大乘玄論 1.11.1
大乘玄論 1.11.1
- Language
- Classical Chinese
1.11.1
攝法第八。 論二諦攝法,為當盡不盡耶? 常有三解。 第一莊嚴云:二諦攝法不盡。 所以然者,若是惑因感虛果,此即是世諦。 虛果故可空,即是真諦。 而常住佛果體非虛假,故非世諦; 不復可空,故非真諦。 引《仁王般若》云「超出二諦外。 」第二開善解:二諦攝盡,故云法無不總義無不該者。 真俗之理,舒之即無法不是,卷之即二諦爾已。 故《大品》云「設有一法出過涅槃者,我亦說如幻如夢。 」大涅槃空、如來空。 第三冶城解云:佛果為真諦所攝而非俗諦。 所以然者,佛果是真實之法,無復虛假,舉體妙絕,故真諦。 舉譬,如水本澄渟,以風潮因緣,故生波浪。 若風息浪靜,還復本水之清。 內合,本唯真諦之理顯,煩惱之風起致生死之浪,生死既息,還一真之理故。 《大經》云「世諦生死時名生,不生死者盡也。 」不生死即是佛果,生滅言世諦。 今並不同。 第一解佛果出二諦外者,《大品》云「不見有法出法性者,是名與般若相應。 」今還有一法出二諦外,即非相應也。 不同第二解者,若言佛果為二諦攝,即佛果定在二諦之內,定是有無。 《成論》云「佛雖在世,不攝有無。 」況滅後耶? 《中論》云「如來在世不言有與無,如來滅後不言有與無。 」云何有無所攝也。 不同第三解者,若言佛果唯是真諦無世諦者,即失機照之能也。 問:今時所明二諦攝法盡不盡耶? 解云:大乘經具有二文,此並是如來方便為緣之說,有時為緣說二諦攝法盡,有時為緣說攝法不盡,具有盡不盡二種法門也。 又欲令攝盡即盡,欲令攝不盡即不盡,無所妨礙。 何者? 一家有單複六種二諦,前後明三種二諦:有時有三諦,有諦、無諦、非有非無中道第一義諦。 有時攝三諦為二諦,有無並世諦,非有非無為第一義諦。 乃至二不二為世諦,非二非不二為第一義諦。 就此義得無有出二諦。 問:學佛二諦云何得失? 請為陳之。 答有十句:一者定性二諦為失,因緣假名二諦為得。 問:今只舉《成論》明三假義不墮失門。 彼明三假為世諦,三假空為真諦。 即三假而常四忘、即四忘而常三假。 即三假而常四絕,故有不自有; 即四絕而常三假,故空不自空,故非性義。 今問:三假為世諦四絕為真諦者,世諦之有為待真空? 彼答云:世諦待真諦者,即世諦為能待,真諦為所待,二諦便是相待假,何得云三假為世諦、四絕為真耶? 若三假世諦之有不待真空者,既不相待,便成自性,故不可答也。 真諦之名為是世諦攝? 為真諦攝? 若是世諦攝者,即世諦還待世諦,長還待長。 若真諦之名為真諦攝者,真諦無名,何得攝名? 問:相待假者,成實師云:成已而待。 中假師云:待已而成。 此云何答? 不然。 論文自破云「未成云何待? 成已云何待? 」今義待時即是成、成時即是待,故無前後之失。 二者有無門。 山中興皇和上述攝嶺大朗師言:二諦是教。 又言:五眼不見理外眾生及一切法。 此是二諦外,二諦不攝; 理內二諦,宛然而有。 不解大師意,執理內理外有異。 三者有本無本門明得失。 他無本,今義有本,不二正道是有無之本。 《華嚴》云「正法性遠離,一切言語道。 一切趣不趣,悉皆寂滅性。 」故非有非無、非亦有亦無、非非有非非無,故言遠離一切趣。 問:何故以二諦為教門? 答:以有無為教,略有五義:一對理明二諦是教,以理無二,故非有非無。 今說有說無,故有無為教。 二者望聖人體,有無未曾有無。 今說有無,此為教緣,故有無為教。 三者為拔見。 舊義執有無是理,由來既久,即二見根深難可傾拔。 攝嶺大師對緣斥病,欲拔二見之根,令捨有無兩執,故說有無能通不二理。 有無非是畢竟,不應住有無中,有無為教。 四者以有無是諸見根,一切經論盛呵二見,斥於有無,如凡夫著有、二乘著無。
Eighth, subsuming phenomena. In discussing whether the two truths subsume all phenomena, do they exhaust them completely or not? There have always been three explanations. First, Zhuangyan says: the two truths do not subsume phenomena exhaustively. Why so? Because if it is a deluded cause bringing about an illusory result, this is conventional truth. Being an illusory result, it can be emptied, which is ultimate truth. But the eternally abiding buddha-fruit in its substance is not illusory, hence it is not conventional truth; it can no longer be emptied, hence it is not ultimate truth. He cites the Benevolent King Prajñāpāramitā: 'It transcends beyond the two truths.' Second, Kaishan explains: the two truths subsume exhaustively; hence it is said that there are no phenomena they do not encompass, no meanings they do not cover. The principles of the ultimate and the conventional, unfolded, leave no phenomenon that is not included; folded up, they are simply the two truths and nothing more. Thus the Pañcaviṃśati says: 'Even if there were a phenomenon surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still say it is like an illusion, like a dream.' Great nirvāṇa is empty; the Tathāgata is empty. Third, Yecheng explains: the buddha-fruit is subsumed under ultimate truth and not conventional truth. Why so? The buddha-fruit is a real phenomenon, no longer illusory, its entire substance wondrously transcendent; therefore it is ultimate truth. To give an analogy: just as water is originally clear and still, yet due to conditions of wind and waves it produces ripples. When the wind ceases and the waves calm down, it returns to the clarity of the original water. The internal correspondence: originally only the principle of ultimate truth was apparent; the wind of afflictions arose, leading to the waves of saṃsāra; saṃsāra having ceased, it returns to the one ultimate principle. The Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Conventional truth is called arising at the time of saṃsāra; that which is not saṃsāra is the exhaustion [of suffering].' That which is not saṃsāra is the buddha-fruit; arising and ceasing is called conventional truth. Now I disagree with all of them. Regarding the first explanation that the buddha-fruit transcends beyond the two truths: the Pañcaviṃśati says, 'Not seeing any phenomenon that transcends the Dharma-nature, this is called being in accord with prajñā.' Now if there were still a phenomenon transcending beyond the two truths, that would not be in accord. Disagreeing with the second explanation: if one says that the buddha-fruit is subsumed under the two truths, then the buddha-fruit is determinately within the two truths, determinately existent or non-existent. The Tattvasiddhi says: 'Although the Buddha is in the world, he is not subsumed under existence or non-existence.' How much less after his extinction? The Madhyamakaśāstra says: 'While the Tathāgata is in the world, one does not speak of existence or non-existence; after the Tathāgata's extinction, one does not speak of existence or non-existence.' How could he be subsumed under existence or non-existence? Disagreeing with the third explanation: if one says that the buddha-fruit is solely ultimate truth and lacks conventional truth, then one loses the capacity of responding to capacities and illuminating. Question: In our present explanation, do the two truths subsume phenomena exhaustively or not? Explanation: The Mahāyāna sūtras contain both passages; these are both the Tathāgata's expedient teachings for particular capacities. Sometimes, for certain capacities, he teaches that the two truths subsume phenomena exhaustively; sometimes, for certain capacities, he teaches that they do not subsume phenomena exhaustively. Both dharma-gates, exhaustive and non-exhaustive, are present. Moreover, if one wishes them to subsume exhaustively, they are exhaustive; if one wishes them not to subsume exhaustively, they are non-exhaustive; there is no obstruction. Why is this? One school has single and compound forms of six kinds of two truths, and earlier and later explained three kinds of two truths: sometimes there are three truths: the truth of existence, the truth of non-existence, and the ultimate truth of the Middle Way that is neither existent nor non-existent. Sometimes the three truths are subsumed into two truths: existence and non-existence are both conventional truth, and neither existent nor non-existent is ultimate truth. And so on, up to: dual and non-dual are conventional truth, and neither dual nor non-dual is ultimate truth. In terms of this meaning, nothing transcends the two truths. Question: In studying the Buddha's two truths, what are the errors and gains? Please expound them. Answer: There are ten propositions. First, positing intrinsic nature in the two truths is an error; dependent co-arising and conventional designation in the two truths is a gain. Question: Now merely citing the Tattvasiddhi's explanation of the three designations does not fall into the gateway of error. It explains that the three designations are conventional truth, and the emptiness of the three designations is ultimate truth. Being identical to the three designations, they are ever fourfold-forgotten; being identical to the fourfold-forgotten, they are ever the three designations. Being identical to the three designations, they are ever fourfold-severed, hence existence does not exist of itself; being identical to the fourfold-severed, they are ever the three designations, hence emptiness is not empty of itself; thus it is not an intrinsic-nature doctrine. Now I ask: if the three designations are conventional truth and the fourfold-severed is ultimate truth, does the existence of conventional truth depend upon ultimate emptiness? If he answers: 'Conventional truth depends upon ultimate truth,' then conventional truth is that which depends, and ultimate truth is that which is depended upon; the two truths are then dependent designation. How could one say that the three designations are conventional truth and the fourfold-severed is the ultimate? If the existence of the three designations of conventional truth does not depend upon ultimate emptiness, then since they do not depend upon each other, it becomes intrinsic nature, and thus he cannot answer. Is the name of ultimate truth subsumed under conventional truth, or subsumed under ultimate truth? If it is subsumed under conventional truth, then conventional truth in turn depends on conventional truth, just as 'long' in turn depends on 'long'. If the name of ultimate truth is subsumed under ultimate truth, ultimate truth has no name, so how could it subsume names? Question: Regarding dependent designation, the Tattvasiddhi masters say: 'Depending occurs after being established.' The Middle-Designation masters say: 'Being established occurs after depending.' How is this answered? Neither is correct. The text of the treatise itself refutes this: 'Before being established, how could there be depending? Once established, how could there be depending?' In our present doctrine, the moment of depending is precisely establishing; the moment of establishing is precisely depending; therefore there is no error of before and after. Second is the gateway of existence and non-existence. Upādhyāya Xinghuang in the mountains recounted the words of Master Dalang of Mount She: 'The two truths are teaching.' He also said: 'The five eyes do not see sentient beings or any phenomena outside principle. These are outside the two truths, not subsumed under the two truths; within principle, the two truths exist distinctly.' Those who do not understand the great master's intent grasp at a difference between inside principle and outside principle. Third is the gateway of having a root and lacking a root, explaining gain and error. Others lack a root; our present doctrine has a root: the non-dual correct path is the root of existence and non-existence. The Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: 'The nature of the true Dharma is far removed / From all paths of words and speech. / All destinies and non-destinies / Are completely of the nature of quiescence.' Therefore it is neither existent nor non-existent, neither both existent and non-existent, nor neither existent nor non-existent; hence it is said to be 'far removed from all destinies.' Question: Why are the two truths taken as the gateway of teaching? Answer: Taking existence and non-existence as teaching has briefly five meanings: First, contrasted with principle, it is explained that the two truths are teaching: because principle has no duality, it is neither existent nor non-existent. Now existence and non-existence are spoken of; hence existence and non-existence are teaching. Second, looking toward the substance of the sages, existence and non-existence have never been existent or non-existent. Now existence and non-existence are spoken of; this is teaching for capacities; hence existence and non-existence are teaching. Third, to uproot views. The old doctrines grasped existence and non-existence as principle; this having lasted a long time, the roots of the two views became deep and difficult to overturn and uproot. The great master of Mount She rebuked the disease in accordance with conditions, wishing to uproot the roots of the two views and cause them to abandon both attachments to existence and non-existence; therefore he taught that existence and non-existence can lead to the non-dual principle. Existence and non-existence are not ultimate, and one should not abide within existence and non-existence; existence and non-existence are teaching. Fourth, because existence and non-existence are the roots of all views, all sūtras and treatises vigorously scold the two views and rebuke existence and non-existence, as ordinary persons cling to existence and practitioners of the two vehicles cling to non-existence.
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- 二諦義 — Classical Chinese