二諦義 1.35
二諦義 1.35
- Language
- Classical Chinese
1.35
次明學二諦失二諦者。大師云「此如失瑠璃珠。譬在大池浴,失瑠璃珠。諸人求珠不得珠,各提瓦石歡喜持出,乃知非真,實是喚魚目謂為夜光。」此即學二諦不識二諦也。問:此人得是聞世諦謂是第一義諦不?解云:亦得。此有二義:一者就破明、二者就立辨。就破明者,論中橫破萬法、竪洗五句,一切畢竟無所有,彼便謂是第一義。此是真諦遣,故一切空也。拙講三論者亦作此謂,言此等破洗是第一義諦。今明此是世諦謂是第一義諦。何以知之?且舉譬,如十六知見我空。無十六知見我,為是世諦、為是第一義諦耶?彼云:十六知見我空,此是世諦空。何者?實無十六知見我,外道顛倒謂有。破十六知見我,十六知見我空者,此是世諦空。今亦爾,實無此等諸法,特是顛倒謂有。今破橫謂,明諸法空,故是世諦空。亦非是世諦,此乃是世諦所離,離如此等諸法始是世諦。為是故,破一切諸法無所有是世諦。以彼不了,謂是第一義,是故墮在失處。故是聞世諦謂是第一義諦也。言立義者,因緣無礙二諦。如《中論》所說「因緣所生法,我說即是空」,即是假名、即是中道,橫竪皆無礙。假即中,即竪無礙,二不礙不二、不二不礙二,二為不二用、不二為二用。因緣生法我說即是空,即橫無礙,有不礙空、空不礙有,有為空用、空為有用。何但空有無礙,唯就有中一切法無礙。如《華嚴》所辨,三世無礙,淨穢長短佛剎無礙,如此無礙名曰聖諦。菩薩得無礙者,非是諸法是有礙,菩薩得無礙觀令諸法無礙、得無礙通使諸法無礙,良由諸法無礙故、菩薩體法無礙故,菩薩得無礙觀。得無礙觀故,得無礙辨、得無礙通。若諸法有礙,菩薩得無礙通使令無礙者,菩薩則有過罪。以諸法自無礙,故菩薩得無礙觀、得無礙通、得無礙辨也。如此無礙,故名第一義也。若是由來人二諦即有礙,三假為世諦、四忘為第一義諦,三假不得為第一義、四忘不得為世諦,第一義不得有名相、世諦不得無名相。所以大師云:「彼作兩橙解義。聞說諸法空,即內置真諦橙中;聞說諸法有,即內置世諦橙中。世諦不得空、真諦不得有,如此有無皆礙,礙故悉是世諦。」彼即云:我有真俗二諦,云何併是世諦耶?解云:有無礙皆是世諦,汝自為是第一義,故是聞世諦為是第一義諦也。如此等竝失如來二諦,不能知佛法深義。若能知二諦,則知佛法深義。何者?識知毘曇二諦是毘曇二諦,知此二諦竝是世諦,終不學如此二諦。識成論二諦是《成實論》折法二諦,非是諸法性空二諦。識從來有得大乘是有礙二諦,識諸佛菩薩無礙二諦。識如此等二諦,故知深佛法義。偈云「若人不能知,分別於二諦,則於深佛法,不知真實義。」若反此,應云若人能了知,分別於二諦,則於深佛法,得知真實義。為是故,說二諦有大利益也。前就《中論》明得失二諦如此。次就《十二門論》以辨得失二諦。論文云「若人知二諦,則得自利、他利、共利。若不知二諦,則不得三利。」此之二論,互明得失也。言自利他利共利者,了世諦第一義諦,發生方便實智,名自利。了第一義諦世諦,發生實方便智,名他利。具了真俗二諦,具生二智,名共利也。二者菩薩自了真俗二諦,發生權實二智,名自利。菩薩如實而悟,今還如實而說,令眾生亦了真俗二諦,發生權實二智,名為他利。自他皆了二諦,皆生二智,名為共利也。
Next, explaining those who study the two truths but forfeit the two truths. The Great Master said: "This is like losing a lapis lazuli jewel. It is as if one bathes in a large pond and loses a lapis lazuli jewel. The people search for the jewel but cannot find it; each picks up tiles and stones, joyfully carries them out, and only then realizes they are not genuine—truly taking a fish eye to be a night-shining pearl." This is studying the two truths without discerning the two truths. Question: Does this person count as 'hearing conventional truth and taking it to be ultimate truth', or not? Explanation: They do count. This has two meanings: first, explaining from the perspective of refutation; second, distinguishing from the perspective of establishment. Explaining from the perspective of refutation: the treatises horizontally refute myriad phenomena and vertically wash away the five propositions, so that ultimately everything is non-existent; they then take this to be the ultimate [truth]. This is being dispelled by ultimate truth, and therefore everything is empty. Clumsy expositors of the Three Treatises also hold this view, saying that such refuting and washing away is ultimate truth. We now explain that this is taking conventional truth to be ultimate truth. How is this known? To take an analogy: as with the emptiness of the self of the sixteen views. Is the non-existence of the self of the sixteen views conventional truth or ultimate truth? They say: 'The emptiness of the self of the sixteen views is conventional truth's emptiness. Why? In reality there is no self of the sixteen views; tīrthikas invertedly assert that it exists. Refuting the self of the sixteen views, so that the self of the sixteen views is empty—this is conventional truth's emptiness.' It is the same here: in reality these various phenomena do not exist; it is merely through inversion that they are said to exist. Now refuting arbitrary assertions and explaining that phenomena are empty is therefore conventional truth's emptiness. Nor is it even conventional truth—this is what conventional truth departs from; only when departing from such phenomena does it become conventional truth. For this reason, refuting all phenomena so that they are non-existent is conventional truth. Because they fail to understand and take it to be the ultimate [truth], they consequently fall into error. Therefore, it is 'hearing conventional truth and taking it to be ultimate truth'. As for establishing the meaning: it is the unhindered two truths of dependent origination. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: 'Whatever is dependently co-arisen, that I declare to be emptiness.' This is provisional designation; this is the Middle Way, unhindered both horizontally and vertically. Provisional is itself the middle—this is vertically unhindered: duality does not hinder non-duality, non-duality does not hinder duality; duality serves as the function of non-duality, non-duality serves as the function of duality. 'Whatever is dependently co-arisen, that I declare to be emptiness'—this is horizontally unhindered: existence does not hinder emptiness, emptiness does not hinder existence; existence serves as the function of emptiness, emptiness serves as the function of existence. Not only are emptiness and existence unhindered, but within existence itself all phenomena are unhindered. As explained in the Avataṃsaka, the three periods of time are unhindered, pure and defiled, long and short buddha-fields are unhindered; such absence of hindrance is called the noble truth. When a bodhisattva attains unhinderedness, it is not that phenomena themselves have hindrances and the bodhisattva, attaining unhindered contemplation, causes phenomena to become unhindered, or attaining unhindered supernatural powers, makes phenomena unhindered. Truly because phenomena are unhindered, and because the bodhisattva embodies phenomena as unhindered, the bodhisattva attains unhindered contemplation. Because they attain unhindered contemplation, they attain unhindered eloquence and unhindered supernatural powers. If phenomena had hindrances and the bodhisattva, attaining unhindered supernatural powers, made them unhindered, the bodhisattva would have faults. Because phenomena are naturally unhindered, the bodhisattva attains unhindered contemplation, unhindered supernatural powers, and unhindered eloquence. Being unhindered like this, it is called the ultimate [truth]. If it were the two truths of past masters, there would be hindrance: the three provisionalities would be conventional truth and the fourfold oblivion would be ultimate truth; the three provisionalities could not be the ultimate [truth], and the fourfold oblivion could not be conventional truth; the ultimate could not possess names and marks, and conventional truth could not lack names and marks. Therefore the Great Master said: 'They understand the meaning by making two drawers. Hearing that phenomena are empty, they place it inside the ultimate truth drawer; hearing that phenomena exist, they place it inside the conventional truth drawer. Conventional truth cannot be empty, and ultimate truth cannot exist. In this way both existence and emptiness are hindered, and because they are hindered, all of it is conventional truth.' They then say: 'I possess the two truths of ultimate and conventional; how can they both be conventional truth?' Explanation: Being hindered by existence and emptiness is entirely conventional truth; you yourself take it to be the ultimate, and therefore it is hearing conventional truth and taking it to be ultimate truth. All such positions forfeit the Tathāgata's two truths and cannot know the profound meaning of the Buddhadharma. If one can know the two truths, one knows the profound meaning of the Buddhadharma. How so? Discerning that the Abhidharma's two truths are the Abhidharma's two truths, one knows that these two truths are both conventional truth, and never studies such two truths. One discerns that the Satyasiddhi's two truths are the Satyasiddhiśāstra's two truths of analytical emptiness, not the two truths of the nature of emptiness of all phenomena. One discerns that past Mahāyāna views with appropriation are hindered two truths, and discerns the unhindered two truths of the buddhas and bodhisattvas. Discerning such two truths, one therefore knows the profound meaning of the Buddhadharma. The verse says: 'If a person cannot know / The distinctions between the two truths, / Then in the profound Buddhadharma / They do not know the real truth.' If stated inversely, it should say: 'If a person can clearly know / The distinctions between the two truths, / Then in the profound Buddhadharma / They know the real truth.' For this reason, expounding the two truths brings great benefit. Above, gaining and forfeiting the two truths was explained in this way according to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Next, distinguishing gaining and forfeiting the two truths according to the Dvādaśamukhaśāstra. The text of the treatise says: 'If a person knows the two truths, they attain benefit for oneself, benefit for others, and mutual benefit. If they do not know the two truths, they do not attain the three benefits.' These two treatises mutually clarify gain and loss. Regarding 'benefit for oneself, benefit for others, and mutual benefit': understanding conventional truth and ultimate truth, thereby generating expedient and real cognition, is called benefit for oneself. Understanding ultimate truth and conventional truth, thereby generating real and expedient cognition, is called benefit for others. Fully understanding both ultimate and conventional truths, fully generating both cognitions, is called mutual benefit. Second: a bodhisattva understanding the ultimate and conventional truths for themselves, generating both provisional and real cognitions, is called benefit for oneself. The bodhisattva, having awakened in accordance with reality, now likewise expounds in accordance with reality, causing sentient beings also to understand the ultimate and conventional truths and generate provisional and real cognitions; this is called benefit for others. Both oneself and others understanding the two truths and both generating the two cognitions is called mutual benefit.
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