大乘玄論 5.12.2

5.12.2

The [master] of the treatise received the Middle Path and proclaimed it with his mouth; therefore, it is termed a treatise. Hence, it is the Middle Contemplation, and it is also the Treatise on the Middle Contemplation. Next is to clarify the divergent interpretations. Without making divisions, distinctions naturally exist, but multiple masters have explained the Middle. Why is that? "Middle" (zhong) is homophonous with "faithful/true" (zhong); therefore, the Middle is simply being true to the principle. Every school claims to be true to the principle, and every interpretation claims to be faithful to the text; hence, their conceptions explaining the Middle are not singular. Briefly discussed, they do not go beyond four schools: the first is the non-Buddhist explanation of the Middle; the second is the Abhidharma explanation of the Middle; the third is the Tattvasiddhi explanation of the Middle; and the fourth is the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna explanation of the Middle. The meaning of this Middle Way will naturally be set forth at length later; now, the non-Buddhist explanation of the Middle must be briefly explained. As Kapila explained the Middle, he said that a lump of clay is neither the pot nor not the pot. Why is that? Because the lump of clay is not identical to the pot, it is said to be "not the pot"; because there is no pot apart from the lump of clay, it is said to be "not not the pot"—this is also neither identical nor distinct. As Ulūka explained the Middle, sound is neither large nor small. Why is that? It is like a large bell having a large sound and a small bell having a small sound. When discussing this sound ultimately, it is truly neither large nor small. As Ṛṣabha explained the Middle, light is neither bright nor dark. Why is that? Because it is newly arisen, it is not bright; because it destroys darkness, it is not dark. Now, I will first refute the first school. Because you hold that the lump of clay is not identical to the pot, it is distinct; because you hold that there is no pot apart from the lump of clay, it is identical. One sees only identity and distinction; where is there neither distinction nor identity? The other two schools are refuted in the same manner. As for the Tattvasiddhi masters, in explaining conventional truth, they have three kinds of the Middle. For instance, because a pillar is not identical to the four dusts, it is not identical; because there is no pillar apart from the four dusts, it is not distinct. Since this conception is the same as that of the non-Buddhists, it is also refuted as before. Now I ask: How does our school (Shanmen) explain the meaning of the Middle? Someone explains: "The Way being neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle; being both existent and non-existent is the provisional." Now I ask: Do you hold that there is separately a 'neither existent nor non-existent' that constitutes the Middle? Or do you take the 'neither existent nor non-existent' that refutes existence and non-existence to constitute the Middle? If you say that there is separately a 'neither existent nor non-existent', this doctrine is inadmissible. Why is that? Originally, because existence and non-existence were refuted, 'neither existent nor non-existent' was obtained; where now can you separately obtain this 'neither existent nor non-existent' to constitute the Middle? Therefore, it is inadmissible. If you say that you merely take the 'neither existent nor non-existent' that refutes existence and non-existence, and use this 'neither existent nor non-existent' to constitute the meaning of the Middle, this is also inadmissible. Why is that? You originally refuted what is existent as not existent, and refuted what is non-existent as not non-existent. Once existence and non-existence are eliminated, 'neither existent nor non-existent' is also removed; how could you merely take this 'neither existent nor non-existent' to constitute the Middle? The provisional is also like this: Do you merely take the negated existence and non-existence to be the provisional? Or do you separately raise existence and non-existence to be the provisional? If you say that you merely take the negated existence and non-existence to be the provisional, this too is not so. Why is that? Since the negated existence and non-existence have already been refuted, how could one have this 'being both existent and non-existent' as the provisional? If you say that one separately raises existence and non-existence to be the provisional, it is not so. Originally, because of 'neither existent nor non-existent', existence and non-existence were obtained; where could one separately raise 'being both existent and non-existent' to be the provisional? Now I ask: Do you definitely take 'neither existent nor non-existent' to be the Middle and 'being both existent and non-existent' to be the provisional? Or is it not so? He says: "I definitely take it [to be so]." Now I ask: If so, is 'neither internal nor external' the Middle, and 'both internal and external' the provisional, or not? Answer: "It is also so." Now I object: The Great Sūtra says, "Neither internal nor external, yet both internal and external—therefore it is called the Middle Way." If so, then 'neither existent nor non-existent, yet both existent and non-existent' is called the Middle Way; how could you exclusively take 'neither existent nor non-existent' to be the Middle, and 'being both existent and non-existent' to be the provisional? If so, you ought to take 'neither internal nor external' to be the Middle, and 'both internal and external' to be the provisional. Furthermore, once you have refuted existence and non-existence, how could you obtain this 'neither existent nor non-existent' as the Middle? Therefore the treatise says: "Since the beginning and the end are already non-existent, how could the middle exist?" This also means that since existence and non-existence are already non-existent, how could the middle exist? Just as refuting conditions one speaks of non-conditions, but there is no further dharma of non-conditions, so too, refuting existence and non-existence one speaks of 'neither existent nor non-existent', but there is no further dharma of 'neither existent nor non-existent'; how could you take this dharma of 'neither existent nor non-existent' to be the Middle? Furthermore, you say that 'neither existent nor non-existent' is the Middle, but existence and non-existence are also the Middle; if you say that 'both existent and non-existent' is the provisional, 'neither existent nor non-existent' is also the provisional. Why is that? "Provisional" means not by itself. Originally, because of 'neither existent nor non-existent', existence and non-existence were spoken of; since existence and non-existence are provisional, why would 'neither existent nor non-existent' not be provisional? The Middle is originally free from annihilationism and eternalism; because of existence and non-existence, you spoke of 'neither existent nor non-existent'. Since 'neither existent nor non-existent' is free from annihilationism and eternalism and is therefore the Middle, 'both existent and non-existent' is also free from annihilationism and eternalism—why would it not be the Middle? If you say that 'neither existent nor non-existent' cannot be the provisional, existence and non-existence also cannot be the provisional. If you say that existence and non-existence cannot be the Middle, 'neither existent nor non-existent' also cannot be the Middle. He said: "If so, would it be good if existence, non-existence, and 'neither existent nor non-existent' were all together the Middle?" Now I clarify: Existence is the view of eternalism; non-existence is the view of annihilationism; and 'neither existent nor non-existent' is the doctrine of foolishness—how could they suddenly be the Middle? He said: "If so, would it be good if they were all together the provisional?" Now I clarify: You grasp non-existence as distinct from existence, grasp existence as distinct from non-existence, and grasp 'neither existent nor non-existent' as distinct from existence and non-existence—how could they all together be the provisional? Now I ask: Since you have refuted others as wrong, what is the characteristic of the Middle now? Answer: The master said that simply this refutation of the middle and the provisional is itself the Middle; where is there separately a Middle? But this idea is difficult, and further explanation is required. One must recognize the meaning of the dharmakāya. The dharmakāya is nowhere present, yet nowhere not present. The dharmakāya is nowhere present: it is not present in existence, not present in non-existence, not present in both existence and non-existence, and not present in neither existence nor non-existence, and so on through all dharmas. The meaning of the Middle is also like this. It is nowhere not present: the dharmakāya is also present in existence, also present in non-existence, also present in both existence and non-existence, and also present in neither existence nor non-existence, and so on through all dharmas of form and mind. The meaning of the Middle is also like this; therefore, there is nothing that is not the Middle. Hence the Two Nights Sūtra clarifies that from the night of attaining the Way to the night of nirvāṇa, [the Buddha] constantly expounded the Middle Way. Since he expounded the Middle Way, between the two nights how could he only speak of 'neither existent nor non-existent' and not speak of existence, non-existence, and so forth? Therefore we know that among all dharmas, there is nothing that is not the Middle. Privately I say: When speaking of its not being present, it is simply not present in attainment; because of attainment, it is not the Middle. When speaking of its being present, it is present in non-attainment; because of non-attainment, it is the Middle. Objection: If it is not present in attainment, why is it said to be nowhere not present? Answer: Now saying that it is nowhere not present means simply that it is present in non-attainment.