三論玄義 1.18

1.18

次明四論破申不同門。所言破申者，凡有三義：一者破外人迷教之病故名為破，申佛二諦教門故名為申；二者申佛正教而邪迷自破，故名為申破耳；三者論主申明佛破，故名申破。諸大乘經破眾生虛妄以顯一道，但末代鈍根不了如來破病顯道之意，四依菩薩還申明佛破，故名申破。非是經中自立義，論中自明破也。問：何以知龍樹申佛破耶？答：最後〈邪見品〉云「瞿曇大聖主，憐愍說是法，悉斷一切見，我今稽首禮。」故知論主申明佛破，非自有破也。問：經中有立有破，論主何故一向破耶？答：末世鈍根迷佛，立破並皆成病，是以論主須並破之，然後具得申如來立破。問：論主申佛破得稱論主破，論主申佛立應名論主立耶？答：亦得爾也。問：四論破申云何同異？答：三論通破眾迷、通申眾教，《智度論》別破般若之迷、別申般若之教。就三論中自開二類：《百論》正破外、傍破內；餘二論正破內、傍破外。所以三論破內外者，一切眾病不出二種：一外道邪畫起迷、二內人稟教失旨，若破斯二則眾病皆除。問：《百論》破外可有明文，何處有破內文耶？答：〈破塵品〉中，外人以內義為證，論主即破其所引，具如彼明。問：何故得破內耶？答：有三種義。一者如向釋之，外人立義不成、引內為證，故須破內。二者內人立義與外道同，如立虛空常遍，乃至立涅槃身智俱無，並與外道同，故須破內。三者外道立義與內人同，故須破之，如破因中無果品說。外道立於三相前後相生，與譬喻部同；立三相展轉一時生，與薩婆多部同。故須破內。故肇法師云「邪辨逼真，殆亂正道」。問：《中論》何故傍破外耶？答：凡有四義。一者欲顯中觀無法不窮、無言不說。若一法不窮、一言不盡，則戲論不滅、中觀不生，是故內外並皆破之。二者內人立義與外道同，故須破外。三者外道立義與內人同，故須破外。四者欲顯中實非內非外、不正不邪，故須破外。問：《百論》破外亦有收取義不？答：亦有四句。一者破而不取，即是外道邪言障中迷觀，於緣無益有損。二者取而不破，外道偷竊如來遺餘善法，今並收之，如賊盜牛，即其證也。又外道各邪心推盡，冥智與內同，如蟲食木偶得成字，亦取而不破。三者亦破亦取，外道偷竊佛教，不識旨歸，今破其迷教之情，收取所迷之教。四者不破不取，即顯道門未曾內外也。

Next is the section clarifying the differences in refutation and exposition among the four treatises. What is meant by refutation and exposition has three meanings in all: First, because it refutes the sickness of outsiders who are confused about the teachings, it is called refutation; because it expounds the Buddha's teaching gate of the two truths, it is called exposition. Second, because it expounds the Buddha's correct teachings and erroneous confusion is thereby spontaneously refuted, it is called exposition-refutation. Third, because the treatise master expounds and clarifies the Buddha's refutation, it is called exposition-refutation. The Mahāyāna sūtras refute the delusions of sentient beings to reveal the single path; but dull-rooted beings of the latter age do not comprehend the Tathāgata's intention in refuting sicknesses to reveal the path, so the bodhisattvas of the four reliances again expound and clarify the Buddha's refutation—hence it is called exposition-refutation. It is not that the sūtras establish their own positions while the treatises clarify their own refutations. Question: How is it known that Nāgārjuna expounds the Buddha's refutation? Answer: The final "Chapter on Erroneous Views" says: "The Great Holy Lord Gautama, / Having pity, spoke this Dharma / To cut off all views entirely; / Now I bow my head in reverence." Hence we know that the treatise master expounded and clarified the Buddha's refutation, not that he had refutations of his own. Question: The sūtras have both establishing and refuting; why does the treatise master exclusively refute? Answer: Dull-rooted beings of the latter age are confused about the Buddha, so both establishing and refuting become illnesses for them. Therefore, the treatise master must refute them both, and only then can he fully expound the Tathāgata's establishing and refuting. Question: If the treatise master expounds the Buddha's refutation and can be called the treatise master's refuting, should the treatise master expounding the Buddha's establishing be called the treatise master's establishing? Answer: That is also acceptable. Question: How do the four treatises agree and differ regarding refutation and exposition? Answer: The Three Treatises generally refute all confusions and generally expound all teachings; the Da zhidu lun specifically refutes confusions concerning prajñā and specifically expounds the teachings of prajñā. Within the Three Treatises, two categories naturally open up: the Śataśāstra primarily refutes the external and tangentially refutes the internal; the other two treatises primarily refute the internal and tangentially refute the external. The reason why the Three Treatises refute both internal and external is that all the illnesses of beings do not exceed two kinds: first, tīrthikas who erroneously contrive and give rise to confusion; second, internal adherents who receive the teachings but miss their intent. If these two are refuted, all illnesses are entirely eliminated. Question: That the Śataśāstra refutes the external has explicit text, but where is there text refuting the internal? Answer: In the "Chapter on Refuting Atoms," the outsider cites an internal tenet as proof, and the treatise master immediately refutes what was cited, fully as clarified there. Question: For what reason may the internal be refuted? Answer: There are three reasons. First, as explained just above, when the outsider's established position is unsuccessful and he cites the internal as proof, it is necessary to refute the internal. Second, internal adherents establish positions identical to those of tīrthikas—such as establishing space as permanent and omnipresent, and even establishing that in nirvāṇa both body and cognition are nonexistent, which are entirely identical to tīrthikas—so it is necessary to refute the internal. Third, tīrthikas establish positions identical to those of internal adherents, so it is necessary to refute them, as spoken in the "Chapter on Refuting the Absence of the Effect in the Cause." Tīrthikas establish that the three characteristics produce one another sequentially, which is identical to the Dārṣṭāntikas; and they establish that the three characteristics produce one another simultaneously through mutual dependence, which is identical to the Sarvāstivādins. Therefore it is necessary to refute the internal. Hence Dharma Master Sengzhao said: "Erroneous arguments resemble the real, almost bringing disorder to the correct path." Question: For what reason does the Madhyamakaśāstra tangentially refute the external? Answer: There are four reasons in all. First, it wishes to reveal that the madhyamaka-vipaśyanā leaves no dharma unplumbed and no words unspoken. If a single dharma were not plumbed or a single word were not exhausted, prapañca would not be extinguished and madhyamaka-vipaśyanā would not arise; therefore, both internal and external are refuted together. Second, internal adherents establish positions identical to those of tīrthikas, so it is necessary to refute the external. Third, tīrthikas establish positions identical to those of internal adherents, so it is necessary to refute the external. Fourth, it wishes to reveal that the central reality is neither internal nor external, neither correct nor erroneous, so it is necessary to refute the external. Question: Does the Śataśāstra's refutation of the external also have the sense of acceptance? Answer: There is also a catuṣkoṭi. First, refuting without accepting: these are the erroneous words of tīrthikas that obstruct the central [reality] and confuse vipaśyanā, bringing no benefit to circumstances, only harm. Second, accepting without refuting: tīrthikas steal the remaining wholesome dharmas of the Tathāgata, which are now collected back, just as [recovering] cattle stolen by thieves serves as proof. Moreover, when tīrthikas, each pushing their erroneous minds to the limit, covertly coincide in cognition with the internal—like an insect eating wood that accidentally forms characters—these are also accepted and not refuted. Third, both refuting and accepting: tīrthikas steal the Buddhist teachings without understanding their purpose; now we refute their sentiment of being confused about the teachings, and accept the teachings about which they were confused. Fourth, neither refuting nor accepting: this reveals that the gate of the path has never been internal or external.