二諦義 1.34

1.34

問：用此語為何耶？解云：欲釋《十二門論》中一句語。彼論云「汝今聞世諦，謂是第一義諦。」今將數論等釋此語。問：若為聞世諦謂是第一義諦也。解云：毘曇亦明二諦義，謂十六諦理、苦無常等為第一義諦，刀杖逼迫等事苦為世諦。彼就事理判二諦也。今明此判二諦倒。何者？理之與事竝是世諦，諸法性空乃是第一義諦。無常等是世諦，謂是第一義諦，故云聞世諦謂是第一義諦，是故墮在失處也。二諦既倒，則一切皆倒。何者？諸佛依二諦說法，二諦既倒故一切皆倒，所以墮在失處也。次《成論》聞世諦謂是第一義諦者，明諸法有為世諦，拆法空為第一義諦。今明諸法有、拆法空竝是世諦。何者？今就性空非性空以判二諦，性空為第一義諦、非性空為世諦。汝拆法空非性空，故是世諦。汝謂是第一義，故墮在失處。何者？汝論宗云正明三藏，龍樹云佛以三藏中不說性空，故無第一義。若有第一義，則乖汝論宗，且應云故我欲正論摩訶衍實義。而傳格噵正論三藏義，故無性空。無性空故，無第一義諦。進退皆屈，此非橫破，道理如此也。

Question: What is the purpose of using these words? Explanation: It is intended to interpret a sentence in the Dvādaśamukhaśāstra. That treatise states: "Now you hear the conventional truth and claim it is the ultimate truth." We now use the Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi to interpret these words. Question: How is it that hearing the conventional truth one claims it is the ultimate truth? Explanation: The Abhidharma also explains the meaning of the two truths, claiming that the principle of the sixteen truths, suffering, impermanence, and so forth, is the ultimate truth, while the suffering of concrete phenomena such as being oppressed by swords and staves is the conventional truth. They distinguish the two truths in terms of concrete phenomenon and principle. Now we explain that this distinction of the two truths is inverted. Why? Both principle and concrete phenomenon are conventional truth; the nature of emptiness of all phenomena is the ultimate truth. Impermanence and so forth are the conventional truth, yet they claim they are the ultimate truth; hence it is said, "Hearing the conventional truth, you claim it is the ultimate truth," and thus they fall into error. Since the two truths are inverted, everything is inverted. Why? The Buddhas teach the Dharma relying on the two truths; since the two truths are inverted, everything is inverted, and therefore they fall into error. Next, regarding the Tattvasiddhi's hearing the conventional truth and claiming it is the ultimate truth: they explain that the existence of all phenomena is the conventional truth, and that emptiness through breaking down phenomena is the ultimate truth. Now we explain that the existence of all phenomena and emptiness through breaking down phenomena are both the conventional truth. Why? At present, we distinguish the two truths in terms of the nature of emptiness versus what is not the nature of emptiness: the nature of emptiness is the ultimate truth, and what is not the nature of emptiness is the conventional truth. Your emptiness through breaking down phenomena is not the nature of emptiness; therefore it is the conventional truth. You claim it is the ultimate; therefore you fall into error. Why? The tenet of your treatise claims to specifically expound the Tripiṭaka, and Nāgārjuna said that within the Tripiṭaka the Buddha did not teach the nature of emptiness; therefore it lacks the ultimate. If it had the ultimate, it would contradict the tenet of your treatise, and it should rather say, "Therefore I wish to correctly discuss the real meaning of the Mahāyāna." Yet the transmission directly states that it correctly discusses the meaning of the Tripiṭaka, and so it lacks the nature of emptiness. Because it lacks the nature of emptiness, it lacks the ultimate truth. Advancing or retreating, it is defeated in either case; this is not an arbitrary refutation, but the principle is truly so.