大乘玄論 2.5.4

2.5.4

If being exists through being, that is real oneness or difference, as refuted before. Also, as the treatise says: 'If it is said that there is oneness, it should not be formed of various phenomena, because it is not one. Just as various parts such as hands and feet form a body, how can one speak of a different mark?' A different mark is also unobtainable; therefore the treatise refutes it, saying: 'If it were one, there should be no distinction of sprout, stalk, and so forth. If one says that grain has differences such as sprout and leaf, since these are equally different marks, why are they not called the sprout and leaf of a tree, etc.? Hence we know they are not different.' Nor are they one; therefore all phenomena are originally unborn—how could there be oneness and difference? Rather, oneness is the oneness of non-oneness; difference is the difference of non-difference. Conventional oneness cannot be taken as oneness; conventional difference cannot be taken as difference. Since there is neither oneness nor difference, this is the Middle Way of conventional truth. Regarding 'neither coming nor going forth' (pu lai pu chu): since it says 'neither coming', it ought to be paired with 'nor going away' (pu qu). That it says 'nor going forth' is because the meaning embraces more—it is not limited to these eight, but should be immeasurable. 'Neither coming' ought to be paired with 'not going away'; 'nor going forth' ought to be paired with 'not entering'. These are mutually mentioned, that is all. In general there are two meanings: First, to show that more is embraced and not limited to eight matters. Second, though they differ, what is inwardly embraced is: since there is 'neither coming', there is 'nor going away'; since there is 'nor going forth', there is 'nor entering'. 'Neither arising nor ceasing', 'neither existence nor non-existence', and so forth, are approaches of mutually subsuming all phenomena. As held by the Tattvasiddhi and non-Buddhist teachers, etc., who say that they come from the primordial darkness (prakṛti), from subtle atoms, from world-nature, and so forth; or like the first flowing water turning back, going forth, and departing. Now the Mahāyāna clarifies the meaning: because of going forth, there is going away—going forth is just going away; because of entering, there is coming—entering is just coming. If there were coming and going, and one spoke of making coming and going, that would be real coming and real going. Now it is clarified that because of emptiness there is coming and going; hence it is not called coming and going. Through conventional truth, coming and going are conventionally spoken of: although coming, there can be no coming; although going, there can be no going. Therefore, coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes. Therefore the Diamond Prajñā Sūtra says: 'If someone says that the Tathāgata comes or goes, this person does not understand the meaning of what the Buddha taught.' If one says that because of emptiness coming and going are spoken of, then coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes; therefore he is called Tathāgata. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Addressing Mañjuśrī, he said: "Coming through the mark of not coming; seeing through the mark of not seeing." Mañjuśrī replied: "It is as the upāsaka says. Coming does not come again; going does not go again."' If coming had a place whence it comes, then having come it would come again; if going had a place whither it goes, then having gone it would go again. Therefore now coming has no place whence it comes, and going has no place whither it goes. Hence the treatise says: 'Like a snake emerging from a hole, a bird coming to roost in a tree, and so forth.' One does not see such marks; hence we know there is neither coming nor going forth. Question: Why is it said that in the eight negations, 'neither coming nor going forth' subsumes phenomena and embraces more, while 'neither arising nor ceasing' and so forth do not? Answer: 'Neither arising nor ceasing' and so forth are also subsumptive of phenomena. For example, 'not arising' completely subsumes all existent arising and so forth; 'not ceasing' gathers all cessation and non-existence, and so forth. These two are self-sufficient, gathering and subsuming completely. But because those who attain awakening are not all the same—though they hear 'neither arising nor ceasing', they have faith in 'neither eternal nor annihilated'—it is therefore necessary to speak of 'neither eternal nor annihilated', desiring to make contemplation and practice comprehensive. Now, 'neither coming nor going forth' is also like this; that it is spoken of as subsuming phenomena is because 'not coming' should be paired with 'not going', and 'going forth' is paired with 'entering'. Since coming and going forth are not paired, therefore by 'coming' it subsumes 'going', and by 'going forth' it subsumes 'entering'. Since arising and ceasing are already paired, because of being paired it is not said that they subsume. Just as outside of 'not arising', is it not so that 'not not-arising' must be subsumed? One must grasp this intention in explaining it, and it can be pursued. However, clarifying 'pairing' has two meanings: First, counteractive pairing (pratipakṣa), such as contemplation on impurity counteracting greed and desire, or loving-kindness and compassion counteracting anger and hatred, etc.—these are all clarifying the meaning of pairing through mutual counteraction. Second, relative pairing, where names and connotations directly confront each other, as the Great Sūtra says: 'Constantly delight in observing the gates of all counteragents, namely suffering and pleasure, up to permanent and impermanent.' 'Permanent' should be paired with 'not temporary and not permanent', yet it is not without broad and narrow senses; this is also the intention of subsuming phenomena. The paired meaning of suffering and pleasure is narrow, clarifying only two phenomena; outside of what is different, it is not subsumed in this way. If one speaks of the difference between suffering and non-suffering, outside of suffering it is non-suffering in this way, so the subsumptive meaning is broad and far-reaching. Just as with pure and impure, pure paired with defiled, and so forth—all are analogous to this, and all have broad and narrow senses that can be pursued; there is no need to examine each phenomenon again. In formulating the three kinds of Middle Way, the aspects have multiple tendencies, but the intent in the end is identical; it is merely that regional expressions differ. Formulating them through the two kinds of method now is as spoken before. Question: Why is it that in conventional truth there is conventional arising and conventional ceasing, while in ultimate truth there is conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing? Answer: There are two tendencies. First, conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature to clarify the emptiness of intrinsic nature, which is conventional arising and conventional ceasing; ultimate truth refutes the conventional to clarify emptiness of dependent co-arising, which is conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing. Question: Conventional truth refutes intrinsic nature to clarify the emptiness of intrinsic nature, taking emptiness of intrinsic nature as the Middle Way of conventional truth, so it should use existence of intrinsic nature as conventional truth. Since it takes conventional existence as conventional truth, it then uses conventional emptiness as the Middle Way. Answer: We now clarify that there is no separate emptiness of intrinsic nature; it merely names the conventional as the emptiness of intrinsic nature, taking its name from its function. What is able to empty this intrinsic nature? The conventional is able to empty this intrinsic nature, so the conventional is named the emptiness of intrinsic nature. On the side of the emptiness of intrinsic nature, it is therefore the Middle Way; on the side of being conventional, it is therefore named conventional truth. Second, conventional arising and conventional ceasing are themselves the Middle of non-arising and non-ceasing; conventional non-arising and conventional non-ceasing are themselves the Middle of neither non-arising nor non-ceasing—this is expressing the meaning. But viewing the two horizontally across from each other is itself the meaning of dependent co-arising, which dispels the two attachments. Furthermore, the master of Sheling said: clarifying the Middle before the conventional is the Middle of substance; clarifying the Middle after the conventional is the Middle of function. Clarifying the conventional before the Middle is the conventional of function; clarifying the conventional after the Middle is the conventional of substance. Therefore, being neither existent nor non-existent yet existent and non-existent is the Middle of substance; conventional existence not being called existence and conventional non-existence not being called non-existence, hence being neither existent nor non-existent, is the Middle of function. Being neither existent nor non-existent yet existent and non-existent is the conventional of substance; conventional existence not being called existence and conventional non-existence not being called non-existence is the conventional of function. Therefore, both the functional Middle and the functional conventional belong to the teaching that is capable of expressing; that which has neither conventional nor Middle is the principle that is expressed.