大乘玄論 1.11.2

1.11.2

又愛多者著有、見多者著無。 又四見多者著有、邪見多者執無。 又佛法中，五百論師執有，聞畢竟空如刀傷心。 方廣執無，不信因果。 又為九十六種外道所執不出有無。 諸佛出世復云有無是二理者，便增諸見心，何由可拔？ 故今明有無是教門，能通不二之理，不應住有無中。 以欲息諸見，故經論明有無是教門。 五者稟教之徒，聞有無是教，能通正道，超凡成聖，故有無是教。 問：以何文證二諦是教？ 答：文處甚多，舉一經一論。 論云「佛依二諦說法。 」故二諦為教。 《大品》云「菩薩住二諦中，為眾生說法，為著有者說空，為著空者說有。 」經論佛菩薩皆明二諦是教。 問：若以五義二文證二諦為教者，今亦以五難二文明二諦非教。 一者若二諦是教者，佛說時即有，不說即應無二諦。 若爾，本以二諦生於二智，佛不說二，即無二智。 既無二諦，佛何所照有二智？ 二者若世諦是教，六度等行皆是世諦。 佛不說世諦，即無世諦，便無六度等行。 若爾，但有詮教法寶，便無涅槃法寶。 三者二諦為境發生二智，二諦名境界法寶。 若二諦是教，但有詮教法寶，亦無境界法寶。 若言教生智故轉名境者，佛不說教，即無教可轉，便無有境。 四者若二諦是教，色等萬法皆是世諦。 世諦既是教者，色等萬法亦應是教。 若爾，佛不說世諦，即無色等萬法。 五者世諦是教者，世諦唯有教，火應無實火用。 若火唯是教，口中說火即應燒口。 次二文證二諦非教。 若言真諦是教者，經云「有佛無佛性相常住。 」而教即有佛方有、無佛即無，何即得常住？ 經云「十二因緣，有佛無佛常自有之。 」故知世諦非教。 答：諦有二種，一於諦、二教諦。 於諦者，色等未曾有無，而於凡是有，名俗諦； 約聖是空，名真諦。 於凡是有名俗諦，故萬法不失； 於聖是空名真諦，故有佛無佛性相常住。 教諦者，諸佛菩薩了色未曾有無，為化眾生故說有無，為二諦教。 欲令因此有無悟不有無，故有無是教。 而舊義明二諦是理者，此是於諦耳。 於諦望教諦，非但失不二理，亦失能表之教。 問：於凡是有既失者，於聖是空亦是失不？ 答：一往對凡夫明聖為得，若望教諦皆是失也。 以色未曾有無，而作有無解，故為失。 問：經云「一切世諦，若於如來即是第一義諦。 」亦是失耶？ 答：一往於諦非但不得表不二理，亦不得能表之教，但是謂情所見耳。 若識兩種二諦，即五難自祛。 問：雖有此通，猶未可見今說色有無是教諦者，不說有無即無教諦。 答：以說為教者，佛不說即無教諦也。 問：若爾者，唯恒有二於諦耳，即無因緣有無。 答：一切法常，是二於諦有無，亦恒是因緣有無。 若於二緣，即是二於諦有無，諸佛菩薩了此色即因緣有無。 然於與教未曾二於二教，若因緣有無未曾有無，如此有無能不有不無，故名為教。 問：他亦云因緣有無，與今何異？ 答：今言因緣有無，此是方便說耳。 聖為教化眾生，故說是有無，敘此有無為教也。 他明道理既是有無，故今不同，但取此一意為正答也。 問：有無望佛菩薩即是因緣有無，即是因緣境，云何言是教？ 答：是因緣有無，可兩望之，發智即境，能開不有不無不二即是教也。 問：佛照有無，有無名境； 佛說有無，有無是教門。 他亦云照有無，有無是境； 說有無，有無亦是教。 與今何異？ 答：他但得二於定性有無，此有無不得開不有不無，故不教也。 又因緣有無是境耳，定性有無非境也。 何者？ 有不自有，由無故有； 無不自無，由有故無。 是有由無故有，有是無有。 悟此因緣有無，能生二慧。 既是定性有無，即生斷常二見，故不得名境也。 次說不說門明得失。 他但明世諦說、真諦不說。 世諦是三假，假故可說。 真諦是四絕，絕不可說。 眾師同此一解。

Furthermore, those with much craving cling to existence, and those with much view cling to non-existence. Furthermore, those with much of the four views cling to existence, and those with much wrong view grasp at non-existence. Furthermore, within the Buddha's Dharma, five hundred treatise-masters grasped at existence, and hearing of ultimate emptiness was like a knife wounding their hearts; the Fangguang grasped at non-existence, disbelieving in cause and effect; and the grasps of the ninety-six kinds of heterodox paths also do not go beyond existence and non-existence. If when buddhas appear in the world they were to say further that existence and non-existence are two principles, this would only increase the minds of various views—by what means could they be pulled out? Therefore we now clarify that existence and non-existence are teaching-approaches, able to lead through to the non-dual principle, and one should not abide within existence and non-existence. Because of the desire to put an end to all views, the sūtras and treatises clarify that existence and non-existence are teaching-approaches. Fifth, when followers who receive the teaching hear that existence and non-existence are teachings, they are able to penetrate the correct path, transcend the ordinary, and achieve sagehood; therefore existence and non-existence are teachings. Question: By what text do you prove that the two truths are teachings? Answer: Textual passages are very numerous; I shall cite one sūtra and one treatise. The treatise says: "The Buddha relies on the two truths to preach the Dharma." Therefore the two truths are teachings. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: "The bodhisattva abides in the two truths to preach the Dharma for sentient beings; for those who cling to existence he preaches emptiness, and for those who cling to emptiness he preaches existence." In both sūtras and treatises, the buddhas and bodhisattvas clarify that the two truths are teachings. Question: If you prove that the two truths are teachings by five meanings and two texts, I will now also clarify that the two truths are not teachings by five objections and two texts. First: if the two truths were teachings, when the Buddha speaks them they would exist, and when he does not speak them there would be no two truths. If so, since originally the two gnoses are generated by the two truths, when the Buddha does not speak the two, there would be no two gnoses. Since there would be no two truths, what would the Buddha illuminate so as to have the two gnoses? Second: if conventional truth were a teaching, practices such as the six perfections are all conventional truth. When the Buddha does not speak conventional truth, there would be no conventional truth, and then there would be no practices such as the six perfections. If so, there would only be the Dharma-jewel of explanatory teaching, and there would be no Dharma-jewel of nirvāṇa. Third: the two truths serve as cognitive objects to give rise to the two gnoses, and the two truths are called the Dharma-jewel of the cognitive realm. If the two truths were teachings, there would only be the Dharma-jewel of explanatory teaching, and also no Dharma-jewel of the cognitive realm. If you say that because teaching generates gnosis it is shift-named a cognitive object, then when the Buddha does not speak the teaching, there would be no teaching that could be shifted, and then there would be no cognitive object. Fourth: if the two truths were teachings, the ten thousand phenomena such as form are all conventional truth. Since conventional truth would be a teaching, the ten thousand phenomena such as form should also be teachings. If so, when the Buddha does not speak conventional truth, there would be no ten thousand phenomena such as form. Fifth: if conventional truth were a teaching, conventional truth would only have teaching, and fire should have no actual function of fire. If fire were only a teaching, speaking "fire" in the mouth should burn the mouth. Next, two texts prove that the two truths are not teachings. If one says that ultimate truth is a teaching, the sūtra says: "Whether there is a buddha or no buddha, the nature and characteristics permanently abide." But teaching only exists when there is a buddha, and does not exist when there is no buddha; how then could it be permanently abiding? The sūtra says: "Whether there is a buddha or no buddha, the twelve links of dependent co-arising permanently and naturally exist on their own." Therefore we know conventional truth is not a teaching. Answer: There are two kinds of truth: first, truth in relation to cognition; second, truth as teaching. As for truth in relation to cognition: form and the like have never been existence or non-existence, yet in relation to the ordinary they are existence, termed conventional truth; in terms of the noble they are empty, termed ultimate truth. In relation to the ordinary they are existence, termed conventional truth, so the ten thousand phenomena are not lost; in terms of the noble they are empty, termed ultimate truth, so whether there is a buddha or no buddha the nature and characteristics permanently abide. As for truth as teaching: the buddhas and bodhisattvas comprehend that form has never been existence or non-existence, and to transform sentient beings they speak of existence and non-existence, making the teaching of the two truths. Wishing to make them awaken to non-existence and non-non-existence by means of this existence and non-existence, existence and non-existence are teachings. But the old doctrine's clarification that the two truths are principles is merely truth in relation to cognition. When truth in relation to cognition is viewed against truth as teaching, not only does it lose the non-dual principle, it also loses the teaching that can express it. Question: Since being existence in relation to the ordinary is an error, is being empty in relation to the noble also an error? Answer: Provisionally, clarifying the noble in contrast to ordinary persons is an attainment; if viewed against truth as teaching, all are errors. Because form has never been existence or non-existence, yet one forms an understanding of existence or non-existence, it is an error. Question: The sūtra says: "All conventional truths, if in relation to the Tathāgata, are ultimate truth." Is this also an error? Answer: Provisionally, truth in relation to cognition not only fails to express the non-dual principle, it also fails to grasp the teaching that can express it; it is merely what is seen by biased conception. If one recognises the two kinds of two truths, the five objections are naturally dispelled. Question: Although there is this resolution, it is still not apparent: if speaking of form's existence and non-existence now is truth as teaching, when one does not speak of existence and non-existence there is no truth as teaching. Answer: Since speaking is taken as teaching, when the Buddha does not speak there is indeed no truth as teaching. Question: If that is so, there are only ever the two truths in relation to cognition, and no dependent co-arising existence and non-existence. Answer: All phenomena are constantly the existence and non-existence of the two truths in relation to cognition, and are also constantly the existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising. If in relation to the two conditions, they are the existence and non-existence of the two truths in relation to cognition; the buddhas and bodhisattvas comprehend this form as the existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising. However, cognition and teaching have never been two cognitions or two teachings; if the existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising have never been existence or non-existence, such existence and non-existence can bring about non-existence and non-non-existence, and are therefore called teaching. Question: Others also speak of dependent co-arising existence and non-existence; how does it differ from our present view? Answer: When we now speak of dependent co-arising existence and non-existence, this is merely an expedient teaching. Because the sage transforms sentient beings by teaching, he speaks of existence and non-existence, laying out this existence and non-existence as teaching. Others clarify that principle itself is existence and non-existence; hence we are different now, and we take only this single meaning as the correct answer. Question: When existence and non-existence are viewed with respect to the buddhas and bodhisattvas, they are the existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising, which is the cognitive object of dependent co-arising; why say they are teachings? Answer: This existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising can be viewed in two ways: generating gnosis, it is a cognitive object; being able to open up the non-dual that is neither existent nor non-existent, it is a teaching. Question: When the Buddha illuminates existence and non-existence, existence and non-existence are called cognitive objects; when the Buddha speaks of existence and non-existence, existence and non-existence are teaching-approaches. Others also say that illuminating existence and non-existence makes existence and non-existence cognitive objects, and speaking of existence and non-existence makes existence and non-existence teachings as well. How does that differ from our present view? Answer: They only attain existence and non-existence of fixed nature in the two cognitions; such existence and non-existence cannot open up non-existence and non-non-existence, and therefore are not teachings. Furthermore, dependent co-arising existence and non-existence is a cognitive object, whereas existence and non-existence of fixed nature is not a cognitive object. Why? Existence does not exist from itself; it exists due to non-existence. Non-existence is not non-existent from itself; it is non-existent due to existence. This existence exists due to non-existence, so existence is non-existence. Awakening to this dependent co-arising existence and non-existence can generate the two wisdoms. Since [their view] is existence and non-existence of fixed nature, it generates the two views of annihilation and permanence; therefore it cannot be called a cognitive object. Next is clarifying correctness and error through the approach of speaking and not speaking. Others only clarify that conventional truth is spoken and ultimate truth is not spoken. Conventional truth is the three designations, and being designated, it can be spoken. Ultimate truth is the four cut-offs, and being cut off, it cannot be spoken. The various masters share this one interpretation.