二諦義 1.31

1.31

問：若為人不知二諦，無利益耶？解云：佛法中即薩衛、方廣不知二諦，大損佛法。何者？薩衛等計一切法皆有，則不識如來第一義諦。由識第一義諦所以成聖，既不識第一義諦則破諸賢聖。論文云「諸賢聖真知性空，名第一義諦。」汝既不識第一義諦，故破聖人，斯有大損也。次方廣道人，計一切法空如龜毛菟角，無因果、君臣父子忠孝之道，此人不識如來世諦。若不識世諦，此有何過？失世諦則失第一義諦，失第一義諦則不得涅槃。《中論》云「若不因世諦，不得第一義。不得第一義，則不得涅槃。」故此人過失極大也。此二人攝一切盡。若內外大小一切計有者，同薩衛有失；一切大小內外計無者；同方廣無失也。又如《中論》初云「佛滅度後五百歲，人根轉鈍，求十二因緣、五陰等決定相，此即不識第一義諦。聞大乘法說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空。若都畢竟空，則無罪福報應等，此即不知世諦。此有無二見眾生，龍樹菩薩，為此等故造此《中論》，即是住二諦破眾生二見。」《大品》云「菩薩住二諦，為眾生說法。」是何物菩薩？今龍樹即其人也。以眾生求十二因緣、五陰決定相，次聞大乘畢竟空，便言無罪福。如此等失於二諦，故龍樹菩薩為破此二人造《中論》也。從初至後，求一切法畢竟不可得，即住第一義諦破有見。次復云「雖空不斷、雖有不常。」有二諦教門，何時無三寶四諦、因果罪福耶？此即住世諦破無見也。又前來借空以破有，後〈四諦品〉借有以破空。如《百論》借一以破異、借異以破一，《中論》亦爾也。此之二種，各示一勢，前申破、後逈破。前申破，住如來因緣世諦破空見、住如來因緣第一義破有見，帶申破。後逈破者，借有破無、借無破有，此有無並是眾生有無，皆須破洗一無所留。借無破有，有去無亦除，故是逈破。此即說於二諦，破眾生二見，故有大利益也。次更明前兩人失二諦義。前明薩衛謂諸法有，不識第一義諦；方廣計有分無故諸分無、柱無故四微無、人無故五陰無，計一切諸法無，不識世諦。一往如此耳。再往二人俱失二諦。薩衛既不知諸法性空者，亦不識諸法於顛倒因緣有，既失第一義即失世諦。故《中論》云「汝破一切諸法因緣空義，則破於世俗諸餘所有法。」此即破空義即破一切有法也。又云「以有空義故，一切法得成；若無空義者，一切即不成。」故薩衛不識空義，二諦皆失也。次方廣明諸法空失於世諦，既失世諦即失第一義諦。故《中論》初云「聞大乘說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空。若都空則無罪福報應等。」如是則失世諦、第一義諦。故方廣不知，有具失二諦也。何故爾？空是有空，既其失有，是即失空。又且有即是空。《中論》云「因緣所生法，我說即是空。」既即是空，失有即失空。空既然，有亦爾。為是義故，此二人皆失二諦。以皆失二諦故，破失令識如來二諦也。

Question: How is it that if a person does not know the two truths, there is no benefit? Answer: In the Buddha-Dharma, the Sarvāstivādins and the Vaitulyakas do not know the two truths, which greatly damages the Buddha-Dharma. Why? The Sarvāstivādins and others calculate that all dharmas inherently exist; thus they do not recognize the Tathāgata's ultimate truth. Because one recognizes the ultimate truth one becomes a sage; since they do not recognize the ultimate truth, they refute the worthy ones and sages. The treatise text says: "The worthy ones and sages truly know the nature of emptiness; this is called the ultimate truth." Since you do not recognize the ultimate truth, you refute the sages, which entails great damage. Next, the Vaitulyaka practitioners calculate that all dharmas are empty like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare, lacking cause and effect, and lacking the way of loyalty and filial piety between ruler and minister, father and son; these people do not recognize the Tathāgata's conventional truth. If one does not recognize conventional truth, what fault is there in this? If one loses conventional truth, one loses the ultimate truth; if one loses the ultimate truth, one does not attain nirvāṇa. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "If not relying on conventional truth, / one cannot attain the ultimate. / If one does not attain the ultimate, / one cannot attain nirvāṇa." Hence these people's faults are extremely great. These two kinds of people encompass all [errors] completely. If, whether internal or external, Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, all who calculate existence share the fault of existence with the Sarvāstivādins; all, whether Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, internal or external, who calculate non-existence share the fault of non-existence with the Vaitulyakas. Furthermore, as the opening of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: "Five hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, people's faculties grew increasingly dull, seeking determinate characteristics in the twelve links of dependent origination, the five aggregates, and so forth; this is failing to recognize the ultimate truth. Hearing the Mahāyāna teachings explain ultimate emptiness, they did not know for what causes and conditions they are empty. If everything is ultimately empty, then there are no sins, merits, retributions, and the like; this is failing to know conventional truth. For the sake of sentient beings with these two views of existence and non-existence, Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed this Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; that is, abiding in the two truths, he refuted sentient beings' two views." The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "The bodhisattva abides in the two truths and expounds the Dharma for sentient beings." What kind of bodhisattva is this? Here Nāgārjuna is precisely that person. Because sentient beings sought determinate characteristics in the twelve links of dependent origination and the five aggregates, and next heard that the Mahāyāna is ultimately empty, they then claimed that there are no sins or merits. Such people lose the two truths; therefore Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna composed the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā to refute these two kinds of people. From beginning to end, seeking all dharmas as ultimately unobtainable is abiding in the ultimate truth to refute the view of existence. Next it also says: "Although empty, it is not cut off; although existent, it is not permanent." With the doctrinal approach of the two truths, when could there ever be no Three Jewels, Four Truths, causes and effects, or sins and merits? This is abiding in conventional truth to refute the view of non-existence. Moreover, previously emptiness was borrowed to refute existence, and later, the chapter on the "Four Truths" borrows existence to refute emptiness. Just as the Śataśāstra borrows oneness to refute difference, and borrows difference to refute oneness, so it is with the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. These two approaches each demonstrate a dynamic: the former is a direct refutation, and the latter is a thoroughgoing refutation. In direct refutation, abiding in the Tathāgata's conventional truth of causes and conditions refutes the view of non-existence, and abiding in the Tathāgata's ultimate truth of causes and conditions refutes the view of existence; this carries with it direct refutation. As for thoroughgoing refutation, one borrows existence to refute non-existence and borrows non-existence to refute existence; both this existence and non-existence are the existence and non-existence [posited by] sentient beings, which must entirely be refuted and cleansed away, leaving nothing behind. When borrowing non-existence to refute existence, once existence is gone, non-existence is also eliminated; therefore it is a thoroughgoing refutation. This means explaining the two truths to refute sentient beings' two views, and hence there is great benefit. Next, we further clarify how the former two people lose the meaning of the two truths. Previously it was explained that the Sarvāstivādins assert that dharmas exist, failing to recognize the ultimate truth; the Vaitulyakas calculate that because the whole is non-existent, the parts are non-existent, because the pillar is non-existent, the four subtle atoms are non-existent, and because the person is non-existent, the five aggregates are non-existent, calculating that all dharmas are non-existent, failing to recognize conventional truth. This is how it appears at first glance. Upon closer inspection, both people lose both truths. Since the Sarvāstivādins do not know that dharmas have the nature of emptiness, neither do they recognize that dharmas exist due to inverted causes and conditions; having lost the ultimate, they have lost the conventional. Therefore the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "If you refute the meaning of the emptiness of causes and conditions of all dharmas, / you refute all other conventional dharmas that exist." This means that refuting the meaning of emptiness refutes all existent dharmas. It also says: "Because there is the meaning of emptiness, / all dharmas are able to be established; / if there is no meaning of emptiness, / then nothing can be established." Therefore, the Sarvāstivādins do not recognize the meaning of emptiness, and thus lose both truths. Next, when the Vaitulyakas explain that dharmas are empty, they lose conventional truth; having lost conventional truth, they lose the ultimate truth. Therefore the beginning of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "Hearing the Mahāyāna teach ultimate emptiness, they do not know for what causes and conditions they are empty. If all is empty, then there are no sins, merits, retributions, and the like." In this way, they lose conventional truth and the ultimate truth. Therefore, when the Vaitulyakas do not know existence, they completely lose both truths. Why is this so? Emptiness is the emptiness of existence; since they have lost existence, they have thereby lost emptiness. Furthermore, existence is itself emptiness. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "Dharmas that arise from causes and conditions, / I declare to be identical to emptiness." Since it is itself empty, losing existence means losing emptiness. If emptiness is so, existence is also like this. For this reason, both people lose both truths. Because they both lose both truths, their loss is refuted so as to cause them to recognize the Tathāgata's two truths.