大乘玄論 4.13

4.13

攝智門第十。問：權實二智攝智盡不？答：攝智皆盡。經有一智二智三智四智五智乃至七十七智，皆二智攝。攝一智者，即如實智。如實智即是佛眼，佛眼無法不見而無所見，無法不見名權智，而無所見名為實智。問：如實智但是照實相智，唯應是實智，云何有權智耶？答：此明如實而知名如實智，故具二智也。次攝二智者，則一切智、一切種智。但此二智凡有六門：一空有分二，一切智為空智、一切種智為有智，此則權實攝也。次以總別分二，總相知為一切智、別相知為一切種智。但總別三門：一以苦無常為總相、陰入界為別相；二以無生滅為總相、諸法差別為別相；三以略為總相、廣為別相，如苦諦為總相、廣分別苦有無量相為別相。三別中取初義，第二義猶是空有，第三義屬後廣略也。三者略說為一切智、廣說為一切種智，如上釋也。四者因為一切智、果為一切種智也。問：二智俱是果門，云何分因果耶？答：例如菩提涅槃為果及以果果。涅槃既是果果，即菩提亦得為因，此義論因果，今亦然矣。五者小乘名一切智、大乘名一切種智，此明小乘總相知十二入苦空無常為一切智，大乘遍知一切法為一切種智。六者一切種智為空智、一切智為有智。以種名性，性即實相；理為諸法根本，故名為種。一切智知一切法，為有智也。次攝三智門者，三智多門，《涅槃》云「一者波若，一切眾生之慧，所謂下智也；二毘婆舍那，謂二乘智，即是中智也；三闍那，佛菩薩智，謂上智也。」又云「波若別相智，別知諸法。毘婆舍那總相智，總知諸法。闍那為破相。」破相者，波若知有，毘婆舍那照空，闍那捨於空有，即中道智也。又如《波若．三慧品》說「二乘為一切智，菩薩道種智，佛一切種智。」二乘名為一切智者，十二入攝一切法，二乘知十二苦空無常，名一切智。論云「此但有一切智名，而無一切智用，猶如晝燈，但有燈名而無燈用。」問：云何無用？答：佛具知一切法別相，然後能知一切總相，故名一切智。二乘但總相知一切，不能一一別相而知。如《涅槃》云「二乘但知於苦，不能分別是苦有無量相，我於彼經竟不說之。」即二乘不能別知，故但有一切智名，而無一切智用也。道種慧者，菩薩知四種道：人天謂福樂道，及三乘道。知佛道自度度他，餘三道但度他也。佛名一切種智者，此一切種智，實異前一切種智。前一切種智但知有法，今合知空有，名一切種智。經云「知一相故，名一切種智。」又云「知一切法行類相貌，名一切種智」也。此三智中，一一皆具照空有，皆有權實二智也。次《地持論》有三智：一清淨智，斷五住惑盡故云清淨，即照第一義空智也；二一切智，即照有智也；三無礙智，無功用智照一切法無復功用，故云無礙。初是實智，後二為權。次《攝大乘論》有三智：一加行智，即進求上地心；二正體智，證如之智，謂實智也；三後得智，即寂而動，謂權智也。此三智即為次第，前有進求之智，次正得實觀，後從實起用，地地中皆具此三智也。又四智攝入二智者，《攝大乘論》云「一切智、一切種智、無礙智、無功用智，前二知空有，次一不從師，後一無有功用。」即《法花經》云「佛智、一切智、自然智、無師智」也。前二別照空有，後二通空有也。次四無礙智，此有多門，今略舉一義，知世諦為知法、知第一義為知義，此即二智。樂說及辭，皆世諦智也。次明四智義。我生已盡、梵行已立、所作已辦、不受後有。釋此不同，《婆沙》云「我生已盡是斷集智，集因能生未來苦果名之為生，無學斷竟，名我生已盡。梵行已立是修道智，梵名為淨，無漏聖道能除垢染、離障清淨，名為梵行。無學聖人道行成滿，名為已立。所作已辦是證滅智，斷惑證滅名為所作，無學證果功成，名為已辦。不受後有是知苦智，後世苦報名為後有，無學聖人於此有不復更受，名不受後有。」問：經說四諦，先明苦集、後明滅道，今何故前斷集修道、後證滅知苦？答四諦示欣厭門，先苦集、後滅道。於欣厭門逆觀次第，故先果後因。四智是順觀門，故先因後果，故前集道、後明滅苦。又要除障，然後善成，故先斷集、後修道。後果中，先滅現在過患、後不受未來苦報，故前滅後苦。《勝鬘》、《涅槃》釋四智又異，今不述之。四智皆入大乘權智，是小乘之實智。次五智攝入二智者，一法住智、二泥洹智、三無諍智、四願智、五邊際智。依小乘，法住智者，知苦集相生諸法存立名法住智，知道及滅名泥洹智。又云：知苦集道名法住智；知於滅諦名泥洹智；令物不起諍為無諍智；願知未來一切事，即便得知，名為願智；邊際智者，報身最後名為邊際，聖人修得自在智故，於報身延促自在，名邊際智。小乘前二智通，利鈍羅漢皆有；後三但利根羅漢有之。又前二通，一切定皆能起；後三但第四禪起。前二通漏無漏，後三但有漏。前二三界身得起，後三但欲界三天下身起。前二以三界法為所緣境，無諍智者但以欲界瞋心為境。大乘五智，一切處、一切身，五十二位皆得起，通漏無漏也。小乘五智，皆為大乘權智攝。大乘論五智，泥洹即是實相，正法屬實智，餘四屬權智。十一智攝入二智者，十智照四諦，是差別智，屬權智攝；如實智照一實諦，即是實相，謂無差別智，故屬實智也。又論云「十智在四眼，如實智為佛眼。」若爾，四眼中具二智，佛眼中亦具二智也。問：菩提與薩婆若，十智何智攝？答：論云「菩提是十智，即是有智，即一切種智；薩波若為如實智，謂空智，亦是一切智。」四十四智者，約十二因緣作之。如云老死苦、老死集、老死滅道，一一皆具四諦觀也。七十七智者，生緣老生，不離生緣老死。初是正觀智，次是審法智。又正觀智簡無因，審法智簡異邪因。三世各二為六，此六是法住智。次一是泥洹智。法住為明生死因果增長故多。泥洹滅之智，三世合一。此皆小乘之義，皆屬大乘權智攝之。若大乘，泥洹智是實智，如上也。如此皆是無分別中善功分別，雖分別不動無分別，不同數論有所得釋。既是名教，不得不知。問：四十四及七十七同從老死起，有何異耶？答：四十四觀果由因，其觀易成，故為鈍根人也。觀果由因者，初觀老死是果，次明老死集者，觀果由因也。七十七即觀因生果，如云生緣老死，生是因，為老死之緣，不離生緣老死亦爾。觀因生果，其事既難，故為利根人。四十四，《成論》文云「在七方便中。」七十七，文不判位。眾師云：在四現忍中也。問：何故不從無明起耶？答：尋末至本，此觀易成。又四十四但得從果起，以具四諦故。若從無明起，無復因，云何得具四諦耶？七十七不從無明起，但從老死起，其觀易成也。問：菩薩觀十二因緣，屬何智耶？答：菩薩無方，不可定判。《釋論》云「菩薩為眾生故，從果觀十二因緣。」

Tenth, the section on subsuming cognitions. Question: Do the two cognitions, provisional and real, completely subsume [all other] cognitions or not? Answer: They completely subsume [all] cognitions. The sūtras have one cognition, two cognitions, three cognitions, four cognitions, five cognitions, up to seventy-seven cognitions; all are subsumed by the two cognitions. As for subsuming the one cognition, this is the cognition of reality (yathābhūtajñāna). The cognition of reality is the buddha-eye. For the buddha-eye, there is no phenomenon that it does not see, and yet there is nothing seen. Its 'seeing no phenomenon that it does not see' is called provisional cognition; its 'having nothing seen' is called real cognition. Question: Since the cognition of reality is only the cognition illuminating the true mark, it should only be real cognition; why would there be provisional cognition? Answer: This explains that knowing in accordance with reality is called the cognition of reality, and thus it possesses both cognitions. Next, as for subsuming two cognitions, these are all-knowledge (sarvajñāna) and knowledge of all aspects (sarvākārajñāna). However, these two cognitions generally have six approaches: First, dividing the two according to emptiness and existence: all-knowledge is the cognition of emptiness, and knowledge of all aspects is the cognition of existence; this is their subsumption under the real and the provisional. Second, dividing the two according to universal and specific: knowing universal characteristics is all-knowledge, and knowing specific characteristics is knowledge of all aspects. But there are three approaches to universal and specific: (1) taking suffering and impermanence as universal characteristics, and the aggregates, sense bases, and elements as specific characteristics; (2) taking non-arising and non-cessation as universal characteristics, and the distinctions among all phenomena as specific characteristics; (3) taking the brief as universal characteristics, and the extensive as specific characteristics, just as the truth of suffering is the universal characteristic, while extensively distinguishing that suffering has immeasurable characteristics is the specific characteristic. Among these three distinctions, we take the first meaning; the second meaning still belongs to emptiness and existence, and the third meaning belongs to the subsequent 'extensive and brief.' Third, spoken briefly it is all-knowledge, and spoken extensively it is knowledge of all aspects, as explained above. Fourth, the cause is all-knowledge, and the effect is knowledge of all aspects. Question: Both cognitions belong to the stage of the effect; how can they be divided into cause and effect? Answer: By analogy, bodhi and nirvāṇa are the effect and the effect-of-the-effect. Since nirvāṇa is the effect-of-the-effect, bodhi may also be considered a cause; discussing cause and effect in this sense applies here as well. Fifth, the Hīnayāna is termed all-knowledge, and the Mahāyāna is termed knowledge of all aspects; this explains that the Hīnayāna's knowing the universal characteristics of the twelve sense bases as suffering, empty, and impermanent is all-knowledge, while the Mahāyāna's universally knowing all phenomena is knowledge of all aspects. Sixth, knowledge of all aspects is the cognition of emptiness, and all-knowledge is the cognition of existence. This is because 'aspect' (zhong) means nature (xing), and nature is the true mark; the principle is the root of all phenomena, and hence it is called 'aspect/seed'. All-knowledge knows all phenomena, so it is the cognition of existence. Next, the section on subsuming three cognitions. There are many approaches to three cognitions. The Nirvāṇasūtra states: 'First is prajñā, the wisdom of all sentient beings, which is called inferior cognition; second is vipaśyanā, which refers to the cognition of the two vehicles, namely intermediate cognition; third is jñāna, the cognition of buddhas and bodhisattvas, which is called superior cognition.' It also states: 'Prajñā is the cognition of specific characteristics, knowing all phenomena specifically. Vipaśyanā is the cognition of universal characteristics, knowing all phenomena universally. Jñāna is the destruction of characteristics.' As for 'destruction of characteristics,' prajñā knows existence, vipaśyanā illuminates emptiness, and jñāna relinquishes both emptiness and existence; that is the cognition of the Middle Way. Furthermore, as the 'Chapter on the Three Wisdoms' of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra explains: 'The two vehicles have all-knowledge; bodhisattvas have the knowledge of the aspects of the path (mārgākārajñāna); buddhas have knowledge of all aspects.' As for the two vehicles being called 'all-knowledge,' the twelve sense bases subsume all phenomena; the two vehicles know that the twelve [bases] are suffering, empty, and impermanent, and this is called all-knowledge. The treatise states: 'This has only the name of all-knowledge, but not the function of all-knowledge; it is like a lamp by day, which has only the name of a lamp, but lacks the function of a lamp.' Question: How does it lack function? Answer: The Buddha completely knows the specific characteristics of all phenomena, and only then can he know the universal characteristics of all; therefore it is called all-knowledge. The two vehicles only know all [phenomena] in their universal characteristics, but cannot know them one by one in their specific characteristics. As the Nirvāṇasūtra states: 'The two vehicles only know suffering, but cannot distinguish that this suffering has immeasurable characteristics; in that sūtra I did not speak of it after all.' That is, the two vehicles cannot know specifically; therefore they have only the name of all-knowledge, but lack the function of all-knowledge. As for the wisdom of the aspects of the path, the bodhisattva knows four kinds of paths: the path of humans and devas, meaning the path of merit and happiness, and the paths of the three vehicles. They know that the buddha-path delivers oneself and delivers others, while the remaining three paths deliver only others. As for the Buddha being called 'knowledge of all aspects,' this 'knowledge of all aspects' is actually different from the previous 'knowledge of all aspects.' The previous 'knowledge of all aspects' only knew existent phenomena; now, knowing both emptiness and existence combined is called knowledge of all aspects. The sūtra states: 'Because one knows the single characteristic, it is called knowledge of all aspects.' It also states: 'Because one knows the behavioral varieties and marks of all phenomena, it is called knowledge of all aspects.' Among these three cognitions, each fully illuminates emptiness and existence, and each possesses both provisional and real cognitions. Next, the Bodhisattvabhūmiśāstra has three cognitions: first, pure cognition, called pure because it completely eliminates the afflictions of the five entrenchments, which is the cognition illuminating the emptiness of ultimate truth; second, all-knowledge, which is the cognition illuminating existence; third, unimpeded cognition, which is effortless cognition that illuminates all phenomena without further effort, and is therefore called unimpeded. The first is real cognition; the latter two are provisional. Next, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha has three cognitions: first, cognition of application (prayogajñāna), which is the mind advancing toward higher grounds; second, fundamental cognition (mūlajñāna), the cognition that realizes suchness, meaning real cognition; third, subsequently attained cognition (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), which is moving while quiescent, meaning provisional cognition. These three cognitions form a sequence: first there is the cognition of advancing search, next one truly attains the real contemplation, and afterwards one generates application from the real; each and every ground possesses these three cognitions. Furthermore, regarding the four cognitions subsumed into the two cognitions: the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'All-knowledge, knowledge of all aspects, unimpeded cognition, and effortless cognition: the first two know emptiness and existence, the next one does not derive from a teacher, and the last one is without effort.' These are what the Lotus Sūtra calls: 'buddha-knowledge, all-knowledge, spontaneous knowledge, and un-instructed knowledge.' The first two distinctly illuminate emptiness and existence; the latter two penetrate both emptiness and existence. Next are the four unimpeded cognitions (pratisaṃvid). There are many approaches to this; now to cite one meaning briefly: knowing conventional truth is knowing Dharma, and knowing ultimate truth is knowing meaning (artha); these are the two cognitions. Eloquence (pratibhāna) and phrasing (nirukti) are both cognitions of conventional truth. Next is the explanation of the meaning of the four cognitions: 'My births are exhausted, the brahma-conduct is established, what was to be done has been done, and I will not experience further existence.' Explanations of this differ. The Vibhāṣā states: ''My births are exhausted' is the cognition of abandoning the origin [of suffering]. The cause of the origin is able to generate future suffering as an effect, and is called 'birth'; when the non-learner has completely severed it, it is called 'my births are exhausted.' 'The brahma-conduct is established' is the cognition of cultivating the path. 'Brahma' means pure; the undefiled noble path is able to eliminate defilements and be pure and free of hindrances, hence it is called 'brahma-conduct.' When the noble non-learner's practice of the path is fulfilled, it is called 'already established.' 'What was to be done has been done' is the cognition of realizing cessation. Severing afflictions and realizing cessation is called 'what was to be done'; when the non-learner's merit in realizing the fruit is accomplished, it is called 'already done.' 'I will not experience further existence' is the cognition of knowing suffering. The suffering retribution of future lives is called 'further existence'; that the noble non-learner will not receive this existence again is called 'not experiencing further existence.'' Question: The sūtras explain the four truths by first expounding suffering and origin, and afterwards cessation and path; why does it now first abandon the origin and cultivate the path, and afterwards realize cessation and know suffering? Answer: The four truths demonstrate the gate of longing and aversion: first suffering and origin, then cessation and path. In the gate of longing and aversion, one contemplates the sequence in reverse order, hence first the effect and then the cause. The four cognitions are the gate of forward contemplation, hence first the cause and then the effect; therefore, it first treats origin and path, and afterwards cessation and suffering. Moreover, one must remove hindrances and only then achieve the good; hence first abandon origin and afterwards cultivate the path. Among the subsequent effects, one first extinguishes present faults and afterwards does not receive future retribution of suffering; hence first cessation, and afterwards [knowing] suffering. The Śrīmālāsūtra and the Nirvāṇasūtra explain the four cognitions differently again, but this will not be expounded now. The four cognitions all enter the provisional cognition of the Mahāyāna, and are the real cognition of the Hīnayāna. Next, regarding the five cognitions subsumed into the two cognitions: (1) cognition of the abiding of phenomena (dharmanisthitijñāna), (2) cognition of nirvāṇa, (3) non-contentious cognition (araṇājñāna), (4) cognition of aspiration (praṇidhijñāna), and (5) cognition of the utmost limit (prāntakoṭikajñāna). According to the Hīnayāna: the cognition of the abiding of phenomena means knowing that suffering and origin mutually generate and maintain the existence of all phenomena, hence it is called cognition of the abiding of phenomena; knowing the path and cessation is called cognition of nirvāṇa. It is also said: knowing suffering, origin, and path is called cognition of the abiding of phenomena; knowing the truth of cessation is called cognition of nirvāṇa; causing sentient beings not to give rise to contention is non-contentious cognition; aspiring to know all matters of the future and immediately knowing them is called cognition of aspiration; as for the cognition of the utmost limit, the end of the retributive body is called the 'utmost limit,' and because noble ones cultivate and attain mastery of cognition, they have mastery over lengthening or shortening their retributive body, which is called cognition of the utmost limit. In the Hīnayāna, the first two cognitions are universal, possessed by both sharp and dull arhats; the latter three are possessed only by sharp-rooted arhats. Furthermore, the first two are universal, able to arise in all concentrations; the latter three arise only in the fourth dhyāna. The first two penetrate both defiled and undefiled, while the latter three are only defiled. The first two can arise in bodies of the three realms, while the latter three arise only in bodies of the three continents of the desire realm. The first two take the phenomena of the three realms as their objective cognitive domains; non-contentious cognition takes only the hateful mind of the desire realm as its domain. The five cognitions of the Mahāyāna can arise in all places, in all bodies, and throughout the fifty-two stages, and they penetrate both defiled and undefiled. The five cognitions of the Hīnayāna are all subsumed by the provisional cognition of the Mahāyāna. When the Mahāyāna discusses the five cognitions, nirvāṇa is the true mark; correct Dharma belongs to real cognition, and the remaining four belong to provisional cognition. As for the eleven cognitions subsumed into the two cognitions: the ten cognitions illuminate the four truths and are distinct cognitions, subsumed under provisional cognition; the cognition of reality illuminates the single real truth, which is the true mark, meaning non-distinct cognition, and therefore belongs to real cognition. Furthermore, the treatise states: 'The ten cognitions reside in the four eyes; the cognition of reality is the buddha-eye.' If so, the four eyes possess both cognitions, and the buddha-eye also possesses both cognitions. Question: Between bodhi and sarvajña, which of the ten cognitions subsumes them? Answer: The treatise states: 'Bodhi is the ten cognitions, which is the cognition of existence, namely the knowledge of all aspects; sarvajña is the cognition of reality, meaning the cognition of emptiness, which is also all-knowledge.' The forty-four cognitions are established in relation to the twelve links of dependent co-arising. For example, [contemplating] that aging and death are suffering, the origin of aging and death, the cessation and the path of aging and death; each link fully possesses the contemplation of the four truths. As for the seventy-seven cognitions: birth conditions aging and death; [aging and death] does not depart from birth conditioning aging and death. The first is the cognition of correct contemplation, and the second is the cognition that scrutinizes phenomena. Furthermore, the cognition of correct contemplation excludes causelessness, and the cognition that scrutinizes phenomena excludes different, erroneous causes. There are two for each of the three times, making six; these six are the cognition of the abiding of phenomena. The next one is the cognition of nirvāṇa. The cognition of the abiding of phenomena is more numerous in order to clarify the increase and growth of cause and effect in saṃsāra. The cognition that extinguishes them in nirvāṇa combines the three times into one. These are all meanings of the Hīnayāna, and all are subsumed under the provisional cognition of the Mahāyāna. In the Mahāyāna, the cognition of nirvāṇa is real cognition, as stated above. All of these are skillful distinctions within the non-conceptual; although distinctions are made, they do not stir from the non-conceptual, unlike the explanations based on attainment by the Sarvāstivādins. Since these belong to nominal teachings, one cannot fail to know them. Question: Since both the forty-four and the seventy-seven begin from aging and death, what is their difference? Answer: The forty-four contemplate the effect as arising from the cause; that contemplation is easily accomplished, so it is for dull-rooted persons. 'Contemplating the effect as arising from the cause' means that one first contemplates aging and death as the effect, and next clarifies the origin of aging and death, which is contemplating the effect as arising from the cause. The seventy-seven contemplate the cause generating the effect; as it is said, 'birth conditions aging and death'—birth is the cause, acting as the condition for aging and death, and '[it] does not depart from birth conditioning aging and death' is also like this. Contemplating the cause generating the effect is difficult, so it is for sharp-rooted persons. Regarding the forty-four, the text of the Tattvasiddhi states: 'They reside in the seven expedient stages.' Regarding the seventy-seven, the text does not determine the stage. Various masters say: they reside in the four stages of present forbearance. Question: Why do they not begin from ignorance? Answer: Tracing from the branch back to the root, this contemplation is easily accomplished. Furthermore, the forty-four can only begin from the effect because they are complete with the four truths. If they began from ignorance, there would no longer be a prior cause; how could they be complete with the four truths? The seventy-seven do not begin from ignorance, but only from aging and death, because this contemplation is easily accomplished. Question: When a bodhisattva contemplates the twelve links of dependent co-arising, to which cognition does it belong? Answer: A bodhisattva has no fixed direction and cannot be definitively categorized. The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra states: 'For the sake of sentient beings, the bodhisattva contemplates the twelve links of dependent co-arising from the effect.'