大乘玄論 5.11

5.11

Next, the third chapter explains the refutation and establishment, as well as the primary and secondary roles of truth and gnosis, in the sūtras and śāstras. If one follows another's explanation: the Abhidharma establishes but does not refute; the Sanlun refutes but does not establish; the Tattvasiddhi both establishes and refutes. Now I ask: if one says that because the Tattvasiddhi refutes the Abhidharma it is called "both establishing and refuting," the Abhidharma also refutes the Tattvasiddhi; why then is it not also "both establishing and refuting"? The Tattvasiddhi refutes the Sarvāstivādin position that the sense organ sees, establishing that seeing is by consciousness, saying: "If seeing were done by the sense organ, a dead person possessing the sense organ should also be able to see. When the eye-consciousness is in the ear, why does the eye organ not see? Yet now, when there is an organ but no consciousness, the organ does not see; therefore it is said that the organ cannot see." Thus it refutes the organ and establishes consciousness, which is termed "both refuting and establishing." The Sarvāstivādins establish that the sense organ sees and refute that consciousness sees: "If seeing were done by consciousness, consciousness being unobstructed, it should see forms outside obstructions. Seeing only what is inside obstructions and not what is outside obstructions, one therefore knows it is solely the organ that sees, having nothing to do with consciousness seeing." Is this not "both refuting and establishing"? Thus merely saying that the Abhidharma establishes but does not refute, while the Tattvasiddhiśāstra both establishes and refutes, is impermissible. Furthermore, to say that the Sanlun only refutes and does not establish is also not so. Who told you that the Sanlun does not establish but preserves refutation? They then cite Master Zhao's preface to the Śataśāstra: "The words have no correspondence; they refute without establishing." Is this not that the Sanlun does not establish, yet maintains refutation? Now I explain that this is not so. When the preface to the treatise says "refutes without establishing," it simply means that one does not grasp at this refutation, and hence it says "refutes without establishing." How does it have anything to do with not establishing yet preserving this refutation? How is this known to be so? A later passage states: "Refuting in accord with what can be refuted, refutation originally refutes what can be refuted; once what can be refuted is non-existent, the refutation is also exhausted." It is merely that one does not establish the existence of this refutation, and so it is said "refutes without establishing." Now I explain that the treatises reveal the contemplation of the middle and the sūtras explain the true Dharma; since they are designated as the contemplation of the middle and the true Dharma, how could there still be refuting and establishing to be discussed? However, if not through refuting and establishing, there would be no way to reveal neither refuting nor establishing; therefore the Siṃhanādasūtra says: "If not through one and two, how could one discern neither one nor two?" Therefore, now wishing to reveal neither refuting nor establishing, one expediently discusses refuting and establishing. Viewed in terms of the Buddha and bodhisattvas relative to each other: if it is the Buddha, not having complete fulfillment yet having complete fulfillment, there is both refuting and establishing; for a bodhisattva, who ought to have complete fulfillment yet does not have complete fulfillment, there is solely refuting without establishing. The Buddha refutes deceptive false views and subsequently speaks the true and genuine Dharma for their sake; therefore he both refutes and establishes. The bodhisattva assists the Buddha in propagating the transformation, straightforwardly refuting false confusion to reveal the Buddha's expedients without erecting anything; therefore he solely refutes without establishing. People hearing this now will definitely say that the Buddha has both refutation and establishment, whereas the author of the treatise solely refutes without establishing, which again turns into a fixed view. Now one must give a comprehensive explanation: not only does the author of the treatise solely refute without establishing, but the Buddha also solely refutes without establishing. Not only does the Buddha both refute and establish, but the author of the treatise also may both refute and establish. People hearing this now will again give rise to doubt: "The Buddha may indeed have establishment; how can the author of the treatise have establishment?" Now I must counter-question you: in saying that the Buddha establishes, what is it that he establishes? The Buddha merely establishes the doctrinal approach of the two truths; the doctrinal approach is merely teaching and indicating to the faculties of beings before him, and truth is merely being truly fitting to the faculties of beings before him. How could it be that only the Buddha can be truly fitting to the faculties of beings before him, while the author of the treatise cannot be truly fitting to the faculties of beings before him? Since the Buddha can be fitting to the faculties before him and thus can have establishment, the author of the treatise can also teach and indicate to the faculties before him and thus can also have establishment. Next, to explain: not only does the author of the treatise have no establishment, the Buddha also has no establishment. People again harbor doubts: "That the author of the treatise merely indicates may mean he has no establishment; why would the Buddha have no establishment?" Now I ask: when you say the Buddha has establishment, what is its characteristic? They would say: "The Buddha's two truths are precisely the doctrinal approach." Now I ask: when you speak of the doctrinal approach of the two truths, what is its purpose? The doctrinal approach of the two truths is merely medicine for the sickness of sentient beings; once there is no sickness, there is no medicine. Moreover, do you believe the doctrinal approach of the two truths is intended to express that all phenomena exist, or to express that all phenomena do not exist? Since you believe that in the doctrinal approach of the two truths, existence expresses non-existence and non-existence expresses not non-existence, revealing that all phenomena are non-existent, this is precisely revealing that all phenomena have nothing established. How could hearing of the doctrinal approach of the two truths entail that there must be establishment? Therefore know that not only does the author of the treatise have no establishment, the Buddha also has no establishment. Next, to explain further: not only is there no establishment, there is also no refutation. People again doubt: "The Buddha and the author of the treatise refute the sickness of sentient beings; how could there be no refutation?" Now I ask: when you speak of refutation, what is refuted? Refutation is merely refuting grasping. Because there is grasping, it is called refutation; because grasping is absent, there is no refutation. Since the author of the treatise has no grasping, the author of the treatise has no refutation. Question: If so, since the author of the treatise has no refutation, the author of the treatise should not expound. Answer: Refutation originally refutes grasping; expounding originally expounds what has been wronged. The author of the treatise has nothing grasped, so the author of the treatise has nothing refuted. When an outsider has been wronged, then the outsider has an expounding; since the author of the treatise has not been wronged, the author of the treatise has no expounding. Question: The designation of refutation originally belongs to outsiders, while the designation of expounding originally belongs to the author of the treatise. Yet now that the designation of expounding belongs to outsiders, the designation of refutation should belong to the author of the treatise. Answer: Refutation originally refutes grasping; expounding originally expounds what has been wronged. The author of the treatise has never grasped, so the author of the treatise has no refutation; the author of the treatise has never been wronged, so the author of the treatise has nothing expounded. The author of the treatise does not even accept expounding; how could he ever accept being wronged? Therefore, not only is there no grasping, there is also no refutation; not only is there no being wronged, there is also no expounding. Completely free without encumbrance—this is called attaining liberation. Therefore an outsider asked: "What benefit is gained by such refutation?" The answer was: "It is called attaining the meaning of liberation; what could be added to this?" Next, to clarify the primary and secondary roles of truth and gnosis: if spoken of fully, one should say the primary and secondary roles of the active and passive aspects of truth and gnosis; now speaking succinctly, it is called the primary and secondary roles of truth and gnosis. What is its characteristic? It is explained that the Buddha takes the two gnoses as the active expounder and the two truths as what is expounded; the author of the treatise takes the two truths as the active discussant and the two gnoses as what is discussed. Since the Buddha takes the two gnoses as the active expounder, he takes the two gnoses as primary, and taking the two truths as what is expounded, he takes the two truths as secondary. Since the author of the treatise takes the two truths as the active discussant, he takes the two truths as primary, and taking the two gnoses as what is discussed, he takes the two gnoses as secondary. The present intention is precisely to clarify these primary and secondary roles of the active and passive aspects of truth and gnosis; setting aside the chapter headings for a moment, one must broadly clarify four kinds of active and passive: first, clarifying the active and passive in reference to the Buddha; second, clarifying the active and passive in reference to cognitive object and gnosis; third, clarifying the active and passive in reference to the author of the treatise; fourth, clarifying the active and passive in reference to the treatise. If the Buddha's two gnoses are the active expounder and the two truths are what is expounded, that is clarifying the active and passive in reference to the Buddha. If a bodhisattva receives the teaching of the two truths and gives rise to the two gnoses, the teaching in turn being called the cognitive object, where the cognitive object is the active producer and gnosis is what is produced, that is clarifying the active and passive in reference to cognitive object and gnosis. If the two gnoses of the author of the treatise are the active expounder and the verbal teaching is what is expounded, that is clarifying the active and passive in reference to the author of the treatise. If the treatise is the active discussant and the sūtra is what is discussed, that is clarifying the active and passive in reference to the treatise. Now, why must one discern the active and passive aspects of truth and gnosis at the beginning of this treatise? There are in all two reasons: first, to clarify the reason for composing the treatise; second, to clarify the non-duality of active and passive. How is it to clarify the reason for composing the treatise? The author of the treatise received the teaching of the two truths and gave rise to the two gnoses; using these two gnoses, he was able to compose the treatise to refute error—this is precisely the reason for composing the treatise. How is it to clarify the non-duality of active and passive? Although there are four pairs of active and passive, they only make one active and passive; although there is one active and passive, it only makes no active and passive; hence neither truth nor gnosis, neither active nor passive, neither secondary nor primary—this is precisely wishing to clarify the non-duality of active and passive. Now next, to explain the heading of the first chapter: carefully comprehend that the Buddha takes the two gnoses as the active expounder and the two truths as what is expounded; the author of the treatise also takes the two gnoses as the active expounder and the verbal teaching as what is expounded. In reference to the author of the treatise, there is no separate gnosis; awakening to the Buddha's teaching gives rise to gnosis; the author of the treatise has no separate exposition, but merely speaks what the Buddha spoke; the author of the treatise has no separate discussion, but merely discusses what the Buddha spoke. Therefore, whether active or passive, for the Buddha both are what is discussed, while for the author of the treatise, whether passive or active, both are the active discussant; for the Buddha, whether active or passive, both are what is expounded, while for the author of the treatise, whether passive or active, both are what expounds. Why is this so? The author of the treatise received the teaching of the two truths and gave rise to the two gnoses; truth and gnosis being non-dual, using truth to complete gnosis, they generally receive the designation of truth. The Buddha used the two gnoses to speak the two truths; truth and gnosis being non-dual, using gnosis to complete truth, they generally receive the designation of gnosis. The Buddha's truth and gnosis generally receive the designation of gnosis; hence whether active or passive, both are what is discussed. The author of the treatise's gnosis and truth are generally called truth; hence whether passive or active, both are the active discussant. Thus the author of the treatise takes the two truths as the active discussant and the two gnoses as what is discussed. Taking the two gnoses as the active expounder and the two truths as what is expounded, the Buddha takes the two gnoses as primary and the two truths as secondary. The author of the treatise takes the two truths as primary and the two gnoses as secondary. Thus the sūtras take gnosis as the active and truth as the passive, while the treatises take truth as the active and gnosis as the passive. Thus the active of the sūtra is the passive of the treatise, and the active of the treatise is the passive of the sūtra; the passive of the sūtra is the active of the treatise, and the passive of the treatise is the active of the sūtra. It is also that the secondary of the sūtra is the primary of the treatise, and the secondary of the treatise is the primary of the sūtra; the primary of the sūtra is the secondary of the treatise, and the active of the sūtra is the passive of the treatise. This passive is then not passive; the passive of the sūtra is the active of the treatise, and this active is then not active. The secondary of the treatise is the primary of the sūtra, and this primary is then not primary; the primary of the treatise is the secondary of the sūtra, and this secondary is then not secondary. Therefore: neither active nor passive, neither secondary nor primary, neither sūtra nor treatise, neither master nor disciple. Being neither active nor passive yet active and passive, neither secondary nor primary yet secondary and primary, neither sūtra nor treatise yet sūtra and treatise, neither master nor disciple yet master and disciple—these are the mutual completion through dependent co-arising of the Buddha and bodhisattvas, sūtras and treatises, master and disciple; and all attain the name of the middle.