大乘玄論 2.7

2.7

Part four: miscellaneous questions.

Objection: Does the eightfold negation, in clarifying the Middle [Way] and provisional [designations] of the two truths, arise from one's own mind, or is there a textual source for it?

Answer: It is supported by both text and principle. As for text, the eightfold negation appears scattered across many sūtras and treatises. In particular, the lower fascicle of the Bodhisattva Yingluo Benye Jing states: “The meaning of the two truths is that they are neither one nor two, neither eternal nor annihilated, neither coming nor going, neither arising nor ceasing.” Furthermore, fascicle twenty-five of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, in the “Lion's Roar Chapter,” states: “The twelve links of dependent co-arising are neither arising nor ceasing, neither eternal nor annihilated, neither one nor two, neither coming nor going, neither cause nor effect.” Its order differs slightly from that of the Madhyamakaśāstra, yet the meaning is identical. As for principle, the two truths are the teaching; thus provisional arising, provisional ceasing, and so forth are conventional truth, while provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing are ultimate truth, fully elucidating the meaning of the Middle [Way] and provisional [designations].

Question: Does the eightfold negation refer to the non-arising and non-ceasing of the teaching, or to the non-arising and non-ceasing of principle?

Answer: It encompasses both modes of non-arising and non-ceasing; however, principle is primary, while the teaching is secondary.

Question: How is this known?

Answer: After enumerating the eightfold negation, that sūtra states: “Yet their marks are non-dual with noble gnosis; therefore, it is the mother of gnosis for all buddhas and bodhisattvas.” The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “The substance of nirvāṇa is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent.” The “Marks and Conduct Chapter” of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra states: “Śāriputra addressed the Buddha: ‘How does the true mark of all phenomena exist?’ The Buddha said: ‘All phenomena exist as having no existence, and what exists in this manner has no existence. Not knowing this matter is called ignorance.’” The general sense of the preface to the Madhyamakaśāstra says: “Hearing of non-arising, non-ceasing, and ultimate emptiness, one loses the two truths.” Furthermore, the “Four Truths Chapter” states: “Although all phenomena are unborn, the two truths nevertheless exist.” Therefore, one knows that it fully encompasses both the Middle [Way] and provisional [designations], with the Middle [Way] as the principal doctrine and the two truths as secondary, just as expounded under the section on the two truths.

Question: If the eightfold negation was spoken by the Buddha, did Nāgārjuna, when composing the Madhyamakaśāstra, cite the eightfold negation from the sūtra and place it at the beginning of the treatise, or not?

Answer: This cannot be determined definitively. Perhaps Piṅgala cited it from the sūtra and positioned it there; or perhaps Nāgārjuna cited the eightfold negation from the sūtra in prefacing the beginning of the Akutobhayā, and thus the commentator placed it at the beginning of the preface's intention for the Madhyamakaśāstra. It ought not to be that the eightfold negation in the Dazhidu Lun was drawn and placed into the Madhyamakaśāstra, for when reaching difficult points, the Dazhidu Lun refers to the Madhyamakaśāstra as the Treatise on Right Contemplation, saying “as expounded in the Treatise on Right Contemplation.” Thus we know that the Dazhidu Lun was composed after the Madhyamakaśāstra. Alternatively, Qingmu [Piṅgala] appeared in the world during the thousand years [of the Semblance Dharma] and commented on the Madhyamakaśāstra; perhaps he cited the eightfold negation from the Dazhidu Lun and positioned it as the prefatory intent of the Madhyamakaśāstra.

Question: When the Dazhidu Lun refers to the Treatise on Right Contemplation, must that be the Madhyamakaśāstra?

Answer: The “Examination of Dharmas Chapter” of the Madhyamakaśāstra calls itself the Treatise on Right Contemplation; therefore, we know that the Madhyamakaśāstra is the Treatise on Right Contemplation. Thus the tradition says: “The Madhyamakaśāstra is the very marrow of the Dazhidu Lun.”

Question: Are the eight negations (八不), eight non-identities (八非), and eight non-existences (八無) the same or different?

Answer: They can be seen as the same, or as different. They are the same as different terms for the same focus. As for their difference: the Middle [Way] is primary in the eight negations, so the eight negations are without counterpart, whereas “non-identity” and the others have counterparts; hence they differ.

Question: Within the eight negations, can “neither arising nor ceasing” be called two negations, or can it not?

Answer: Since one says “neither arising nor ceasing,” how could it not be two negations?

Question: Neither arising and furthermore not ceasing—does this deny both errors? If it is called two negations because it negates the two errors of arising and ceasing, so that one can speak of two negations, then because of not ceasing and not arising, should there not also be two Middles?

Answer: Only the dual elimination of both arising and ceasing constitutes the true Middle.

Question: If only the dual elimination of arising and ceasing constitutes the true Middle, then by eliminating both arising and ceasing, should there not be only a single negation?

Answer: It is neither arising and furthermore not ceasing; it dually negates arising and ceasing, and for this reason there is one Middle.

Question: If the dual elimination constitutes one true Middle, then dual elimination of the two truths should also constitute one true Middle, leaving no three kinds of Middle.

Answer: In reality there is only one true Middle of the single path; the three kinds of Middle are distinguished to eliminate illnesses. To eliminate attachments as well, both the two negations and the two Middles are valid in meaning.

Question: When provisional arising is non-arising and provisional ceasing is non-ceasing, and neither arising nor ceasing is called the Middle of conventional truth; and when provisional non-arising is not non-arising and provisional non-ceasing is not non-ceasing, and neither non-arising nor non-ceasing is called the Middle Way of ultimate truth—how does the Middle of conventional truth’s neither arising nor ceasing differ from the ultimate truth’s provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing?

Answer: Positing “provisional” distinguishes it from the non-arising of the Middle; hence they are distinct.

Question: How do the provisional and the non-provisional differ?

Answer: In contrast to provisional arising and provisional ceasing, one clarifies provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing. These provisional non-arisings and the like are all functions of the non-dual Middle Way. When one eliminates provisional arising and provisional ceasing, along with provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing, then neither arising nor non-arising, neither ceasing nor non-ceasing—this alone is the true Middle. Thus provisional non-arising and provisional non-ceasing, like provisional arising and provisional ceasing, are all provisional, all function, and all branches. The Middle of neither arising nor ceasing, like the Middle of neither non-arising nor non-ceasing, are all the Middle, all substance, and all the root. Although substance and function, Middle and provisional, are distinguished, there are no actual traces: it is neither substance nor function, neither Middle nor provisional, and is only designated expediently as substance, function, Middle, provisional, and so forth.

Question: The “Examination of the Four Truths Chapter” of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: “Phenomena that arise from causes and conditions, I say are empty; they are also provisional designations, and also the Middle Way.” This expresses three meanings; what does it mean?

Answer: This verse can be explained from multiple perspectives; here it is explained according to one meaning. This verse contains three lines, which surpasses the eightfold negation, for the eightfold negation is just one phrase of the Middle Way. “Arising from causes and conditions” refers to the phenomena of arising and ceasing produced by causes and conditions. Since the arising and ceasing thus produced arise from causes and conditions, there is nothing that can be deemed arising and nothing that can be deemed ceasing; they are merely empty arising and empty ceasing. Since what is produced is empty, the causes and conditions that produce this arising and ceasing are also empty. Since that which produces and that which is produced are both non-existent, it says: “I say they are empty.” Thus the “Examination of Dharmas Chapter” of the Madhyamakaśāstra says: “When arising, it is empty arising; when ceasing, it is empty ceasing.” The Niepan Lun states: “Born in the royal palace, it is born without arising; ceasing in the Twin Trees, it ceases without being non-existent.” “They are also provisional designations” is the second [phrase]; because they are provisional, there are the causes and conditions that can produce, and because they are provisional, there is the arising and ceasing that is produced; provisional arising is not called arising, and provisional ceasing is not called ceasing. Because provisional arising and ceasing are not called arising and ceasing, this is the third phrase—the Middle Way of neither arising nor ceasing; hence it says “and also the Middle Way.”

Mahāyāna treatises explain doctrine through two kinds of approaches: the first is the sequential order of doctrinal meaning, and the second is the order according to faculties and conditions. The sequential order of doctrinal meaning must proceed consecutively from beginning to end, with preceding and succeeding points generating one another. The order according to faculties and conditions removes illness as soon as it arises and expounds teaching whenever conditions are present, without needing consecutive generation from beginning to end. To clarify the meaning of causes and conditions is comprehensive: if one understands causes and conditions, it is called the Buddha's Dharma; if one does not understand causes and conditions, it is not the Buddha's Dharma. Thus the “Examination of the Four Truths Chapter” of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: “Whoever sees causes and conditions sees the Buddha and the Dharma.” Now, refuting external causes and conditions comprehensively refutes all illnesses; elucidating the Buddha’s causes and conditions comprehensively elucidates the Buddha's teachings. Hence, causes and conditions are placed at the beginning of the treatise.

Question: The two truths also comprehensively encompass all teachings. Since this Madhyamakaśāstra takes the two truths as its doctrine, if students of the teachings are primarily confused about the two truths, why does it not title its opening as the chapter refuting [wrong views on] the two truths?

Answer: There are reasons why it could, and why it could not. As for why it could: when outsiders hear of non-arising, non-ceasing, and ultimate emptiness, they lose the two truths; the treatise was composed to elucidate the two truths. Furthermore, because of confusion regarding the Buddha's two truths, disputations arose; because the treatise was composed for this purpose, the two truths could well have been placed at the beginning of the treatise. As for why it could not: the term “two truths” is narrow, whereas “causes and conditions” is pervasive. For the two truths are merely dual and not non-dual, merely teaching and not principle. But teaching and principle, dual and non-dual, are all causes and conditions, so its meaning is comprehensive.

Question: Since causes and conditions are comprehensive, why not take causes and conditions as the doctrine?

Answer: Taking the two truths as the doctrine, how could it be divorced from causes and conditions? However, when the buddhas teach the Dharma, they always rely on the two truths; now, we are specifically disputing the Buddha's two truths with outsiders, so the two truths are taken as the doctrine. Furthermore, Qingmu's prefatory intent to the chapter states: “Causes and conditions are precisely the eightfold negation; the eightfold negation is precisely causes and conditions.” Since the eightfold negation runs throughout the opening of the treatise, causes and conditions are likewise placed at the head of the treatise.

Question: How do we know that the eightfold negation is precisely causes and conditions?

Answer: Both the verse and the prose commentary provide textual evidence. The verse says, “Able to expound these causes and conditions,” which means able to expound the causes and conditions of the eightfold negation. The prose commentary says, “Expounding the marks of causes and conditions, namely neither arising nor ceasing, and so forth.”

Question: The eightfold negation is causes and conditions; if one refutes causes and conditions, does one refute the eightfold negation, and if one elucidates the eightfold negation, should one elucidate causes and conditions?

Answer: If one realizes that the substance of causes and conditions is precisely the eightfold negation, there is no need for refutation. But outsiders do not recognize that causes and conditions are precisely the eightfold negation; they hold that the eightfold negation is merely ultimate truth, and causes and conditions are merely conventional truth. Because their understanding of causes and conditions is perverse, the chapter refutes causes and conditions.

Question: Did Nāgārjuna elucidate in accordance with the Buddha's teaching, or not in accordance with the teaching? If he elucidated in accordance with the teaching, the Buddha first taught the small [Hīnayāna] and later the great [Mahāyāna]; why now explain the great first and the small later? If he did not elucidate in accordance with the teaching, that would be an inversion.

Answer: There are four reasons. First, Nāgārjuna elucidated the Buddha's teaching in accordance with the Buddha's original intent. Why is this? The buddhas appear in the world for the sake of the one great cause—namely, the path of the One Vehicle; only for those with shallow and dull faculties did they accommodate them with the lesser teaching. Now, to elucidate the Buddha's original intent, he first elucidates the great. Second, he wished to show that the Madhyamakaśāstra and Śataśāstra mutually open up and complement one another: the Śataśāstra begins shallow and ends deep, whereas the Madhyamakaśāstra begins deep and ends shallow. Third, the Buddha himself first taught the small and later clarified the great; the Madhyamakaśāstra itself expounds the reality of the Mahāyāna and did not intend to teach the small, but because outsiders were incapable of practicing the Mahāyāna contemplations, the treatise master additionally expounded the lesser vehicle for them. Fourth, he wished to show that the lesser vehicle emerges from the Mahāyāna; therefore, the great comes first and the small later.

Question: The term “causes and conditions” is pervasive, so both arising and non-arising are causes and conditions. The eightfold negation is solely non-arising; how can one say that causes and conditions are precisely the eightfold negation?

Answer: The non-arising of the eightfold negation is the non-arising of causes and conditions; therefore, from non-arising, arising is established. Thus the Madhyamakaśāstra says: “As the sūtra states: ‘If one sees causes and conditions, one sees the Dharma; if one sees the Dharma, one sees the Buddha. If one does not see causes and conditions, one does not see the Dharma; if one does not see the Dharma, one does not see the Buddha.’” This is borrowing causes and conditions to refute non-cause-and-condition. Thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “Among these outsiders, there is not a single phenomenon that does not arise from causes and conditions. Buddha-nature is not like this, because it does not arise from causes.” This is borrowing non-cause-and-condition to refute causes and conditions.

Question: Since buddha-nature is not causes and conditions, is it uncaused or not?

Answer: That is also acceptable. Hence it is said: “Nirvāṇa is uncaused, yet its substance is the result.” However, buddha-nature is neither cause nor result. Thus the Madhyamakaśāstra contains both meanings: as when refuting outsider views of uncaused existence, it teaches the twelve links of dependent co-arising, which is borrowing cause to refute uncaused existence. Furthermore, in the text it refutes production from the four conditions, which is borrowing non-causes-and-conditions to refute causes and conditions. When arriving at the true Dharma, it has never been either causes and conditions or non-causes-and-conditions.

Question: Are “causes and conditions” in “Able to expound these causes and conditions, skillfully extinguishing all conceptual proliferations” and in “phenomena produced by causes and conditions” the same or different?

Answer: Since they are mentioned in two places, how could they be identical? Yet both are provisionally designated causes and conditions, so how could they differ? Their meaning is identical. Now, in clarifying the meaning of causes and conditions in the Mahāyāna: “cause” (hetu)—such as reliance cause, habituation cause, generating cause, and so forth—all refer to conditions as causes. If like the four conditions, all refer to causes as conditions. If conditions condition a cause, the cause is precisely a condition, and the meaning of condition becomes cause. If causes cause a condition, the meaning of condition is also cause; thus the meaning of causes and conditions is pervasive. When it is said that the eightfold negation of neither arising nor ceasing is causes and conditions, the undifferentiated meaning of causes and conditions is differentiated into three meanings: First, it obtains the name “causes and conditions” directly in its substance. It is because the eightfold negation itself is causes and conditions. How so? Because depending on non-arising there is non-ceasing, and depending on non-ceasing there is non-arising; hence the eightfold negation is causes and conditions. It is simply that the eightfold negation’s non-arising and so on is verbal exposition, so nothing is not causes and conditions; hence it is called causes and conditions in its immediate aspect. Calling the eightfold negation causes and conditions is because the Buddha’s eightfold negation negates everything. Second, the eightfold negation is called causes and conditions because it is the root of causes and conditions. Causes and conditions are empty, and because causes and conditions are deconstructed, the eightfold negation is not causes and conditions. Since the eightfold negation negates all—neither arising nor ceasing, and so forth—it also negates causes and conditions as well as non-causes-and-conditions; how could it directly in substance be causes and conditions? Therefore, it is the root of causes and conditions. Third, it obtains its name after refuting causes and conditions. As when the Abhidharma distinguishes the six causes and so on to explain phenomena. Now, clarifying that the eightfold negation negates everything explains that there are no phenomena of causes and conditions, refuting the outsider view of causes and conditions; hence it is called causes and conditions. Possessing these three meanings, people attain different awakenings, and the suppression or revelation of these meanings is not without differences of depth. Possessing these three meanings, it is titled the “Examination of Causes and Conditions Chapter.”

Question: Regarding the one able to expound causes and conditions, does this obstruct only wrong speech as conceptual proliferation, or is wrong contemplation also conceptual proliferation?

Answer: It is both pervasive and not pervasive. How so? When dual yet non-dual, it is pervasive; when non-dual yet dual, they are distinct.

Question: If it is pervasive, is wrong contemplation also wrong speech?

Answer: Since no wrong words have yet been spoken, how could it be wrong speech?

Question: If when no wrong words have been spoken it is not yet wrong speech, then when no frivolous words have been spoken, it should not yet be conceptual proliferation.

Answer: “Conceptual proliferation” (prapañca) is a metaphorical name. Hence wrong contemplation is called gaining nothing with respect to the Path, just like the idle play of small children.

Question: If what is not yet wrong speech is already conceptual proliferation, then what is not yet right speech is already the sūtra of right speech.

Answer: As before, when there is no difference, then making a difference is invalid. The difference within non-difference has also been explained; thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: “At the time of Kāśyapa Buddha, this sūtra was not non-existent; it was merely not expounded.”

Question: Does one stop conceptual proliferation with non-conceptual proliferation, and also stop conceptual proliferation with conceptual proliferation?

Answer: Both are valid.

Question: If one stops conceptual proliferation with conceptual proliferation to make it non-conceptual proliferation, then one should also stop non-conceptual proliferation with non-conceptual proliferation, turning it into conceptual proliferation, by reverse deduction.

Answer: Since both approaches speak of stopping, they mutually bring about cessation. If stopping conceptual proliferation with conceptual proliferation still brings about non-conceptual proliferation, how much more would stopping non-conceptual proliferation with non-conceptual proliferation fail to turn it into conceptual proliferation?

Question: Since one stops conceptual proliferation with conceptual proliferation, this means stopping words with words.

Answer: It is valid. There are instances where sound is prevented with non-sound, and instances where sound is prevented with sound.

Question: If one stops words with words, one should also extract a thorn with a thorn, cure an illness with an illness, and match the long against the long.

Answer: Mutual dependence discusses mutual completion, spoken with respect to manifesting marks. Stopping and curing aim to bring about removal and departure; therefore this principle holds, so they are not analogous.

Question: It was said above that the four positions, such as permanence and impermanence, are all conceptual proliferations; are all four positions conceptual proliferations?

Answer: The four positions of attainment are all conceptual proliferations; the four positions expounded expediently through non-attainment are all free from conceptual proliferation, and are also right speech.

Question: If the four positions of non-attainment are not conceptual proliferation, then the inversions of non-attainment should also not be conceptual proliferation.

Answer: When non-attainment provisionally speaks the four positions, it is appropriate; provisionally positing inversions is not appropriate. Why is this? Because sentient beings have many inversions and few non-inversions. If spoken freely, when right goodness is fully accomplished, expounding the four inversions is precisely inverted.

Question: If the four positions of attainment are all conceptual proliferations, are the four positions of non-attainment all free from conceptual proliferation?

Answer: Speaking relatively for the moment: permanence is conceptual proliferation, while impermanence is non-conceptual proliferation. Again, impermanence is conceptual proliferation, while permanence is non-conceptual proliferation. Furthermore, both permanence and impermanence are conceptual proliferation, while neither permanence nor impermanence is non-conceptual proliferation. Comprehensively summarizing from beginning to end: whenever one examines the four positions with a mind fixed on marks, resulting in attainment, they are all conceptual proliferations; with respect to subsequent expedient means, none are conceptual proliferations. Thus the Fanzhe Lun says they are slander.