大乘玄論 1.11

Eighth, subsuming phenomena. In discussing whether the two truths subsume all phenomena, do they exhaust them completely or not? There have always been three explanations. First, Zhuangyan says: the two truths do not subsume phenomena exhaustively. Why so? Because if it is a deluded cause bringing about an illusory result, this is conventional truth. Being an illusory result, it can be emptied, which is ultimate truth. But the eternally abiding buddha-fruit in its substance is not illusory, hence it is not conventional truth; it can no longer be emptied, hence it is not ultimate truth. He cites the Benevolent King Prajñāpāramitā: 'It transcends beyond the two truths.' Second, Kaishan explains: the two truths subsume exhaustively; hence it is said that there are no phenomena they do not encompass, no meanings they do not cover. The principles of the ultimate and the conventional, unfolded, leave no phenomenon that is not included; folded up, they are simply the two truths and nothing more. Thus the Pañcaviṃśati says: 'Even if there were a phenomenon surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still say it is like an illusion, like a dream.' Great nirvāṇa is empty; the Tathāgata is empty. Third, Yecheng explains: the buddha-fruit is subsumed under ultimate truth and not conventional truth. Why so? The buddha-fruit is a real phenomenon, no longer illusory, its entire substance wondrously transcendent; therefore it is ultimate truth. To give an analogy: just as water is originally clear and still, yet due to conditions of wind and waves it produces ripples. When the wind ceases and the waves calm down, it returns to the clarity of the original water. The internal correspondence: originally only the principle of ultimate truth was apparent; the wind of afflictions arose, leading to the waves of saṃsāra; saṃsāra having ceased, it returns to the one ultimate principle. The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Conventional truth is called arising at the time of saṃsāra; that which is not saṃsāra is the exhaustion [of suffering].' That which is not saṃsāra is the buddha-fruit; arising and ceasing is called conventional truth. Now I disagree with all of them. Regarding the first explanation that the buddha-fruit transcends beyond the two truths: the Pañcaviṃśati says, 'Not seeing any phenomenon that transcends the Dharma-nature, this is called being in accord with prajñā.' Now if there were still a phenomenon transcending beyond the two truths, that would not be in accord. Disagreeing with the second explanation: if one says that the buddha-fruit is subsumed under the two truths, then the buddha-fruit is determinately within the two truths, determinately existent or non-existent. The Tattvasiddhi says: 'Although the Buddha is in the world, he is not subsumed under existence or non-existence.' How much less after his extinction? The Madhyamakaśāstra says: 'While the Tathāgata is in the world, one does not speak of existence or non-existence; after the Tathāgata's extinction, one does not speak of existence or non-existence.' How could he be subsumed under existence or non-existence? Disagreeing with the third explanation: if one says that the buddha-fruit is solely ultimate truth and lacks conventional truth, then one loses the capacity of responding to capacities and illuminating. Question: In our present explanation, do the two truths subsume phenomena exhaustively or not? Explanation: The Mahāyāna sūtras contain both passages; these are both the Tathāgata's expedient teachings for particular capacities. Sometimes, for certain capacities, he teaches that the two truths subsume phenomena exhaustively; sometimes, for certain capacities, he teaches that they do not subsume phenomena exhaustively. Both dharma-gates, exhaustive and non-exhaustive, are present. Moreover, if one wishes them to subsume exhaustively, they are exhaustive; if one wishes them not to subsume exhaustively, they are non-exhaustive; there is no obstruction. Why is this? One school has single and compound forms of six kinds of two truths, and earlier and later explained three kinds of two truths: sometimes there are three truths: the truth of existence, the truth of non-existence, and the ultimate truth of the Middle Way that is neither existent nor non-existent. Sometimes the three truths are subsumed into two truths: existence and non-existence are both conventional truth, and neither existent nor non-existent is ultimate truth. And so on, up to: dual and non-dual are conventional truth, and neither dual nor non-dual is ultimate truth. In terms of this meaning, nothing transcends the two truths. Question: In studying the Buddha's two truths, what are the errors and gains? Please expound them. Answer: There are ten propositions. First, positing intrinsic nature in the two truths is an error; dependent co-arising and conventional designation in the two truths is a gain. Question: Now merely citing the Tattvasiddhi's explanation of the three designations does not fall into the gateway of error. It explains that the three designations are conventional truth, and the emptiness of the three designations is ultimate truth. Being identical to the three designations, they are ever fourfold-forgotten; being identical to the fourfold-forgotten, they are ever the three designations. Being identical to the three designations, they are ever fourfold-severed, hence existence does not exist of itself; being identical to the fourfold-severed, they are ever the three designations, hence emptiness is not empty of itself; thus it is not an intrinsic-nature doctrine. Now I ask: if the three designations are conventional truth and the fourfold-severed is ultimate truth, does the existence of conventional truth depend upon ultimate emptiness? If he answers: 'Conventional truth depends upon ultimate truth,' then conventional truth is that which depends, and ultimate truth is that which is depended upon; the two truths are then dependent designation. How could one say that the three designations are conventional truth and the fourfold-severed is the ultimate? If the existence of the three designations of conventional truth does not depend upon ultimate emptiness, then since they do not depend upon each other, it becomes intrinsic nature, and thus he cannot answer. Is the name of ultimate truth subsumed under conventional truth, or subsumed under ultimate truth? If it is subsumed under conventional truth, then conventional truth in turn depends on conventional truth, just as 'long' in turn depends on 'long'. If the name of ultimate truth is subsumed under ultimate truth, ultimate truth has no name, so how could it subsume names? Question: Regarding dependent designation, the Tattvasiddhi masters say: 'Depending occurs after being established.' The Middle-Designation masters say: 'Being established occurs after depending.' How is this answered? Neither is correct. The text of the treatise itself refutes this: 'Before being established, how could there be depending? Once established, how could there be depending?' In our present doctrine, the moment of depending is precisely establishing; the moment of establishing is precisely depending; therefore there is no error of before and after. Second is the gateway of existence and non-existence. Upādhyāya Xinghuang in the mountains recounted the words of Master Dalang of Mount She: 'The two truths are teaching.' He also said: 'The five eyes do not see sentient beings or any phenomena outside principle. These are outside the two truths, not subsumed under the two truths; within principle, the two truths exist distinctly.' Those who do not understand the great master's intent grasp at a difference between inside principle and outside principle. Third is the gateway of having a root and lacking a root, explaining gain and error. Others lack a root; our present doctrine has a root: the non-dual correct path is the root of existence and non-existence. The Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: 'The nature of the true Dharma is far removed / From all paths of words and speech. / All destinies and non-destinies / Are completely of the nature of quiescence.' Therefore it is neither existent nor non-existent, neither both existent and non-existent, nor neither existent nor non-existent; hence it is said to be 'far removed from all destinies.' Question: Why are the two truths taken as the gateway of teaching? Answer: Taking existence and non-existence as teaching has briefly five meanings: First, contrasted with principle, it is explained that the two truths are teaching: because principle has no duality, it is neither existent nor non-existent. Now existence and non-existence are spoken of; hence existence and non-existence are teaching. Second, looking toward the substance of the sages, existence and non-existence have never been existent or non-existent. Now existence and non-existence are spoken of; this is teaching for capacities; hence existence and non-existence are teaching. Third, to uproot views. The old doctrines grasped existence and non-existence as principle; this having lasted a long time, the roots of the two views became deep and difficult to overturn and uproot. The great master of Mount She rebuked the disease in accordance with conditions, wishing to uproot the roots of the two views and cause them to abandon both attachments to existence and non-existence; therefore he taught that existence and non-existence can lead to the non-dual principle. Existence and non-existence are not ultimate, and one should not abide within existence and non-existence; existence and non-existence are teaching. Fourth, because existence and non-existence are the roots of all views, all sūtras and treatises vigorously scold the two views and rebuke existence and non-existence, as ordinary persons cling to existence and practitioners of the two vehicles cling to non-existence.

Furthermore, those with much craving cling to existence, and those with much view cling to non-existence. Furthermore, those with much of the four views cling to existence, and those with much wrong view grasp at non-existence. Furthermore, within the Buddha's Dharma, five hundred treatise-masters grasped at existence, and hearing of ultimate emptiness was like a knife wounding their hearts; the Fangguang grasped at non-existence, disbelieving in cause and effect; and the grasps of the ninety-six kinds of heterodox paths also do not go beyond existence and non-existence. If when buddhas appear in the world they were to say further that existence and non-existence are two principles, this would only increase the minds of various views—by what means could they be pulled out? Therefore we now clarify that existence and non-existence are teaching-approaches, able to lead through to the non-dual principle, and one should not abide within existence and non-existence. Because of the desire to put an end to all views, the sūtras and treatises clarify that existence and non-existence are teaching-approaches. Fifth, when followers who receive the teaching hear that existence and non-existence are teachings, they are able to penetrate the correct path, transcend the ordinary, and achieve sagehood; therefore existence and non-existence are teachings. Question: By what text do you prove that the two truths are teachings? Answer: Textual passages are very numerous; I shall cite one sūtra and one treatise. The treatise says: "The Buddha relies on the two truths to preach the Dharma." Therefore the two truths are teachings. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "The bodhisattva abides in the two truths to preach the Dharma for sentient beings; for those who cling to existence he preaches emptiness, and for those who cling to emptiness he preaches existence." In both sūtras and treatises, the buddhas and bodhisattvas clarify that the two truths are teachings. Question: If you prove that the two truths are teachings by five meanings and two texts, I will now also clarify that the two truths are not teachings by five objections and two texts. First: if the two truths were teachings, when the Buddha speaks them they would exist, and when he does not speak them there would be no two truths. If so, since originally the two gnoses are generated by the two truths, when the Buddha does not speak the two, there would be no two gnoses. Since there would be no two truths, what would the Buddha illuminate so as to have the two gnoses? Second: if conventional truth were a teaching, practices such as the six perfections are all conventional truth. When the Buddha does not speak conventional truth, there would be no conventional truth, and then there would be no practices such as the six perfections. If so, there would only be the Dharma-jewel of explanatory teaching, and there would be no Dharma-jewel of nirvāṇa. Third: the two truths serve as cognitive objects to give rise to the two gnoses, and the two truths are called the Dharma-jewel of the cognitive realm. If the two truths were teachings, there would only be the Dharma-jewel of explanatory teaching, and also no Dharma-jewel of the cognitive realm. If you say that because teaching generates gnosis it is shift-named a cognitive object, then when the Buddha does not speak the teaching, there would be no teaching that could be shifted, and then there would be no cognitive object. Fourth: if the two truths were teachings, the ten thousand phenomena such as form are all conventional truth. Since conventional truth would be a teaching, the ten thousand phenomena such as form should also be teachings. If so, when the Buddha does not speak conventional truth, there would be no ten thousand phenomena such as form. Fifth: if conventional truth were a teaching, conventional truth would only have teaching, and fire should have no actual function of fire. If fire were only a teaching, speaking "fire" in the mouth should burn the mouth. Next, two texts prove that the two truths are not teachings. If one says that ultimate truth is a teaching, the sūtra says: "Whether there is a buddha or no buddha, the nature and characteristics permanently abide." But teaching only exists when there is a buddha, and does not exist when there is no buddha; how then could it be permanently abiding? The sūtra says: "Whether there is a buddha or no buddha, the twelve links of dependent co-arising permanently and naturally exist on their own." Therefore we know conventional truth is not a teaching. Answer: There are two kinds of truth: first, truth in relation to cognition; second, truth as teaching. As for truth in relation to cognition: form and the like have never been existence or non-existence, yet in relation to the ordinary they are existence, termed conventional truth; in terms of the noble they are empty, termed ultimate truth. In relation to the ordinary they are existence, termed conventional truth, so the ten thousand phenomena are not lost; in terms of the noble they are empty, termed ultimate truth, so whether there is a buddha or no buddha the nature and characteristics permanently abide. As for truth as teaching: the buddhas and bodhisattvas comprehend that form has never been existence or non-existence, and to transform sentient beings they speak of existence and non-existence, making the teaching of the two truths. Wishing to make them awaken to non-existence and non-non-existence by means of this existence and non-existence, existence and non-existence are teachings. But the old doctrine's clarification that the two truths are principles is merely truth in relation to cognition. When truth in relation to cognition is viewed against truth as teaching, not only does it lose the non-dual principle, it also loses the teaching that can express it. Question: Since being existence in relation to the ordinary is an error, is being empty in relation to the noble also an error? Answer: Provisionally, clarifying the noble in contrast to ordinary persons is an attainment; if viewed against truth as teaching, all are errors. Because form has never been existence or non-existence, yet one forms an understanding of existence or non-existence, it is an error. Question: The sūtra says: "All conventional truths, if in relation to the Tathāgata, are ultimate truth." Is this also an error? Answer: Provisionally, truth in relation to cognition not only fails to express the non-dual principle, it also fails to grasp the teaching that can express it; it is merely what is seen by biased conception. If one recognises the two kinds of two truths, the five objections are naturally dispelled. Question: Although there is this resolution, it is still not apparent: if speaking of form's existence and non-existence now is truth as teaching, when one does not speak of existence and non-existence there is no truth as teaching. Answer: Since speaking is taken as teaching, when the Buddha does not speak there is indeed no truth as teaching. Question: If that is so, there are only ever the two truths in relation to cognition, and no dependent co-arising existence and non-existence. Answer: All phenomena are constantly the existence and non-existence of the two truths in relation to cognition, and are also constantly the existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising. If in relation to the two conditions, they are the existence and non-existence of the two truths in relation to cognition; the buddhas and bodhisattvas comprehend this form as the existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising. However, cognition and teaching have never been two cognitions or two teachings; if the existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising have never been existence or non-existence, such existence and non-existence can bring about non-existence and non-non-existence, and are therefore called teaching. Question: Others also speak of dependent co-arising existence and non-existence; how does it differ from our present view? Answer: When we now speak of dependent co-arising existence and non-existence, this is merely an expedient teaching. Because the sage transforms sentient beings by teaching, he speaks of existence and non-existence, laying out this existence and non-existence as teaching. Others clarify that principle itself is existence and non-existence; hence we are different now, and we take only this single meaning as the correct answer. Question: When existence and non-existence are viewed with respect to the buddhas and bodhisattvas, they are the existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising, which is the cognitive object of dependent co-arising; why say they are teachings? Answer: This existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising can be viewed in two ways: generating gnosis, it is a cognitive object; being able to open up the non-dual that is neither existent nor non-existent, it is a teaching. Question: When the Buddha illuminates existence and non-existence, existence and non-existence are called cognitive objects; when the Buddha speaks of existence and non-existence, existence and non-existence are teaching-approaches. Others also say that illuminating existence and non-existence makes existence and non-existence cognitive objects, and speaking of existence and non-existence makes existence and non-existence teachings as well. How does that differ from our present view? Answer: They only attain existence and non-existence of fixed nature in the two cognitions; such existence and non-existence cannot open up non-existence and non-non-existence, and therefore are not teachings. Furthermore, dependent co-arising existence and non-existence is a cognitive object, whereas existence and non-existence of fixed nature is not a cognitive object. Why? Existence does not exist from itself; it exists due to non-existence. Non-existence is not non-existent from itself; it is non-existent due to existence. This existence exists due to non-existence, so existence is non-existence. Awakening to this dependent co-arising existence and non-existence can generate the two wisdoms. Since [their view] is existence and non-existence of fixed nature, it generates the two views of annihilation and permanence; therefore it cannot be called a cognitive object. Next is clarifying correctness and error through the approach of speaking and not speaking. Others only clarify that conventional truth is spoken and ultimate truth is not spoken. Conventional truth is the three designations, and being designated, it can be spoken. Ultimate truth is the four cut-offs, and being cut off, it cannot be spoken. The various masters share this one interpretation.

Now it is asked: If the conventional truth is solely expressible and the ultimate truth is inexpressible, does this not entail an intrinsic nature? Answer: According to our present doctrine, although the conventional truth is expressible, the expressed is the ultimate and is inexpressible; and the inexpressible ultimate is the expressible conventional. Thus, there is no intrinsic nature. Question: If conventionality, being identical to the ultimate, is inexpressible, is this the inexpressibility of the conventional, or the inexpressibility of the ultimate? If it is still the inexpressibility of the ultimate, then the conventional lacks the meaning of being inexpressible; how then is it not an intrinsic nature? Answer: When we look comprehensively at the sūtras and treatises, they comprise a catuṣkoṭi: first, the conventional truth is expressed while the ultimate is unexpressed; second, the ultimate is expressed while the conventional is unexpressed; third, both are expressed; fourth, both are unexpressed. This catuṣkoṭi has many approaches, which shall now be set forth in full. First, the conventional truth speaks of arising and ceasing, while the ultimate truth does not speak of arising and ceasing; hence it is said that the conventional truth is expressed while the ultimate truth is unexpressed. Second, the ultimate truth speaks of non-arising and non-ceasing, while the conventional truth does not speak of non-arising and non-ceasing; hence the ultimate truth is expressed while the conventional truth is unexpressed. Third, the conventional truth speaks of arising and ceasing, and the ultimate truth speaks of the absence of arising and ceasing; hence both truths are expressed. Fourth, the conventional truth does not speak of the absence of arising and ceasing, and the ultimate truth does not speak of arising and ceasing; hence neither of the two truths is expressed. Question: Where does this catuṣkoṭi come from? Answer: The first fascicle of the Treatise [on the Great Prajñāpāramitā] states: "Persons and the like exist on account of conventional truth and do not exist on account of ultimate truth, just like the dharma-nature, etc." Existing on account of ultimate truth and not existing on account of conventional truth is precisely this meaning. Second: Explaining arising and ceasing is the conventional truth expressing it; non-arising and non-ceasing is the conventional truth not expressing it. Non-arising and non-ceasing is the ultimate truth expressing it; neither non-arising nor non-ceasing is the ultimate truth not expressing it. This means that both truths are expressed and both are unexpressed. Third: Speaking of arising and ceasing and speaking of non-arising and non-ceasing are both expressions on account of conventional truth; the ultimate truth does not speak of arising and ceasing, nor does it speak of neither arising nor ceasing; hence it is said that the conventional truth is expressed and the ultimate truth is unexpressed. Fourth, regarding the ultimate truth being expressed and the conventional truth not being expressed: although the conventional truth speaks of arising and ceasing or non-arising and non-ceasing, in reality nothing is expressed; although the ultimate truth expresses nothing, there is nothing it does not express. Question: If the conventional truth speaks and yet expresses nothing, expressing nothing enters into the ultimate truth; and if the ultimate truth expresses nothing and yet leaves nothing unexpressed, this is still the conventional truth. Where then is there a case where the conventional truth is unexpressed and the ultimate truth is expressed? Answer: For those with attainment who hold to an intrinsic nature, the meaning is indeed like that. Conventional truth in itself is expression; if there is no expression, it pertains to the ultimate truth. The ultimate truth in itself is without expression; if there is expression, it again pertains to conventional truth. In this way, both the ultimate and conventional become obstructive dharmas. We now explain that for the buddhas and bodhisattvas, non-attainment is emptiness, and dependent co-arising is unobscured; therefore emptiness is the emptiness of existence, and existence is the existence of emptiness. Emptiness being the emptiness of existence, although empty, it exists; existence being the existence of emptiness, although existing, it is empty. Expressing is the expression of non-expression; not expressing is the non-expression of expression. Because expression is the expression of non-expression, although expressing, it does not express; because non-expression is the non-expression of expression, although not expressing, it constantly expresses. Hence it is established that conventional truth is unexpressed while the ultimate is expressed. Question: The Madhyamakaśāstra states, "The conventional truth has verbal expression; the ultimate truth has no verbal expression." Others say: "The ultimate truth is without names and words; all names and words are conventional truth." If verbal teachings are the ultimate truth, then since verbal teachings arise and cease, the ultimate truth ought to arise and cease. If the ultimate is without arising and ceasing, why do you now say that the ultimate truth is entirely teaching? Answer: We do not take verbal teaching to be the ultimate truth; rather, we speak of it as the ultimate and conventional merely because it is the expression of the ultimate and the expression of the conventional. Fourth is clarifying gain and loss through revealing and not revealing. Existence and non-existence held with attainment fixate upon existence and non-existence, and cannot reveal the Way. Existence and non-existence of non-attainment can only then reveal the Way; hence this is called the approach of revealing and not revealing. Fifth is the approach of gain and loss regarding principle and teaching. Others possess only principle without teaching; we now possess both principle and teaching. Sixth is clarifying gain and loss through the approach of shallow and deep. Others only clarify emptiness and existence as the two truths and are therefore shallow; we now clarify the fourfold two truths and are therefore deep. Seventh is clarifying gain and loss through the approach of inside and outside the principle. The first is the meaning of outside the principle, and the second is the meaning of inside the principle. If the mind's activity is outside the principle, it is called outside the principle; if the mind's activity is inside the principle, it is called inside the principle. Eighth is clarifying gain and loss through the approach of no intrinsic nature. Just as a single form has never had intrinsic nature of its own, nor is it a provisional designation, yet relative to intrinsic conditions it becomes an intrinsic nature, and relative to provisional conditions it becomes provisional. Inside and outside the principle, and attainment and non-attainment, are also like this. Just as a single form has never been ultimate or conventional: a lustful person sees form as pure, while a person practicing the contemplation of impurity sees form as impure. Ninth is clarifying gain and loss in terms of mutual dependence. Question: What person does this counter? Answer: There are three meanings in total. First, it is so that those who study the Mahāyānasaṃgraha will not grasp at the three natures, nor preserve the principle of the three non-natures. As for the three natures, they are paratantra, parikalpita, and pariniṣpanna. The parikalpita nature refers to the six sense objects being conceptualized by consciousness; hence it is called the parikalpita nature. The paratantra nature refers to the fundamental consciousness serving as the basis for the seeds; hence it is named paratantra. The pariniṣpanna nature is the true suchness of the two kinds of selflessness. As for the three non-natures: knowing that sense objects have no marks, one speaks of the nature of the marklessness of conceptualization. As for the nature of non-arising of paratantra: knowing that the fundamental consciousness is without arising, one speaks of the nature of non-arising. Knowing that the principle of selflessness is without nature, pariniṣpanna is thus of the nature of non-arising. The Sanlun states that dharmas without nature are also non-existent; other traditions do not eliminate the three non-natures, whereas this treatise eliminates the three non-natures, and therefore it is said that they are all mutually dependent. Tenth is the approach of obliterating gain and loss. If one sees the aforementioned meanings as loss and takes the obliteration of nature and provisionality through the absence of inside and outside as gain, these are all losses. If one can be without gain and without loss, not knowing what to call it, one forcibly designates it as gain. Thus, by means of these ten approaches, the two doctrines—the others' and our own—are distinguished.