大乘玄論 5.11

5.11

次第三章明經論破立諦智傍正。若如他人所釋：毘曇立而不破，三論破而不立，成實亦立亦破。今問：若言成實破毘曇故，名亦立亦破者，毘曇亦破成實，何故非亦立亦破耶？成實破數人根見，立用識見，云：若用根能見，死人有根，亦應能見。眼識在耳中，眼根何意不見耶？而今有根無識、根不見者，故云根不能見，故破根立識，名為亦破亦立。數人立根見破識見。若用識見，識無障礙，應見障外色。但見障內、不見障外者，故知但是根見，非關識見。豈非亦破亦立耶？若止言毘曇立而不破，成實論亦立亦破不可也。又云：三論但破不立。亦不然。誰向君噵三論不立而存破耶？彼即引肇師《百論．序》云「言而無當，破而不立。」豈非三論不立而有破耶？今明不然。論序云破而不立者，只不執此破，故言破而不立。何關不立而存有此破耶？何以知然？下文云「破如可破，破本破於可破，可破既無，在破亦盡。」只不立有此破，故云破而不立也。今明論顯中觀、經明正法，既稱中觀正法，豈更有破立可論？但若不因破立，無以顯不破不立，故《師子吼經》言「若不因一二，云何得辨無一無二？」是故今時欲顯無破無立，故方便論於破立。就佛菩薩相望，若是佛不具足而具足，故有破有立；菩薩當具足而不具足，故唯破不立。佛破虛妄邪見，後為說真實正法，是故亦破亦立；菩薩助佛揚化，直破邪迷顯佛方便，無所樹立，是以唯破不立也。人今聞此，便定謂佛有破有立、論主唯破不立，即復成見。今須通釋，非但論主唯破不立，佛亦唯破而不立。非但佛亦破亦立，論主亦得亦破亦立。今人聞此以復生疑：佛可得有立，論主那得有立？今須返問汝：言佛立者，何所立？佛只立二諦教門，教門只是教示前緣，諦只是諦當前緣。何容只佛能諦當前緣，論主不能諦當前緣？佛既能當前緣，既得有立；論主亦能教示前緣，亦得有立也。次明非但論主無立，佛亦無立。人以復疑通：論主示，可無立。佛何意無立也？今問：汝言佛有立者，相是若為？彼家即噵說：佛二諦即是教門。今問：汝言二諦教門，欲何所為？二諦教門只是眾生病藥，既無有病則無有藥。且又汝信二諦教門，欲表諸法是有？欲表諸法非有？汝既信二諦教門，有表不有、無表不無，顯諸法無所有，即是顯諸法無所立。那聞二諦教門即合有立也？故知非但論主無立，佛亦無立。次更明非但無立亦復無破。人以復疑：佛與論主破眾生病，那得無破？今問：汝言破，何所破？破只是破執耳。有執故名破，執無故無破。論主既無執，故論主無破也。問：若爾，論主既無破，論主應不申。答：破本破於執，申本申於屈。論主無所執，故論主無所破。外人有屈，即外人有申；論主既無屈，則論主無有申。問：破名本在外人，申名本屬論主。而今申名既屬外人，破名應屬論主。答：破本破於執，申本申於屈。論主不曾執，則論主無有破；論主不曾屈，則論主無所申。論主尚不受於申，寧當受屈耶？是故非但無執亦復無破，非但無屈亦復無申，蕭然無累，名得解脫。故外人問云：如此破得何利？答云：名得解脫義。何以加之？次明諦智傍正。若具足為言，應云諦智能所傍正，今簡略為語，故云諦智傍正。若為是其相？明佛以二智為能說、二諦為所說，論主以二諦為能論、以二智為所論。佛既二智為能說，即以二智為正；二諦為所說，則以二諦為傍。論主既以二諦為能論，則以二諦為正；二智為所論，則以二智為傍。今辨意正欲明此之諦智能所傍正，章門且置，但須汎明四種能所：一者即是就佛明能所、二者即是境智明能所、三者就論主明能所、四者就論明能所也。若佛二智為能說、二諦為所說，箇即是就佛明能所也。若菩薩稟二諦教發生二智、教轉名境，境是能生、智是所生，箇即是就境智明能所也。若論主二智為能說、言教為所說，箇即是就論主明能所也。若論是能論、經是所論，箇即是就論明能所。而今何故在此論初須辨諦智能所？凡有兩義：一者欲明造論所由、二者欲明能所不二。若為是欲明造論所由？論主稟二諦教發生二智，用此二智故能造論破邪，箇即是造論所由也。若為是欲明能所不二？然雖有四能所，只成一能所，雖有一能所，只成無能所，故不諦不智、不能不所、不傍不正，箇即是欲明能所不二也。今次釋初章門，好體佛以二智為能說、二諦為所說，論主亦以二智為能說、言教為所說。就論主無別智，悟佛教生智；論主無別說，還說佛所說；論主無別論，還論佛所說。故佛若能若所並是所論，論主若所若能並是能論；佛若能若所並是所申，論主若所若能並是能申。何故爾？論主稟二諦教發生二智，諦智不二，以諦成智，故通受諦名。佛以二智說於二諦，諦智不二，以智成諦，故通受智名。佛之諦智，通受智名，故若能若所並是所論。論主之智諦通名諦，故若所若能並是能論，故論主以二諦為能論、以二智為所論。以二智為能說、二諦為所說，故佛以二智為正、二諦為傍。論主以二諦為正、二智為傍。故經以智為能、以諦為所，故論以諦為能、以智為所。是則經能為論所、論能為經所，經所為論能、論所為經能。亦是經傍為論正、論傍為經正，經正為論傍、經能為論所。此所則非所，經所為論能，此能則非能。論傍為經正，此正則非正；論正為經傍，此傍則非傍，故非能非所、非傍非正、不經不論、不師不弟。非能非所而能所、非傍正而傍正、不經論而經論、不師不弟而師弟，是佛菩薩經論師弟因緣相成，並得名中也。

Next, the third chapter explains the refutation and establishment, as well as the primary and secondary roles of truth and gnosis, in the sūtras and śāstras. If one follows another's explanation: the Abhidharma establishes but does not refute; the Sanlun refutes but does not establish; the Tattvasiddhi both establishes and refutes. Now I ask: if one says that because the Tattvasiddhi refutes the Abhidharma it is called "both establishing and refuting," the Abhidharma also refutes the Tattvasiddhi; why then is it not also "both establishing and refuting"? The Tattvasiddhi refutes the Sarvāstivādin position that the sense organ sees, establishing that seeing is by consciousness, saying: "If seeing were done by the sense organ, a dead person possessing the sense organ should also be able to see. When the eye-consciousness is in the ear, why does the eye organ not see? Yet now, when there is an organ but no consciousness, the organ does not see; therefore it is said that the organ cannot see." Thus it refutes the organ and establishes consciousness, which is termed "both refuting and establishing." The Sarvāstivādins establish that the sense organ sees and refute that consciousness sees: "If seeing were done by consciousness, consciousness being unobstructed, it should see forms outside obstructions. Seeing only what is inside obstructions and not what is outside obstructions, one therefore knows it is solely the organ that sees, having nothing to do with consciousness seeing." Is this not "both refuting and establishing"? Thus merely saying that the Abhidharma establishes but does not refute, while the Tattvasiddhiśāstra both establishes and refutes, is impermissible. Furthermore, to say that the Sanlun only refutes and does not establish is also not so. Who told you that the Sanlun does not establish but preserves refutation? They then cite Master Zhao's preface to the Śataśāstra: "The words have no correspondence; they refute without establishing." Is this not that the Sanlun does not establish, yet maintains refutation? Now I explain that this is not so. When the preface to the treatise says "refutes without establishing," it simply means that one does not grasp at this refutation, and hence it says "refutes without establishing." How does it have anything to do with not establishing yet preserving this refutation? How is this known to be so? A later passage states: "Refuting in accord with what can be refuted, refutation originally refutes what can be refuted; once what can be refuted is non-existent, the refutation is also exhausted." It is merely that one does not establish the existence of this refutation, and so it is said "refutes without establishing." Now I explain that the treatises reveal the contemplation of the middle and the sūtras explain the true Dharma; since they are designated as the contemplation of the middle and the true Dharma, how could there still be refuting and establishing to be discussed? However, if not through refuting and establishing, there would be no way to reveal neither refuting nor establishing; therefore the Siṃhanādasūtra says: "If not through one and two, how could one discern neither one nor two?" Therefore, now wishing to reveal neither refuting nor establishing, one expediently discusses refuting and establishing. Viewed in terms of the Buddha and bodhisattvas relative to each other: if it is the Buddha, not having complete fulfillment yet having complete fulfillment, there is both refuting and establishing; for a bodhisattva, who ought to have complete fulfillment yet does not have complete fulfillment, there is solely refuting without establishing. The Buddha refutes deceptive false views and subsequently speaks the true and genuine Dharma for their sake; therefore he both refutes and establishes. The bodhisattva assists the Buddha in propagating the transformation, straightforwardly refuting false confusion to reveal the Buddha's expedients without erecting anything; therefore he solely refutes without establishing. People hearing this now will definitely say that the Buddha has both refutation and establishment, whereas the author of the treatise solely refutes without establishing, which again turns into a fixed view. Now one must give a comprehensive explanation: not only does the author of the treatise solely refute without establishing, but the Buddha also solely refutes without establishing. Not only does the Buddha both refute and establish, but the author of the treatise also may both refute and establish. People hearing this now will again give rise to doubt: "The Buddha may indeed have establishment; how can the author of the treatise have establishment?" Now I must counter-question you: in saying that the Buddha establishes, what is it that he establishes? The Buddha merely establishes the doctrinal approach of the two truths; the doctrinal approach is merely teaching and indicating to the faculties of beings before him, and truth is merely being truly fitting to the faculties of beings before him. How could it be that only the Buddha can be truly fitting to the faculties of beings before him, while the author of the treatise cannot be truly fitting to the faculties of beings before him? Since the Buddha can be fitting to the faculties before him and thus can have establishment, the author of the treatise can also teach and indicate to the faculties before him and thus can also have establishment. Next, to explain: not only does the author of the treatise have no establishment, the Buddha also has no establishment. People again harbor doubts: "That the author of the treatise merely indicates may mean he has no establishment; why would the Buddha have no establishment?" Now I ask: when you say the Buddha has establishment, what is its characteristic? They would say: "The Buddha's two truths are precisely the doctrinal approach." Now I ask: when you speak of the doctrinal approach of the two truths, what is its purpose? The doctrinal approach of the two truths is merely medicine for the sickness of sentient beings; once there is no sickness, there is no medicine. Moreover, do you believe the doctrinal approach of the two truths is intended to express that all phenomena exist, or to express that all phenomena do not exist? Since you believe that in the doctrinal approach of the two truths, existence expresses non-existence and non-existence expresses not non-existence, revealing that all phenomena are non-existent, this is precisely revealing that all phenomena have nothing established. How could hearing of the doctrinal approach of the two truths entail that there must be establishment? Therefore know that not only does the author of the treatise have no establishment, the Buddha also has no establishment. Next, to explain further: not only is there no establishment, there is also no refutation. People again doubt: "The Buddha and the author of the treatise refute the sickness of sentient beings; how could there be no refutation?" Now I ask: when you speak of refutation, what is refuted? Refutation is merely refuting grasping. Because there is grasping, it is called refutation; because grasping is absent, there is no refutation. Since the author of the treatise has no grasping, the author of the treatise has no refutation. Question: If so, since the author of the treatise has no refutation, the author of the treatise should not expound. Answer: Refutation originally refutes grasping; expounding originally expounds what has been wronged. The author of the treatise has nothing grasped, so the author of the treatise has nothing refuted. When an outsider has been wronged, then the outsider has an expounding; since the author of the treatise has not been wronged, the author of the treatise has no expounding. Question: The designation of refutation originally belongs to outsiders, while the designation of expounding originally belongs to the author of the treatise. Yet now that the designation of expounding belongs to outsiders, the designation of refutation should belong to the author of the treatise. Answer: Refutation originally refutes grasping; expounding originally expounds what has been wronged. The author of the treatise has never grasped, so the author of the treatise has no refutation; the author of the treatise has never been wronged, so the author of the treatise has nothing expounded. The author of the treatise does not even accept expounding; how could he ever accept being wronged? Therefore, not only is there no grasping, there is also no refutation; not only is there no being wronged, there is also no expounding. Completely free without encumbrance—this is called attaining liberation. Therefore an outsider asked: "What benefit is gained by such refutation?" The answer was: "It is called attaining the meaning of liberation; what could be added to this?" Next, to clarify the primary and secondary roles of truth and gnosis: if spoken of fully, one should say the primary and secondary roles of the active and passive aspects of truth and gnosis; now speaking succinctly, it is called the primary and secondary roles of truth and gnosis. What is its characteristic? It is explained that the Buddha takes the two gnoses as the active expounder and the two truths as what is expounded; the author of the treatise takes the two truths as the active discussant and the two gnoses as what is discussed. Since the Buddha takes the two gnoses as the active expounder, he takes the two gnoses as primary, and taking the two truths as what is expounded, he takes the two truths as secondary. Since the author of the treatise takes the two truths as the active discussant, he takes the two truths as primary, and taking the two gnoses as what is discussed, he takes the two gnoses as secondary. The present intention is precisely to clarify these primary and secondary roles of the active and passive aspects of truth and gnosis; setting aside the chapter headings for a moment, one must broadly clarify four kinds of active and passive: first, clarifying the active and passive in reference to the Buddha; second, clarifying the active and passive in reference to cognitive object and gnosis; third, clarifying the active and passive in reference to the author of the treatise; fourth, clarifying the active and passive in reference to the treatise. If the Buddha's two gnoses are the active expounder and the two truths are what is expounded, that is clarifying the active and passive in reference to the Buddha. If a bodhisattva receives the teaching of the two truths and gives rise to the two gnoses, the teaching in turn being called the cognitive object, where the cognitive object is the active producer and gnosis is what is produced, that is clarifying the active and passive in reference to cognitive object and gnosis. If the two gnoses of the author of the treatise are the active expounder and the verbal teaching is what is expounded, that is clarifying the active and passive in reference to the author of the treatise. If the treatise is the active discussant and the sūtra is what is discussed, that is clarifying the active and passive in reference to the treatise. Now, why must one discern the active and passive aspects of truth and gnosis at the beginning of this treatise? There are in all two reasons: first, to clarify the reason for composing the treatise; second, to clarify the non-duality of active and passive. How is it to clarify the reason for composing the treatise? The author of the treatise received the teaching of the two truths and gave rise to the two gnoses; using these two gnoses, he was able to compose the treatise to refute error—this is precisely the reason for composing the treatise. How is it to clarify the non-duality of active and passive? Although there are four pairs of active and passive, they only make one active and passive; although there is one active and passive, it only makes no active and passive; hence neither truth nor gnosis, neither active nor passive, neither secondary nor primary—this is precisely wishing to clarify the non-duality of active and passive. Now next, to explain the heading of the first chapter: carefully comprehend that the Buddha takes the two gnoses as the active expounder and the two truths as what is expounded; the author of the treatise also takes the two gnoses as the active expounder and the verbal teaching as what is expounded. In reference to the author of the treatise, there is no separate gnosis; awakening to the Buddha's teaching gives rise to gnosis; the author of the treatise has no separate exposition, but merely speaks what the Buddha spoke; the author of the treatise has no separate discussion, but merely discusses what the Buddha spoke. Therefore, whether active or passive, for the Buddha both are what is discussed, while for the author of the treatise, whether passive or active, both are the active discussant; for the Buddha, whether active or passive, both are what is expounded, while for the author of the treatise, whether passive or active, both are what expounds. Why is this so? The author of the treatise received the teaching of the two truths and gave rise to the two gnoses; truth and gnosis being non-dual, using truth to complete gnosis, they generally receive the designation of truth. The Buddha used the two gnoses to speak the two truths; truth and gnosis being non-dual, using gnosis to complete truth, they generally receive the designation of gnosis. The Buddha's truth and gnosis generally receive the designation of gnosis; hence whether active or passive, both are what is discussed. The author of the treatise's gnosis and truth are generally called truth; hence whether passive or active, both are the active discussant. Thus the author of the treatise takes the two truths as the active discussant and the two gnoses as what is discussed. Taking the two gnoses as the active expounder and the two truths as what is expounded, the Buddha takes the two gnoses as primary and the two truths as secondary. The author of the treatise takes the two truths as primary and the two gnoses as secondary. Thus the sūtras take gnosis as the active and truth as the passive, while the treatises take truth as the active and gnosis as the passive. Thus the active of the sūtra is the passive of the treatise, and the active of the treatise is the passive of the sūtra; the passive of the sūtra is the active of the treatise, and the passive of the treatise is the active of the sūtra. It is also that the secondary of the sūtra is the primary of the treatise, and the secondary of the treatise is the primary of the sūtra; the primary of the sūtra is the secondary of the treatise, and the active of the sūtra is the passive of the treatise. This passive is then not passive; the passive of the sūtra is the active of the treatise, and this active is then not active. The secondary of the treatise is the primary of the sūtra, and this primary is then not primary; the primary of the treatise is the secondary of the sūtra, and this secondary is then not secondary. Therefore: neither active nor passive, neither secondary nor primary, neither sūtra nor treatise, neither master nor disciple. Being neither active nor passive yet active and passive, neither secondary nor primary yet secondary and primary, neither sūtra nor treatise yet sūtra and treatise, neither master nor disciple yet master and disciple—these are the mutual completion through dependent co-arising of the Buddha and bodhisattvas, sūtras and treatises, master and disciple; and all attain the name of the middle.