大乘玄論 4.12

4.12

斷伏門第九。先依《中論疏》先立異家義，然後辨。問：二智云何斷煩惱耶？答：此經云「佛為增上慢人說斷煩惱」，實不斷也。問曰：大小經論皆明斷惑，云何不斷？答：若言斷者，今請問之：為有惑可斷耶？如其實有，即不可斷。又經云「若法先有後無，諸佛菩薩即有過罪。」云何言斷？如其無惑，竟何所斷？又有惑即是有見，無惑名為無見，亦有亦無、非有非無並是煩惱，云何煩惱斷煩惱耶？又縱有煩惱者為所斷、慧為能斷，為見惑故斷？不見斷耶？如其見者，即明闇並，云何斷耶？若不相見，復何所斷？若言解惑相違而懸斷者，即天竺燃燈破震旦闇，一品之解除一切惑。又慧獨能斷？假伴共除？若獨能斷者，菩薩何故修八聖道？獨慧不斷，雖復假伴亦不能斷，如一盲不見，眾盲亦然。又一念斷？為相續耶？若一念者，惑亦一念即與俱謝，何能斷耶？若相續斷者，為滅故續？不滅續耶？滅即復無所續，不滅無復能續，云何續耶？以是推之，即無所斷，是以不應言智斷惑。問：若爾，應無有斷。何故經云「一念相應慧，斷煩惱習」耶？答：如上推之，即畢竟無斷。如是了悟，即是斷也。所以然者，於一切處求解惑無從，即心無所依。心無所依，即眾累清淨，故名為斷也。斷與不斷不相違。問：以無所依名為斷者，為波若斷？為方便斷耶？答：舊云波若是空慧故斷，方便照有即不斷也。今明有所得空有二慧俱不能斷，無所得空有俱能斷也。但不二而二，開二慧不同，方便實慧即不斷而斷，實慧方便斷而不斷。問：何故爾耶？答：有所依著是諸煩惱根，諸法實相是無著之本。由實相無所依故生波若，波若即無所著故眾惑清淨，故名斷也。問：若會境生智然後斷惑，與他何異？答：不言惑外別有實相故會實相斷，但了煩惱本自不生、今亦不滅，即是實相，故名會實相斷。問：為但波若斷？薩波若亦斷？答：此義舊有二師：或言金剛心斷，是波若斷；或言佛智所斷，即薩波若斷。今明《大品》云「菩薩無礙道中行，佛在解脫道中行，無一切暗。」詳此文意，無礙、解脫俱有斷不斷義。若一念正觀，惑不現前，即無礙正斷；解脫出居累外，故解脫不斷。故云「佛在解脫道中行，無一切暗」也。若言解脫續於無礙，鎮前無惑之處，遮未來惑不得續生，即有遮斷，故亦名斷。無礙正斷故，得言金剛惑盡；未有解脫遮未來惑，得云不盡。故盡與不盡二既不違。問：波若為無礙、薩婆若為解脫者，得言地前為無礙、初地為解脫不？答：有人云，亦得如此。小乘即苦忍之前習行未久，但伏非斷；大乘地前修行積時，是故能斷也。今謂不然。大小乘義乃優劣懸殊，如來制立大格相似，小乘即七方便伏、苦忍斷之；大乘三十心伏、初地斷也。初地中自開無礙、解脫，無礙正斷、解脫遮斷，如上釋也。問：為轉無礙為解脫？為無礙謝解脫生耶？答：《毘曇》即謝，《成論》即轉。斥此二說，餘處已明，今略陳之。金剛若謝，別有佛果，云何波若反名薩云若？轉金剛而成佛者，云何轉無常之法而作常耶？今明者，具有轉謝及不轉不謝。若了悟金剛本不生滅，即金剛是佛，故不轉不謝。是故經云「一切眾生本來寂滅，不復更滅」也。於妄謂之心，息生滅之見，故名為謝。約了悟之者，前謂生滅，今悟無生滅，是故名轉。二文一會，義無所違。問：若地前伏、初地斷者，何得《釋論》云「初地時未捨結，七地方斷」耶？答：眾師不同。生公用大頓悟義，唯佛斷惑，爾前未斷，故佛名為覺，爾前未覺。瑤師用小頓悟義，七地方斷，引向文證之。今明皆無所妨。《大經》云「唯佛名眼見佛性，十地已還皆稱聞見。」即唯佛斷惑，爾前不斷也。初地已來，但斷麁累、未除細惑，故云不斷。七地除細，故言斷耳。故各有其義，不應偏執。問：為中伏假斷？為假伏中斷？答：適緣取悟，無有定也。自有中伏假斷，如求性有無不可得，故名非有非無，目之為中。此但伏性有無，猶未斷也。次明假有假無，即性有無始斷。所以然者，識假有假無，即知畢竟無有定性有無，故名假斷也。次明假伏中斷者，對性有無，說假有無，以伏性有無，故云假伏。次明悟假有不有、假無不無，非有非無名中道，前性有無始得永斷，故名假伏中斷也。問：亦得假伏假斷、中伏中斷以不？答：亦有此義。如識假有無，即性有無永斷，名為假斷也。自有識假有無但伏，性有無猶未斷也。自有悟非有非無，但伏於性。自有悟非有無，性惑永斷，不須說假也。問：云何名假名惑、實法惑耶？答：成論師云，緣假迷假，稱假名惑，則迷假人法等。緣實迷實，名實法惑，如迷五塵等。今明此是三藏一部之義耳。大乘假實惑者，即向所明之，即前之假名為假惑，即前之實名為實惑。所以然者，諸法未曾假實。今有此假實，良非惑耶？問：大乘亦有假名實法義不？答：二是假名，不二為中道，中道即是實相，故名實法。迷因緣假名二諦，稱為假惑；迷不二實相，目實惑也。問：云何迷耶？答：不二二名為二諦，二不二為中道。二定二故名迷假，不二定不二稱為迷實。又二不二皆名為假，非二不二方為實，迷此假實名假實惑也。

Ninth, the gate of severing and subduing. Relying first upon the Commentary on the Madhyamakaśāstra, the views of other traditions are first established, and then analyzed. Question: How do the two gnoses sever the afflictions? Answer: This sūtra states, "The Buddha spoke of severing afflictions for persons of overweening pride"; in reality, nothing is severed. Question: Sūtras and treatises of both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna all explain the severing of delusion; how can it not be severed? Answer: If one speaks of severing, let me now ask: Is there an affliction that can be severed? If it truly exists, then it cannot be severed. Furthermore, a sūtra states: "If phenomena existed beforehand and were absent afterward, the buddhas and bodhisattvas would incur fault." How could one speak of severing? If there is no affliction, what after all is severed? Moreover, to have affliction is the view of existence; to be without affliction is called the view of non-existence; and both-existence-and-non-existence as well as neither-existence-nor-non-existence are all afflictions—how could affliction sever affliction? Furthermore, even granted that there are afflictions as the object to be severed and wisdom as that which can sever: does it sever because it sees the afflictions, or does it sever without seeing them? If it sees them, then light and darkness would coexist—how could it sever them? If they do not encounter each other, what further is there to sever? If one says that understanding and delusion are opposed to each other and severing occurs at a distance, then lighting a lamp in India would dispel darkness in China, and a single grade of understanding would eliminate all delusions. Furthermore, is wisdom alone able to sever, or does it rely on companions to eliminate them together? If it were able to sever alone, why would bodhisattvas cultivate the eightfold noble path? If wisdom alone cannot sever, even if it relies on companions it still cannot sever, just as if one blind person cannot see, a crowd of blind people likewise cannot. Furthermore, does it sever in a single thought-moment, or through a continuum? If in a single thought-moment, the delusion also perishes together with that single thought-moment—how could it sever it? If it severs through a continuum, does the continuum proceed because of cessation, or does it proceed without cessation? If there is cessation, there is nothing further to continue; if there is no cessation, there is nothing further that can continue—how could there be a continuum? Inferring from this, there is nothing to be severed; therefore one ought not to say that gnosis severs delusion. Question: If so, there should be no severing. Why does the sūtra state: "Wisdom corresponding in a single thought-moment severs the habits of affliction"? Answer: Inferring as above, there is ultimately no severing. To awaken to this is itself severing. Why is this? Seeking understanding and delusion anywhere yields no result, so the mind has nothing upon which to rely. When the mind has nothing upon which to rely, the manifold burdens are completely purified; hence it is called severing. Severing and non-severing do not conflict. Question: If non-reliance is called severing, is it severed by prajñā or is it severed by upāya? Answer: Formerly it was said that prajñā is the wisdom of emptiness and therefore severs, whereas upāya cognizes existence and therefore does not sever. Now it is explained that the dual wisdoms of emptiness and existence of attainment are both unable to sever, whereas emptiness and existence of non-attainment are both able to sever. Yet within non-duality there is duality, opening the two wisdoms differently: the real wisdom of upāya severs without severing, and the upāya of real wisdom severs yet does not sever. Question: Why is that? Answer: Having reliance and attachment is the root of all afflictions; the real mark of all phenomena is the basis of non-attachment. Because the real mark has nothing to rely upon, prajñā arises; prajñā has nothing to attach to, so the manifold delusions are completely purified—hence it is called severing. Question: If encountering the cognitive object gives rise to gnosis and then severs delusion, how is this different from other traditions? Answer: We do not say that outside of delusion there is a separate real mark such that one encounters the real mark to sever it; but simply comprehending that afflictions are originally unborn and now also unceasing is itself the real mark—hence it is called severing upon encountering the real mark. Question: Is it severed only by prajñā, or is it severed by sarvajñā as well? Answer: On this meaning, there were formerly two masters: one said that it is severed by the adamantine mind, which is severing by prajñā; another said that it is severed by the Buddha's gnosis, which is severing by sarvajñā. Now it is explained that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra states: "The bodhisattva acts within the unobstructed path; the Buddha acts within the path of liberation, free from all darkness." Examining the purport of this text, both the unobstructed and liberation have the senses of severing and non-severing. If in a single thought-moment of correct contemplation the affliction does not manifest, that is the direct severing of the unobstructed [path]; liberation abides beyond all burdens, and so liberation does not sever. Hence it says: "The Buddha acts within the path of liberation, free from all darkness." If one says that liberation continues after the unobstructed, occupying the former place that is free from delusion and blocking future delusion from continuing to arise, then there is obstructive severing, so it is also called severing. Because the unobstructed path directly severs, one can say that the adamantine [mind] exhausts delusion; because liberation has not yet blocked future delusion, one can say it is not exhausted. Thus, exhaustion and non-exhaustion do not conflict with each other. Question: If prajñā is the unobstructed and sarvajñā is liberation, can one say that the stages prior to the grounds are the unobstructed and the first ground is liberation? Answer: Some say that this is also permissible: in the Hīnayāna, before the patience regarding suffering, practice has not been cultivated for long, so it only subdues and does not sever; in the Mahāyāna, before the grounds, practice has accumulated over time, and therefore it can sever. Now we say this is not so. The meanings of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna differ vastly in superiority and inferiority, yet the broad framework established by the Tathāgata is similar: in the Hīnayāna, the seven expedient stages subdue, and the patience regarding suffering severs; in the Mahāyāna, the thirty minds subdue, and the first ground severs. Within the first ground itself, the unobstructed and liberation are distinguished: the unobstructed directly severs, and liberation obstructively severs, as explained above. Question: Is the unobstructed transformed into liberation, or does the unobstructed perish and liberation arise? Answer: The Abhidharma holds that it perishes; the Tattvasiddhi holds that it is transformed. Refutation of these two explanations has already been clarified elsewhere; now it will be briefly stated. If the adamantine [mind] perishes and a separate fruit of buddhahood exists, why is prajñā on the contrary called sarvajñā? If the adamantine [mind] is transformed into buddhahood, how could an impermanent phenomenon be transformed into the permanent? Now it is explained that it possesses both transformation and perishing, as well as non-transformation and non-perishing. If one realizes that the adamantine [mind] is originally unborn and unceasing, then the adamantine [mind] is the Buddha; hence there is neither transformation nor perishing. Therefore the sūtra states: "All sentient beings are originally in complete extinction and do not undergo further extinction." With respect to the mind of deluded presumption, the view of arising and ceasing ceases; hence it is called perishing. With respect to one who realizes: formerly one presumed arising and ceasing, and now one realizes non-arising and non-ceasing; therefore it is called transformation. When the two passages are integrated, their meaning does not conflict. Question: If prior to the grounds there is subduing and at the first ground there is severing, how can the Treatise state: "At the first ground, fetters have not yet been abandoned; only at the seventh ground are they severed"? Answer: The various masters differ. Master Dao sheng adopted the doctrine of great sudden awakening: only the Buddha severs delusion, and prior to that it is not yet severed; hence the Buddha is called Awakened, and prior to that one is not yet awakened. Master Yao adopted the doctrine of small sudden awakening: they are only severed at the seventh ground, citing the aforementioned text as proof. Now it is explained that neither presents any contradiction. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states: "Only the Buddha is said to see buddha-nature with the eye; from the tenth ground on down, all are said to see it by hearing." That is, only the Buddha severs delusion, and prior to that it is not severed. From the first ground onward, only coarse burdens are severed, while subtle delusions have not yet been eliminated; hence it is said not to be severed. At the seventh ground, subtle delusions are eliminated; hence it is said to be severed. Thus each has its rationale, and one should not adhere to a one-sided view. Question: Does the middle subdue and the conventional sever, or does the conventional subdue and the middle sever? Answer: Depending on circumstances, one attains awakening; there is no fixed rule. There are instances where the middle subdues and the conventional severs: as when seeking the intrinsic existence or non-existence is impossible, it is called neither-existence-nor-non-existence and designated the middle. This only subdues intrinsic existence and non-existence, but has not yet severed them. Next, when conventional existence and conventional non-existence are clarified, intrinsic existence and non-existence are then first severed. Why is this? When one recognizes conventional existence and conventional non-existence, one knows that there is ultimately no fixed intrinsic existence or non-existence; hence it is called conventional severing. Next, concerning the conventional subduing and the middle severing: in opposition to intrinsic existence and non-existence, conventional existence and non-existence are taught to subdue intrinsic existence and non-existence; hence it is called conventional subduing. Next, when one realizes that conventional existence is not [intrinsic] existence and conventional non-existence is not [intrinsic] non-existence, neither-existence-nor-non-existence is called the Middle Way, and the previous intrinsic existence and non-existence are then permanently severed; hence it is called conventional subduing and middle severing. Question: Can there also be conventional subduing and conventional severing, or middle subduing and middle severing? Answer: There is also this meaning. As when one recognizes conventional existence and non-existence, intrinsic existence and non-existence are permanently severed; this is called conventional severing. There are instances where recognizing conventional existence and non-existence merely subdues, while intrinsic existence and non-existence are not yet severed. There are instances where realizing neither-existence-nor-non-existence merely subdues intrinsic nature. There are instances where realizing neither-existence-nor-non-existence permanently severs intrinsic delusion, without needing to speak of the conventional. Question: What are called delusion regarding conventional designations and delusion regarding real phenomena? Answer: The Tattvasiddhi masters say that taking conventionalities as cognitive objects and being confused about conventionalities is called delusion regarding conventional designations, namely being confused about conventional persons and phenomena; taking real things as cognitive objects and being confused about real things is called delusion regarding real phenomena, as being confused about the five sense objects and so forth. Now it is explained that this is merely the doctrine of the single corpus of the Tripiṭaka. As for the Mahāyāna's delusion regarding the conventional and the real, it is just what was explained above: taking the aforementioned conventional designations as conventional delusion, and taking the aforementioned real as real delusion. Why is this? The manifold phenomena have never been conventional or real. Now that there are this conventional and this real, are they not indeed delusion? Question: Does the Mahāyāna also have the meaning of conventional designations and real phenomena? Answer: Duality is conventional designation, and non-duality is the Middle Way; the Middle Way is the real mark, and is therefore called real phenomena. Being confused about the two truths of dependently arisen conventional designations is called conventional delusion; being confused about the non-dual real mark is designated real delusion. Question: How is one confused? Answer: Non-duality as duality is called the two truths, and duality as non-duality is the Middle Way. Taking duality as definitely dual is called being confused about the conventional; taking non-duality as definitely non-dual is called being confused about the real. Furthermore, both duality and non-duality are called conventional, and only neither-duality-nor-non-duality is the real; being confused about this conventional and real is called the delusion of the conventional and the real.