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Translation of 大乘玄論
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- pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-21) of in.bauddha.taisho.1853 · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…
Contents
Text
1.1
Composed by the Hu [monk] Jizang.
1.2
The meaning of the two truths has ten levels:
1.3
First, indicating the general import; second, explaining the names; third, establishing the names; fourth, existence and non-existence; fifth, the essence of the two truths; sixth, the Middle Way; seventh, mutual identity; eighth, subsuming phenomena; ninth, distinguishing the teachings; tenth, sameness and difference.
1.4
As for the two truths, they are the comprehensive expression of the verbal teachings, provisional designations based on mutual dependence, the wondrous reality of emptiness and quiescence, and the ultimate designation fathoming the Middle Way. They clarify that the Tathāgata always expounds the Dharma relying on the two truths: the first is conventional truth, and the second is ultimate truth. Therefore, the two truths are solely approaches of teaching, having no concern with cognitive objects and principle. Yet practitioners have their skillfulness and clumsiness, and consequently there are differences between gain and loss. Therefore, if one possesses skillful expedient wisdom and studies these two truths, one achieves non-attainment; if one lacks skillful expedient wisdom, studying the teaching immediately results in attainment. Therefore, the three masters of the ordinary tradition phrased their positions differently: [Master] Kaishan stated: "The two truths are the ultimate purport of the Dharma-nature, the supreme principle of the single real non-dual." [Master] Zhuangyan stated: "The two truths are the superior cognitive objects for expelling delusion, the true ford for entering the Path." [Master] Guangzhai stated: "The two truths are the distant spring of the sacred teaching, the profound storehouse of spiritual gnosis." Although these three explanations differ—some expressions containing cognitive understanding, others incorporating the sacred teaching—they all agree in taking cognitive objects and principle to be the truth. If one relies on Dharma Master Daliang of Guangzhou, he determinately takes the verbal teachings to be the truth. Now [we] do not agree with these various masters. Question: Why did [the Master of] Sheling, Xinghuang, take the verbal teachings to be the truth? Answer: There is a profound meaning in this. Because it was in response to taking principle to be truth all along, he made a provisional explanation in response to conditions. Question: The Madhyamakaśāstra states, "The Buddhas expound the Dharma relying on the two truths." The Nirvāṇa Sūtra states, "Because they accord with sentient beings, they expound the two truths." Which truth is this? Answer: That which relies is the truth as teaching; that upon which it relies is truth in relation to cognition. Question: Is truth in relation to cognition a loss, and truth as teaching a gain? Answer: In relation to ordinary beings, it is a loss; in relation to the Tathāgata, it is a gain; in relation to the noble ones, it is both gain and loss. When masters say that truth in relation to cognition is a loss and truth as teaching is a gain, this is because studying the teaching turns into delusion. The original relation [to cognition] is a general delusion; the relation [to cognition] in studying the teaching is a specific delusion. The general delusion is the root; the specific delusion is the branch. The root is the earlier delusion; the branch is the later delusion. Question: Why establish the two truths in relation to cognition of ordinary beings and noble ones? Answer: It shows the gain and loss of ordinary beings and noble ones, in order to transform ordinary beings into noble ones. Question: If truth in relation to cognition is a loss, why is it called truth? Answer: The treatise itself explains: "All phenomena are empty of intrinsic nature. The world, being inverted, calls them existent. In relation to worldly people, this is real, and it is called 'truth'. The worthy and noble ones truly know this inversion to be empty of intrinsic nature. In relation to the noble ones, this is real, and it is called 'truth'." These are the two truths in relation to cognition; the Buddhas expound relying on these, and this is merely called truth as teaching. Question: Why is the teaching named truth? Answer: There are several meanings. First, it is expounded relying on reality, so what is expounded is also real; therefore, it is named truth. Second, these are the sincere and true words of the Tathāgata; therefore, they are named truth. Third, the teaching expounding existence and non-existence can truly express the Path; therefore, it is named truth. Fourth, expounding the Dharma can truly benefit conditions; therefore, it is named truth. Fifth, what is expounded is not inverted; therefore, it is named truth. In its differences from other traditions, there are ten kinds of difference: First is the difference between principle and teaching. They explain that the two truths are principle, the three designations are the conventional, and the four cut-offs are the ultimate. Now we explain that duality is the teaching, and non-duality is principle. Other traditions have principle without teaching; now we explain having both teaching and principle. Second is the difference between having marks and marklessness. Other traditions abide in existence and non-existence, and therefore have marks. Now we explain that existence expresses non-existence, and non-existence expresses not non-existence; not abiding in existence or non-existence, it is therefore named markless. Third is the difference between attainment and non-attainment. Other traditions abide in existence and non-existence, so it is called having attainment. Now we explain not abiding in existence or non-existence, so it is called non-attainment. Fourth is the difference between being within and outside principle. Other traditions abide in existence and non-existence, so they are outside principle. Now we explain not abiding in existence or non-existence, so it is within principle. Fifth is the difference between opening and concealing. Others abide in existence and abide in non-existence; this existence and non-existence conceals the Tathāgata's existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising. Now we explain that the two truths are teaching: existence expressing non-existence, and non-existence expressing not non-existence; this immediately opens the Tathāgata's teaching without obstruction. Sixth is the difference between the half-letter and full-letter [teachings]. Other traditions only have duality and lack non-duality; therefore, they only have teaching without principle, and this is called the half-letter. Now we explain possessing both principle and teaching completely, which is called the full-letter. Seventh is the difference between foolishness and wisdom. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] states, "Regarding light and darkness, the foolish consider them dual, while the wise thoroughly comprehend that they are non-dual." Duality of ultimate and conventional is foolishness; non-duality is wisdom. Therefore, know that non-duality is principle and duality is teaching. Eighth is the difference between essence and function. They have function without essence; now we completely possess both essence and function. Ninth is the difference between root and branch. Non-duality is the root, and duality is the branch. Others only have the branch without the root; now we completely possess both root and branch. Tenth is the difference between definitive and non-definitive. The two truths of other traditions abide in existence and non-existence, so they are called non-definitive. Now we explain that expounding existence seeks to reveal non-existence, and expounding non-existence seeks to reveal not non-existence; existence and non-existence reveal neither existence nor non-existence, and so this is called the definitive meaning. Others merely take existence as conventional truth and emptiness as ultimate truth. Now we explain that both existence and emptiness are conventional truth; only neither emptiness nor existence is first called ultimate truth. Third, emptiness and existence are dual; neither emptiness nor existence is non-dual. Both duality and non-duality are conventional truth; neither duality nor non-duality is called ultimate truth. Fourth, these three kinds of two truths are all approaches of teaching. Expounding these three approaches is to cause one to awaken to non-triplicity, where there is nothing relied upon or attained; this is first called principle. Question: Are the former three all conventional truth, and non-triplicity ultimate truth? Answer: It is so. Question: If so, what is the difference between principle and teaching? Answer: Naturally, taking the two truths as teaching and non-duality as principle are all adaptations suited to conditions; there is no contradiction. Question: Why construct these four tiers of two truths? Answer: In contrast to the Abhidharma's two truths of phenomena and principle, the first tier of the two truths of emptiness and existence is clarified. Second, in contrast to the Tattvasiddhi masters' two truths of emptiness and existence: your two truths of emptiness and existence are my conventional truth, and only neither emptiness nor existence is ultimate truth; thus there is the second tier of the two truths. Third, in contrast to the Mahāyāna masters' taking the duality of paratantra and parikalpita as conventional truth, and the non-dual pariniṣpanna nature—unborn paratantra and markless parikalpita—as ultimate truth: now we clarify that both duality and non-duality are my school's conventional truth, and only neither duality nor non-duality is ultimate truth; thus there is the third tier of the two truths. Fourth, the Mahāyāna masters further state: the three natures are the conventional, and the non-posited truth of the three non-natures is the ultimate truth. Therefore, now we clarify that your duality of paratantra and parikalpita and your non-duality of pariniṣpanna are posited truth; neither duality nor non-duality and the non-posited truth of the three non-natures are both my conventional truth; only when words are forgotten and thoughts cut off is it ultimate truth. The text contains many meanings, which will be explained later. Question: If existence and non-existence as teachings express the principle of neither existence nor non-existence, why not use the teaching of neither existence nor non-existence to express the principle of neither existence nor non-existence? Why must one use the teaching of existence and non-existence to express the principle of neither existence nor non-existence? Answer: One cannot point to the moon with the moon; one should point to the moon with a finger. If it were a bodhisattva of sharp faculties, it should be expounded like that; but ordinary beings are attached to existence and non-existence, so existence and non-existence are used to express neither existence nor non-existence. Question: If one expounds truth in relation to cognition for sentient beings, this would further increase their afflictions; why expound the Dharma relying on the two truths in relation to cognition? Answer: Ordinary beings are attached to existence, and the two vehicles are stuck in emptiness. Now we clarify that the Tathāgata's existence and non-existence of dependent co-arising are provisional existence and provisional non-existence: because it is provisional existence, it is not existent; because it is provisional non-existence, it is not non-existent. How could it increase afflictions? Question: The Tattvasiddhi masters state that the sixteen views are not subsumed under the two truths; the sixteen views do not exist in principle, as they stem from the arbitrary imputations of non-Buddhists, and thus are not conventional truth. Since they are not conventional truth, their identity with emptiness is also not ultimate truth. What does this mean? Answer: If one says that the sixteen views stem from the arbitrary imputations of non-Buddhists and are not subsumed under the two truths, then the aggregates, realms, and sense fields also stem from the arbitrary imputations of ordinary beings; how could one say they are subsumed under the two truths? If what is seen by ordinary beings were conventional truth, ordinary beings would be noble ones.
1.5
Second, explaining the names. If [one follows] the explanations of others: the conventional has the meaning of floating and empty; the ultimate takes the name of true and solid. The mundane (shi) has the meaning of being differentiated and separate; the supreme (diyi) takes as its purport that which cannot be surpassed. This is explaining the meaning in accordance with the names, not explaining the names by means of the meaning. If that were so, one could say that all worldly phenomena have names without having meaning. Now, we clarify that the conventional has the meaning of the non-conventional, and the ultimate has the meaning of the non-ultimate. If one were to discuss it exhaustively, one should eliminate the catuskoṭi with neither conventional nor non-conventional as the meaning of conventional. However, now, to counter the other's [view that] floating and empty is the meaning of the conventional, we now clarify that non-conventional is its meaning; this is called transcendent phenomena having both names and meaning. We now cite the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: "Unborn and unextinguished is the meaning of impermanence; the five aggregates being empty and non-existent is the meaning of suffering." The conventional [view holds that] "real and true" is the meaning of truth (satya/dì), merely explaining the meaning of truth with truth itself; this can be seen by analogy with the preceding. In interpreting the meaning of truth, there are four different masters. The first says: the principle of the four truths being real is truth. The Sutra of the Buddha's Last Teaching says: "The sun may be made cold and the moon made hot, but what the Buddha taught as the truth of suffering is truly suffering, and cannot be made into pleasure." Therefore, taking the principle's reality constitutes truth. The second master says: the cognitive object and principle are not truth; the gnosis that is capable of observing is truth. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "If suffering were a noble truth, then hell-beings who possess suffering ought to be the noble truth of suffering." But now, the suffering of the hells and so on is not a noble truth, so how could the cognitive object before one be truth? The third interpretation: taking the words and text that are capable of expressing the principle as truth. The fourth master says: taking the combination of cognitive object, gnosis, text, and principle as truth. If there is merely the cognitive object without gnosis, it is not truth; if one takes only gnosis, text, and principle, it is also not truth. Now we clarify: these four interpretations are all correct and all wrong, like the blind men touching the elephant who do not grasp the elephant's body, yet do not depart from the elephant. It is not that the sūtras lack such interpretations; the buddhas, through skillful means, made these explanations in accordance with sentient beings. Now we turn back and refute them one by one. If the first interpretation says that the cognitive object and principle being genuinely real is named truth, then hell-beings and animals should be the noble truth of suffering, and venomous snakes, angry sparrows, and the lustful should be the noble truth of the origin [of suffering]. If the second interpretation says that taking gnosis as truth, it should be called expedient and ultimate truth. If the third interpretation says that the text and words expressing genuine reality are truth, since text and words ultimately do not reach the principle, how can they be truth? If the fourth interpretation says that the combination of cognitive object and gnosis is truth, since cognitive object and gnosis are themselves not truth, how can their combination become truth? Just as a single [grain of] sand cannot produce oil, combining two [grains of] sand will not yield oil either. Now we clarify: these ultimate and conventional [truths] are two kinds of teaching gates of the Tathāgata. If named from the standpoint of that which expresses, there are two truths; if named from that which is expressed, there is only one truth; therefore it is not only taking genuine reality as the meaning. In the case of the two truths in relation to cognition, one takes genuine reality as truth. In the case of truth as teaching by dependent co-arising, there are many meanings; or one explains truth by the words of honest truth. These two teachings express the non-dual Path; the teachings inevitably never err or deviate, which is the meaning of truth. Explaining truth according to the name is like this. If one explains truth according to its meaning: truth takes non-truth as its meaning; this is vertical discussion. If discussed horizontally, truth takes all phenomena as its meaning. For example, as stated in the meaning of ultimate and conventional: the conventional takes floating and empty as its meaning, and the conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning. The conventional takes the non-conventional as its meaning, and the ultimate is also like this. Furthermore, to examine truth relative to non-truth, there are five points: First, the two truths viewed against each other are two non-truths: the conventional is not the ultimate, and the ultimate is not the conventional; thus the two truths become two non-truths. Second, neither existent nor non-existent is the meaning of the two non-truths: that which is capable of expressing is existence and non-existence, and that which is expressed is neither existence nor non-existence; thus they become two non-truths. Third, the two gnoses are the meaning of the two non-truths: since the ultimate and conventional are two cognitive objects, the cognitive object naturally stands relative to the non-cognitive-object, and the non-cognitive-object is gnosis. Fourth, the meaning has three varieties: 1. In terms of outside the principle, the two conditions and two cognitive objects of ordinary people and sages; 2. In terms of inside the principle, the two conditions and two cognitive objects of ordinary people and sages; 3. Vertically viewing inside and outside the principle against each other, there is the meaning of truth and non-truth for ordinary people and sages. Regarding ordinary people and sages outside the principle: for example, existence is real to the ordinary person, and therefore is truth; emptiness is unreal to the ordinary person, and is thus non-truth. Emptiness is also like this for the sage. The two individuals, ordinary person and sage, each practice one real and one unreal; therefore there is the meaning of truth and non-truth. Ordinary people and sages inside the principle are also like this. Next, vertically discussing it: ordinary people and sages outside the principle are both inversions and practices of attainment, and are both ordinary persons; inside the principle, whether ordinary person or sage, both are named sage. The two truths are also like this: outside the principle, whether ultimate or conventional, both are conventional truth; inside the principle, whether ultimate or conventional, both are ultimate truth. That which is practiced inside the principle is not what is practiced outside; that which is practiced outside the principle is not what is practiced inside; thus there is the meaning of truth and non-truth. Fifth, directly in terms of ordinary people and sages, each has truth and non-truth. For example, existence is real to the ordinary person, yet this very existence is unreal to the sage. This single existence naturally possesses reality and unreality; it does not require another explanation. Next, further clarifying the combined discussion of truth in relation to cognition and truth as teaching, there are three propositions: 1. That which is capable of being truth, while that which is [its object] is not truth; 2. That which is [the object of truth] is truth, while that which is capable is not truth; 3. Both that which is capable and that which is [its object] are truth. That which is capable is truth and that which is its object is not truth refers to truth in relation to cognition: existence is real to the ordinary person, and emptiness is real to the sage; one takes the two cognitive attitudes as truth, and does not take the two cognitive objects of emptiness and existence as truth. Saying that truth as teaching is that which is expressed and not that which is capable: the two gnoses are capable of expounding, and the two truths are what is expounded; this determines subject and object in terms of cognitive object and gnosis. Both that which is capable and that which is its object being truth refers to taking together both the truth in relation to cognition and the truth as teaching. Furthermore, within truth as teaching, there are again three propositions: 1. That which is capable is named truth; 2. That which is [its object] is named truth; 3. Both that which is capable and that which is [its object] are named truth. That which is capable is named truth refers to the two teachings of the ultimate and conventional: because they are capable of expressing the Path, they are named truth. That which is [its object] is named truth refers to: the principle expressed by the ultimate and the conventional is real, therefore the teaching capable of expressing it is also real; this takes its name from expressing the real. Both that which is capable and that which is its object refers to expounding principle and teaching together: without principle there is no teaching, and without teaching there is no principle; through the dependent co-arising of principle and teaching, both of these are real, so both that which is capable and that which is its object are truth. In truth in relation to cognition there are three propositions: 1. Both are correct; 2. Both are errors; 3. Both are correct and both are errors. Saying that both are correct and both are errors: the ordinary person cognizes existence, and this existence is an error; the noble sages truly know the emptiness of intrinsic nature, and this emptiness is correct. Both being errors: because both are cognitive relation, both are errors. Both being correct: simply knowing the dual relation, one then knows the non-dual; since it is neither dual nor non-dual, the five propositions are all pure. However, among these three propositions, the first two propositions are truth in relation to cognition, and the latter one proposition is truth as teaching. The first two propositions are the cognitive object in relation to cognition, and the latter one proposition is the cognitive object of teaching. The cognitive object in relation to cognition does not transform, whereas the cognitive object of teaching does transform.
1.6
The third [section] is the establishment of names. This is distinguished through three gates: first, distinguishing the establishment of names; next, distinguishing the transcending of names; and finally, distinguishing borrowed names. As for establishing names: neither ultimate nor conventional is also the Middle Way; it is also called non-existence; it is also called the correct Dharma; it is also called non-abiding. This 'neither ultimate nor conventional' is nameless, yet a name is now conventionally established for it. This name is established on the basis of what is nameless, just as Tilapāyī does not truly eat oil, yet is forcibly said to eat oil. The two truths are likewise: because the ultimate expresses what is not ultimate and the conventional expresses what is not conventional, we conventionally speak of the ultimate and conventional. Because they are conventional words, names have no power to grasp things, and things have no real entity that corresponds to names. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'From the root of non-abiding, all phenomena are established; non-abiding is having no root.' Hence it is said that both the subject and the object take non-abiding as their root. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: 'Prajñā is like the great earth, giving birth to the myriad things; prajñā, the correct Dharma, and non-abiding—these three are different names for the same thing.' If we distinguish the two truths within their function, they mutually establish names for each other: the conventional establishes the name for the ultimate, and 'worldly' establishes the name for 'paramārtha' (first/highest), as in saying 'because of the worldly, there is the highest.' Ultimate and conventional are also like this: 'ultimate' should correspond to 'worldly', and 'first' should correspond to 'second'. Yet now 'ultimate' corresponds to 'conventional', and 'worldly' corresponds to 'first'; these are not directly correlative in meaning, so the sages did not necessarily establish names by way of direct opposition. Hence the sūtra says: 'Phenomena have neither this nor that, because they are free from correlativity.' Next, to clarify correlativity: 'ultimate' and 'conventional' receive their names according to their intrinsic substances, whereas 'worldly' and 'first' are appellations used for praise and dispraise within application. Second is distinguishing the transcending of names. According to standard transmission, conventional truth does not transcend names. They cite a passage from the Tattvasiddhi: 'In the beginning of the kalpa, things did not yet have names; the sages established names, such as objects like vases and robes; therefore conventional truth does not transcend names.' Concerning the ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood, the three masters differ. Guangzhai said: 'Both of these do not transcend names: ultimate truth has names such as "suchness" and "reality-limit", and the fruit of buddhahood has names such as "permanence, bliss, self, and purity"; it merely transcends coarse names, but does not transcend subtle names.' Zhuangyan said: 'Both of these transcend names. The fruit of buddhahood transcends the two truths, and is therefore beyond names; ultimate truth is originally empty by nature, forgetting the catuṣkoṭi and cutting off the hundred negations, and therefore transcends names.' Kaishan said: 'Ultimate truth transcends names, but the fruit of buddhahood does not transcend names. The principle of ultimate truth transcends the catuṣkoṭi and the hundred negations, so it transcends names; the fruit of buddhahood belongs to conventional truth, which is why it does not transcend names; yet if the buddha-gnosis accords with suchness, it transcends names.' Now we explain: as a preliminary formulation, why should this not be acceptable? However, it is not an exposition of the real principle. We now ask: if things at the beginning of the kalpa were given names and designations, then since ultimate truth is nameless, how does designating things by conventional names differ from the ultimate? Furthermore, we ask: as for the name 'fire', is it identical to fire or separate from fire? If this name 'fire' were identical to fire, then calling out 'fire' would burn one's mouth; if the name 'fire' were separate from fire, why does it not refer to water? Therefore we know that it is neither identical to nor separate from the substance that has the name. If it is in the mouth and not upon the fire, then fire transcends the name. Moreover, regarding traditional names such as cnidium (shéchuáng) and knotweed (hǔzhàng), the conventional truth transcends these names. Furthermore, we ask: what sort of thing is a 'person'? Why are the human head, hands, and so forth called a 'person'? If names are forcibly established, how can they not all transcend names? Next, we challenge the three positions on the fruit of buddhahood. First, we challenge the first master. If one claims that ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood merely transcend coarse names but do not transcend subtle names, we now counter: they are profound originally because they transcend names; if they do not transcend names, they are not profound. We challenge the second master, who claims that ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood both transcend names: we now counter that if seeking the ultimate by means of names does not attain the ultimate, then this name has only the words and lacks the principle. If ultimate truth has words but lacks principle, it would be like a śrotāpanna speaking of nirvāṇa; if the fruit of buddhahood has principle but lacks words, it would be like the Vātsīputrīyas positing a pudgala. We challenge the third master, who claims that the fruit of buddhahood does not transcend names while ultimate truth transcends names: this is identical to what the previous two masters maintained, so it will not be distinguished in detail. Now we explain by distinguishing with the catuṣkoṭi: first, both transcend names; second, both do not transcend names; third, the ultimate transcends names while the conventional does not; fourth, the conventional transcends names while the ultimate does not. That both truths transcend names means: both truths are suchness, so how could they not both transcend names? That both truths do not transcend names means: attaining the mark of suchness is called the Tathāgata, and because he attains these two marks of suchness, neither of them transcends names. Moreover, it is said that the Tathāgata always preaches the Dharma relying on the two truths. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'Dharmas such as vases and robes exist in the worldly siddhānta, but do not exist in the paramārtha siddhānta. Suchness, the reality-limit, and so forth exist in the paramārtha siddhānta, but do not exist in the worldly siddhānta.' These names alternately exist and do not exist; therefore we know that both kinds both transcend and do not transcend names. Third, the ultimate transcends names while the conventional does not: texts for this are numerous, as the sūtra says, 'Spoken according to conventional dharmas, not according to the ultimate.' Fourth, the conventional transcends names while the ultimate does not, as in the statement: 'Arising cannot be spoken of; non-arising also cannot be spoken of; both arising and non-arising cannot be spoken of; neither arising nor non-arising cannot be spoken of.' All four propositions are ineffable, which means that conventional truth transcends names. Now we formulate another perspective: conventional truth transcends the real but does not transcend the conventional, while ultimate truth transcends the conventional and also transcends the real. How so? Sentient beings cling to existence as existence and cling to non-existence as non-existence; these notions of existence and non-existence are the two views of annihilationism and eternalism, which are substantive realities. Now, to refute existence we say 'not existent', and to refute non-existence we say 'not non-existent'; thus we clarify that the Buddha taught conventional existence and conventional non-existence as conventional truth, and this conventional existence is not called existence, and this conventional non-existence is not called non-existence. Question: What kind of existence is this conventional existence? Answer: We clarify that this conventional existence is not called real existence, and conventional non-existence is also not called real non-existence. Thus, this conventional existence and conventional non-existence are called conventional truth; because they are not called real existence and real non-existence, they are said to transcend names. Yet this 'not existent' establishes conventional existence, and this 'not non-existent' establishes conventional non-existence; this is the meaning of not transcending the conventional. If we say that both truths transcend names, ultimate truth transcends the catuṣkoṭi and is free from the hundred negations, and conventional truth also transcends the catuṣkoṭi and is free from the hundred negations. However, this meaning has never existed before; only our school possesses it. Saying that both truths transcend the catuṣkoṭi and are free from the hundred negations means: the conventional is not definitely conventional, so the conventional is called ultimate conventional; the ultimate is not definitely ultimate, so the ultimate is called conventional ultimate. The ultimate conventional is conventional conventionality, and the conventional ultimate is conventional ultimacy. For conventional conventionality, a hundred affirmations cannot affirm it, and a hundred negations cannot negate it; conventional ultimacy is also like this. How so? Conventional conventionality is affirmation, yet affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; non-negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Conventional ultimacy is negation, yet affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; affirmative negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Therefore, both are free from the catuṣkoṭi and cut off from the hundred negations. Although both truths are free from the catuṣkoṭi and cut off from the hundred negations, the way both truths transcend names is greatly different. How so? The conventional truth's transcendence is the transcendence of the real, whereas the ultimate truth's transcendence is the transcendence of the conventional. For conventional truth to transcend the real: an affirmation of affirmation is a real affirmation, and a negation of negation is an intrinsic negation. Because conventional truth transcends the real, an affirmation of affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; a negation of negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. For ultimate truth to transcend the conventional: it is neither an affirmation of affirmation nor a conventional affirmation, neither a negation of negation nor a conventional negation, because ultimate truth transcends intrinsic conventionality. Not only can an affirmation of affirmation not affirm it, but a non-affirmation also cannot affirm it; not only can a negation of negation not negate it, but an affirmative negation also cannot negate it. Both an affirmation of affirmation and a non-affirmation entirely fail to affirm it; both a negation of negation and an affirmative negation entirely fail to negate it. Ultimate truth doubly transcends, while conventional truth transcends the real; this is a gradual relinquishment that explains the meaning of both truths transcending names, with conventional truth transcending the real and ultimate truth transcending both conventional and real. Next, secondly, to explain the meaning of both truths transcending names from the perspective of the level path: the conventional is not definitely conventional, for it is conventional because of the ultimate; the ultimate is not definitely ultimate, for it is ultimate because of the conventional. Because it is conventional through the ultimate, the conventional is conventional conventionality; because the ultimate exists through the conventional conventionality, the ultimate is conventional ultimacy. Since it is called conventional conventionality, all four propositions are transcended: conventional conventionality is not conventional, conventional conventionality is not non-conventional, conventional conventionality is not both conventional and non-conventional, and conventional conventionality is not neither conventional nor non-conventional; conventional ultimacy is also like this. Third is discussing borrowed names. Regarding borrowing and not borrowing, this corresponds to transcending and not transcending. If both truths transcend names, then both kinds borrow names; if neither transcends names, then neither borrows from the other. Now we also turn to critique what the previous three masters said. Those three masters all uniformly explained: conventional truth has things and has names, and by using names to summon things they are attained, hence it does not borrow names. Concerning ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood, there were three masters' interpretations. Now we first challenge conventional truth's not transcending names. If conventional truth having things means it immediately has names, then at the beginning of the kalpa there should already have been names, without needing the sages to establish names for them. If things originally had no names, how is this different from ultimate truth originally having no names, with names later established for the ultimate? We ask: if this is borrowing names conventionally, why would establishing names for things later not be borrowing names? If you seek the ultimate through names, you are far removed from the ultimate; we also say that seeking things through names is far removed from the things. Furthermore, we ask: now in conventional truth, if one seeks things through names and things correspond to names, let us ask: does the name 'vase' reside on the vase, or does it reside in the mouth? It is entirely as previously challenged. If it resides on the vase, in what place is the name? If it resides in the mouth, then the vase lacks a name—how is this not transcending names? How does this differ from the ultimate? If it is said that the ultimate originally lacks names and borrows them from conventional truth: if there were a name for the ultimate in conventional truth, one could say it borrows it; but now in conventional truth there is no dharma called suchness, which transcends and is detached—how can one speak of borrowing? Moreover, the sūtra says, 'The ultimate truth has names and has realities.' When did it say it lacks names? The sūtra also says, 'All dharmas merely have conventional names.' Because there are only names without realities, it is said to transcend names; because there are only names, it is called borrowing. If there are names, they are merely provisional positing. Why? Emptiness borrows names from existence, but existence does not borrow names from emptiness. Therefore, if one says ultimate truth is nameless and borrows names from conventional truth, this principle is untenable. Now we ask: if seeking the ultimate by names is far removed from the ultimate, does this name 'ultimate' express the ultimate principle or not? If this name expresses the principle, and one attains the principle relying on the name, why say that the ultimate principle transcends names? The name would then be useless. Since this name does not attain the principle, this name is ultimately idle talk; it could be said to have principle but lack words. The standard approaches to ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood have three masters: Guangzhai held that neither of the two transcends subtle names, so neither needs to borrow. Zhuangyan said both transcend names, which is why both must borrow. Kaishan explained that the fruit of buddhahood belongs to conventional truth and has names, so it does not need to borrow, while ultimate truth is nameless, so it must borrow. These three interpretations should be challenged based on the above; they will not be repeated here, as they can be understood from the foregoing. Now we clarify that borrowing is another name for conventionality (prajñapti); yet this is not found in sūtras or treatises, nor is this formulation recorded in the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna scriptures, so we fear the word 'borrow' should not be used. If we now speak of borrowing, it is merely accommodating others' intentions. Now we clarify that borrowing is another name for conventionality. Now, since the two truths have the catuṣkoṭi to distinguish the meaning of transcending and not transcending names, borrowing and not borrowing can be understood by analogy with this. If both transcend names, then neither truth borrows. If neither truth transcends names, then both borrow. If one transcends and one does not, then one borrows and one does not. If we say both truths transcend names and then discuss the meaning of borrowing, we explain that the ultimate cannot be designated by a name, and as for the names of the two truths, there is no dharma that can be spoken of. Because both truths transcend names, we do not speak of borrowing. Now, through non-ultimate we conventionally speak of ultimate, and through non-conventional we can speak of conventional; because the conventional depends on the ultimate, we say the conventional borrows names from the ultimate; because the ultimate depends on the conventional, we say the ultimate borrows names from the conventional. Therefore, both truths do not transcend names, and we conventionally speak of borrowed names, yet this borrowing of names is also non-borrowing. Now, because the ultimate is not ultimate of itself, it is spoken of through the conventional. Because the ultimate is not of itself, it requires the other, and therefore we speak of borrowing. If it is non-borrowing: we explain that if the ultimate were spoken of by virtue of the ultimate, that could be borrowing. But since the conventional is by virtue of the ultimate, how could that be borrowing? Therefore it is said that this conventional is also non-borrowing. Discussing borrowed names horizontally is like this. If discussed vertically: the ultimate borrows names from the non-ultimate, and the conventional borrows names from the non-conventional. Another question is raised: 'If it borrows names from the non-ultimate, the ultimate should merely be named "non-ultimate"; how could it be named "ultimate"? The conventional is also like this.' Answer: We now clarify that between the ultimate and non-ultimate, one cannot borrow if they are identical, nor can one borrow if they are different; it is by dependent co-arising and conventional designations that we speak of borrowing. Borrowing is an alternative name for dependency: if one does not depend on the non-ultimate, one cannot speak of the ultimate. Because of the non-ultimate there is the ultimate; because of the ultimate there is the non-ultimate. The ultimate and the non-ultimate are conventional designations of dependent co-arising, hence we speak of borrowing.
1.7
Fourth, existence and non-existence. Now we first explain provisional existence, and then provisional non-existence. What is ordinarily explained is that altogether there are three kinds of conventional designations: first, designation through causal composition (hetu-samākhyā), where four subtle elements compose a pillar or the five aggregates compose a person, hence called causally composed; second, designation through succession (saṃtatya-samākhyā), where the preceding thought-moment ceases of itself and continues on to form the subsequent thought-moment, the two thought-moments being linked, hence called designation through succession; third, designation through mutual dependence (apekṣā-samākhyā), where, like lord and minister, father and son, or great and small, the designations are not fixed and all follow and depend on one another, hence called designation through mutual dependence. As for what is grasped when entering the path, the three vehicles differ: the śrāvaka uses causal composition, the pratyekabuddha uses succession, and the bodhisattva uses mutual dependence. But the *Tattvasiddhi* takes the Tripiṭaka as its doctrine and mostly explains causal composition to enter the path. The reason for this is twofold: first, causal composition is the substance of conventional truth, while succession and mutual dependence are its functions; if the substance is already empty, the functions are naturally dispelled. Second, causal composition has multiple tiers, and the practice of contemplation proceeds from shallow to deep: initially one grasps the five sense faculties to empty the sentient being, and next grasps the four great elements and four subtle elements to break down phenomena; therefore it mostly grasps causal composition. As for the two designations of succession and mutual dependence, they do not have these tiers, and hence it does not use them. Now we clarify that taking the three designations in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* as orthodox is our doctrine: first, [designation of] phenomena (dharma-prajñapti); second, [designation of] grasping/appropriation (upādāna-prajñapti); third, [designation of] names (nāma-prajñapti). Explanations of the three designations differ. What we now use is this: the four subtle elements composing sense faculties and great elements are all the designation of phenomena; the sentient being as a provisional person is the designation of grasping; and all names are the designation of names. The designation of names is fundamentally pervasive: within the designation of names, taking the sense of that which can compose is the designation of phenomena, while taking the sense of that which is composed is the designation of grasping. It is not like other schools where the designation of phenomena is the substance and the other two are functions. Therefore the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* says: “Prajñā and the five aggregates are the designation of phenomena; the bodhisattva is the designation of grasping; and all names and designations are the designation of names.” The internal phenomena are like this. External phenomena can be understood accordingly: the four subtle elements and four great elements are the designation of phenomena, the world is the designation of grasping, and all names and designations are the designation of names. Now, in clarifying that mutual dependence is primary, we intend to clarify that the great being’s contemplative practice has three meanings: first, the designation of mutual dependence is pervasive, such that there is nothing that is not dependent; whereas the two designations of causality and succession are not necessarily entirely provisional. Second, in the designation of mutual dependence, there are no real phenomena; once the ailment is dispelled, purity is attained; whereas in the two designations of causality and succession, there remain real phenomena, so dispelling the ailment leaves a residue. Third, the designation of mutual dependence is unimpeded: just as long depends on short, short also depends on long; whereas the two designations of causality and succession are impeded in their sense of composition, for the subtle elements only compose the great elements, but the great elements do not compose the subtle elements; and they only succeed what precedes, not what succeeds; hence we use the designation of mutual dependence. In the case of the śrāvaka, causal composition is the substance, while succession and mutual dependence are the functions; when the substance is empty, the functions depart of themselves. Now we contemplate that the substance of mutual dependence is originally unborn and currently unceasing. As the functions of causality and succession depart, there have always been general and specific mutual dependence: general is mutual dependence of differentiation, and specific is mutual dependence of co-aggregation, just as person, vase, cloth, and pillar are general mutual dependence, while long, short, square, and round are specific mutual dependence. Question: If when mutual dependence is empty, causality and succession depart of themselves, when contemplating mutual dependence, what object’s mutual dependence does one contemplate? Is it not that causal composition comes first, and succession and mutual dependence come afterward? Answer: Not so. In Hīnayāna contemplative practice, there are first substantial phenomena, which are broken down to enter emptiness; therefore they only see emptiness, but do not see non-emptiness. Now, when the Mahāyāna contemplates mutual dependence, it posits no substantial phenomena: all phenomena are originally unborn and currently unceasing. The initial thought-moment is the unimpeded path; the subsequent thought-moment is the path of liberation. Therefore the sūtra says: “Not only does one see emptiness, one also sees the non-emptiness of buddha-nature.” Question: Is being neither existent nor non-existent and yet existent and non-existent a coarse provisionality or a subtle provisionality? Answer: This is a coarse provisionality. Why so? Because it is explained by taking both the two phenomena of existence and non-existence together, it is a coarse provisionality. If one explains subtle provisionality, it is neither existent nor not-existent, and yet existent and not-existent, because it clarifies the meaning with respect to a single phenomenon. Thus, two phenomena constitute the coarse, and a single phenomenon constitutes the subtle. Why do we now distinguish this coarse and subtle? Coarse and subtle are distinguished in order to clarify the two kinds of hundred negations and two kinds of antidotes in the sūtras. If one speaks of suffering, pleasure, non-self, and so on, this is a coarse antidote; if one speaks of real and unreal, sentient being and non-sentient being, secure and insecure, and so on, this is a subtle antidote. If one says that the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa is neither existent nor non-existent, this is a coarse hundred negations; if one says neither cause nor not-cause, neither result nor not-result, this explains negation through subtle meaning. This clarifies the coarse and subtle of provisional existence. Question: Earlier it was said “neither existent nor non-existent”; what thing is neither existent nor non-existent? Answer: The earlier “neither existent nor non-existent” negates intrinsic existence and non-existence, in order to establish the suchness of conventional truth. Question: Later it explains “neither existent nor not-existent”; what thing is existent or not-existent? Answer: It is provisionally existent and not-existent in this way, hence it is said “neither existent nor not-existent.” Saying “neither existent” means not-existent existence; saying “neither not-existent” means not non-existent non-existence. This both deconstructs the provisional and establishes the suchness of ultimate truth. Question: What thing is existent and not-existent? Answer: All phenomena originally arise from the unborn; all take the letter *A* as their foundation. That is, all phenomena return to the single gate of the unborn of the letter *A*. Therefore the sūtra says: “The forty-two letters all return to the letter *A*.”
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