不取。以此重故，偏說為倒；我所見等，輕故不說。又依達摩多羅所說，欲令四倒於十使中，全攝二使及一小分。我倒之中全攝我見，樂淨二倒全攝見取。常倒如上。於邊見中但攝一邊。《雜心論》主存依後釋，《成實》亦然。問曰：何故唯說此等為四倒乎？《雜心》釋言「具三義故，說此為倒。一者使斷執取之義；二者妄置自有建立；三一向倒全違正道。言使斷者，簡別五鈍。言妄置者，簡別斷見。邪見無所立，故言一向倒。簡異戒取，以戒取人猶為果報持禁戒故。」有為四倒。辨之麁爾。次辨無為。無為倒中，常見無常、我見無我、樂見無樂、淨見無淨，是邪見攝。常為生滅、樂見為苦、淨計為穢，此等皆是妄置之心，非是謗無。《毘婆沙》中名為邪智，非是邪見。若通攝之，亦是邪見，更無餘義。問曰：斷常二種相對，俱名邊見。無常見常、常見無常此二亦對，以何義故不俱名邊，而於常法計為無常是邪見乎？通釋應齊。但今為明一法異見是其邊見，異法異見不名邊見。一法異見名為之邊，對彼一法彰邊顯故。無常見常、常見無常，異法異見，不對一法，彰邊不顯，故不名邊。若如是者，無常見常亦應非邊，何故偏說常見為邊？以彼常見對斷故邊，非對無常。攝使如是。

In the seventh section, differentiating the inversions in relation to the ten fetters (anuśayas). As for the ten fetters: first is the view of a self-body (satkāyadṛṣṭi), second is the view of extremes (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), third is wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), fourth is the attachment to mere rules and rituals (śīlavrataparāmarśa), fifth is the attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), sixth is doubt (vicikitsā), seventh is greed (rāga), eighth is anger (pratigha), ninth is ignorance (avidyā), and tenth is conceit (māna). Seeing a self in the body is called the view of a self-body. Grasping at annihilation and positing permanence is called the view of extremes. Slandering all dharmas by denying cause and effect is called wrong view. What is not a true remedy being deludedly regarded as capable of purifying is called the attachment to rules and rituals. Grasping the inferior as superior is called the attachment to views. Hesitation regarding the path is called doubt. Defilement toward sense objects is called greed. Indignation is called anger. Dark dullness is called ignorance. Haughtily looking down on others is called conceit. Among the ten fetters, the first five are sharp fetters and the latter five are dull. This meaning is broadly explained as in the chapter on the ten fetters. Now, in relation to these ten, we differentiate the inversions. Therein we first distinguish their aspects in relation to the four conditioned inversions. The sūtras and treatises differ, and what they clarify is also distinct. As the Vibhajyavādin says, the four inversions such as permanence are a minor portion of three of the ten fetters, not exhausting all three fetters. Within the view of self, one selects a portion—the view of self—to be the inversion of self, while the view of what belongs to self is not spoken of as an inversion. Within the view of extremes, one selects a portion—the view of permanence—to be the inversion of permanence, and does not take the view of annihilation. Within the attachment to views, one selects a portion—the two kinds of attachment to views regarding bliss and purity—to be the inversions of bliss and purity; all other grasping of the inferior as superior is completely excluded. Because these are grave, they are specifically spoken of as inversions; the view of what belongs to self and the like, being light, are not so described. Furthermore, according to what Dharmatrāta says, he intends that the four inversions, among the ten fetters, completely subsume two fetters and a minor portion of one. The inversion of self completely subsumes the view of self; the two inversions of bliss and purity completely subsume the attachment to views. The inversion of permanence is as above: within the view of extremes, it subsumes only one extreme. The author of the *Abhidharmahṛdaya* preserves and relies on this latter explanation, and so does the *Tattvasiddhi*. Question: Why are only these spoken of as the four inversions? The *Abhidharmahṛdaya* explains: "Because they possess three meanings, these are spoken of as inversions: first, the meaning of causing severance and grasping; second, deludedly asserting one's own establishment; third, being wholly inverted and entirely contrary to the correct path. 'Causing severance' differentiates them from the five dull [fetters]. 'Deludedly asserting' differentiates them from the view of annihilation. Wrong view establishes nothing, so it is said to be wholly inverted. It differentiates them from the attachment to rules and rituals, because a person with attachment to rules and rituals still maintains prohibitions and precepts for the sake of retribution." The four conditioned inversions have been thus roughly analyzed. Next, we distinguish the unconditioned [inversions]. Among the unconditioned inversions, seeing the permanent as impermanent, seeing self as non-self, seeing bliss as non-bliss, and seeing purity as non-purity are subsumed under wrong view. Regarding the permanent as arising and ceasing, seeing bliss as suffering, and conceiving purity as foulness—all these are minds of deluded assertion, not the slandering of non-existence. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā* these are called wrong knowledge, not wrong view. If subsumed broadly, they are also wrong view, with no further distinction. Question: The two types, annihilation and permanence, oppose each other, and both are called views of extremes. Seeing permanence in the impermanent and seeing impermanence in the permanent also oppose each other; for what reason are they not both called [views of] extremes, but rather conceiving impermanence in a permanent dharma is a wrong view? Broadly explaining, they should be equal. However, now to clarify: a divergent view regarding a single dharma is a view of extremes, while divergent views regarding different dharmas are not called views of extremes. A divergent view regarding a single dharma is called extreme because its extreme is clearly manifest in relation to that single dharma. Seeing permanence in the impermanent and seeing impermanence in the permanent are divergent views regarding different dharmas; not being directed toward a single dharma, the manifestation of an extreme is not evident, so they are not called extremes. If so, seeing permanence in the impermanent should also not be an extreme; why is the view of permanence uniquely spoken of as an extreme? Because that view of permanence is an extreme in opposition to annihilation, not in opposition to impermanence. The subsumption of the fetters is like this.