大乘玄論 1.5

1.5

釋名第二。若如他釋：俗以浮虛為義，真以真固為名。世是隔別為義，第一莫過為旨。此是隨名釋義，非是以義釋名。若爾，可謂世間諸法者有字無義。今明俗以不俗為義、真以不真為義，若具足論之，應以非俗非不俗遣四句為俗義。但今對他浮虛是俗義，今明不俗為義，是名出世法者有字有義。今引《淨名經》「不生不滅是無常義，五陰空無所有是苦義。」常途真實是諦義，還以諦釋諦義，例前可見。解諦義，有四家不同。一云：四諦理實是為諦。《遺教經》云「日可令冷、月可令熱，佛說苦諦真實是苦，不可令樂。」故以理實為諦。第二家云：境理非諦，能觀智為諦。《大經》云「若苦是聖諦者，地獄眾生有苦，應是苦聖諦。」而今地獄等苦非聖諦，豈得前境為諦？第三解：取能詮理之文言為諦。第四家云：合取境智文理為諦。若單境不智亦非諦，單取智文理亦非諦。今明四解並是並非，如眾盲摸象不得象體，然不離象。經中非無此釋，諸佛方便隨從眾生故作此說。今還一一難之。第一解云境理審實名諦者，地獄畜生應是苦聖諦，毒蛇瞋雀多欲應是集聖諦。第二解云以智為諦者，應名權實諦。第三解云文言詮審實為諦者，文言終不得理，那得為諦？第四解云若以境智合為諦者，境智既其非諦，今合那得為諦？如一沙不能出油，合二沙不得油也。今明此真俗是如來二種教門，能表為名則有二諦，若從所表為名則唯一諦，故非只以審實為義。若二於諦，即以審實為諦。若就因緣教諦即有多義，或以誠諦之言釋諦。此二教表不二之道，教必不差違，即是諦義。依名釋諦如是。若依義釋諦，諦以不諦為義，此是竪論。若橫論，諦以諸法為義。例如真俗義中說，俗以浮虛為義、俗以真為義。俗以不俗為義，真亦然。更料簡諦待不諦，有五條意：一者二諦相望是二不諦，俗非真、真非俗，故二諦成二不諦。二者非有非無是二不諦義。能表是有無，所表非有無，故成二不諦。三者二智是二不諦義。真俗既二境，境自待不境，不境即是智。四者義有三種：一者就理外凡聖二緣二境；二者就理內凡聖二緣二境；三者竪理內外相望有凡聖諦不諦義。理外凡聖者，如有於凡實，所以為諦；空於凡不實，即是不諦。空於聖亦然。凡聖二人各行一實一虛，故有諦不諦義。理內凡聖亦然。次竪論者，若理外凡聖，皆是顛倒有所得行，俱是凡夫理內，若凡若聖皆名為聖。二諦亦然，理外若真若俗俱是俗諦，理內若真若俗皆是真諦。理內所行，非外所行；理外所行，非內所行，有諦不諦義。五者直就凡聖各自有諦不諦。如有於凡是實，即此有於聖為不實。只此一有，自有實不實，不須他釋。次更明於諦、教諦合論，有三句：一者能諦所非諦；二者所諦能非諦；三者亦能亦所諦。能諦所非諦者，即是於諦，有於凡實、空於聖實，取兩情為諦，不取空有二境為諦。言教諦是所非能者，二智是能說、二諦是所說，此就境智判能所。亦能亦所諦者，合取於教二諦。更就教諦中復有三句：一能名諦；二所名諦；三亦能亦所名諦。言能名諦者，即是真俗二教，以能表道故名諦。言所名諦者，真俗所表理實，故能表之教亦實，此從表實為名。亦能亦所者，即理教合說，非理即不教、非教即不理，理教因緣此二皆實，故能所皆諦。於諦有三句：一皆得、二皆失、三亦得亦失。言亦得亦失者，凡於是有，此有為失。諸賢聖真知性空，此空為得。二皆失者，二皆是於，故二皆失。二皆得者，只知於二，即知不二，既非二非不二，五句皆淨。然此三句，前二句即於諦，後一句即教諦。前二句即於境，後一句教境。於境即不轉，教境即轉也。

Second, explaining the names. If [one follows] the explanations of others: the conventional has the meaning of floating and empty; the ultimate takes the name of true and solid. The mundane (shi) has the meaning of being differentiated and separate; the supreme (diyi) takes as its purport that which cannot be surpassed. This is explaining the meaning in accordance with the names, not explaining the names by means of the meaning. If that were so, one could say that all worldly phenomena have names without having meaning. Now, we clarify that the conventional has the meaning of the non-conventional, and the ultimate has the meaning of the non-ultimate. If one were to discuss it exhaustively, one should eliminate the catuskoṭi with neither conventional nor non-conventional as the meaning of conventional. However, now, to counter the other's [view that] floating and empty is the meaning of the conventional, we now clarify that non-conventional is its meaning; this is called transcendent phenomena having both names and meaning. We now cite the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: "Unborn and unextinguished is the meaning of impermanence; the five aggregates being empty and non-existent is the meaning of suffering." The conventional [view holds that] "real and true" is the meaning of truth (satya/dì), merely explaining the meaning of truth with truth itself; this can be seen by analogy with the preceding. In interpreting the meaning of truth, there are four different masters. The first says: the principle of the four truths being real is truth. The Sutra of the Buddha's Last Teaching says: "The sun may be made cold and the moon made hot, but what the Buddha taught as the truth of suffering is truly suffering, and cannot be made into pleasure." Therefore, taking the principle's reality constitutes truth. The second master says: the cognitive object and principle are not truth; the gnosis that is capable of observing is truth. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "If suffering were a noble truth, then hell-beings who possess suffering ought to be the noble truth of suffering." But now, the suffering of the hells and so on is not a noble truth, so how could the cognitive object before one be truth? The third interpretation: taking the words and text that are capable of expressing the principle as truth. The fourth master says: taking the combination of cognitive object, gnosis, text, and principle as truth. If there is merely the cognitive object without gnosis, it is not truth; if one takes only gnosis, text, and principle, it is also not truth. Now we clarify: these four interpretations are all correct and all wrong, like the blind men touching the elephant who do not grasp the elephant's body, yet do not depart from the elephant. It is not that the sūtras lack such interpretations; the buddhas, through skillful means, made these explanations in accordance with sentient beings. Now we turn back and refute them one by one. If the first interpretation says that the cognitive object and principle being genuinely real is named truth, then hell-beings and animals should be the noble truth of suffering, and venomous snakes, angry sparrows, and the lustful should be the noble truth of the origin [of suffering]. If the second interpretation says that taking gnosis as truth, it should be called expedient and ultimate truth. If the third interpretation says that the text and words expressing genuine reality are truth, since text and words ultimately do not reach the principle, how can they be truth? If the fourth interpretation says that the combination of cognitive object and gnosis is truth, since cognitive object and gnosis are themselves not truth, how can their combination become truth? Just as a single [grain of] sand cannot produce oil, combining two [grains of] sand will not yield oil either. Now we clarify: these ultimate and conventional [truths] are two kinds of teaching gates of the Tathāgata. If named from the standpoint of that which expresses, there are two truths; if named from that which is expressed, there is only one truth; therefore it is not only taking genuine reality as the meaning. In the case of the two truths in relation to cognition, one takes genuine reality as truth. In the case of truth as teaching by dependent co-arising, there are many meanings; or one explains truth by the words of honest truth. These two teachings express the non-dual Path; the teachings inevitably never err or deviate, which is the meaning of truth. Explaining truth according to the name is like this. If one explains truth according to its meaning: truth takes non-truth as its meaning; this is vertical discussion. If discussed horizontally, truth takes all phenomena as its meaning. For example, as stated in the meaning of ultimate and conventional: the conventional takes floating and empty as its meaning, and the conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning. The conventional takes the non-conventional as its meaning, and the ultimate is also like this. Furthermore, to examine truth relative to non-truth, there are five points: First, the two truths viewed against each other are two non-truths: the conventional is not the ultimate, and the ultimate is not the conventional; thus the two truths become two non-truths. Second, neither existent nor non-existent is the meaning of the two non-truths: that which is capable of expressing is existence and non-existence, and that which is expressed is neither existence nor non-existence; thus they become two non-truths. Third, the two gnoses are the meaning of the two non-truths: since the ultimate and conventional are two cognitive objects, the cognitive object naturally stands relative to the non-cognitive-object, and the non-cognitive-object is gnosis. Fourth, the meaning has three varieties: 1. In terms of outside the principle, the two conditions and two cognitive objects of ordinary people and sages; 2. In terms of inside the principle, the two conditions and two cognitive objects of ordinary people and sages; 3. Vertically viewing inside and outside the principle against each other, there is the meaning of truth and non-truth for ordinary people and sages. Regarding ordinary people and sages outside the principle: for example, existence is real to the ordinary person, and therefore is truth; emptiness is unreal to the ordinary person, and is thus non-truth. Emptiness is also like this for the sage. The two individuals, ordinary person and sage, each practice one real and one unreal; therefore there is the meaning of truth and non-truth. Ordinary people and sages inside the principle are also like this. Next, vertically discussing it: ordinary people and sages outside the principle are both inversions and practices of attainment, and are both ordinary persons; inside the principle, whether ordinary person or sage, both are named sage. The two truths are also like this: outside the principle, whether ultimate or conventional, both are conventional truth; inside the principle, whether ultimate or conventional, both are ultimate truth. That which is practiced inside the principle is not what is practiced outside; that which is practiced outside the principle is not what is practiced inside; thus there is the meaning of truth and non-truth. Fifth, directly in terms of ordinary people and sages, each has truth and non-truth. For example, existence is real to the ordinary person, yet this very existence is unreal to the sage. This single existence naturally possesses reality and unreality; it does not require another explanation. Next, further clarifying the combined discussion of truth in relation to cognition and truth as teaching, there are three propositions: 1. That which is capable of being truth, while that which is [its object] is not truth; 2. That which is [the object of truth] is truth, while that which is capable is not truth; 3. Both that which is capable and that which is [its object] are truth. That which is capable is truth and that which is its object is not truth refers to truth in relation to cognition: existence is real to the ordinary person, and emptiness is real to the sage; one takes the two cognitive attitudes as truth, and does not take the two cognitive objects of emptiness and existence as truth. Saying that truth as teaching is that which is expressed and not that which is capable: the two gnoses are capable of expounding, and the two truths are what is expounded; this determines subject and object in terms of cognitive object and gnosis. Both that which is capable and that which is its object being truth refers to taking together both the truth in relation to cognition and the truth as teaching. Furthermore, within truth as teaching, there are again three propositions: 1. That which is capable is named truth; 2. That which is [its object] is named truth; 3. Both that which is capable and that which is [its object] are named truth. That which is capable is named truth refers to the two teachings of the ultimate and conventional: because they are capable of expressing the Path, they are named truth. That which is [its object] is named truth refers to: the principle expressed by the ultimate and the conventional is real, therefore the teaching capable of expressing it is also real; this takes its name from expressing the real. Both that which is capable and that which is its object refers to expounding principle and teaching together: without principle there is no teaching, and without teaching there is no principle; through the dependent co-arising of principle and teaching, both of these are real, so both that which is capable and that which is its object are truth. In truth in relation to cognition there are three propositions: 1. Both are correct; 2. Both are errors; 3. Both are correct and both are errors. Saying that both are correct and both are errors: the ordinary person cognizes existence, and this existence is an error; the noble sages truly know the emptiness of intrinsic nature, and this emptiness is correct. Both being errors: because both are cognitive relation, both are errors. Both being correct: simply knowing the dual relation, one then knows the non-dual; since it is neither dual nor non-dual, the five propositions are all pure. However, among these three propositions, the first two propositions are truth in relation to cognition, and the latter one proposition is truth as teaching. The first two propositions are the cognitive object in relation to cognition, and the latter one proposition is the cognitive object of teaching. The cognitive object in relation to cognition does not transform, whereas the cognitive object of teaching does transform.