大乘玄論 2.7

2.7

第四雜問。難問：八不明中假二諦自心所作，有出處耶？答：有文有理。文則八不處處經論散出。但《菩薩瓔珞本業經》下卷云「二諦義者，不一亦不二，不常亦不斷，不來亦不去，不生亦不滅」也。又《大經》二十五〈師子吼品〉云「十二因緣，不生不滅、不常亦不斷、不一不二、不來不去、非因非果。」與《中論》次第小異而意同也。理則二諦是教，故假生假滅等是世諦，假不生假不滅是真諦，故具明中假義也。問：八不是不生不滅等教不生不滅，為理不生不滅之不生不滅等耶？答：具含兩不生不滅等，但理為正，教則傍也。問：何以知之？答：彼經中烈八不竟云「而相即聖智無二，故是諸佛菩薩智母」也。《大經》云「涅槃之體非有無，非亦有亦無」也。《大品經．相行品》「身子白佛：『諸法實相云何有？』佛云：『諸法無所有如是有，如是有無所有。是事不知，名為無明。』」也。《中論》序大意云「聞不生不滅畢竟空，便失二諦」也。又〈四諦品〉云「諸法雖無生，而有二諦也。」故知具含中假，而中為正宗、二諦為傍，具如二諦中說也。問：八不是佛說者，龍樹造《中論》時即引經中八不安論初為非？答：不可定判。或賓伽引經中安處，或可龍樹引經中八不序《無畏論》初，故注論者安《中論》序意初也。而應非是《釋論》中八不牽安處《大論》中，至難處即指《中論》為《正觀論》，如《正觀論》中說。故知《釋論》、《中論》後造也。又亦可青目於千年中出世注《中論》。或可引《釋論》中八不安處《中論》序意也。問：《釋論》中指《正觀論》者，何必是《中論》耶？答：《中論．觀法品》云正觀論之稱，故知《中論》是《正觀論》也。故相傳云：《中論》是《釋論》之骨髓也。問：八不、八非、八無，是一是異？答：亦可一、亦可異。是一，眼目異名也。異者，八不中為正，故八不無對，非等有對，故異也。問：八不中不生不滅得云兩不？為不得耶？答：既云不生不滅，那非兩不也？問：不生復不滅，兩過噵所不？所以言兩不者，不生復不滅兩過噵不，故得論兩不；不滅不生故，應是兩中也。答：雙除生滅始是正中也。問：若雙除生滅方是正中者，亦應生滅雙除唯是一不不？答：不生復不滅，雙不於生滅，所以一中也。問：若雙除故一正中者，亦應雙除二諦故一正中，則無三種中也。答：實是一道正中，為除病故辨三種中。亦除執故，兩不二中並得義也。問：假生不生、假滅不滅，不生不滅名為世諦中。假不生非不生、假不滅非不滅，非不生非不滅名為真諦中道者。世諦不生不滅中，與真諦假不生假不滅，若為異耶？答：安假簡異中不生等，故則殊也。問，假不假寧異耶？答：對假生假滅，明假不生假不滅。此假不生等，皆是不二中道之用。除假生假滅與假不生假不滅等，不生非不生、不滅非不滅方是正中也。故假不生假不滅，如假生假滅，悉是假，亦是用，亦是末也。不生不滅中，如非不生非不滅中，皆是中，亦是體，亦是本也。雖體用與中假等開，而無蹤跡，非體非用、非中非假，強名體用中假等也。問：《中論．四諦品》云「因緣所生法，我說即是無，亦是假名亦是中道。」則是三義，云何耶？答：明此偈多種勢，今一種意釋之。此一偈有三句，即勝八不，八不正是一中道句。言因緣所生者，是因緣所生之生滅法。此所生之生滅，既從因緣而生，故無可為生、無可為滅，只是空生空滅。所生既空，能生此生滅之因緣亦空。能生所生既並無，故言我說即是無也。故《中論．觀法品》云「生時空生、滅時空滅」也。《涅槃論》云「王宮生，生而不起。雙林滅，滅而不無」也。亦是假名者，即是第三句，以假故有能生之因緣，以假故有所生之生滅，假生不名生、假滅不名滅也。以假生滅不名生滅故，即是第三句不生不滅中道，故云亦是中道義也。大乘論明義有二種法門：一云義次、二謂根緣次也。義次者，必須前後相生始終次第也。根緣者，有疾即除、有緣即說，不必須前後相生也。明因緣義則總，若識因緣者名為佛法，不識因緣則非佛法。故《中論．四諦品》云「若見因緣則見佛與法」也。今破外因緣則總破眾病，申佛因緣則總申佛教也，故因緣在論初也。問：二諦亦總收眾教。此《中論》既言二諦為宗者，若學教之流正迷二諦，何不題破二諦品耶？答：亦得不得。得者，外人聞不生不滅畢竟空便失二諦，欲申二諦故造論。又迷佛二諦故生諍論，為此造論，亦得二諦在論初也。不得者，二諦語局，因緣則通。以二諦但是二非不二，但是教而非理。若是教之與理、二與不二，並是因緣，義則總也。問：因緣既總，何故不以因緣為宗？答：二諦為宗，豈離因緣？但諸佛說法常依二諦，今正與外人共諍佛二諦，故以二諦為宗也。又青目序品意云「因緣即是八不，八不即是因緣。」八不既貫論初，因緣亦標論首也。問：何以知八不即是因緣耶？答：偈及長行並有文證。偈言「能說是因緣」，即能說八不因緣。長行云「說因緣相，所謂不生不滅等也。」問：八不是因緣，若破因緣即破八不，若申八不即應申因緣耶？答：若體因緣即是八不，無假須破。但外人不識因緣即是八不，八不自是真諦、因緣自是世諦。彼解因緣僻故，所以破因緣品也。問：龍樹為稱佛教申？為不稱教申？若稱教申者，佛前說小後說大，今何故前明大後說小。若不稱教申，即是顛倒也。答：有四義：一龍樹稱佛本意申佛教也。所以者何？諸佛出世為一大事因緣故，謂一乘道，但為淺鈍之緣，曲為小教。今申佛本意，故前申大也。二欲明《中》、《百》兩論互相開避，《百論》前淺後深，《中論》前深後淺也。三佛自前說小後明大，《中論》自說大乘實，不欲說小，但為外人不堪學大乘觀行，故論主更為說小乘也。四欲示小乘從大乘出，是故前大後小也。問：因緣語通，故生與不生皆是因緣。八不但是不生，云何言因緣即是八不也？答：八不不生，此是因緣不生，故不生即得生也。故《中論》云「如經中說：若見因緣即名見法，見法即見佛也。若不見因緣即不見法，不見法即不見佛也。」此是借因緣破不因緣也。故《大經》云「是諸外道，無有一法不從因緣生。佛性不爾，不從因生故。」是借不因緣破因緣也。問：佛性既非因緣，是無因以不？答：亦得。故云「涅槃無因而體是果。」然佛性非因亦非果也，故《中論》具有二義，如破無因等外道計，故說十二因緣，此是借因破無因。又文中破四緣生，故是借非因緣破因緣。至論正法，未曾是因緣及不因緣也。問：「能說是因緣，善滅諸戲論」與「因緣所生法」二處因緣，是因緣是同是異？答：既云兩處，寧得是同？復是假名因緣，那得異？而意同也。今大乘明因緣義，因者如依因習因生因等，並是說緣為因。若如四緣等，皆是說因為緣。若緣緣於因，因即是緣，緣義為因。若因因於緣，緣義亦因，故因緣義通。而言八不不生不滅等為因緣，但因緣義無差別差別開為三義：一者當體得因緣名。只八不是因緣故。何者？因不生故不滅、不滅故不生，則八不是因緣。只八不不生等是言說，故無非因緣，故云當相是因緣。名八不為因緣，佛八不不一切故也。二者八不是因緣本故名因緣。則因緣空，壞因緣故，八不非因緣。既八不不一切不生不滅等，亦不因緣與不不因緣，豈得當體是因緣？是故因緣本也。三者破因緣已得名。如《毘曇》辨六因等明諸法等也。今明八不不一切，辨無因緣法，破外道因緣義，故名因緣。然備有此三義，遂得悟不同，抑沒不無淺深之異。而具有三義，名觀因緣品也。問：能說因緣者，唯障邪說是戲論？邪觀亦是戲論？答：有通有不通。何者？二而不二通，不二而二別。問：若通者，邪觀亦是邪說不？答：既未邪言，云何是邪說？問？若未邪言未是邪說者，亦未戲言未是戲論也。答：戲論是借譬之名。故名邪觀於道無所剋獲，如小兒戲論為耳。問：未邪說已是戲論者，未正說已是正說經也。答：亦如前無差別，差別即不得。差別無差別亦有明之，故《大經》云「迦葉佛時非無此經，但不說耳。」問：以不戲論止戲論，亦以戲論止戲論不？答：亦通得也。問：若以戲論止戲論令不戲論，亦應以不戲論止不戲論令成戲論反決也。答：兩途既皆言止，故相與令息。故戲論止戲論尚令不戲論，豈況不戲論止不戲論而令成戲論耶？問：既以戲論止戲論，即以言止言。答：得。自有以不聲遮聲，自有以聲遮聲也。問：若以言止言，亦應㨝出㨝、以病治病，即應以長待長也。答：相待論相成，就相顯發為論。止治令有所去離故，此義即通，所以不例也。問：上云常無常等四句並戲論者，四句悉戲論不？答：有所得四句並是戲論，無所得方便說四句悉非戲論，亦是正說。問：無所得四句非戲論者，亦應無所得顛倒非戲論也。答：無所得假名說四句則便，假安顛倒則不便。何故爾？以眾生多顛倒、少不顛倒故。若任而論之，正善具成就，演說四顛倒即倒也。問：若有所得四句皆是戲論，無所得四句並非戲論耶？答：一往相對論，常是戲論、無常非戲論。又無常是戲論、常非戲論。復常無常俱是戲論、非常非無常非戲論。總括始終明之，凡論相心四句，成有所得，並是戲論；就後方便，皆非戲論也。故《反折論》云謗也。

Part four: miscellaneous questions.

Objection: Does the eightfold negation, in clarifying the Middle [Way] and provisional [designations] of the two truths, arise from one's own mind, or is there a textual source for it?

Answer: It is supported by both text and principle. As for text, the eightfold negation appears scattered across many sūtras and treatises. In particular, the lower fascicle of the Bodhisattva Yingluo Benye Jing states: “The meaning of the two truths is that they are neither one nor two, neither eternal nor annihilated, neither coming nor going, neither arising nor ceasing.” Furthermore, fascicle twenty-five of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, in the “Lion's Roar Chapter,” states: “The twelve links of dependent co-arising are neither arising nor ceasing, neither eternal nor annihilated, neither one nor two, neither coming nor going, neither cause nor effect.” Its order differs slightly from that of the Madhyamakaśāstra, yet the meaning is identical. As for principle, the two truths are the teaching; thus provisional arising, provisional ceasing, and so forth are conventional truth, while provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing are ultimate truth, fully elucidating the meaning of the Middle [Way] and provisional [designations].

Question: Does the eightfold negation refer to the non-arising and non-ceasing of the teaching, or to the non-arising and non-ceasing of principle?

Answer: It encompasses both modes of non-arising and non-ceasing; however, principle is primary, while the teaching is secondary.

Question: How is this known?

Answer: After enumerating the eightfold negation, that sūtra states: “Yet their marks are non-dual with noble gnosis; therefore, it is the mother of gnosis for all buddhas and bodhisattvas.” The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “The substance of nirvāṇa is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent.” The “Marks and Conduct Chapter” of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra states: “Śāriputra addressed the Buddha: ‘How does the true mark of all phenomena exist?’ The Buddha said: ‘All phenomena exist as having no existence, and what exists in this manner has no existence. Not knowing this matter is called ignorance.’” The general sense of the preface to the Madhyamakaśāstra says: “Hearing of non-arising, non-ceasing, and ultimate emptiness, one loses the two truths.” Furthermore, the “Four Truths Chapter” states: “Although all phenomena are unborn, the two truths nevertheless exist.” Therefore, one knows that it fully encompasses both the Middle [Way] and provisional [designations], with the Middle [Way] as the principal doctrine and the two truths as secondary, just as expounded under the section on the two truths.

Question: If the eightfold negation was spoken by the Buddha, did Nāgārjuna, when composing the Madhyamakaśāstra, cite the eightfold negation from the sūtra and place it at the beginning of the treatise, or not?

Answer: This cannot be determined definitively. Perhaps Piṅgala cited it from the sūtra and positioned it there; or perhaps Nāgārjuna cited the eightfold negation from the sūtra in prefacing the beginning of the Akutobhayā, and thus the commentator placed it at the beginning of the preface's intention for the Madhyamakaśāstra. It ought not to be that the eightfold negation in the Dazhidu Lun was drawn and placed into the Madhyamakaśāstra, for when reaching difficult points, the Dazhidu Lun refers to the Madhyamakaśāstra as the Treatise on Right Contemplation, saying “as expounded in the Treatise on Right Contemplation.” Thus we know that the Dazhidu Lun was composed after the Madhyamakaśāstra. Alternatively, Qingmu [Piṅgala] appeared in the world during the thousand years [of the Semblance Dharma] and commented on the Madhyamakaśāstra; perhaps he cited the eightfold negation from the Dazhidu Lun and positioned it as the prefatory intent of the Madhyamakaśāstra.

Question: When the Dazhidu Lun refers to the Treatise on Right Contemplation, must that be the Madhyamakaśāstra?

Answer: The “Examination of Dharmas Chapter” of the Madhyamakaśāstra calls itself the Treatise on Right Contemplation; therefore, we know that the Madhyamakaśāstra is the Treatise on Right Contemplation. Thus the tradition says: “The Madhyamakaśāstra is the very marrow of the Dazhidu Lun.”

Question: Are the eight negations (八不), eight non-identities (八非), and eight non-existences (八無) the same or different?

Answer: They can be seen as the same, or as different. They are the same as different terms for the same focus. As for their difference: the Middle [Way] is primary in the eight negations, so the eight negations are without counterpart, whereas “non-identity” and the others have counterparts; hence they differ.

Question: Within the eight negations, can “neither arising nor ceasing” be called two negations, or can it not?

Answer: Since one says “neither arising nor ceasing,” how could it not be two negations?

Question: Neither arising and furthermore not ceasing—does this deny both errors? If it is called two negations because it negates the two errors of arising and ceasing, so that one can speak of two negations, then because of not ceasing and not arising, should there not also be two Middles?

Answer: Only the dual elimination of both arising and ceasing constitutes the true Middle.

Question: If only the dual elimination of arising and ceasing constitutes the true Middle, then by eliminating both arising and ceasing, should there not be only a single negation?

Answer: It is neither arising and furthermore not ceasing; it dually negates arising and ceasing, and for this reason there is one Middle.

Question: If the dual elimination constitutes one true Middle, then dual elimination of the two truths should also constitute one true Middle, leaving no three kinds of Middle.

Answer: In reality there is only one true Middle of the single path; the three kinds of Middle are distinguished to eliminate illnesses. To eliminate attachments as well, both the two negations and the two Middles are valid in meaning.

Question: When provisional arising is non-arising and provisional ceasing is non-ceasing, and neither arising nor ceasing is called the Middle of conventional truth; and when provisional non-arising is not non-arising and provisional non-ceasing is not non-ceasing, and neither non-arising nor non-ceasing is called the Middle Way of ultimate truth—how does the Middle of conventional truth’s neither arising nor ceasing differ from the ultimate truth’s provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing?

Answer: Positing “provisional” distinguishes it from the non-arising of the Middle; hence they are distinct.

Question: How do the provisional and the non-provisional differ?

Answer: In contrast to provisional arising and provisional ceasing, one clarifies provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing. These provisional non-arisings and the like are all functions of the non-dual Middle Way. When one eliminates provisional arising and provisional ceasing, along with provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing, then neither arising nor non-arising, neither ceasing nor non-ceasing—this alone is the true Middle. Thus provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing, like provisional arising and provisional ceasing, are all provisional, all function, and all branches. The Middle of neither arising nor ceasing, like the Middle of neither non-arising nor non-ceasing, are all the Middle, all substance, and all the root. Although substance and function, Middle and provisional, are distinguished, there are no actual traces: it is neither substance nor function, neither Middle nor provisional, and is only designated expediently as substance, function, Middle, provisional, and so forth.

Question: The “Examination of the Four Truths Chapter” of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: “Phenomena that arise from causes and conditions, I say are empty; they are also provisional designations, and also the Middle Way.” This expresses three meanings; what does it mean?

Answer: This verse can be explained from multiple perspectives; here it is explained according to one meaning. This verse contains three lines, which surpasses the eightfold negation, for the eightfold negation is just one phrase of the Middle Way. “Arising from causes and conditions” refers to the phenomena of arising and ceasing produced by causes and conditions. Since the arising and ceasing thus produced arise from causes and conditions, there is nothing that can be deemed arising and nothing that can be deemed ceasing; they are merely empty arising and empty ceasing. Since what is produced is empty, the causes and conditions that produce this arising and ceasing are also empty. Since that which produces and that which is produced are both non-existent, it says: “I say they are empty.” Thus the “Examination of Dharmas Chapter” of the Madhyamakaśāstra says: “When arising, it is empty arising; when ceasing, it is empty ceasing.” The Niepan Lun states: “Born in the royal palace, it is born without arising; ceasing in the Twin Trees, it ceases without being non-existent.” “They are also provisional designations” is the second [phrase]; because they are provisional, there are the causes and conditions that can produce, and because they are provisional, there is the arising and ceasing that is produced; provisional arising is not called arising, and provisional ceasing is not called ceasing. Because provisional arising and ceasing are not called arising and ceasing, this is the third phrase—the Middle Way of neither arising nor ceasing; hence it says “and also the Middle Way.”

Mahāyāna treatises explain doctrine through two kinds of approaches: the first is the sequential order of doctrinal meaning, and the second is the order according to faculties and conditions. The sequential order of doctrinal meaning must proceed consecutively from beginning to end, with preceding and succeeding points generating one another. The order according to faculties and conditions removes illness as soon as it arises and expounds teaching whenever conditions are present, without needing consecutive generation from beginning to end. To clarify the meaning of causes and conditions is comprehensive: if one understands causes and conditions, it is called the Buddha's Dharma; if one does not understand causes and conditions, it is not the Buddha's Dharma. Thus the “Examination of the Four Truths Chapter” of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: “Whoever sees causes and conditions sees the Buddha and the Dharma.” Now, refuting external causes and conditions comprehensively refutes all illnesses; elucidating the Buddha’s causes and conditions comprehensively elucidates the Buddha's teachings. Hence, causes and conditions are placed at the beginning of the treatise.

Question: The two truths also comprehensively encompass all teachings. Since this Madhyamakaśāstra takes the two truths as its doctrine, if students of the teachings are primarily confused about the two truths, why does it not title its opening as the chapter refuting [wrong views on] the two truths?

Answer: There are reasons why it could, and why it could not. As for why it could: when outsiders hear of non-arising, non-ceasing, and ultimate emptiness, they lose the two truths; the treatise was composed to elucidate the two truths. Furthermore, because of confusion regarding the Buddha's two truths, disputations arose; because the treatise was composed for this purpose, the two truths could well have been placed at the beginning of the treatise. As for why it could not: the term “two truths” is narrow, whereas “causes and conditions” is pervasive. For the two truths are merely dual and not non-dual, merely teaching and not principle. But teaching and principle, dual and non-dual, are all causes and conditions, so its meaning is comprehensive.

Question: Since causes and conditions are comprehensive, why not take causes and conditions as the doctrine?

Answer: Taking the two truths as the doctrine, how could it be divorced from causes and conditions? However, when the buddhas teach the Dharma, they always rely on the two truths; now, we are specifically disputing the Buddha's two truths with outsiders, so the two truths are taken as the doctrine. Furthermore, Qingmu's prefatory intent to the chapter states: “Causes and conditions are precisely the eightfold negation; the eightfold negation is precisely causes and conditions.” Since the eightfold negation runs throughout the opening of the treatise, causes and conditions are likewise placed at the head of the treatise.

Question: How do we know that the eightfold negation is precisely causes and conditions?

Answer: Both the verse and the prose commentary provide textual evidence. The verse says, “Able to expound these causes and conditions,” which means able to expound the causes and conditions of the eightfold negation. The prose commentary says, “Expounding the marks of causes and conditions, namely neither arising nor ceasing, and so forth.”

Question: The eightfold negation is causes and conditions; if one refutes causes and conditions, does one refute the eightfold negation, and if one elucidates the eightfold negation, should one elucidate causes and conditions?

Answer: If one realizes that the substance of causes and conditions is precisely the eightfold negation, there is no need for refutation. But outsiders do not recognize that causes and conditions are precisely the eightfold negation; they hold that the eightfold negation is merely ultimate truth, and causes and conditions are merely conventional truth. Because their understanding of causes and conditions is perverse, the chapter refutes causes and conditions.

Question: Did Nāgārjuna elucidate in accordance with the Buddha's teaching, or not in accordance with the teaching? If he elucidated in accordance with the teaching, the Buddha first taught the small [Hīnayāna] and later the great [Mahāyāna]; why now explain the great first and the small later? If he did not elucidate in accordance with the teaching, that would be an inversion.

Answer: There are four reasons. First, Nāgārjuna elucidated the Buddha's teaching in accordance with the Buddha's original intent. Why is this? The buddhas appear in the world for the sake of the one great cause—namely, the path of the One Vehicle; only for those with shallow and dull faculties did they accommodate them with the lesser teaching. Now, to elucidate the Buddha's original intent, he first elucidates the great. Second, he wished to show that the Madhyamakaśāstra and Śataśāstra mutually open up and complement one another: the Śataśāstra begins shallow and ends deep, whereas the Madhyamakaśāstra begins deep and ends shallow. Third, the Buddha himself first taught the small and later clarified the great; the Madhyamakaśāstra itself expounds the reality of the Mahāyāna and did not intend to teach the small, but because outsiders were incapable of practicing the Mahāyāna contemplations, the treatise master additionally expounded the lesser vehicle for them. Fourth, he wished to show that the lesser vehicle emerges from the Mahāyāna; therefore, the great comes first and the small later.

Question: The term “causes and conditions” is pervasive, so both arising and non-arising are causes and conditions. The eightfold negation is solely non-arising; how can one say that causes and conditions are precisely the eightfold negation?

Answer: The non-arising of the eightfold negation is the non-arising of causes and conditions; therefore, from non-arising, arising is established. Thus the Madhyamakaśāstra says: “As the sūtra states: ‘If one sees causes and conditions, one sees the Dharma; if one sees the Dharma, one sees the Buddha. If one does not see causes and conditions, one does not see the Dharma; if one does not see the Dharma, one does not see the Buddha.’” This is borrowing causes and conditions to refute non-cause-and-condition. Thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “Among these outsiders, there is not a single phenomenon that does not arise from causes and conditions. Buddha-nature is not like this, because it does not arise from causes.” This is borrowing non-cause-and-condition to refute causes and conditions.

Question: Since buddha-nature is not causes and conditions, is it uncaused or not?

Answer: That is also acceptable. Hence it is said: “Nirvāṇa is uncaused, yet its substance is the result.” However, buddha-nature is neither cause nor result. Thus the Madhyamakaśāstra contains both meanings: as when refuting outsider views of uncaused existence, it teaches the twelve links of dependent co-arising, which is borrowing cause to refute uncaused existence. Furthermore, in the text it refutes production from the four conditions, which is borrowing non-causes-and-conditions to refute causes and conditions. When arriving at the true Dharma, it has never been either causes and conditions or non-causes-and-conditions.

Question: Are “causes and conditions” in “Able to expound these causes and conditions, skillfully extinguishing all conceptual proliferations” and in “phenomena produced by causes and conditions” the same or different?

Answer: Since they are mentioned in two places, how could they be identical? Yet both are provisionally designated causes and conditions, so how could they differ? Their meaning is identical. Now, in clarifying the meaning of causes and conditions in the Mahāyāna: “cause” (hetu)—such as reliance cause, habituation cause, generating cause, and so forth—all refer to conditions as causes. If like the four conditions, all refer to causes as conditions. If conditions condition a cause, the cause is precisely a condition, and the meaning of condition becomes cause. If causes cause a condition, the meaning of condition is also cause; thus the meaning of causes and conditions is pervasive. When it is said that the eightfold negation of neither arising nor ceasing is causes and conditions, the undifferentiated meaning of causes and conditions is differentiated into three meanings: First, it obtains the name “causes and conditions” directly in its substance. It is because the eightfold negation itself is causes and conditions. How so? Because depending on non-arising there is non-ceasing, and depending on non-ceasing there is non-arising; hence the eightfold negation is causes and conditions. It is simply that the eightfold negation’s non-arising and so on is verbal exposition, so nothing is not causes and conditions; hence it is called causes and conditions in its immediate aspect. Calling the eightfold negation causes and conditions is because the Buddha’s eightfold negation negates everything. Second, the eightfold negation is called causes and conditions because it is the root of causes and conditions. Causes and conditions are empty, and because causes and conditions are deconstructed, the eightfold negation is not causes and conditions. Since the eightfold negation negates all—neither arising nor ceasing, and so forth—it also negates causes and conditions as well as non-causes-and-conditions; how could it directly in substance be causes and conditions? Therefore, it is the root of causes and conditions. Third, it obtains its name after refuting causes and conditions. As when the Abhidharma distinguishes the six causes and so on to explain phenomena. Now, clarifying that the eightfold negation negates everything explains that there are no phenomena of causes and conditions, refuting the outsider view of causes and conditions; hence it is called causes and conditions. Possessing these three meanings, people attain different awakenings, and the suppression or revelation of these meanings is not without differences of depth. Possessing these three meanings, it is titled the “Examination of Causes and Conditions Chapter.”

Question: Regarding the one able to expound causes and conditions, does this obstruct only wrong speech as conceptual proliferation, or is wrong contemplation also conceptual proliferation?

Answer: It is both pervasive and not pervasive. How so? When dual yet non-dual, it is pervasive; when non-dual yet dual, they are distinct.

Question: If it is pervasive, is wrong contemplation also wrong speech?

Answer: Since no wrong words have yet been spoken, how could it be wrong speech?

Question: If when no wrong words have been spoken it is not yet wrong speech, then when no frivolous words have been spoken, it should not yet be conceptual proliferation.

Answer: “Conceptual proliferation” (prapañca) is a metaphorical name. Hence wrong contemplation is called gaining nothing with respect to the Path, just like the idle play of small children.

Question: If what is not yet wrong speech is already conceptual proliferation, then what is not yet right speech is already the sūtra of right speech.

Answer: As before, when there is no difference, then making a difference is invalid. The difference within non-difference has also been explained; thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: “At the time of Kāśyapa Buddha, this sūtra was not non-existent; it was merely not expounded.”

Question: Does one stop conceptual proliferation with non-conceptual proliferation, and also stop conceptual proliferation with conceptual proliferation?

Answer: Both are valid.

Question: If one stops conceptual proliferation with conceptual proliferation to make it non-conceptual proliferation, then one should also stop non-conceptual proliferation with non-conceptual proliferation, turning it into conceptual proliferation, by reverse deduction.

Answer: Since both approaches speak of stopping, they mutually bring about cessation. If stopping conceptual proliferation with conceptual proliferation still brings about non-conceptual proliferation, how much more would stopping non-conceptual proliferation with non-conceptual proliferation fail to turn it into conceptual proliferation?

Question: Since one stops conceptual proliferation with conceptual proliferation, this means stopping words with words.

Answer: It is valid. There are instances where sound is prevented with non-sound, and instances where sound is prevented with sound.

Question: If one stops words with words, one should also extract a thorn with a thorn, cure an illness with an illness, and match the long against the long.

Answer: Mutual dependence discusses mutual completion, spoken with respect to manifesting marks. Stopping and curing aim to bring about removal and departure; therefore this principle holds, so they are not analogous.

Question: It was said above that the four positions, such as permanence and impermanence, are all conceptual proliferations; are all four positions conceptual proliferations?

Answer: The four positions of attainment are all conceptual proliferations; the four positions expounded expediently through non-attainment are all free from conceptual proliferation, and are also right speech.

Question: If the four positions of non-attainment are not conceptual proliferation, then the inversions of non-attainment should also not be conceptual proliferation.

Answer: When non-attainment provisionally speaks the four positions, it is appropriate; provisionally positing inversions is not appropriate. Why is this? Because sentient beings have many inversions and few non-inversions. If spoken freely, when right goodness is fully accomplished, expounding the four inversions is precisely inverted.

Question: If the four positions of attainment are all conceptual proliferations, are the four positions of non-attainment all free from conceptual proliferation?

Answer: Speaking relatively for the moment: permanence is conceptual proliferation, while impermanence is non-conceptual proliferation. Again, impermanence is conceptual proliferation, while permanence is non-conceptual proliferation. Furthermore, both permanence and impermanence are conceptual proliferation, while neither permanence nor impermanence is non-conceptual proliferation. Comprehensively summarizing from beginning to end: whenever one examines the four positions with a mind fixed on marks, resulting in attainment, they are all conceptual proliferations; with respect to subsequent expedient means, none are conceptual proliferations. Thus the Fanzhe Lun says they are slander.