二諦義 2.63

2.63

問：若爾，乖前言。前言俗亦諦亦非諦，於凡是諦、於聖非諦；真亦諦亦非諦，於聖是諦、於凡非諦。有四句義，有於凡實、空於聖實，空於凡虛、有於聖虛。凡實為聖虛、聖實為凡虛，凡虛為聖實、聖虛為凡實。今那得言俗有諦非諦、真但諦無非諦？前後之言自相違返耶？解云：不相違。今明俗亦諦非諦、真但諦無非諦者，此約初發心開真俗二諦義。聖人有權實二智，了性空即實智、知顛倒即權智；凡但知俗不知真，是故俗亦諦亦非諦，真但諦非是非諦也。而前明四句互虛實者，還是聖人詺之耳。明凡謂諸法道理實有，若於諸法本性空便不生信，故性空於凡非諦。非是凡知性空，謂性空是虛非諦，乃是聖詺道凡於性空不生信，故言非諦耳。若爾，前後無相違也。

Question: If so, this contradicts your previous statement. Earlier you said that the conventional is both truth and not truth—being truth to ordinary people and not truth to noble ones; and that the ultimate is both truth and not truth—being truth to noble ones and not truth to ordinary people. There is a four-clause sense: existence is real to ordinary people; emptiness is real to noble ones; emptiness is insubstantial to ordinary people; existence is insubstantial to noble ones. What is real to ordinary people is insubstantial to noble ones, and what is real to noble ones is insubstantial to ordinary people; what is insubstantial to ordinary people is real to noble ones, and what is insubstantial to noble ones is real to ordinary people. Now how can you say that the conventional has both truth and not truth, while the ultimate is only truth and lacks not truth? Do not the earlier and later statements contradict each other? Answer: They do not contradict each other. Now explaining that the conventional is both truth and not truth, while the ultimate is only truth and lacks not truth, is in accordance with the sense of opening the two truths of the ultimate and conventional upon the initial resolve [for awakening]. Noble ones possess the two cognitions of provisional and real: comprehending the nature of emptiness is the real cognition, and knowing inversions is the provisional cognition. Ordinary people only know the conventional and do not know the ultimate. For this reason, the conventional is both truth and not truth, while the ultimate is only truth and not non-truth. However, the previous explanation of the four clauses being mutually insubstantial and real was still merely designated by noble ones. It explains that ordinary people regard all phenomena as really existing in principle; if they encounter the original nature of emptiness of all phenomena, they do not give rise to faith; therefore the nature of emptiness is not truth to ordinary people. It is not that ordinary people know the nature of emptiness and consider the nature of emptiness to be insubstantial and not truth; rather, it is noble ones designating that ordinary people do not give rise to faith in the nature of emptiness, and therefore it is called "not truth." If so, the earlier and later [statements] do not contradict each other.