二諦義 3.5

3.5

問：經既不例，汝何得輒例耶？今明所以不例者，《涅槃》正釋諦義，明唯真是實，故唯真是諦；俗即虛妄非實，故俗即非諦。為此義故，但明世諦即第一義，不得言第一義即世諦也。若是《大品》，不為釋諦義，直明空即色、色即空，平道用也。淨名亦是隻用，唯得言色性自空、非色滅空，不得言空性自色、非空滅色。通即皆得。而今但言色性自空非色滅空者，正對二乘有所得人義。小乘人折色求空，對此故明色性自空非滅除此色然後方空，此即開兩觀、分二空。明小乘人折色空觀、大乘人即色空觀，小乘人折色空、大乘色本性空，為是故但明色性自空非色滅空也。雖有三經文，諸師多就《大品經》明色即空空即色也。然此義難解。大忍法師云：「我三十年思此義不解，值山中法師得悟。」此師既悟，始信三論云云。由來釋相即義者，有三大法師。光宅無別釋，此師《法華》盛行《成論》永絕也。今出莊嚴、開善、龍光三人釋二諦相即義。莊嚴云：緣假無可以異空，故俗即真；四忘無可以異有，故真即俗。雖俗即真，終不可以名相為無名相；雖真即俗，終不可以無名相為名相，故二諦不異為相即也。次開善解云：假無自體，生而非有，故俗即真；真無體可假，故真即俗。俗即真，離無無有；真即俗，離有無無。故不二而二，中道即二諦；二而不二，二諦即中道。

Question: Since the sūtras are not uniform, how can you arbitrarily treat them as uniform? Answer: The reason they are not uniform is now explained. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] specifically explains the meaning of truth (satya): it clarifies that only the ultimate is real, and therefore only the ultimate is a truth; the conventional is false and unreal, and therefore the conventional is not a truth. For this reason, it only explains that conventional truth is identical with the ultimate, and one cannot say that the ultimate is identical with the conventional. But the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā does not aim to explain the meaning of truth; it straightforwardly clarifies that emptiness is identical with form and form is identical with emptiness, using both equally. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa also uses only one side: one can only say that the nature of form is inherently empty and that it is not that emptiness arises from the destruction of form; one cannot say that the nature of emptiness is inherently form and that form arises from the destruction of emptiness. Broadly speaking, both would hold. Yet the reason it now only says that the nature of form is inherently empty and that it is not that emptiness arises from the destruction of form is precisely to counter the doctrines of the people of the two vehicles who have appropriation. People of the Hīnayāna analyze form to seek emptiness; in response to this, it clarifies that the nature of form is inherently empty, and that it is not that one extinguishes this form and only then is there emptiness. This initiates the two contemplations and distinguishes the two emptinesses: it clarifies the contemplation of emptiness by analyzing form among Hīnayāna people, and the contemplation of emptiness as identical with form among Mahāyāna people; it clarifies emptiness by analyzing form for Hīnayāna people, and the original emptiness of the nature of form for Mahāyāna people. It is for this reason that it only clarifies that the nature of form is inherently empty and not that emptiness arises from the destruction of form. Although there are passages from these three sūtras, the various masters mostly rely on the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā to explain that form is identical with emptiness and emptiness is identical with form. However, this meaning is difficult to comprehend. Dharma Master Daren said: "For thirty years I pondered this meaning and did not understand it; upon meeting the Dharma Master in the mountains, I attained awakening." Once this master was awakened, he began to believe in the Three Treatises and so forth. In the tradition of interpreting the meaning of mutual identity, there have been three great Dharma masters. Guangzhai offered no distinct interpretation; for this master, his [work on the] Lotus Sūtra flourished widely, while his [tradition of the] Tattvasiddhi-śāstra came completely to an end. Now we set forth the interpretations of the mutual identity of the two truths by the three masters Zhuangyan, Kaishan, and Longguang. Zhuangyan said: "Causal provisionality cannot be differentiated from emptiness, and therefore the conventional is identical with the ultimate; the fourfold transcendence cannot be differentiated from existence, and therefore the ultimate is identical with the conventional. Although the conventional is identical with the ultimate, name and characteristics can never be made into the absence of name and characteristics; although the ultimate is identical with the conventional, the absence of name and characteristics can never be made into name and characteristics. Therefore, the non-difference of the two truths constitutes mutual identity." Next, Kaishan explained: "The provisional has no self-nature; arising, it is yet not existent, and therefore the conventional is identical with the ultimate; the ultimate has no nature that could be provisional, and therefore the ultimate is identical with the conventional. The conventional being identical with the ultimate, apart from non-existence there is no existence; the ultimate being identical with the conventional, apart from existence there is no non-existence. Therefore, non-dual yet dual, the middle way is the two truths; dual yet non-dual, the two truths are the middle way."