大乘玄論 1.10

1.10

Seventh, explaining mutual identity. Next, analyzing the mutual identity of the two truths, the sūtras have two passages. If we take the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, it says: 'Conventional truth is ultimate truth; ultimate truth is conventional truth.' This simply speaks of identity as non-separation, and therefore speaks of 'identity'. This phrasing is somewhat broad. If we take the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, 'Emptiness is form; form is emptiness.' This meaning is precise. Kaishan explains that the two truths have one substance, taking 'identity is' as identity. Longguang explains that the two truths have distinct substances, taking 'non-separation' as identity. Although there are many masters, they do not go beyond these two. Now I refute them: if the two truths have distinct substances like the horns of an ox, this also contradicts the various sūtras and treatises, and is not worth refuting. Now I ask: when Kaishan says form is emptiness, is it that when form arises, emptiness arises together with form, and therefore it is said that form is emptiness? Or is it that before form has arisen, this emptiness already exists, and therefore it is said that form is emptiness? If before form arose, the emptiness that is identical to form already existed, then emptiness originally existed and form was just born. Since the original and the new are different, how can they be mutually identical? What originally exists is permanent, and what is newly existent is impermanent; permanent and impermanent being different, they cannot be identical. If you say that the permanent and impermanent share one substance, then when burning the conventional, one should burn the ultimate truth, and when the conventional arises and ceases, the ultimate should arise and cease. If you say they are of one substance, then when the conventional is identical to the ultimate, the conventional should be permanent, and both truths would be merely permanent. When the ultimate is identical to the conventional, the ultimate should be impermanent, and both truths would be impermanent. If they are of one substance yet you say the conventional is impermanent and the ultimate is permanent, I could just as well say that because they are of one substance, the conventional is permanent and the ultimate is impermanent. Next I refute: does your 'form is emptiness' have a boundary, or does it lack a boundary? If it has a boundary, different substances cannot be mutually identical. If it lacks a boundary, they merge into one substance, and both are permanent or both are impermanent. Lacking a boundary, one obtains unity and loses the two truths; having a boundary, one obtains the two truths and loses mutual identity. How can you resolve this? Longguang holds that the two truths have distinct substances, and Kaishan holds that they are of one substance; now I explain that the two truths are neither one nor different, taking departure from the catuṣkoṭi as their substance. I also explain that neither one nor different, neither non-separate, neither 'identity is' nor non-'identity is', departing from the catuṣkoṭi, is identity. If discussed in terms of truth in relation to cognition, it is said that the two truths each have their own substance, being differentiated in relation to two mental states. If discussed in terms of having no existence, emptiness and existence are both without existence, hence they are said to be of one substance. If discussed in terms of truth as teaching, in relation to function there are two substances. If discussed in terms of the Middle Way, in the end they are of one substance. Question: If so, how does this differ from the oneness and difference of others? Answer: For others, the two truths are determinate cognitive objects and determinate principles, determinately one or determinately different. Now I explain that truth in relation to cognition is like sky-flowers, seen because of eye disease; sky-flowers have neither oneness nor difference. Because there are no flowers, one cannot say they are of one substance with the sky. As for truth as teaching, neither existent nor non-existent, existence and non-existence are provisionally spoken of; never having been existent or non-existent, they cannot have two substances, nor can they be said to be of one substance. Therefore this differs from others. Since there is neither existence nor non-existence, what identity or non-identity can be discussed? All four koṭis are swept away. They posit form and posit emptiness, and make form identical to emptiness; therefore they fall into the previous refutation. Now I explain that form is ultimately empty; with what could it be identical to emptiness? It is only because sentient beings see form that it is said form is emptiness. There is one formulation which says: conventional designation speaking of existence is conventional truth; conventional designation speaking of emptiness is ultimate truth. Having explained provisional existence, that which is non-existence is existence; having explained provisional emptiness, that which is non-emptiness is emptiness. Non-existence being existence, it is an existence not different from emptiness; non-emptiness being emptiness, it is an emptiness not different from existence. Existence not different from emptiness, existence is called empty existence; emptiness not different from existence, emptiness is called existent emptiness. Existence being called empty existence, empty existence is therefore existent emptiness; emptiness being called existent emptiness, existent emptiness is therefore empty existence.