大乘玄論 2.5.2

2.5.2

Yet phenomena are not non-existent; they arise and perish anew at every moment. As the Layman Sūtra says, "Immediate arising is immediate aging, which is immediate dying." How could there be something that should perish yet does not perish? If the entire substance does not perish, who then perishes? If the entire substance perishes, who remains and does not perish? What perishes is constantly perishing from kṣaṇa to kṣaṇa and thought-moment to thought-moment, never not perishing; what does not perish is constantly non-perishing. One only sees two fragments of annihilation and permanence; how can this attain the Middle Way? They claim that one phenomenon possesses these two aspects of perishing and non-perishing, and therefore can elucidate the Middle Way. Now I say this is not so. If one phenomenon has the aspects of perishing and non-perishing, on the side of the aspect of perishing there is not a single phenomenon that does not perish, completely dissolving; where then is the aspect of non-perishing to explain continuity-designation? Furthermore, do you take one phenomenon to be the middle? Or do you take the two designations to be the middle? If the two designations are the middle, what thing do the two designations designate? Do they denote two phenomena? Or do they denote one phenomenon? If the two designations denote two phenomena, one merely sees two designations and two phenomena; how can this be the middle? If the two designations designate one phenomenon, one merely sees two designations upon one phenomenon, like the two designations "pupil" and "eye" upon a child; how can that be the Middle Way? You ask, upon what one phenomenon are the aspects of perishing and non-perishing posited? Posited upon one phenomenon. What kind of thing is this one phenomenon? Is it mind? Is it space? If it is mind, mind is a factual existent, hence it is not the middle. That which should perish and that which does not perish—the two aspects are, moreover, mutually contradictory; hence it is not the middle. If a single designation is termed "middle", just as a single designation "form" designates a single form, it should also be the Middle Way, as before with no difference. In what preceded, where there were two aspects, and the two designations above denoted them, one merely saw two designations designating two aspects and did not see the Middle Way. If both are removed, there is nothing left; when there is nothing, how could it be the middle? Next, in refuting that the conditional designation elucidates the middle, they claim that the causal-formation-designation is the substance, continuity is the function, and conditional designation establishes the designation for phenomena. If they say: because it is conventional it is not real; not real is empty; and matching the principle it is not empty—then does this conventional emptiness match the principle? Matching the principle, therefore it is not empty: on what basis is this said? If they say that non-Buddhists call it empty, hence it is not that [kind of] empty, the other's designation does not properly match the principle, whereas your designation is a conventional emptiness that matches the principle: where then are not-empty and not-real posited? Furthermore, if one explains the middle in terms of long and short, that is also not so. Taking five feet as short and one zhang as long, long exists of itself as long and does not depend on short; short exists of itself as short and does not depend on long. One only sees two fragments, long and short; from where does the name "middle" emerge? If long is long of itself, and long does not require short, one should also just use long to constitute the middle. If it is not so, then two objects together make one length. If two objects share a length, whose length is it definitively? Furthermore, if one says that neither short nor long, neither that nor this, is named the middle, then this becomes: both being removed, there is nothing left; when there is nothing, how can it be named the middle? One should refute this extensively in this manner. Just as chapter by chapter the treatise completely refutes mutual dependence, it naturally appears in the text, as refuted in the "Chapter on the Burning and the Burnable". Next, in refuting the ultimate-truth Middle Way: they claim that the ultimate neither arises nor perishes, is devoid of marks and designations, and therefore a designation is borrowed to name it "ultimate"; it is non-existent yet not non-existent, existent yet not existent, and a designation is borrowed to name it the "Middle Way". Now I say this is not so. If it is said that the ultimate is devoid of designations and a designation is borrowed, naming the ultimate to be the middle, is there that which borrows and that which is borrowed, or not? If there is that which is borrowed, then there is a thing that is named. If there is no that which is borrowed, being neither subject nor object [of borrowing], then there is no ultimate principle, which is identical to wrong views. If it is said that the ultimate is a conventional designation of conventional truth borrowed to designate the ultimate truth, conventional truth is empty and false; what could be the ultimate? "Ultimate" is named real; conventional truth is floating and empty; how can it be named real? Furthermore, ultimate truth transcends designations; why should it need a borrowed designation? If a designation can be borrowed, it should not transcend; if it transcends, it does not need borrowing. Furthermore, when a practitioner seeks the ultimate and attains the ultimate, how can attainment be called the Middle Way? If a designation is borrowed to name the ultimate, and the principle that is borrowed cannot be borrowed, then merely "cannot be borrowed" is a designation; how can it be said to be devoid of designations? If a designation is borrowed to designate the ultimate, and the ultimate principle is devoid of marks and designations, one should also not say that gnosis accords with the ultimate. If the ultimate cannot be accorded with, there is also no person who accords with the ultimate to sever defilements. If it is said that the real principle can be accorded with, then the real principle should also have a designation. If it is said that conventional truth has a middle, while the ultimate principle has neither middle nor non-middle, this is merely the Middle Way of conventional truth. If the ultimate principle lacks the middle, how can one speak of an ultimate-truth Middle Way? Kaishan's fundamental doctrine states that an empty substance is without marks, and being without marks is the ultimate truth: emptiness is the conventional principle, and marklessness is the ultimate principle. Since there are two principles, these are two things; how can this be the Middle Way? Furthermore, the ultimate principle is neither existent nor non-existent, yet non-existent. This non-existence of "yet non-existent" takes non-non-existence as non-existence. Since it says "non-non-existence", how can it be non-existence? If one speaks of the non-existence that is paired with existence, this non-existence is a one-sided non-existence; hence it is not the middle. Next, in refuting the combination of the two truths to explain the Middle Way: they say that conventional truth speaks of non-non-existence and ultimate truth speaks of non-existence, and neither existent nor non-existent are combined to elucidate the Middle Way. Now I say this is not so. Since it speaks of abandoning both, how can it be called the Middle Way? Furthermore, non-non-existence is existence—conventional truth; non-existence is merely ultimate truth's non-existence: two designations in two places. If the two designations and two places are different, how can it be called the Middle Way? Kaishan's fundamental doctrine says: the entire substance is identical to the ultimate, hence not existent; the entire substance is identical to the conventional, hence not non-existent; thus neither existent nor non-existent is the single Middle Way of ultimate and conventional. Now I say this is not so. Since it is said that the entire substance is identical to the ultimate, which is markless and nameless, then the conventional is lost; what thing remains such that one can speak of mutual identity and take neither existent nor non-existent as the Middle Way? Therefore, although there are three kinds of Middle Way, when examined they have no referent and correspond to nothing; hence they are mere words and not the Middle Way of the Buddhadharma. Next, in refuting the Middle Way of the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna: they say, "The ālaya-consciousness is originally unarising and unperishing, constantly fixed from ancient times to the present, having neither beginning nor end." It is only because of violating the real that deluded thoughts arise; thus they say, "The six consciousnesses blaze in distress, accordingly obscuring the ālaya; this is named the tathāgatagarbha. Later, cultivating the understanding of the ten stages, one severs the deluded six consciousnesses stage by stage. Once the six consciousnesses are exhausted, the understanding of deluded thoughts is also removed, manifesting the real to accomplish function; this is named the dharmakāya." It is like the wind rising and clearing the clouds: when the wind ceases, the bright sun shines alone. Once the dharmakāya is manifested, it possesses various adaptive capabilities; therefore, unarising, it manifests arising; unperishing, it manifests perishing; it is neither cause nor effect. Its various functions such as cause and effect are not singular; therefore the sūtra says: "The Buddha's true dharmakāya is like empty space; / adapting to things, it manifests forms like the moon in water." Now I say this is not so. If the dharmakāya is fundamentally existent, by what cause can it be attained?