三論玄義 1.17

1.17

次明眾論旨歸門。通論大小乘經同明一道，故以無得正觀為宗。但小乘教者正觀猶遠，故就四諦教為宗。大乘正明正觀，故諸大乘經同以不二正觀為宗。但約方便用異，故有諸部差別。如明應說不應說，今昔開會，名為法華。破斥八倒，辨常無常用，名為涅槃。至論不二正道更無別異，在經既爾，在論亦然。雖諸部有異同，用不二正觀為宗。又經論同宗，佛說正觀為經，論申正觀為論。經論用異，正觀無別。故《無量義經》云「如水洗穢義同，約井池為異。」自昔及今，一切諸教同治斷常之病、同開正道，但約今昔教用異耳。今四論約用不同，故辨四宗差別。《智度論》正釋《大品》，而龍樹開《大品》為二道：前明般若道、次明方便道。此之二道即是法身父母，故《大品》以實慧、方便慧為宗。論申經二慧，還以二慧為宗。如《中論》申二諦，還以二諦為宗也。問：《大品》何故前明般若、後明方便耶？答：般若方便實無前後，而作前後說者，般若為體、方便為用。故《智度論》云「譬如金為體，金上精巧為用。」故前明其體、後辨其用也。又非凡夫行、非賢聖行，是菩薩行。般若超凡、方便越聖，要前超凡後方越聖，故前明般若、後辨方便。又眾生起見凡有二種：一者有見、二者無見。般若破其有見，方便斥其無見，故前明般若、後辨方便。若明次第者，三藏多說有教以破外道，而封執三藏之有，故般若次說空。惑者著般若之空，故次說方便令其離空。故《智度論．序》云「知邪病之自起，故《阿含》為之作。以滯有之為患，故《般若》為之照。」即斯意也。若約位而言，般若配於六地，故前明之；方便在於七地，故後說也。問：舊亦明《大品》二慧為宗，與今何異？答：今明聖心未曾二，為眾生故無二說二，欲令因二悟於不二。故與舊不同。又雖明二慧，與舊亦異。舊義實慧但照空不達有，漚和但照有不達空，蓋是限局聖心，便成二見。今明至人體無礙之道，故有無礙之用。般若既照空即能鑒有，方便既涉有即能鑒空，具如二智中說。次明《中論》以二諦為宗。所以用二諦為宗者，二諦是佛法根本，如來自行化他皆由二諦。自行由二諦者，如《瓔珞經．佛母品》明二諦能生佛，故二諦是佛母。蓋取二智為佛，二諦能生二智，故以二諦為母，即是如來自德圓滿由於二諦。化他德由二諦者，如來有所說法教化眾生常依二諦。故《中論》云「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法」也。問：何以知自他兩德並由二諦耶？答：《十二門論》云「以識二諦故，即得自利他利及以共利。」即其事也。以二諦是自行化他之本，故申明二諦以為論宗，即令一切眾生具得自他二利也。問：何人迷二諦，論主破迷申二諦耶？答：有三種人迷於二諦。一者小乘五百部，各執諸法有決定性，聞畢竟空如刀傷心，此人失第一義諦。然既失第一義諦，亦失世諦。所以然者，空宛然而有，故有名空有，方是世諦。彼既失空，亦是迷有，故失世諦。故五百部執出如來二諦之外。二者方廣道人，謂一切諸法如龜毛兔角、無罪福報應，此人失於世諦。然有宛然而空，故空名有空。既失空有，亦失有空，如斯之人亦失二諦。又諸外道亦失二諦，如有見外道迷於真諦，空見外道迷於世諦。又凡夫著有故迷真諦，二乘滯空迷世諦也。第三人得二諦名而失二諦旨。斯執甚多，今略出二種：或言二諦一體、或言二諦異體，並不成二諦之義，具如疏初序之。今破此之失，申明二諦，故用二諦為宗也。問：何以得知此論用二諦為宗耶？答：略有三種。一者《瓔珞經．佛母品》明二諦不生不滅乃至不來不去。今論正明八不，故知即是辨於二諦，故以二諦為宗。二者青目序論意，明外人失二諦，龍樹菩薩為是等故造此《中論》。即知破外迷失申明二諦，故以二諦為宗也。三者關內曇影《中論．序》云「此論雖無理不窮、無言不盡，統其要歸，會通二諦。」今還述舊釋，故知二諦為宗也。問：既名中論，何故不用中道為宗，乃以二諦為宗耶？答：即二諦是中道，既以二諦為宗，即是中道為宗。所以然者，還就二諦以明中道故。有世諦中道、真諦中道、非真非俗中道，但今欲名宗兩舉，故中諦互說，故宗舉其諦、名題其中。若以中道為名，復以中道為宗者，但得不二義，失其二義故也。問：經何故立二諦耶？答：此有兩義。一者欲示佛法是中道故，以有世諦是故不斷，以第一義是故不常，所以立於二諦。又二慧是三世佛法身父母，以有第一義故生般若，以有世諦故生方便，具實慧、方便慧有十方三世佛，是故立二諦。又知第一義是自利、知世諦故能利他，具知二諦即得共利，故立二諦。又有二諦故佛語皆實，以世諦故說有是實，第一義故說空是實。又佛法漸深，先說世諦因果教化，後為說第一義。又成就得道智者說第一義，無有說世諦；又若不先說世諦因果、直說第一義，則生斷見。是故具明二諦也。次明《百論》宗者，《百論》破邪申明二諦，具如〈空品〉末說，亦應以二諦為宗。但今欲與《中論》互相開避，《中論》以二諦為宗、《百論》用二智為宗，即欲明諦智互相成也。問：《百論》何故用二智為宗耶？答：提婆與外道對面擊揚鬪一時權巧智慧，但提婆權智巧能破邪巧能顯正，而實無所破亦無所顯，故名實智。一論始終明此二智，故以二智為宗。《中論》不與內諍一時權巧，但共同學二諦之人諍二諦得失，故以二諦為宗。則《中論》用所申為宗，百論用能申為宗，欲明佛與菩薩能所共相成也。次明《十二門論》宗者，此論亦破內迷申明二諦，亦以二諦為宗。但今欲示三論不同，宜以境智為宗。所言境智者，論云「大分深義所謂空也。若通達是義即通達大乘，具足六波羅蜜無所障礙。」大分深義謂實相之境，由實相境發生般若，由般若故萬行得成。即是境智之義，故用境智為宗也。

Next is the section explaining the central tenets of the various treatises. Broadly speaking, the sūtras of both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna elucidate the one single Path, and therefore take correct contemplation free from grasping as their central tenet. However, because in the teachings of the Hīnayāna correct contemplation is still distant, they take the teaching of the four noble truths as their central tenet. The Mahāyāna directly explains correct contemplation, and thus all Mahāyāna sūtras take non-dual correct contemplation as their central tenet. It is only with regard to their differences in expedient function that there are distinctions among the various texts. For instance, explaining what should be preached and what should not be preached, and opening and converging the present and the past [teachings], is called the Lotus Sūtra. Refuting the eight inversions, and discerning the functions of permanence and impermanence, is called the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. In the ultimate discussion of the non-dual correct path there is no difference whatsoever; as this is so for sūtras, it is likewise so for treatises. Although the various texts have differences, they all take non-dual correct contemplation as their central tenet. Furthermore, sūtras and treatises share the same central tenet: the Buddha speaking correct contemplation is a sūtra, while treatises clarifying correct contemplation are treatises. Although the functions of sūtras and treatises differ, the correct contemplation is not distinct. Therefore the Sūtra of Immeasurable Meanings says: "Just as water washing away filth is identical in function, distinctions are made only with respect to wells and ponds." From the past down to the present, all teachings alike cure the sickness of annihilation and permanence, and alike open up the correct path; they differ only with respect to the functions of the teachings past and present. Now, as the four treatises differ in their functions, we discern the differences among their four central tenets. The Dazhidulun directly interprets the Pañcaviṃśati; Nāgārjuna divided the Pañcaviṃśati into two paths: first explaining the path of prajñā, and next explaining the path of upāya. These two paths are the father and mother of the dharmakāya; hence the Pañcaviṃśati takes real wisdom and expedient wisdom as its central tenet. Since the treatise elucidates the two wisdoms of the sūtra, it likewise takes the two wisdoms as its central tenet. This is just as the Madhyamakaśāstra elucidates the two truths and likewise takes the two truths as its central tenet. Question: Why does the Pañcaviṃśati explain prajñā first and upāya later? Answer: In truth, prajñā and upāya have no before or after; yet they are spoken of as before and after because prajñā is the essence and upāya is the function. Therefore the Dazhidulun says: "For example, gold is the essence, while the craftsmanship wrought upon the gold is the function." Hence its essence is explained first, and its function is discerned later. Furthermore, neither the practice of ordinary people nor the practice of noble sages is the practice of bodhisattvas. Prajñā transcends ordinary people, and upāya surpasses noble sages; since one must first transcend ordinary people and only then surpass noble sages, prajñā is explained first, and upāya is discerned later. Moreover, there are two kinds of views that sentient beings give rise to: first, the view of existence; second, the view of non-existence. Prajñā refutes their view of existence, and upāya rejects their view of non-existence; hence prajñā is explained first, and upāya is discerned later. If one explains the sequence: the Tripiṭaka mostly teaches existence to refute tīrthikas, but [people] cling stubbornly to the existence taught in the Tripiṭaka, so prajñā next teaches emptiness. Deluded people cling to the emptiness of prajñā, so next upāya is taught to make them leave emptiness behind. Therefore the preface to the Dazhidulun says: "Knowing that the sickness of error arises of itself, the Āgamas were composed for it; because clinging to existence is a calamity, prajñā was shone upon it." Such is the meaning. If spoken of in terms of stages, prajñā corresponds to the sixth bhūmi, hence it is explained first; upāya resides in the seventh bhūmi, hence it is spoken of later. Question: The earlier masters also explained that the Pañcaviṃśati takes the two wisdoms as its central tenet; how does that differ from the present [view]? Answer: We now explain that the sagely mind is never dual; for the sake of sentient beings, where there is no duality it speaks of two, wishing to cause them to awaken to non-duality by means of duality. Therefore it differs from the earlier masters. Furthermore, although both explain two wisdoms, this also differs from the earlier masters. The old doctrine held that real wisdom only illuminates emptiness and does not reach existence, while upāya only illuminates existence and does not reach emptiness. This was merely to delimit the sagely mind, resulting in two views. We now explain that the ultimate person embodies the unobstructed path and therefore possesses unobstructed function. Since prajñā illuminates emptiness, it can thereby perceive existence; since upāya engages with existence, it can thereby perceive emptiness, exactly as explained in [the section on] the two knowledges. Next, we explain that the Madhyamakaśāstra takes the two truths as its central tenet. Why does it take the two truths as its central tenet? The two truths are the root of the Buddhadharma; the Tathāgata's own practice and his converting of others both proceed from the two truths. That his own practice proceeds from the two truths: as the "Mother of the Buddhas Chapter" in the Yingluo jing explains, the two truths are able to give birth to Buddhas, so the two truths are the mother of the Buddhas. This takes the two knowledges as the Buddha, and because the two truths can give birth to the two knowledges, the two truths are taken as the mother; that is, the Tathāgata's own perfection of virtue proceeds from the two truths. That the virtue of converting others proceeds from the two truths: when the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma to teach and transform sentient beings, he always relies on the two truths. Therefore the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "The Buddhas rely on the two truths / in preaching the Dharma for sentient beings." Question: How is it known that both virtues, of oneself and others, proceed from the two truths? Answer: The Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra says: "Because one recognizes the two truths, one obtains benefit for oneself, benefit for others, and mutual benefit." This is precisely the point. Because the two truths are the root of one's own practice and converting others, elucidating the two truths is taken as the central tenet of the treatise, thereby causing all sentient beings to completely obtain both benefits, for oneself and for others. Question: Who is deluded about the two truths, such that the treatise master refutes their delusion and elucidates the two truths? Answer: There are three kinds of people who are deluded about the two truths. First, the five hundred sects of the Hīnayāna, each clinging to dharmas as having a determinate nature; hearing of ultimate emptiness is like a knife wounding their hearts. Such people lose paramārthasatya. Yet, since they lose paramārthasatya, they also lose saṃvṛtisatya. Why is this? Emptiness clearly manifests as existence, so existence is called 'empty existence', and only this is saṃvṛtisatya. Since they lose emptiness, they are also deluded about existence, and therefore lose saṃvṛtisatya. Thus the attachments of the five hundred sects fall outside the Tathāgata's two truths. Second, the Fangguang masters, who claim that all dharmas are like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare, and that there are no transgressions, blessings, or retributions; such people lose saṃvṛtisatya. Yet existence clearly manifests as empty, so emptiness is called 'existent emptiness'. Since they lose empty existence, they also lose existent emptiness; such people likewise lose both truths. Furthermore, all tīrthikas also lose the two truths: tīrthikas with views of existence are deluded about paramārthasatya, while tīrthikas with views of emptiness are deluded about saṃvṛtisatya. Moreover, ordinary people cling to existence and are therefore deluded about paramārthasatya; those of the two vehicles dwell in emptiness and are deluded about saṃvṛtisatya. The third kind of people obtain the names of the two truths but lose the purport of the two truths. Such attachments are very numerous; now two are briefly brought forth: some say the two truths are of one substance, while others say the two truths are of different substances. Neither accomplishes the meaning of the two truths, exactly as set forth at the beginning of the commentary's preface. Now, refuting these errors and elucidating the two truths, it takes the two truths as its central tenet. Question: How is it known that this treatise takes the two truths as its central tenet? Answer: Briefly, there are three [reasons]. First, the "Mother of the Buddhas Chapter" in the Yingluo jing explains that the two truths are neither arising nor ceasing, up to neither coming nor going. Since the present treatise directly explains the eight negations, we know that this is discerning the two truths, and therefore it takes the two truths as its central tenet. Second, Qingmu's preface to the treatise's meaning explains that outsiders lost the two truths, and Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed this Madhyamakaśāstra for their sake. Thus we know that refuting outsiders' delusions and losses elucidates the two truths, and therefore it takes the two truths as its central tenet. Third, Tanying of Guannai states in his preface to the Madhyamakaśāstra: "Although this treatise leaves no principle unprobed and no word unexhausted, gathering together its essential destination, it converges upon and penetrates the two truths." Now we re-state this earlier explanation, and thus know that the two truths are the central tenet. Question: Since it is named Madhyamakaśāstra, why does it not take the middle path as its central tenet, but instead takes the two truths as its central tenet? Answer: The two truths are themselves the middle path; since it takes the two truths as its central tenet, that is already taking the middle path as its central tenet. Why is this? It is because the middle path is explained precisely in terms of the two truths. There is the middle path of saṃvṛtisatya, the middle path of paramārthasatya, and the middle path of neither-ultimate-nor-conventional. But now, wishing to bring forth both the name and the central tenet, 'middle' and 'truths' are stated in alternation; hence the central tenet presents the truths, while the title bears 'middle'. If the middle path were taken as the title and the middle path were also taken as the central tenet, one would only obtain the meaning of non-duality and lose the meaning of duality. Question: Why do sūtras establish the two truths? Answer: There are two meanings to this. First, wishing to demonstrate that the Buddhadharma is the middle path: because there is saṃvṛtisatya, there is non-annihilation; because there is paramārtha, there is non-permanence; therefore the two truths are established. Furthermore, the two wisdoms are the father and mother of the dharmakāya of the Buddhas of the three periods: because there is paramārtha, prajñā is born; because there is saṃvṛtisatya, upāya is born. With real wisdom and expedient wisdom complete, there are the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three periods; therefore the two truths are established. Furthermore, knowing paramārtha is self-benefit; because of knowing saṃvṛtisatya, one can benefit others; knowing both truths completely, one obtains mutual benefit; therefore the two truths are established. Furthermore, because there are two truths, the Buddha's words are all true: by virtue of saṃvṛtisatya, speaking of existence is true; by virtue of paramārtha, speaking of emptiness is true. Furthermore, the Buddhadharma deepens gradually: first it speaks of the cause and effect of saṃvṛtisatya to instruct and transform, and later it speaks of paramārtha for them. Furthermore, to those who have achieved the wisdom of attaining the path, it speaks of paramārtha without speaking of saṃvṛtisatya; and if it did not first speak of the cause and effect of saṃvṛtisatya but directly spoke of paramārtha, annihilationist views would arise. For these reasons the two truths are fully explained. Next, explaining the central tenet of the Śataśāstra: the Śataśāstra refutes the erroneous and elucidates the two truths, exactly as stated at the end of the "Chapter on Emptiness", and should also take the two truths as its central tenet. However, now wishing to make a distinction from the Madhyamakaśāstra: the Madhyamakaśāstra takes the two truths as its central tenet, while the Śataśāstra takes the two knowledges as its central tenet; that is, wishing to show that truths and knowledges mutually complete each other. Question: Why does the Śataśāstra take the two knowledges as its central tenet? Answer: Āryadeva confronted the tīrthikas face to face, striking and challenging them, contending with momentary expedients and skillful wisdom; yet Āryadeva's expedient wisdom was skillfully able to refute the erroneous and skillfully able to reveal the correct, while in reality there was nothing refuted and nothing revealed, which is therefore called real wisdom. From beginning to end the entire treatise explains these two knowledges, and therefore it takes the two knowledges as its central tenet. The Madhyamakaśāstra does not contend with inner [disputants] over momentary expedients, but only contends with fellow students of the two truths over the gains and losses regarding the two truths; therefore it takes the two truths as its central tenet. Thus the Madhyamakaśāstra takes what is elucidated as its central tenet, while the Śataśāstra takes that which elucidates as its central tenet, wishing to show that the Buddha and the bodhisattvas, the subjective and the objective, mutually complete each other. Next, explaining the central tenet of the Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra: this treatise also refutes inner delusions and elucidates the two truths, and also could take the two truths as its central tenet. However, now wishing to show the differences among the three treatises, it is appropriate to take object and cognition as its central tenet. As for what is called object and cognition, the treatise says: "The great, profound meaning is what is called emptiness. If one penetrates this meaning, one penetrates the Mahāyāna, fully possessing the six pāramitās without obstruction." The great, profound meaning refers to the objective sphere of dharmatā; through the objective sphere of dharmatā prajñā is generated, and through prajñā the myriad practices are accomplished. This is the meaning of object and cognition; hence it takes object and cognition as its central tenet.