大乘玄論 1.5

1.5

Second, explaining the names. If [one follows] the explanations of others: the conventional has the meaning of floating and empty; the ultimate takes the name of true and solid. The mundane (shi) has the meaning of being differentiated and separate; the supreme (diyi) takes as its purport that which cannot be surpassed. This is explaining the meaning in accordance with the names, not explaining the names by means of the meaning. If that were so, one could say that all worldly phenomena have names without having meaning. Now, we clarify that the conventional has the meaning of the non-conventional, and the ultimate has the meaning of the non-ultimate. If one were to discuss it exhaustively, one should eliminate the catuskoṭi with neither conventional nor non-conventional as the meaning of conventional. However, now, to counter the other's [view that] floating and empty is the meaning of the conventional, we now clarify that non-conventional is its meaning; this is called transcendent phenomena having both names and meaning. We now cite the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: "Unborn and unextinguished is the meaning of impermanence; the five aggregates being empty and non-existent is the meaning of suffering." The conventional [view holds that] "real and true" is the meaning of truth (satya/dì), merely explaining the meaning of truth with truth itself; this can be seen by analogy with the preceding. In interpreting the meaning of truth, there are four different masters. The first says: the principle of the four truths being real is truth. The Sutra of the Buddha's Last Teaching says: "The sun may be made cold and the moon made hot, but what the Buddha taught as the truth of suffering is truly suffering, and cannot be made into pleasure." Therefore, taking the principle's reality constitutes truth. The second master says: the cognitive object and principle are not truth; the gnosis that is capable of observing is truth. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "If suffering were a noble truth, then hell-beings who possess suffering ought to be the noble truth of suffering." But now, the suffering of the hells and so on is not a noble truth, so how could the cognitive object before one be truth? The third interpretation: taking the words and text that are capable of expressing the principle as truth. The fourth master says: taking the combination of cognitive object, gnosis, text, and principle as truth. If there is merely the cognitive object without gnosis, it is not truth; if one takes only gnosis, text, and principle, it is also not truth. Now we clarify: these four interpretations are all correct and all wrong, like the blind men touching the elephant who do not grasp the elephant's body, yet do not depart from the elephant. It is not that the sūtras lack such interpretations; the buddhas, through skillful means, made these explanations in accordance with sentient beings. Now we turn back and refute them one by one. If the first interpretation says that the cognitive object and principle being genuinely real is named truth, then hell-beings and animals should be the noble truth of suffering, and venomous snakes, angry sparrows, and the lustful should be the noble truth of the origin [of suffering]. If the second interpretation says that taking gnosis as truth, it should be called expedient and ultimate truth. If the third interpretation says that the text and words expressing genuine reality are truth, since text and words ultimately do not reach the principle, how can they be truth? If the fourth interpretation says that the combination of cognitive object and gnosis is truth, since cognitive object and gnosis are themselves not truth, how can their combination become truth? Just as a single [grain of] sand cannot produce oil, combining two [grains of] sand will not yield oil either. Now we clarify: these ultimate and conventional [truths] are two kinds of teaching gates of the Tathāgata. If named from the standpoint of that which expresses, there are two truths; if named from that which is expressed, there is only one truth; therefore it is not only taking genuine reality as the meaning. In the case of the two truths in relation to cognition, one takes genuine reality as truth. In the case of truth as teaching by dependent co-arising, there are many meanings; or one explains truth by the words of honest truth. These two teachings express the non-dual Path; the teachings inevitably never err or deviate, which is the meaning of truth. Explaining truth according to the name is like this. If one explains truth according to its meaning: truth takes non-truth as its meaning; this is vertical discussion. If discussed horizontally, truth takes all phenomena as its meaning. For example, as stated in the meaning of ultimate and conventional: the conventional takes floating and empty as its meaning, and the conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning. The conventional takes the non-conventional as its meaning, and the ultimate is also like this. Furthermore, to examine truth relative to non-truth, there are five points: First, the two truths viewed against each other are two non-truths: the conventional is not the ultimate, and the ultimate is not the conventional; thus the two truths become two non-truths. Second, neither existent nor non-existent is the meaning of the two non-truths: that which is capable of expressing is existence and non-existence, and that which is expressed is neither existence nor non-existence; thus they become two non-truths. Third, the two gnoses are the meaning of the two non-truths: since the ultimate and conventional are two cognitive objects, the cognitive object naturally stands relative to the non-cognitive-object, and the non-cognitive-object is gnosis. Fourth, the meaning has three varieties: 1. In terms of outside the principle, the two conditions and two cognitive objects of ordinary people and sages; 2. In terms of inside the principle, the two conditions and two cognitive objects of ordinary people and sages; 3. Vertically viewing inside and outside the principle against each other, there is the meaning of truth and non-truth for ordinary people and sages. Regarding ordinary people and sages outside the principle: for example, existence is real to the ordinary person, and therefore is truth; emptiness is unreal to the ordinary person, and is thus non-truth. Emptiness is also like this for the sage. The two individuals, ordinary person and sage, each practice one real and one unreal; therefore there is the meaning of truth and non-truth. Ordinary people and sages inside the principle are also like this. Next, vertically discussing it: ordinary people and sages outside the principle are both inversions and practices of attainment, and are both ordinary persons; inside the principle, whether ordinary person or sage, both are named sage. The two truths are also like this: outside the principle, whether ultimate or conventional, both are conventional truth; inside the principle, whether ultimate or conventional, both are ultimate truth. That which is practiced inside the principle is not what is practiced outside; that which is practiced outside the principle is not what is practiced inside; thus there is the meaning of truth and non-truth. Fifth, directly in terms of ordinary people and sages, each has truth and non-truth. For example, existence is real to the ordinary person, yet this very existence is unreal to the sage. This single existence naturally possesses reality and unreality; it does not require another explanation. Next, further clarifying the combined discussion of truth in relation to cognition and truth as teaching, there are three propositions: 1. That which is capable of being truth, while that which is [its object] is not truth; 2. That which is [the object of truth] is truth, while that which is capable is not truth; 3. Both that which is capable and that which is [its object] are truth. That which is capable is truth and that which is its object is not truth refers to truth in relation to cognition: existence is real to the ordinary person, and emptiness is real to the sage; one takes the two cognitive attitudes as truth, and does not take the two cognitive objects of emptiness and existence as truth. Saying that truth as teaching is that which is expressed and not that which is capable: the two gnoses are capable of expounding, and the two truths are what is expounded; this determines subject and object in terms of cognitive object and gnosis. Both that which is capable and that which is its object being truth refers to taking together both the truth in relation to cognition and the truth as teaching. Furthermore, within truth as teaching, there are again three propositions: 1. That which is capable is named truth; 2. That which is [its object] is named truth; 3. Both that which is capable and that which is [its object] are named truth. That which is capable is named truth refers to the two teachings of the ultimate and conventional: because they are capable of expressing the Path, they are named truth. That which is [its object] is named truth refers to: the principle expressed by the ultimate and the conventional is real, therefore the teaching capable of expressing it is also real; this takes its name from expressing the real. Both that which is capable and that which is its object refers to expounding principle and teaching together: without principle there is no teaching, and without teaching there is no principle; through the dependent co-arising of principle and teaching, both of these are real, so both that which is capable and that which is its object are truth. In truth in relation to cognition there are three propositions: 1. Both are correct; 2. Both are errors; 3. Both are correct and both are errors. Saying that both are correct and both are errors: the ordinary person cognizes existence, and this existence is an error; the noble sages truly know the emptiness of intrinsic nature, and this emptiness is correct. Both being errors: because both are cognitive relation, both are errors. Both being correct: simply knowing the dual relation, one then knows the non-dual; since it is neither dual nor non-dual, the five propositions are all pure. However, among these three propositions, the first two propositions are truth in relation to cognition, and the latter one proposition is truth as teaching. The first two propositions are the cognitive object in relation to cognition, and the latter one proposition is the cognitive object of teaching. The cognitive object in relation to cognition does not transform, whereas the cognitive object of teaching does transform.