二諦義 1.32

1.32

問：何人失二諦耶？解云：大而為言，有兩種人失二諦：一者不學二諦失二諦、二者學二諦失二諦，凡失二諦不出此二種也。若是《百論》，即對不學二諦失二諦緣。何者？《百論》正對破外道，外道不知諸法性空，不識第一義諦；既不知諸法性空，亦不知諸法於顛倒因緣有，不識世諦。所以提婆菩薩從初破諸法性有，畢竟無所有；次〈破空品〉破性空。破外道性有、性空竟，然後示如來因緣二諦，明諸法性空為真諦；隨俗說故無過，即世諦。破彼空有示其二諦，《百論》作此用也。次明《中論》者，具破兩種失。《百論》但破不學二諦失二諦緣，中論具破不學二諦失二諦及學二諦失二諦緣。何者？《中論》正破內、傍破外，正破內則正破學二諦失二諦緣、傍破外即破不學二諦失二諦緣。破不學二諦失二諦，如《百論》也。破學二諦失二諦者，復有兩種：一者正破大乘、二者傍破小乘，大乘學二諦失二諦、小乘不識二諦失二諦。小乘不識二諦失二諦者，即是前方廣、薩衛兩人，竝不識二諦。薩衛明諸法性有，不知諸法性空。既不知性空，即不識諸法顛倒有。不知性空，不識第一義諦；不知顛倒有，即不識世諦也。次方廣不識二諦者，未知此人何學。彼若小乘學，則推畫起邪見，明有分既無，諸分亦無，於有起邪見。彼若大乘學，則聞大乘說起邪見。聞大乘說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空。若都畢竟空，云何分別有罪福報應等？若有罪福則不應空。推畫空便起邪見也。既起空見，即不識世諦；既不識世諦，即不識第一義諦。又此空是邪見空，故二諦皆失也。

Question: Who loses the two truths? Answer: Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of people who lose the two truths: first, those who do not study the two truths and lose the two truths; second, those who study the two truths and lose the two truths. In general, losing the two truths does not go beyond these two kinds. In the case of the Śataśāstra, it directly confronts those conditions where people do not study the two truths and lose the two truths. Why? The Śataśāstra directly and primarily refutes the tīrthikas; the tīrthikas do not know the nature of emptiness of all dharmas and do not recognize the ultimate truth; since they do not know the nature of emptiness of all dharmas, neither do they know that dharmas exist through inverted causes and conditions, and they do not recognize conventional truth. Therefore, Āryadeva Bodhisattva from the beginning refutes the intrinsic existence of all dharmas, showing that they are ultimately non-existent; next, in the chapter "Refutation of Emptiness", he refutes intrinsic emptiness. Having finished refuting the tīrthikas' intrinsic existence and intrinsic emptiness, he then demonstrates the Tathāgata's two truths of causes and conditions, explaining that the nature of emptiness of all dharmas is the ultimate truth; and because expounding in accordance with convention is without fault, that is conventional truth. Refuting their emptiness and existence to reveal the two truths—such is the function of the Śataśāstra. Next, as for the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, it fully refutes both kinds of loss. The Śataśāstra only refutes the conditions of not studying the two truths and losing the two truths, whereas the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā fully refutes the conditions of not studying the two truths and losing the two truths, as well as studying the two truths and losing the two truths. Why? The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā directly refutes internal [Buddhist schools] and collaterally refutes external [tīrthikas]; directly refuting internal [schools] means directly refuting those who study the two truths yet lose the two truths, and collaterally refuting external [teachings] means refuting those who do not study the two truths and lose the two truths. Refuting those who do not study the two truths and lose the two truths is like the Śataśāstra. As for refuting those who study the two truths yet lose the two truths, there are again two kinds: first, directly refuting the Mahāyāna, and second, collaterally refuting the Hīnayāna. The Mahāyāna studies the two truths and loses the two truths; the Hīnayāna fails to recognize the two truths and loses the two truths. The Hīnayāna failing to recognize the two truths and losing the two truths refers to the aforementioned two people, the Vaitulyakas and the Sarvāstivādins, neither of whom recognizes the two truths. The Sarvāstivādins explain that dharmas have intrinsic existence and do not know that dharmas have the nature of emptiness. Since they do not know the nature of emptiness, they do not recognize that dharmas have inverted existence. Not knowing the nature of emptiness, they do not recognize the ultimate truth; not knowing inverted existence, they do not recognize conventional truth. Next, as for the Vaitulyakas' failure to recognize the two truths, it is not yet known what doctrine this person studied. If he studied the Hīnayāna, then through deductive inference he gave rise to wrong views, explaining that since the whole is non-existent, the parts are also non-existent, giving rise to wrong views regarding existence. If he studied the Mahāyāna, then upon hearing Mahāyāna teachings he gave rise to wrong views. Hearing the Mahāyāna teach ultimate emptiness, he did not know for what causes and conditions it is empty. If all is ultimately empty, how can one distinguish the existence of sins, merits, retributions, and the like? If there are sins and merits, then they should not be empty. Deducing emptiness, he then gave rise to wrong views. Having given rise to the view of emptiness, he did not recognize conventional truth; not recognizing conventional truth, he did not recognize the ultimate truth. Furthermore, this emptiness is an emptiness of wrong views; therefore both truths are lost.