大乘義章 6.4

6.4

第一門中，先總釋名，後辨其相。所言使者，如《地論》說「隨逐縛義，名之為使。」蓋乃就喻以名煩惱，如世公使隨逐罪人得便繫縛，煩惱亦爾，久隨行人繫縛三有不令出離，故名為使。《毘曇》、《成實》亦同此說。故《雜心》云「使之隨逐，如空行影，水行隨。」《成實》說言「使之隨逐，如母隨子，亦如瘧病鼠毒未發、如熱鐵黑相、如種中牙、如債未還。」此等皆是隨逐義也。有人釋言：驅役名使。於義無爽，但非經論。名義如是。次辨其相。使義開合，廣略不定，今就一門且論十種，所謂身見、邊見、邪見、戒取、見取、貪、瞋、癡、慢及疑。言身見者，亦名我見。五陰名身，身中見我取執分明，從其所迷故名身見。故《雜心》云「於五陰中，審爾計著，名身見也。以見我故，從其所立，亦名我見。」相狀如何？身見有二：一眾生著我、二法著我。於五陰中建立我人，名眾生著我；於陰界入取性執相，名法著我。此二如前無我章中具廣分別。言邊見者，斷常乖中，故名邊見。相狀如何？若依《毘曇》，唯於苦中計斷取常名為邊見。若依《成實》，一切法中取斷計常皆名邊見。故彼《成實．邊見品》云「一切法常，是名常見。一切法斷，是名斷見。一切法有，是名常見。一切法無，是名斷見。身與神異，身滅神在，是名常見。身與神一，身滅神亡，是名斷見。地水火風苦樂壽命七分是常，是名常見。七分斷滅，是名斷見。死後更作，是名常見。死後不作，是名斷見。如是一切皆名邊見。」問曰：無常橫計為常說為邊見，常計無常何故非邊見？此義如前八倒章中具廣分別。言邪見者，謬執乖正，故名邪見。相狀如何？如經中說「謗無因果一切諸法，是其相也。」問曰：五見斯皆是邪，何故謗無偏名邪見？《成實》釋云「此見重故，偏名為邪。」言戒取者，於有漏法取為能淨，故云戒取。相狀如何？戒取有二：一者獨頭、二者足上。不依諸見，直取苦行烏鷄戒等以為聖道，說為能淨，名為獨頭；依諸見起，名為足上。諸見是其戒取之本，戒取脚足，取此諸見以為能淨，名足上也。問曰：戒取所取非一，或取苦行以為能淨，或取持戒、或取布施、或取禮拜糞掃衣等，或取諸見以為能淨。如是非一，何故經中但云戒取，不說施取苦行取等？《雜心》釋言「是中略故，且云戒取。若具應言戒等取也。」問曰：等略，以何義故偏就戒名，不就餘者？釋言：戒行取執者多，故偏言耳。取云何取多？諸內道人多取持戒以之為道，諸外道人多取烏鷄鹿狗戒等以之為道，是故名多。自餘一切苦行等事，唯外道取，非佛弟子，是故名少。從多立稱，故名戒取。言見取者，取諸見等以為第一，故云見取。相狀如何？見取有二：一者獨頭、二者足上。言獨頭者，不依諸見，直取有漏下劣之法以為第一，故名獨頭，如不淨中妄計為淨、苦計為樂、無想天報謂涅槃等。言足上者，依諸見起，故名足上。諸見是其見取之本，見取脚足，依此足上取為第一，名足上也。問曰：見取所取非一，何故經中但云見取，不說餘者？《雜心》釋言「是中略故，但名見取。若具應言見等取也。」又問：等略，何故就見以彰取名，不就餘者？以從多故。一切世人多取己見以為第一，故偏說之。又取見者，心則堅強、執固難捨，故偏說見。所言貪者，於境染愛，名之為貪。貪相如何？於中廣略，開合非一。或分為二，一愛己身、二愛所須。或分為三，前二如上，加愛妻色。或分為四，前三上，加愛親戚。或分為五，前四如上，加愛名稱。或分為六，前五如上，加愛豪貴勢力自在。或分為七，前六如上，加愛死滅，如論中說無有愛等。或分為八，前七如上，加愛己見。或分為九，前八如上，加愛善法，如說愛佛愛菩提等。若廣分別，貪有無量。若依大乘，此等一切皆是貪使；若依小乘，善貪非使。又小乘中，依如《毘曇》，唯貪是使，慳等非使。若依《成實》，多欲惡欲慳著憍逸，如是一切皆是貪使。所言瞋者，違境忿怒，故名為瞋。依如《毘曇》，唯瞋是使，自餘忿恚惱恨嫉害，如是一切斯不名使。若依《成實》，忿恚惱恨、嫉妬殺害、狠戾專執、不忍不悅、不調等事，悉是瞋使。大乘亦爾。言無明者，依如《毘曇》，癡闇之心體無慧明，故曰無明。若依《成實》，邪心分別，無正慧明，故曰無明。何故如是？《毘曇》闇惑為過，《成實》唯以取執為患，故說不同。大乘法中，癡闇、取執並是過患，兩義兼取。名義如是。體相云何？宗別不同，所說亦異。有一論師宣說無法為無明使，彼人所說，無智慧處即是無明，更無別法。如人不語，正名無語，是中更無不語法生。《成實論》中非破此義，經說無明為生死因，若是無法，云何為因？若依《毘曇》，有二分別：一對諸使以別無明，無明有二：一者不共、二者相應。言不共者，於彼諦理及以色聲香味觸等，緣而不了，不與一切諸使和合，名為不共。言相應者，除前不共，自餘一切諸煩惱中無智之心，與諸使合，名為相應。二約境分別，無明有二：一者迷理，於四真諦闇惑不了。二者迷事，於陰界入色香味等不能正解，起諸業行，此等皆是無明使也。依如《成實》，無明亦二，一者取性、二者現起。言取性者，一切凡夫執性之心。此之取性，遍通一切善、惡、無記三性之心中。故彼《成實．無明品》云「一切凡夫未入空者，常有邪見，名為無明。」彼文復言「貪中無瞋，瞋中無貪。無明不爾，一切處有。」明知是通。此之取性，是無明中根本正使。有人釋言：此取性者，是十使地，非無明使。彼人何故作如是說？言此微細，不能驅役往來生死，故不名使。此語不然，依何文證得知非使？如《成實》中解無明使，正說於此，云何言非？若言此是十使地故非無明使，與十為地，何妨是其無明使乎？又若取性是十使地，不得說為無明使者，三苦之中即行即苦，是三苦體亦應非是三苦之中行苦所攝。然彼雖是三苦之體，而得攝在行苦之中，此亦應然。若言取性不能驅役令非使者，三有受生皆由取性，若離取性，雖有諸業不能牽果。是則取性驅役最強，何為非使？又復論中隨逐解使，不以驅役解釋使義。驅役之言，自出人口，不關經論，何為用此辨定是非？然彼論中隨逐解使，隨逐之中無過取性，何為非使？以斯徵窮，取性是使，不得言非。言現起者，作意而生，止在不善，不通餘心。何者是乎？論文不定，人釋種種。有人釋言：貪瞋癡慢及諸見中各有九品，分前八品為無明使，第九一品為餘九使。此言定非，十使之中皆有九品，云何說言貪瞋等中無前八品？無明使中無第九品？是大難解。又如論說「於欲界中，貪瞋癡慢各有九品，斷前六品成斯陀含，斷後三微成阿那含。」若貪瞋等無前六品，竟何所斷？無明使中無有後三，復何所除？以此推研，此言叵依。又人復言：簡去鈍使，直就五見隨義以分。五見之中前之八品，見心未明，不得名見，但可說之為無明使。此同前破。又《成實》中不以闇障為無明使，何須分取不了之心為無明使？又《成實》說「邪明之中，無正慧明，名為無明。」若五見中前之八品，見未成故非見使者，前之八品邪明未成，亦應不得說為無明。又《成實》言「邪見未成，說之為疑。」今云何言邪見未成說為無明？以此推窮，定知不以見前八品為無明使。若爾，用何以為無明？當知無明就諸使上隨義以分，無別心體。云何義分？解釋有三：一就餘九使隨義以分。餘九使中有闇障義，斯是無明，故因緣中無明支者，過去煩惱悉名無明。又論說言「一切煩惱，迷覆人心，皆令盲冥。」盲冥猶是無明義也。二三毒分別。除貪除瞋，自餘一切悉是無明。故論說言「除貪除瞋，餘之八使從捨生故，斯名癡也。」三就邪見無正慧明說為無明。此就五見隨義以分，於五見中邪心推求，斯名邪見。即此五見，無正慧明，盡是無明。故論說言「邪見之心，無正慧明，名無明也。」若無別體，應無十使。釋言：義別故得有之。雖有三解，准依論文，後釋應是無明使體。《成實》如是。大乘法中，無明有二：一事中無知，不解世法；二性結無明，迷於理實，於中有三，謂麁中細。麁者與彼四住相應，如小乘說；中者所謂恒沙無明；細者所謂無明住地。此等皆是無明使也。問曰：何故小乘法中，不染無知非無明使，大乘是使？小乘法中，但為斷除染污煩惱得滅便不用；不求如來一切種智，故不說使。大乘法中求佛種智，不染無知障佛種智，故說為使。言慢使者，陵物名慢。慢相云何？如《涅槃》說，慢有八種。八名是何？一直名慢、二名大慢、三名慢慢、四不如慢、五名憍慢亦名傲慢、六名我慢、七增上慢、八名邪慢。此義廣釋如八慢章。所言疑者，於境不決，猶預曰疑。疑有二種：一者疑事，如夜觀樹，疑為是人為非人等；二者疑理，疑諸諦等。小乘法中，唯取疑理說為疑使；大乘通取，皆須斷故。十使名相，辨之麁爾。

In the first section, we first generally explain the names, and afterwards distinguish their characteristics. As for the term "underlying afflictions" (anuśaya; 使), the *Daśabhūmika-śāstra* states: "The meaning of following and binding is called anuśaya." This is simply naming the afflictions (kleśa) by way of a metaphor: just as in worldly affairs a public bailiff follows a criminal and, seizing the opportunity, binds him, so it is with afflictions: they follow the practitioner for a long time, binding him within the three realms of existence so that he cannot escape; hence they are named anuśaya. The Abhidharma and the *Tattvasiddhi* also share this explanation. Thus the *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* says: "The following of an anuśaya is like a shadow moving in the sky, or water moving along." The *Tattvasiddhi* states: "The following of an anuśaya is like a mother following her child; it is also like a malarial disease or rat poison that has not yet erupted; like the black mark on hot iron; like a sprout in a seed; or like an unpaid debt." These are all the meaning of "following." Some explain it by saying: "To drive and enslave is called anuśaya." While there is nothing wrong with the meaning, it is simply not found in the sūtras and treatises. Such is the meaning of the name. Next we distinguish their characteristics. The opening and combining of the meaning of anuśaya is extensive or brief and not fixed; here, in this one section, we will provisionally discuss ten kinds: namely, view of individuality (satkāyadṛṣṭi), extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), adherence to rules and observances (śīlavrataparāmarśa), adherence to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), greed (rāga), anger (pratigha), ignorance (avidyā), pride (māna), and doubt (vicikitsā). As for the view of individuality, it is also named the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi). The five aggregates (skandha) are called the "body" (kāya); within the body, one sees a self and grasps it clearly; because of that about which one is deluded, it is called the "view of individuality." Thus the *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* says: "To definitively conceptualize and adhere within the five aggregates is called the view of individuality. Because one sees a self, based on what is established, it is also named the view of self." What are its characteristics? The view of individuality is twofold: first, attachment to a self in sentient beings; second, attachment to a self in dharmas. Establishing a self or person within the five aggregates is called attachment to a self in sentient beings; grasping at intrinsic nature and clinging to characteristics within the aggregates, elements (dhātu), and sense bases (āyatana) is called attachment to a self in dharmas. These two are broadly distinguished in detail as in the previous chapter on non-self. As for the extreme view, because annihilation and permanence violate the middle, it is named the extreme view. What are its characteristics? If one relies on the Abhidharma, it is only conceptualizing annihilation or grasping permanence with respect to suffering that is called the extreme view. If one relies on the *Tattvasiddhi*, grasping annihilation or conceptualizing permanence with respect to all dharmas is in every case called the extreme view. Thus the chapter on extreme views in that *Tattvasiddhi* states: "That all dharmas are permanent is called the view of permanence. That all dharmas are annihilated is called the view of annihilation. That all dharmas exist is called the view of permanence. That all dharmas do not exist is called the view of annihilation. That the body and the soul are distinct, and that when the body perishes the soul remains, is called the view of permanence. That the body and the soul are one, and that when the body perishes the soul is destroyed, is called the view of annihilation. That the seven factors of earth, water, fire, wind, suffering, pleasure, and lifespan are permanent is called the view of permanence. That the seven factors are annihilated is called the view of annihilation. That one acts again after death is called the view of permanence. That one does not act after death is called the view of annihilation. All such things are called extreme views." Question: Arbitrarily conceptualizing the impermanent as permanent is said to be an extreme view; why is conceptualizing the permanent as impermanent not an extreme view? This meaning is distinguished in detail as in the previous chapter on the eight inversions. As for wrong view, because erroneous grasping contradicts what is correct, it is named wrong view. What are its characteristics? As stated in the sūtras: "Slandering all dharmas by denying cause and effect is its characteristic." Question: All five views are wrong; why is slandering [cause and effect] by asserting nonexistence specifically named wrong view? The *Tattvasiddhi* explains: "Because this view is grave, it is specifically named wrong." As for adherence to rules and observances, grasping at sāsrava dharmas as being able to purify is why it is called adherence to rules and observances. What are its characteristics? Adherence to rules and observances is twofold: first, isolated; second, based on the feet [of other views]. Not relying on various views, directly taking austerities or the rules of crows and chickens as the noble path, and explaining them as able to purify, is called isolated; arising in reliance on various views is called based on the feet. The various views are the root of this adherence to rules and observances, and the adherence to rules and observances constitutes the legs and feet; taking these various views as able to purify is called based on the feet. Question: That which is grasped by adherence to rules and observances is not one: one may grasp at austerities as being able to purify, or grasp at observing precepts, or grasp at giving, or grasp at paying homage or wearing refuse rag robes, or grasp at various views as being able to purify. Being manifold like this, why do the sūtras only say adherence to rules, and do not speak of adherence to giving, adherence to austerities, and so forth? The *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* explains: "It is an abbreviation here, and so it provisionally says adherence to rules. If given fully, it should be adherence to rules and so forth." Question: Since it is abbreviated with "and so forth," for what reason is the name applied specifically to rules, and not to the others? The explanation is: Those who grasp at the practice of rules are numerous; hence it is spoken of specifically. Why are those who grasp numerous? Most within the Buddhist path grasp at keeping precepts as being the path, and most outside the Buddhist path grasp at the rules of crows, chickens, deer, dogs, and so on as being the path; therefore they are called numerous. All other matters such as austerities are only grasped by non-Buddhists and not by disciples of the Buddha; therefore they are called few. Establishing the designation from the majority, it is therefore called adherence to rules. As for adherence to views, grasping at various views and so forth as supreme is why it is called adherence to views. What are its characteristics? Adherence to views is twofold: first, isolated; second, based on the feet. As for isolated, not relying on various views, directly grasping at inferior sāsrava dharmas as supreme is called isolated—such as falsely conceptualizing the impure as pure, conceptualizing suffering as pleasure, or considering the retributive state of the Heaven of Non-conception to be nirvāṇa. As for based on the feet, arising in reliance on various views is why it is called based on the feet. The various views are the root of this adherence to views, and the adherence to views constitutes the legs and feet; relying upon these feet and grasping them as supreme is called based on the feet. Question: That which is grasped by adherence to views is not one; why do the sūtras only say adherence to views, and do not speak of the others? The *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya* explains: "Because it is an abbreviation here, it is merely named adherence to views. If given fully, it should be called adherence to views and so forth." Further question: Since it is abbreviated with "and so forth," why is the name of adherence made manifest with respect to views and not with respect to the others? Because it is based on the majority. Most people in the world grasp at their own views as supreme; hence it is spoken of specifically. Furthermore, in those who grasp at views, the mind is hard, rigid, and obstinately clinging, difficult to relinquish; hence views are spoken of specifically. As for greed, tainted craving toward sense-objects is called greed. What are the characteristics of greed? Among them, broad and brief, opening and combining, are not one. It may be divided into two: first, craving for one's own body; second, craving for what is needed. It may be divided into three: the former two as above, with the addition of craving for the beauty of a wife. It may be divided into four: the former three as above, with the addition of craving for relatives. It may be divided into five: the former four as above, with the addition of craving for reputation. It may be divided into six: the former five as above, with the addition of craving for nobility, power, and mastery. It may be divided into seven: the former six as above, with the addition of craving for extinction at death, as when the treatises speak of craving for non-existence (vibhavatṛṣṇā) and so on. It may be divided into eight: the former seven as above, with the addition of craving for one's own views. It may be divided into nine: the former eight as above, with the addition of craving for wholesome dharmas, as when speaking of craving for the Buddha, craving for bodhi, and so on. If broadly distinguished, greed is limitless. If relying on the Mahāyāna, all of these are the anuśaya of greed; if relying on the Hīnayāna, wholesome greed is not an anuśaya. Furthermore, within the Hīnayāna, relying on the Abhidharma, only greed is an anuśaya, while stinginess and so forth are not anuśayas. If relying on the *Tattvasiddhi*, excessive desire, evil desire, stingy attachment, arrogance, and heedlessness—all such things are anuśayas of greed. As for anger, wrath toward contrary objects is called anger. Relying on the Abhidharma, only anger is an anuśaya, and all other things such as indignation, resentment, vexation, malice, jealousy, and cruelty are not named anuśayas. If relying on the *Tattvasiddhi*, indignation, resentment, vexation, malice, jealousy, killing, cruelty, obstinacy, stubborn clinging, intolerance, displeasure, untamedness, and so forth are all the anuśaya of anger. The Mahāyāna is also like this. As for ignorance, relying on the Abhidharma, a dark and deluded mind whose nature lacks the light of wisdom is therefore called ignorance. If relying on the *Tattvasiddhi*, discriminating with a wrong mind, lacking the light of correct wisdom, is called ignorance. Why is it like this? The Abhidharma considers darkness and delusion to be the fault, whereas the *Tattvasiddhi* only considers grasping and clinging to be the defect; hence their explanations differ. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, both delusion-darkness and grasping-clinging are defects, and both meanings are adopted. Such is the meaning of the name. What are its nature and characteristics? The traditions differ, and what they teach is also distinct. There is a treatise master who proclaimed that a nonexistent dharma (abhāva) is the anuśaya of ignorance; what he said was that the place where wisdom is absent is itself ignorance, and there is no separate dharma. Just as when a person does not speak, it is properly called "no speech," and within this there is no separate dharma of non-speech that arises. The *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* refutes this meaning: the sūtras state that ignorance is the cause of saṃsāra; if it were a nonexistent dharma, how could it be a cause? If relying on the Abhidharma, there are two distinctions: First, distinguishing ignorance in contrast with the various anuśayas. Ignorance is twofold: first, unshared (āveṇika); second, associated (samprayukta). As for unshared, taking as objects the truth of the truths as well as forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and so forth, yet not understanding them, and not combining with any of the other anuśayas, is called unshared. As for associated, excluding the aforementioned unshared, the unknowing mind within all other afflictions that combines with the various anuśayas is called associated. Second, distinguishing according to the object: ignorance is twofold. First, delusion regarding principle: being dark, deluded, and uncomprehending regarding the four noble truths. Second, delusion regarding phenomena: being unable to correctly understand the aggregates, elements, sense bases, forms, smells, tastes, and so forth, thereby giving rise to karmic actions. All these are the anuśaya of ignorance. Relying on the *Tattvasiddhi*, ignorance is also twofold: first, grasping at intrinsic nature; second, manifesting in the present. As for grasping at intrinsic nature, it is the mind of all ordinary persons that clings to an intrinsic nature. This grasping at intrinsic nature pervades the minds of all three natures: wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. Therefore, the chapter on ignorance in that *Tattvasiddhi* states: "All ordinary persons who have not entered emptiness constantly have wrong views, which is called ignorance." That text further says: "Within greed there is no anger, and within anger there is no greed. Ignorance is not like this; it exists everywhere." One clearly knows that it is pervasive. This grasping at intrinsic nature is the fundamental, primary anuśaya among ignorance. Someone explains: "This grasping at intrinsic nature is the ground of the ten anuśayas, not the anuśaya of ignorance." Why does that person speak like this? He says that this is subtle and cannot drive and enslave one back and forth through birth and death, and therefore it is not named an anuśaya. These words are incorrect. Based on what textual evidence is it known not to be an anuśaya? When the *Tattvasiddhi* explains the anuśaya of ignorance, it speaks precisely of this; how can one say it is not? If one says that because this is the ground of the ten anuśayas it is not the anuśaya of ignorance, since it serves as the ground for the ten, what prevents it from being the anuśaya of ignorance? Furthermore, if grasping at intrinsic nature were the ground of the ten anuśayas and could not be said to be the anuśaya of ignorance, then among the three sufferings, since conditioning itself is suffering and is the substance of the three sufferings, it also ought not to be subsumed under the suffering of conditioning (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā) among the three sufferings. Yet, although it is the substance of the three sufferings, it can still be subsumed within the suffering of conditioning; this should be likewise. If one says that because grasping at intrinsic nature cannot drive and enslave, it is not an anuśaya: rebirth in the three realms of existence is entirely due to grasping at intrinsic nature; if separated from grasping at intrinsic nature, although there are karmas, they cannot draw forth the fruition. Thus grasping at intrinsic nature drives and enslaves most strongly; why would it not be an anuśaya? Furthermore, in the treatises, anuśaya is explained through "following," not by using "driving and enslaving" to explain the meaning of anuśaya. The words "driving and enslaving" originated from people's mouths and do not pertain to the sūtras and treatises; why use this to evaluate right and wrong? Moreover, the treatises explain anuśaya through following, and among things that follow, nothing exceeds grasping at intrinsic nature; why would it not be an anuśaya? Investigating thoroughly by this, grasping at intrinsic nature is an anuśaya, and it cannot be said not to be. As for manifesting in the present, it is produced by deliberate attention, is restricted to the unwholesome, and does not extend to other minds. What is it? The treatise text is not fixed, and people's explanations are various. Someone explains: "Greed, anger, ignorance, pride, and the various views each have nine grades; dividing them, the first eight grades are the anuśaya of ignorance, and the ninth single grade is the other nine anuśayas." These words are certainly wrong. Among the ten anuśayas, each has nine grades; how could one say that within greed, anger, and so forth there are not the first eight grades, and that within the anuśaya of ignorance there is no ninth grade? This is very difficult to understand. Furthermore, as the treatises say: "In the desire realm, greed, anger, ignorance, and pride each have nine grades; severing the first six grades makes one a sakṛdāgāmin, and severing the last three subtle ones makes one an anāgāmin." If greed and so forth lacked the first six grades, what would ultimately be severed? And if the anuśaya of ignorance lacked the last three, what would be eliminated? Inferring and examining by this, these words cannot be relied upon. Another person further says: "Setting aside the dull anuśayas and taking only the five views to divide them according to meaning: among the five views, in the first eight grades, the mind of view is not yet clear and cannot be named view; it can only be spoken of as the anuśaya of ignorance." This is refuted as before. Furthermore, the *Tattvasiddhi* does not take dark obstruction as the anuśaya of ignorance; why would it need to separately take an uncomprehending mind as the anuśaya of ignorance? Moreover, the *Tattvasiddhi* says: "Within wrong illumination, the absence of the illumination of correct wisdom is called ignorance." If in the first eight grades of the five views, because the view is not yet accomplished, they are not the anuśaya of view, then because the wrong illumination of the first eight grades is not yet accomplished, they also ought not to be spoken of as ignorance. Furthermore, the *Tattvasiddhi* says: "When wrong view is not yet accomplished, it is spoken of as doubt." How could one now say that when wrong view is not yet accomplished, it is spoken of as ignorance? Investigating thoroughly by this, one definitely knows that the first eight grades of views are not taken as the anuśaya of ignorance. If so, what is taken to be ignorance? One should know that ignorance is divided according to meaning upon the various anuśayas, and has no separate mental substance. How is it divided by meaning? There are three explanations: First, it is divided according to meaning with respect to the other nine anuśayas. The other nine anuśayas contain the meaning of dark obstruction, and this is ignorance; therefore, as for the link of ignorance in dependent origination, past afflictions are all named ignorance. Moreover, a treatise says: "All afflictions bewilder and veil the human mind, making it entirely blind and dark." Blind and dark is still the meaning of ignorance. Second, distinguishing by the three poisons: excluding greed and anger, all the remaining ones are ignorance. Therefore a treatise says: "Excluding greed and anger, because the remaining eight anuśayas arise from neutral equanimity, they are called delusion." Third, in terms of wrong views lacking the illumination of correct wisdom, it is spoken of as ignorance. This is divided according to meaning with respect to the five views: within the five views, inferring with a wrong mind is called wrong view. These very five views, lacking the illumination of correct wisdom, are entirely ignorance. Therefore a treatise says: "A mind of wrong view, lacking the illumination of correct wisdom, is called ignorance." If it has no separate substance, there should not be ten anuśayas. The explanation is: because the meanings are distinct, they can exist. Although there are three explanations, conforming to the treatise text, the latter explanation should be the substance of the anuśaya of ignorance. Such is the *Tattvasiddhi*. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, ignorance is twofold: first, unknowing regarding phenomena, not understanding worldly dharmas; second, the ignorance of essential fetters, being deluded regarding principle and reality, within which there are three: coarse, middling, and subtle. The coarse is that associated with the four entrenchments, as taught in the Hīnayāna; the middling is the so-called ignorance [numerous as the] sands of the Ganges; the subtle is the so-called entrenchment ground of ignorance. All these are anuśayas of ignorance. Question: Why is it that in the Hīnayāna Dharma, non-defiled unknowing is not an anuśaya of ignorance, while in the Mahāyāna it is an anuśaya? In the Hīnayāna Dharma, one merely seeks to sever defiled afflictions to attain cessation and is then done; one does not seek the Tathāgata's sarvākārajñatā (all-aspect knowledge), and so it is not spoken of as an anuśaya. In the Mahāyāna Dharma, one seeks the Buddha's all-aspect knowledge, and non-defiled unknowing obstructs the Buddha's all-aspect knowledge; therefore it is spoken of as an anuśaya. As for the anuśaya of pride, disparaging others is called pride. What are the characteristics of pride? As stated in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, pride is of eight kinds. What are the eight names? First is simply called pride (māna); second is called great pride (atimāna); third is called excessive pride (mānātimāna); fourth is inferiority pride (ūnamāna); fifth is called arrogant pride (asmimāna / darpa), also called haughty pride; sixth is called self-pride (asmimāna); seventh is pride of superiority (adhimāna); eighth is called wrong pride (mithyāmāna). This meaning is broadly explained as in the chapter on the eight prides. As for doubt, lack of certainty regarding objects and wavering hesitation is called doubt. Doubt is twofold: first, doubt regarding phenomena, such as seeing a tree at night and doubting whether it is a human or a non-human, etc.; second, doubt regarding principle, doubting the truths and so forth. In the Hīnayāna Dharma, one only takes doubt regarding principle as the anuśaya of doubt; the Mahāyāna encompasses both, because both must be severed. The names and characteristics of the ten anuśayas have thus been roughly distinguished.