二諦義 3.13

3.13

Next, fourth, is to clarify the substance of the two truths. Now, the substance of the two truths is also difficult to understand. From antiquity down to the present, there have been fourteen schools of explanation in all. If one were to examine in detail the merits and faults of each, and evaluate their orthodoxy or heterodoxy in terms of the sūtras and treatises, it would [take as long as] the chronological sequence in the Great Sūtra. Now I shall briefly present the explanations of the three mainstream schools and attempt to discuss them. The Great Master usually put forward three schools to clarify the meaning of the substance of the two truths: the first school clarifies that the two truths have a single substance; the second school clarifies that the two truths have different substances; the third school clarifies that the two truths take the Middle Way as their substance. Regarding the school that clarifies that the two truths have a single substance, there are further three theories: the first says that ultimate truth is the substance; the second says that conventional truth is the substance; the third says that the two truths mutually designate each other as the substance. As for the first, that ultimate truth is the substance, there are two meanings: first, it clarifies emptiness as the fundamental basis of principle. It clarifies that all phenomena take emptiness as their fundamental basis, and that existence is not the fundamental basis; for this reason, it takes ultimate truth as the substance. Second, existence is conventional truth, and breaking down the conventional originally aims at awakening to the ultimate; therefore, the ultimate is the substance. As for saying that the conventional is the substance: one must rely on breaking down the conventional to attain the ultimate; if one does not break down the conventional, one does not attain the ultimate. Precisely because one first breaks down the conventional and thus attains the ultimate, the conventional is the substance. The third school, which speaks of mutual designation as the substance, says that the previous two schools are both biased, and now clarifies that it possesses both meanings. Clarifying emptiness as the fundamental basis of existence, the ultimate is the substance of the conventional; the conventional is the function of the ultimate, and by breaking down the conventional one attains the ultimate, so the conventional is the substance of the ultimate and the ultimate is the function of the conventional. The two truths are mutually the substance, and the ultimate and conventional are mutually the function. These three explanations are within the tradition of Kaishan. Kaishan fundamentally took the ultimate as the substance, and the other two explanations are branch developments. The second school clarifies that the two truths have different substances: the three designations are the substance of conventional truth, and the four negations are the substance of ultimate truth; names and characteristics are the substance of conventional truth, and the absence of names and characteristics is the substance of ultimate truth; therefore, the substances of the two truths are different. As for the third, which clarifies that the Middle Way is the substance of the two truths: this is also Dharma Master Kaishan, who employed the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths. He clarified that duality is [grounded] in non-duality; therefore his preface says: 'Dual yet non-dual, the two truths are the Middle Way; non-dual yet dual, the Middle Way is the two truths. Therefore, the Middle Way is taken as the substance of the two truths.' Thus, in general terms there are three schools, but distinguished in detail there are five explanations. However, although there are explanations of three schools, that the two truths have a single substance or that the two truths have different substances are not worth examining closely here. Now I shall briefly discuss the meaning of taking the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths. Why? Mount She and Xinghuang both took the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths, and that [school] also clarifies that the Middle Way is the substance of the two truths; therefore it must be examined and distinguished. Now, that [school] has three kinds of Middle Way: which Middle Way does it take as the substance? As for the three kinds of Middle Way: first, the Middle within conventional truth; second, the Middle within ultimate truth; third, the Middle combining and clarifying both truths. The Middle Way within conventional truth has three kinds: first, because the principle of the effect exists within the cause, it is not non-existent; precisely because the actual effect does not [yet] exist, it is not existent—this is the Middle Way of cause and effect as neither existent nor non-existent. Second, because real entities perish, it is not eternal; because of continuity, it is not severed—this is the Middle Way of continuity as neither eternal nor severed. Third, the Middle Way of mutual dependence, which will be differentiated later, etc. As for the Middle Way within ultimate truth: neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way within ultimate truth. As for the Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths: neither ultimate nor conventional is the Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths. This is different from the Middle Way within ultimate truth: within ultimate truth, it is neither existent nor non-existent, not 'neither ultimate nor conventional'. The Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths is precisely neither ultimate nor conventional. Next, among the three kinds of Middle that he clarifies, which Middle Way does he take as the substance of the two truths? The explanation is: he does not use the Middle Way of conventional truth as the substance of the two truths, nor does he use the Middle Way of neither ultimate nor conventional as the substance of the two truths. Why? For him, there is no separate phenomenon that is neither ultimate nor conventional. Zhuangyan clarified that the Buddha-fruit of nirvāṇa transcends the two truths; Kaishan clarified that the two truths encompass all phenomena completely. Now when one says 'neither ultimate nor conventional', they are negated relative to each other. In precise analysis, there are only the ultimate and the conventional: the conventional is not the ultimate, and the ultimate is not the conventional—this constitutes 'neither ultimate nor conventional'. 'Not conventional' is just the ultimate; 'not ultimate' is just the conventional. There is no separate 'neither ultimate nor conventional'; therefore it is not used as the substance of the two truths. When he says that the Middle Way is the substance, the Middle Way of ultimate truth is the substance. The Middle Way of ultimate truth is still ultimate truth; therefore his preface says: 'The two truths are the ultimate principle of the one ultimate that is non-dual.' It has always been said that he contradicts himself; in fact he definitely does not contradict himself, because the Middle Way is still ultimate truth, and ultimate truth is still the Middle Way.