大乘義章 6.5

6.5

第二門中三性分別。言三性者，所謂善、惡、無記法也。若依《毘曇》，欲界地中身邊兩見，一向無記，不記不因是見墮惡道故。《地論》中亦同此說。餘之八使，一向不善。上二界中一切諸使，悉是無記。若依《成實》，三界上下一切十使，悉是不善。故彼《成實．雜問品》云「身邊二見是諸見本，云何無記？」問曰：十使若俱不善，善無記中取性無明是不善不？有人釋言：善無記中取性無明是善無記，非是不善。此義不然。凡言不善，違理為義。此既違理，何為不得說為不善？若是不善，云何得在善無記中？釋言：性惡在於相善及無記中，竟有何咎？若使性惡不得在於善無記中，生滅行苦亦應不在樂捨受中。以此類彼，其義相似。問曰：若使善中取性是不善者，善與取性為一為異？若當是一，取性不善，善亦不善；善是善故，取性亦善，斷取性時，善亦應斷。若當是異，取性便非相善之體，取性有漏，善應無漏。釋言：不定。善據其相，取性據體，體相別故，不得定一。不定一故，善感樂受、性招行苦，善資出世、取性障道。得出世時，斷除取性，善資不亡。不定異故，善業受果，必依取性，取性是漏，善名有漏。善中取性，一異如是，無記亦然。問曰：上界所有十使若是不善，是不善為繫上界？為繫下地？此義不定。上界所有善無記中，取性無明性雖不善，非起不善，繫屬上界。若論現起，十使不善，繫屬欲界，彼《成實》中欲界不善得寄起故。問曰：若爾，上界起使繫屬欲界，是則上界應無煩惱。若無煩惱，應是無漏，應是出世。釋言：上界現起不善唯屬欲界，與上界合，故非無漏。又彼善中有取性故，不名無漏，非無漏故不名出世。大乘法中，義有兩兼。若望果報，同《阿毘曇》，故《大品》云「上界十使，是其無記。」對理而辨，義同《成實》，一切十使皆是不善。

In the second section, distinction is made according to the three natures. As for the 'three natures,' they are the dharmas of good, bad, and indeterminate. If based on the Abhidharma, within the plane of the desire realm, the two views of identity and extremes are exclusively indeterminate, because [they are] not recorded as causing one to fall into the miserable destinies on account of these views. The *Daśabhūmika-śāstra* also holds this view. The remaining eight proclivities are exclusively bad. In the upper two realms, all proclivities are entirely indeterminate. If based on the *Tattvasiddhi*, all ten proclivities throughout the three realms, both higher and lower, are entirely bad. Therefore, its 'Chapter on Miscellaneous Questions' says: 'The two views of identity and extremes are the roots of all views; how could they be indeterminate?' Question: If the ten proclivities are all bad, is the grasping-at-nature ignorance within good and indeterminate [states] bad or not? Someone explains: Grasping-at-nature ignorance within good and indeterminate [states] is good or indeterminate; it is not bad. This formulation is not correct. Wherever 'bad' is spoken of, its meaning is contrary to principle. Since this is contrary to principle, why could it not be called bad? If it is bad, how can it exist within the good and the indeterminate? Explanation: What fault is there after all in an essential badness existing within phenomenal goodness and indeterminacy? If essential badness could not exist within the good and the indeterminate, the suffering of conditioning of arising and cessation also should not exist within pleasant and neutral feelings. Comparing this to that, the meanings are similar. Question: If grasping-at-nature within the good is bad, are the good and the grasping-at-nature identical or different? If they were identical, then since grasping-at-nature is bad, the good would also be bad; and because the good is good, grasping-at-nature would also be good, and when grasping-at-nature is severed, the good should also be severed. If they were different, grasping-at-nature would then not be the substance of phenomenal goodness; grasping-at-nature being sāsrava, the good should be anāsrava. Explanation: It is not fixed. 'Good' is based on its phenomenal appearance, while 'grasping-at-nature' is based on its substance; because substance and appearance are distinct, they cannot be definitely identical. Because they are not definitely identical, the good induces pleasant feeling while [grasping-at-]nature invites the suffering of conditioning; the good assists the supramundane, while grasping-at-nature obstructs the path. When the supramundane is attained, grasping-at-nature is severed and eliminated, while the assistance of the good is not destroyed. Because they are not definitely different, when good karma receives fruition, it must rely on grasping-at-nature; grasping-at-nature is tainted (sāsrava), so the good is called sāsrava. The identity and difference of grasping-at-nature within the good are like this, and the same is true for the indeterminate. Question: If all ten proclivities in the higher realms are bad, is this badness bound to the higher realms, or is it bound to the lower plane? This meaning is not fixed. In the good and indeterminate of the higher realms, although the grasping-at-nature ignorance is by nature bad, it is not an actively arisen badness, so it is bound to the higher realms. If discussing active manifestation, the ten bad proclivities are bound to the desire realm, because in the *Tattvasiddhi*, the badness of the desire realm can arise parasitically [in the higher realms]. Question: If so, and the arising of proclivities in the higher realms is bound to the desire realm, then the higher realms should have no afflictions. If there are no afflictions, they should be anāsrava, and should be supramundane. Explanation: The active badness that manifests in the higher realms belongs solely to the desire realm, yet it conjoins with the higher realms; therefore, it is not anāsrava. Furthermore, because there is grasping-at-nature within that goodness, it is not called anāsrava; not being anāsrava, it is not called supramundane. In the Mahāyāna teaching, the meaning partakes of both. If viewed in terms of fruition and retribution, it agrees with the Abhidharma; hence the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* says: 'The ten proclivities of the higher realms are indeterminate.' When analyzed with respect to principle, its meaning agrees with the *Tattvasiddhi*: all ten proclivities are bad.