大乘玄論 2.5.4

2.5.4

若以有故有，即是實一異，如前破也。 亦如論說「若言有一，不應為諸法成，以不一故。 如手足等諸分成身，何得言異相？ 」異相亦不可得，故論破云「若一者，不應芽莖等別。 若謂穀有可芽葉等別異者，等是異相，何不名樹等芽葉耶？ 故知不異。 」亦復不一故，諸法本來不生，何得有一異？ 但一是不一一、異是不異異，假一不可為一、假異不可為異。 既無一無異，即是世諦中道也。 不來不出者，既言不來，則應對不去。 而言不出者，義有所兼，非止此八，則應有無量。 不來則應對有不去，不出應對有不入，是互舉耳。 凡有二義：一者示有所兼非止有八事。 二者雖異而內有所兼者，既有不來則有不去，既有不出則有不入。 不生不滅、不有不無等，一切諸法相攝門也。 如《成論》與外道師等所計，或言從冥初來、微塵世性等來，亦如初流水反去出離等。 今大乘明義，由出故去，出即是去； 由入故來，入即是來。 若有來去說作來去者，即實來實去。 今明以空來去，故不名來去。 以世諦假說來去，雖來不可來、雖去不可去，故來無所從、去無所至。 故《金剛波若經》云「若言如來有來有去者，是人不解佛所說義。 」若言空故說來去，則來無所從、去無所至，故言如來也。 有《淨名經》云「對文殊言：『不來相而來，不見相而見。 』文殊答云：『如居士言。 來不更來，去不更去。 』」若來有所從，則來已更來； 若去有所至，則去已更去。 故今來無所從、去無所至也。 故論云「如蛇從穴出，鳥來栖樹等。 」不見有如是等相，故知無有來出也。 問：八不中何故云不來不出是攝法有所兼，而不生不滅等非耶？ 答：不生不滅等亦是攝法，如不生則攝一切有生等皆盡，不滅則收一切滅無等。 此二自足，收攝悉盡。 但為得悟者不同，雖聞不生不滅，而信不常不斷，故須說不常不斷，欲令觀行周普故。 今不來不出亦然，而言攝法者，為不來應對不去、出即對入。 來出既不對，故以來攝去、出攝入。 生滅既對，對故不言攝。 如不生外，如是不不生，豈得不攝？ 須得此意釋之，可尋也。 但明對有二義：一者對治，如不淨觀治貪欲、慈悲治瞋恚等，皆是相對治明對義。 二者相對，名味敵對，如《大經》言「常樂觀察諸對治門，所謂苦樂乃至恒不恒。 」恒應對不暫不恒，而不無賖切，亦是攝法意也。 苦樂對義則切，止明二法，異外如是不攝。 若言苦不苦異，苦外如是不苦，攝義則廣遠。 如淨不淨，淨對穢等，一切例然，皆有賖切意可尋，不須復歷法辨也。 作三種中道，相多種勢，意終是同，但方言異耳。 今二種方法作，如前所說也。 問：何故世諦假生假滅，真諦假不生假不滅耶？ 答：有二種勢。 一者世諦破性明性空，即是假生假滅； 真諦破假明因緣空故，即是假不生假不滅也。 問：世諦破性明性空，性空為世諦中道，應用性有為世諦。 既以假有為世諦，則用假空為中道也。 答：今明無別有性空，只詺假為性空，從功用作名。 誰能空此性？ 假能空此性，名假作性空。 性空邊故即是中道，假故即名世諦也。 二者假生假滅，自是不生不滅中； 假不生假不滅，自是非不生非不滅中，即是表義。 但橫兩相望，自是因緣義，則遣二執也。 又攝嶺師云：假前明中是體中，假後明中是用中。 中前明假是用假、中後明假是體假，故非有非無而有而無是體中； 假有不名有、假無不名無，故非有非無是用中。 非有非無而有而無是體假，假有不名有、假無不名無是用假，故用中假皆屬能表之教，無假無中乃是所表之理也。

If being exists through being, that is real oneness or difference, as refuted before. Also, as the treatise says: 'If it is said that there is oneness, it should not be formed of various phenomena, because it is not one. Just as various parts such as hands and feet form a body, how can one speak of a different mark?' A different mark is also unobtainable; therefore the treatise refutes it, saying: 'If it were one, there should be no distinction of sprout, stalk, and so forth. If one says that grain has differences such as sprout and leaf, since these are equally different marks, why are they not called the sprout and leaf of a tree, etc.? Hence we know they are not different.' Nor are they one; therefore all phenomena are originally unborn—how could there be oneness and difference? Rather, oneness is the oneness of non-oneness; difference is the difference of non-difference. Conventional oneness cannot be taken as oneness; conventional difference cannot be taken as difference. Since there is neither oneness nor difference, this is the Middle Way of conventional truth. Regarding 'neither coming nor going forth' (pu lai pu chu): since it says 'neither coming', it ought to be paired with 'nor going away' (pu qu). That it says 'nor going forth' is because the meaning embraces more—it is not limited to these eight, but should be immeasurable. 'Neither coming' ought to be paired with 'not going away'; 'nor going forth' ought to be paired with 'not entering'. These are mutually mentioned, that is all. In general there are two meanings: First, to show that more is embraced and not limited to eight matters. Second, though they differ, what is inwardly embraced is: since there is 'neither coming', there is 'nor going away'; since there is 'nor going forth', there is 'nor entering'. 'Neither arising nor ceasing', 'neither existence nor non-existence', and so forth, are approaches of mutually subsuming all phenomena. As held by the Tattvasiddhi and non-Buddhist teachers, etc., who say that they come from the primordial darkness (prakṛti), from subtle atoms, from world-nature, and so forth; or like the first flowing water turning back, going forth, and departing. Now the Mahāyāna clarifies the meaning: because of going forth, there is going away—going forth is just going away; because of entering, there is coming—entering is just coming. If there were coming and going, and one spoke of making coming and going, that would be real coming and real going. Now it is clarified that because of emptiness there is coming and going; hence it is not called coming and going. Through conventional truth, coming and going are conventionally spoken of: although coming, there can be no coming; although going, there can be no going. Therefore, coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes. Therefore the Diamond Prajñā Sūtra says: 'If someone says that the Tathāgata comes or goes, this person does not understand the meaning of what the Buddha taught.' If one says that because of emptiness coming and going are spoken of, then coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes; therefore he is called Tathāgata. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Addressing Mañjuśrī, he said: "Coming through the mark of not coming; seeing through the mark of not seeing." Mañjuśrī replied: "It is as the upāsaka says. Coming does not come again; going does not go again."' If coming had a place whence it comes, then having come it would come again; if going had a place whither it goes, then having gone it would go again. Therefore now coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes. Hence the treatise says: 'Like a snake emerging from a hole, a bird coming to roost in a tree, and so forth.' One does not see such marks; hence we know there is neither coming nor going forth. Question: Why is it said that in the eight negations, 'neither coming nor going forth' subsumes phenomena and embraces more, while 'neither arising nor ceasing' and so forth do not? Answer: 'Neither arising nor ceasing' and so forth are also subsumptive of phenomena. For example, 'not arising' completely subsumes all existent arising and so forth; 'not ceasing' gathers all cessation and non-existence, and so forth. These two are self-sufficient, gathering and subsuming completely. But because those who attain awakening are not all the same—though they hear 'neither arising nor ceasing', they have faith in 'neither eternal nor annihilated'—it is therefore necessary to speak of 'neither eternal nor annihilated', desiring to make contemplation and practice comprehensive. Now, 'neither coming nor going forth' is also like this; that it is spoken of as subsuming phenomena is because 'not coming' should be paired with 'not going', and 'going forth' is paired with 'entering'. Since coming and going forth are not paired, therefore by 'coming' it subsumes 'going', and by 'going forth' it subsumes 'entering'. Since arising and ceasing are already paired, because of being paired it is not said that they subsume. Just as outside of 'not arising', is it not so that 'not not-arising' must be subsumed? One must grasp this intention in explaining it, and it can be pursued. However, clarifying 'pairing' has two meanings: First, counteractive pairing (pratipakṣa), such as contemplation on impurity counteracting greed and desire, or loving-kindness and compassion counteracting anger and hatred, etc.—these are all clarifying the meaning of pairing through mutual counteraction. Second, relative pairing, where names and connotations directly confront each other, as the Great Sūtra says: 'Constantly delight in observing the gates of all counteragents, namely suffering and pleasure, up to permanent and impermanent.' 'Permanent' should be paired with 'not temporary and not permanent', yet it is not without broad and narrow senses; this is also the intention of subsuming phenomena. The paired meaning of suffering and pleasure is narrow, clarifying only two phenomena; outside of what is different, it is not subsumed in this way. If one speaks of the difference between suffering and non-suffering, outside of suffering it is non-suffering in this way, so the subsumptive meaning is broad and far-reaching. Just as with pure and impure, pure paired with defiled, and so forth—all are analogous to this, and all have broad and narrow senses that can be pursued; there is no need to examine each phenomenon again. In formulating the three kinds of Middle Way, the aspects have multiple tendencies, but the intent in the end is identical; it is merely that regional expressions differ. Formulating them through the two kinds of method now is as spoken before. Question: Why is it that in conventional truth there is conventional arising and conventional ceasing, while in ultimate truth there is conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing? Answer: There are two tendencies. First, conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature to clarify the emptiness of intrinsic nature, which is conventional arising and conventional ceasing; ultimate truth refutes the conventional to clarify emptiness of dependent co-arising, which is conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing. Question: Conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature to clarify the emptiness of intrinsic nature, taking emptiness of intrinsic nature as the Middle Way of conventional truth, so it should use existence of intrinsic nature as conventional truth. Since it takes conventional existence as conventional truth, it then uses conventional emptiness as the Middle Way. Answer: We now clarify that there is no separate emptiness of intrinsic nature; it merely names the conventional as the emptiness of intrinsic nature, taking its name from its function. What is able to empty this intrinsic nature? The conventional is able to empty this intrinsic nature, so the conventional is named the emptiness of intrinsic nature. On the side of the emptiness of intrinsic nature, it is therefore the Middle Way; on the side of being conventional, it is therefore named conventional truth. Second, conventional arising and conventional ceasing are themselves the Middle of non-arising and non-ceasing; conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing are themselves the Middle of neither non-arising nor non-ceasing—this is expressing the meaning. But viewing the two horizontally across from each other is itself the meaning of dependent co-arising, which dispels the two attachments. Furthermore, the master of Sheling said: clarifying the Middle before the conventional is the Middle of substance; clarifying the Middle after the conventional is the Middle of function. Clarifying the conventional before the Middle is the conventional of function; clarifying the conventional after the Middle is the conventional of substance. Therefore, being neither existent nor non-existent yet existent and non-existent is the Middle of substance; conventional existence not being called existence and conventional non-existence not being called non-existence, hence being neither existent nor non-existent, is the Middle of function. Being neither existent nor non-existent yet existent and non-existent is the conventional of substance; conventional existence not being called existence and conventional non-existence not being called non-existence is the conventional of function. Therefore, both the functional Middle and the functional conventional belong to the teaching that is capable of expressing; that which has neither conventional nor Middle is the principle that is expressed.