二諦義 2.89

2.89

問：若為凡說空、不為聖者，何故有佛話經却除諸菩薩兩佛共話，此則佛佛相為也。今明佛話不為佛，佛話為眾生。若不為眾生，佛則非話，故隨凡說有亦為凡，隨聖說空亦為凡，不為佛也。「善男子！如出世人所知者，名第一義諦。世人之所知者，名為世諦」者，前明依二諦說，今明所依二諦，即前是教二諦、今是於二諦。然此文與《中論》一種，故三論義可信也。《中論》云「世間顛倒謂有，於世人名俗諦。諸賢聖真知諸法空，於聖人名第一義諦。」如此文，世人知名世諦、出世人知名第一義諦也。論次云「依是二諦為眾生說法」，即是此云「隨順眾生說有二諦，隨世人說世諦、隨出世人說第一義諦」也，《成實論》義壞。今明隨眾生故說二諦，何時道理有二諦耶？二諦義若壞，一切義壞也。次更簡前一句。前既云世諦即第一義，可得第一義諦即世諦不？解云：通皆得。於聖唯有真諦，世諦即第一義諦；亦於凡唯有世諦，第一義諦即世諦。通論皆得。但今正是世諦即第一義諦，唯有真諦、無有俗諦。何者？唯真是實俗非實，唯有一如無二如，唯有一真無二真，故無世諦也。而今有二諦者，有二義：一者隨順眾生故說有二諦，即教諦。二者於眾生有二諦，即於諦也。然於教二諦，他家所無，唯山門相承有此義也。

Question: If one teaches emptiness for the ordinary and not for the noble, why is there a sūtra of the Buddha's conversation where, setting aside all the bodhisattvas, two Buddhas converse together? This would mean Buddhas act for the sake of Buddhas. Now we clarify that a Buddha's conversation is not for the sake of Buddhas; a Buddha's conversation is for the sake of sentient beings. If not for sentient beings, a Buddha would not converse. Therefore, teaching existence in accordance with the ordinary is for the ordinary, and teaching emptiness in accordance with the noble is also for the ordinary, not for Buddhas. [The Buddha said:] "Good son! What is known by people beyond the world is called ultimate truth; what is known by worldly people is called conventional truth." The previous part clarified teaching in reliance on the two truths; the present part clarifies the two truths relied upon. That is, the former is the two truths as teaching, and the present is the two truths from perspective. Now, this passage is identical to that of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; hence the doctrine of the Three Treatises can be trusted. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "Worldly inversions deem there to be existence; for worldly people this is called conventional truth. All the worthy and noble truly know all phenomena to be empty; for noble persons this is called ultimate truth." As in this passage, what worldly people know is called conventional truth, and what people beyond the world know is called ultimate truth. The treatise continues: "Relying on these two truths, they preach the Dharma for sentient beings," which is what is expressed here as: "In accordance with sentient beings, I teach that there are two truths; in accordance with worldly people, I teach conventional truth; in accordance with people beyond the world, I teach ultimate truth." The doctrine of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra is destroyed. We now clarify that the two truths are taught because of according with sentient beings; when in principle could there ever be two truths? If the meaning of the two truths is destroyed, all meanings are destroyed. Next, we further examine the previous proposition. Since it was said earlier that conventional truth is itself ultimate truth, can it be that ultimate truth is itself conventional truth? Explanation: Broadly speaking, both are permissible. From the perspective of the noble one there is only ultimate truth, and conventional truth is itself ultimate truth; also, from the perspective of the ordinary person there is only conventional truth, and ultimate truth is itself conventional truth. Broadly discussed, both are permissible. But at present, it precisely means that conventional truth is itself ultimate truth: there is only ultimate truth and no conventional truth. Why? Only the ultimate is real and the conventional is not real; there is only one suchness and no two suchnesses; there is only one ultimate and no two ultimates; hence there is no conventional truth. That there are now two truths has two meanings: first, through accordance with sentient beings, two truths are taught, which is truth as teaching; second, for sentient beings there are two truths, which is truth from perspective. However, the two truths as perspective and teaching are absent in other schools; only the transmission of our mountain school has this doctrine.