二諦義 3.13

3.13

次明二諦體第四。然二諦體亦為難解。爰古至今凡有十四家解釋，若一一詳其得失、約經論簡其邪正者，則《大經》時序。今略出當路三家解，試而論之。大師常出三家明二諦體義：第一家明二諦一體、第二家明二諦異體、第三家明二諦以中道為體。就明二諦一體家復有三說：一云真諦為體、二云俗諦為體、三云二諦互指為體。第一真諦為體者，有二義：一者明空為理本。明一切法皆以空為本、有非是本，為是故以真諦為體也。二者有為俗諦，折俗本為悟真，故真為體也。言俗為體者，要由折俗故得真，若不拆俗則不得真。良由前拆俗故得真，所以俗為體也。第三家說互指為體，云前兩家竝僻，今明具二義。明空為有本，故真為俗體；俗為真用，拆俗得真，故俗為真體、真為俗用，二諦互為體、真俗互為用也。此即是開善門宗有此三釋。開善本以真為體，餘兩釋支流也。第二家明二諦異體，三假為俗諦體、四忘為真諦體，名相為俗諦體、無名相為真諦體，故二諦體異也。第三明中道為二諦體者，還是開善法師，用中道為二諦體。彼明二即於不二，故彼序云「二而不二，二諦即中道；不二而二，中道即二諦。故以中道為二諦體。」此即總論有三家，別開則有五釋也。然雖有三家解釋，二諦一體、二諦異體，此不足可簡。今略論中道為二諦體義。何者？攝嶺、興皇皆以中道為二諦體，彼亦明中道為二諦體，故須簡之。然彼有三種中道，今用何物中道為體耶？三種中道者，一世諦中、二真諦中、三二諦合明中。世諦中道者有三種：一因中有果理故非無，即無果事故非有，非有非無因果中道也。二者實法滅故不常，相續故不斷，不常不斷相續中道也。三者相待中道，後當辨之云云。真諦中道者，非有非無為真諦中道也。二諦合明中道者，非真非俗為二諦合明中道。此異真諦中道，真諦中非有非無，不非真非俗。二諦合明中道，即非真非俗也。次彼明三種中用何中道為二諦體耶？解云：彼不用俗諦中道為二諦體，亦不用非真非俗中道為二諦體。何者？彼無別非真非俗法。莊嚴明佛果涅槃出二諦外，開善明二諦攝法盡。今言非真非俗者，互望為非。覈論唯是真俗，俗非真、真非俗，為非真非俗。非俗只是真，非真只是俗，無別非真非俗，故不用為二諦體也。言中道為體者，真諦中道為體。真諦中道還是真諦，故彼序云「二諦者一真不二之極理」。從來言彼相違；彼定不相違，中道還是真諦，真諦還是中道故也。

Next, fourth, is to clarify the substance of the two truths. Now, the substance of the two truths is also difficult to understand. From antiquity down to the present, there have been fourteen schools of explanation in all. If one were to examine in detail the merits and faults of each, and evaluate their orthodoxy or heterodoxy in terms of the sūtras and treatises, it would [take as long as] the chronological sequence in the Great Sūtra. Now I shall briefly present the explanations of the three mainstream schools and attempt to discuss them. The Great Master usually put forward three schools to clarify the meaning of the substance of the two truths: the first school clarifies that the two truths have a single substance; the second school clarifies that the two truths have different substances; the third school clarifies that the two truths take the Middle Way as their substance. Regarding the school that clarifies that the two truths have a single substance, there are further three theories: the first says that ultimate truth is the substance; the second says that conventional truth is the substance; the third says that the two truths mutually designate each other as the substance. As for the first, that ultimate truth is the substance, there are two meanings: first, it clarifies emptiness as the fundamental basis of principle. It clarifies that all phenomena take emptiness as their fundamental basis, and that existence is not the fundamental basis; for this reason, it takes ultimate truth as the substance. Second, existence is conventional truth, and breaking down the conventional originally aims at awakening to the ultimate; therefore, the ultimate is the substance. As for saying that the conventional is the substance: one must rely on breaking down the conventional to attain the ultimate; if one does not break down the conventional, one does not attain the ultimate. Precisely because one first breaks down the conventional and thus attains the ultimate, the conventional is the substance. The third school, which speaks of mutual designation as the substance, says that the previous two schools are both biased, and now clarifies that it possesses both meanings. Clarifying emptiness as the fundamental basis of existence, the ultimate is the substance of the conventional; the conventional is the function of the ultimate, and by breaking down the conventional one attains the ultimate, so the conventional is the substance of the ultimate and the ultimate is the function of the conventional. The two truths are mutually the substance, and the ultimate and conventional are mutually the function. These three explanations are within the tradition of Kaishan. Kaishan fundamentally took the ultimate as the substance, and the other two explanations are branch developments. The second school clarifies that the two truths have different substances: the three designations are the substance of conventional truth, and the four negations are the substance of ultimate truth; names and characteristics are the substance of conventional truth, and the absence of names and characteristics is the substance of ultimate truth; therefore, the substances of the two truths are different. As for the third, which clarifies that the Middle Way is the substance of the two truths: this is also Dharma Master Kaishan, who employed the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths. He clarified that duality is [grounded] in non-duality; therefore his preface says: 'Dual yet non-dual, the two truths are the Middle Way; non-dual yet dual, the Middle Way is the two truths. Therefore, the Middle Way is taken as the substance of the two truths.' Thus, in general terms there are three schools, but distinguished in detail there are five explanations. However, although there are explanations of three schools, that the two truths have a single substance or that the two truths have different substances are not worth examining closely here. Now I shall briefly discuss the meaning of taking the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths. Why? Mount She and Xinghuang both took the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths, and that [school] also clarifies that the Middle Way is the substance of the two truths; therefore it must be examined and distinguished. Now, that [school] has three kinds of Middle Way: which Middle Way does it take as the substance? As for the three kinds of Middle Way: first, the Middle within conventional truth; second, the Middle within ultimate truth; third, the Middle combining and clarifying both truths. The Middle Way within conventional truth has three kinds: first, because the principle of the effect exists within the cause, it is not non-existent; precisely because the actual effect does not [yet] exist, it is not existent—this is the Middle Way of cause and effect as neither existent nor non-existent. Second, because real entities perish, it is not eternal; because of continuity, it is not severed—this is the Middle Way of continuity as neither eternal nor severed. Third, the Middle Way of mutual dependence, which will be differentiated later, etc. As for the Middle Way within ultimate truth: neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way within ultimate truth. As for the Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths: neither ultimate nor conventional is the Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths. This is different from the Middle Way within ultimate truth: within ultimate truth, it is neither existent nor non-existent, not 'neither ultimate nor conventional'. The Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths is precisely neither ultimate nor conventional. Next, among the three kinds of Middle that he clarifies, which Middle Way does he take as the substance of the two truths? The explanation is: he does not use the Middle Way of conventional truth as the substance of the two truths, nor does he use the Middle Way of neither ultimate nor conventional as the substance of the two truths. Why? For him, there is no separate phenomenon that is neither ultimate nor conventional. Zhuangyan clarified that the Buddha-fruit of nirvāṇa transcends the two truths; Kaishan clarified that the two truths encompass all phenomena completely. Now when one says 'neither ultimate nor conventional', they are negated relative to each other. In precise analysis, there are only the ultimate and the conventional: the conventional is not the ultimate, and the ultimate is not the conventional—this constitutes 'neither ultimate nor conventional'. 'Not conventional' is just the ultimate; 'not ultimate' is just the conventional. There is no separate 'neither ultimate nor conventional'; therefore it is not used as the substance of the two truths. When he says that the Middle Way is the substance, the Middle Way of ultimate truth is the substance. The Middle Way of ultimate truth is still ultimate truth; therefore his preface says: 'The two truths are the ultimate principle of the one ultimate that is non-dual.' It has always been said that he contradicts himself; in fact he definitely does not contradict himself, because the Middle Way is still ultimate truth, and ultimate truth is still the Middle Way.