大乘玄論 2.5.2

2.5.2

而諸法無非有，新新生滅。 如《居士經》云「即生即老即死。 」寧有應滅而不滅？ 舉體遂不滅者，復誰滅耶？ 若舉體滅者，復誰在不滅耶？ 而滅者剎那念念恒滅，不曾不滅； 不滅者恒不滅。 只見斷常兩片，何得中道？ 彼謂一法有此滅不滅二義，故得明中道也。 今謂不然。 一法有滅有不滅義者，滅義邊無有一法不滅，舉體消亡，何處有不滅義辨相續假耶？ 又汝為是一法為中？ 為是二名為中？ 若二名為中，二名詺何物？ 為目二法？ 為目一法？ 若二名目二法，只見兩名兩法，何得是中耶？ 若二名詺一法，只見一法上有兩名，如童子上眼目二名，寧得是中道耶？ 汝言安何處一法有滅不滅義？ 安一法上。 一法是何物？ 是心？ 是虛空？ 是心者，心是事有，故非中也。 應滅不滅，兩義復相違，故非中也。 若一名名中者，如色一名名一色，亦應是中道如向無與。 向有二義，上兩名目者，只見二名詺二義，不見中道。 若兩除則無所，無所何為中也？ 次破相待假明中，彼云因成假為體、相續為用。 相待為法立名。 若言假故不真，不真是虛，稱當於理不虛者； 此假虛是當理，當理故不虛，以何言耶？ 若言外道說為虛，故不此虛者，他假不當稱理，汝假當理之假虛，不虛不真安何處耶？ 又若約長短明中者，亦不然。 以五尺為短、一丈為長，長自在長，不在於短； 短自在短，不在於長。 只見長短兩片，中名出何處耶？ 若長自長，長則不須短者，亦應只用長成於中。 若不爾者，二物共為一長。 二物共長，定是誰長耶？ 又言不短不長不彼不此名為中者，此則成兩除則無所，無所何名為中？ 如是應廣破。 如論品品悉破相待，自現於文中，如《燃可燃品》中破也。 次破真諦中道。 彼云：真不生不滅、無相無名，所以寄名名真。 無而非無、有而非有，寄名名中道也。 今云不然。 若言真無名寄名、名真為中者，有能寄、有所寄以不？ 若有所寄，即有所名物。 若無所寄，非能非所者，則無真理，則同邪見也。 若言真是世諦假名寄名真諦者，世諦虛假，何者為真？ 真名為實，世諦浮虛，何得名實？ 又真諦絕名，何勞須寄名？ 名若可寄，則不應絕，絕則不須寄也。 又行人尋真得真，得云何名中道？ 若寄名名真，所寄之理不可寄者，只不可寄是名，何謂是無名也？ 若寄名詺真，真理無名無相者，亦不應言智會真。 真不被會，故亦無人會真斷結。 若言實理可會者，亦應實理有名。 若言世諦有中、真理無中不中，此乃是世諦中道。 真理無中，云何言真諦中道？ 開善義本言虛體則無相，無相是真諦者，虛是俗理、無相是真理，既有二理即是二物，云何是中道也？ 又真理非有非無而無也。 此而無之無，非無為無。 既言非無，那是無？ 若言對有之無，此無是偏無，故非中也。 次破合二諦辨中道。 彼言：世諦言非無，真諦言非有，非有非無合明中道也。 今謂不然。 既言兩捨，何名中道？ 又非無則是有世諦，非有只是真諦無，兩名兩處。 兩名兩處不同，何得名中道耶？ 開善義本云：舉體即真故非有，舉體即俗故非無，則非有非無真俗一中道也。 今云不然。 既言舉體即真，即是無相無名則失俗，復有何物而言相即、非有非無為中道耶？ 故雖有三種中道，撿之無所無當，故但有語言，非佛法中道也。 次破《地論》中道。 彼云「阿梨耶識本來不生不滅，古今常定，非始非終。 」但違真故起妄想，故彼云「六識熾惱，隨覆梨耶，名為如來藏。 後修十地之解，分分斷除妄想六識。 六識既盡，妄想之解亦除，顯真成用，名為法身。 」譬如風起雲除，風息皎日獨朗。 法身既顯，有諸應能，所以不生現生、不滅現滅，不因不果。 因果等諸用非一，故經云「佛真法身猶如虛空，應物現形如水中月」也。 今謂不然。 法身本有，為何因可得？

Yet phenomena are not non-existent; they arise and perish anew at every moment. As the Layman Sūtra says, "Immediate arising is immediate aging, which is immediate dying." How could there be something that should perish yet does not perish? If the entire substance does not perish, who then perishes? If the entire substance perishes, who remains and does not perish? What perishes is constantly perishing from kṣaṇa to kṣaṇa and thought-moment to thought-moment, never not perishing; what does not perish is constantly non-perishing. One only sees two fragments of annihilation and permanence; how can this attain the Middle Way? They claim that one phenomenon possesses these two aspects of perishing and non-perishing, and therefore can elucidate the Middle Way. Now I say this is not so. If one phenomenon has the aspects of perishing and non-perishing, on the side of the aspect of perishing there is not a single phenomenon that does not perish, completely dissolving; where then is the aspect of non-perishing to explain continuity-designation? Furthermore, do you take one phenomenon to be the middle? Or do you take the two designations to be the middle? If the two designations are the middle, what thing do the two designations designate? Do they denote two phenomena? Or do they denote one phenomenon? If the two designations denote two phenomena, one merely sees two designations and two phenomena; how can this be the middle? If the two designations designate one phenomenon, one merely sees two designations upon one phenomenon, like the two designations "pupil" and "eye" upon a child; how can that be the Middle Way? You ask, upon what one phenomenon are the aspects of perishing and non-perishing posited? Posited upon one phenomenon. What kind of thing is this one phenomenon? Is it mind? Is it space? If it is mind, mind is a factual existent, hence it is not the middle. That which should perish and that which does not perish—the two aspects are, moreover, mutually contradictory; hence it is not the middle. If a single designation is termed "middle", just as a single designation "form" designates a single form, it should also be the Middle Way, as before with no difference. In what preceded, where there were two aspects, and the two designations above denoted them, one merely saw two designations designating two aspects and did not see the Middle Way. If both are removed, there is nothing left; when there is nothing, how could it be the middle? Next, in refuting that the conditional designation elucidates the middle, they claim that the causal-formation-designation is the substance, continuity is the function, and conditional designation establishes the designation for phenomena. If they say: because it is conventional it is not real; not real is empty; and matching the principle it is not empty—then does this conventional emptiness match the principle? Matching the principle, therefore it is not empty: on what basis is this said? If they say that non-Buddhists call it empty, hence it is not that [kind of] empty, the other's designation does not properly match the principle, whereas your designation is a conventional emptiness that matches the principle: where then are not-empty and not-real posited? Furthermore, if one explains the middle in terms of long and short, that is also not so. Taking five feet as short and one zhang as long, long exists of itself as long and does not depend on short; short exists of itself as short and does not depend on long. One only sees two fragments, long and short; from where does the name "middle" emerge? If long is long of itself, and long does not require short, one should also just use long to constitute the middle. If it is not so, then two objects together make one length. If two objects share a length, whose length is it definitively? Furthermore, if one says that neither short nor long, neither that nor this, is named the middle, then this becomes: both being removed, there is nothing left; when there is nothing, how can it be named the middle? One should refute this extensively in this manner. Just as chapter by chapter the treatise completely refutes mutual dependence, it naturally appears in the text, as refuted in the "Chapter on the Burning and the Burnable". Next, in refuting the ultimate-truth Middle Way: they claim that the ultimate neither arises nor perishes, is devoid of marks and designations, and therefore a designation is borrowed to name it "ultimate"; it is non-existent yet not non-existent, existent yet not existent, and a designation is borrowed to name it the "Middle Way". Now I say this is not so. If it is said that the ultimate is devoid of designations and a designation is borrowed, naming the ultimate to be the middle, is there that which borrows and that which is borrowed, or not? If there is that which is borrowed, then there is a thing that is named. If there is no that which is borrowed, being neither subject nor object [of borrowing], then there is no ultimate principle, which is identical to wrong views. If it is said that the ultimate is a conventional designation of conventional truth borrowed to designate the ultimate truth, conventional truth is empty and false; what could be the ultimate? "Ultimate" is named real; conventional truth is floating and empty; how can it be named real? Furthermore, ultimate truth transcends designations; why should it need a borrowed designation? If a designation can be borrowed, it should not transcend; if it transcends, it does not need borrowing. Furthermore, when a practitioner seeks the ultimate and attains the ultimate, how can attainment be called the Middle Way? If a designation is borrowed to name the ultimate, and the principle that is borrowed cannot be borrowed, then merely "cannot be borrowed" is a designation; how can it be said to be devoid of designations? If a designation is borrowed to designate the ultimate, and the ultimate principle is devoid of marks and designations, one should also not say that gnosis accords with the ultimate. If the ultimate cannot be accorded with, there is also no person who accords with the ultimate to sever defilements. If it is said that the real principle can be accorded with, then the real principle should also have a designation. If it is said that conventional truth has a middle, while the ultimate principle has neither middle nor non-middle, this is merely the Middle Way of conventional truth. If the ultimate principle lacks the middle, how can one speak of an ultimate-truth Middle Way? Kaishan's fundamental doctrine states that an empty substance is without marks, and being without marks is the ultimate truth: emptiness is the conventional principle, and marklessness is the ultimate principle. Since there are two principles, these are two things; how can this be the Middle Way? Furthermore, the ultimate principle is neither existent nor non-existent, yet non-existent. This non-existence of "yet non-existent" takes non-non-existence as non-existence. Since it says "non-non-existence", how can it be non-existence? If one speaks of the non-existence that is paired with existence, this non-existence is a one-sided non-existence; hence it is not the middle. Next, in refuting the combination of the two truths to explain the Middle Way: they say that conventional truth speaks of non-non-existence and ultimate truth speaks of non-existence, and neither existent nor non-existent are combined to elucidate the Middle Way. Now I say this is not so. Since it speaks of abandoning both, how can it be called the Middle Way? Furthermore, non-non-existence is existence—conventional truth; non-existence is merely ultimate truth's non-existence: two designations in two places. If the two designations and two places are different, how can it be called the Middle Way? Kaishan's fundamental doctrine says: the entire substance is identical to the ultimate, hence not existent; the entire substance is identical to the conventional, hence not non-existent; thus neither existent nor non-existent is the single Middle Way of ultimate and conventional. Now I say this is not so. Since it is said that the entire substance is identical to the ultimate, which is markless and nameless, then the conventional is lost; what thing remains such that one can speak of mutual identity and take neither existent nor non-existent as the Middle Way? Therefore, although there are three kinds of Middle Way, when examined they have no referent and correspond to nothing; hence they are mere words and not the Middle Way of the Buddhadharma. Next, in refuting the Middle Way of the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna: they say, "The ālaya-consciousness is originally unarising and unperishing, constantly fixed from ancient times to the present, having neither beginning nor end." It is only because of violating the real that deluded thoughts arise; thus they say, "The six consciousnesses blaze in distress, accordingly obscuring the ālaya; this is named the tathāgatagarbha. Later, cultivating the understanding of the ten stages, one severs the deluded six consciousnesses stage by stage. Once the six consciousnesses are exhausted, the understanding of deluded thoughts is also removed, manifesting the real to accomplish function; this is named the dharmakāya." It is like the wind rising and clearing the clouds: when the wind ceases, the bright sun shines alone. Once the dharmakāya is manifested, it possesses various adaptive capabilities; therefore, unarising, it manifests arising; unperishing, it manifests perishing; it is neither cause nor effect. Its various functions such as cause and effect are not singular; therefore the sūtra says: "The Buddha's true dharmakāya is like empty space; / adapting to things, it manifests forms like the moon in water." Now I say this is not so. If the dharmakāya is fundamentally existent, by what cause can it be attained?