二諦義 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

Explaining the names of the two truths: this meaning is extremely difficult. In explaining the names of the two truths, 'conventional' means insubstantial, and 'ultimate' means real; this has long been explained traditionally. Now, not yet knowing how the names of the two truths were obtained, how should we explain them? In explaining this question: our tradition explains that the two truths are of two kinds: first, the two truths as teaching; second, the two truths from perspective. The true and sincere words of the Tathāgata are called the two truths as teaching; the two kinds of subjective conception are called the two truths from perspective. This distinguishes the two truths from perspective and as teaching in terms of conception and cognition.

2.3

Question: The truth as teaching is the Buddha's teaching; the name 'truth as teaching' arises from the Buddha. The truth from perspective is perspective on conditions; does the name 'truth from perspective' arise from conditions or not? Explanation: The truth as teaching is the Buddha's teaching, and the name 'truth as teaching' arises from the Buddha; the truth from perspective is perspective on conditions, and the name 'truth from perspective' also arises from the Buddha. Objection: The truth as teaching is the Buddha's teaching, so the truth as teaching arises from the Buddha; the truth from perspective is perspective on conditions, so how could the truth from perspective arise from the Buddha? Explanation: You have grasped it wrongly. I said: the truth as teaching is the Buddha's teaching, and the name 'truth as teaching' arises from the Buddha; the truth from perspective is perspective on conditions, and the name 'truth from perspective' arises from the Buddha. 'Truth from perspective' and 'the name of the truth from perspective'—these statements are broadly examined. Now we explain that the name 'truth as teaching' arises from the Buddha, and the name 'truth from perspective' also arises from the Buddha.

2.4

Question: Truth as teaching arises from the Buddha, and truth from perspective also arises from the Buddha. Since truth as teaching is teaching, truth from perspective is also teaching. (The cross-examination continues thus.) Explanation: Both kinds of two truths are the Buddha's teaching.

2.5

Question: The truth as teaching may well be teaching; how is the truth from perspective also teaching? Since there is the distinction between perspective and teaching, how can both together be teaching? Explanation: The names of the two truths from perspective are also spoken for the sake of sentient beings. Speaking of existence for sentient beings is conventional truth from the perspective of ordinary beings; speaking of emptiness for sentient beings is ultimate truth from the perspective of noble ones. Speaking of emptiness and existence for sentient beings constitutes the two truths from perspective; therefore the two truths from perspective are also teaching.

2.6

Question: The names of the two truths from perspective are the Buddha's teaching, and the names arise from the Buddha; from where do the two truths of emptiness and existence arise? Explanation: The two truths of emptiness and existence exist precisely because the Buddhas appear in the world; when Buddhas have not appeared in the world, they do not exist. To explain by contracting the long into the short: when the Buddha had not yet appeared in the world, although one spoke of emptiness and existence, one did not know that emptiness and existence are the two truths. Just as before the Buddha appeared in the world, there were also names such as suffering, origin, cessation, and path, yet it was not known that suffering, origin, cessation, and path are truths. Because the Buddha appeared in the world, he expounded the four truths of suffering, origin, cessation, and path; therefore the sūtra says 'the gate of ambrosia was first opened.' Emptiness and existence are also like this: because the Buddha appeared in the world, he designated emptiness and existence as the two truths; hence it is said that only when the Buddha appears in the world are emptiness and existence named the two truths. Next, to explain more extensively: whether the Buddha appears in the world or has not appeared in the world, emptiness and existence are both known through the Buddha. Therefore the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says: 'At the beginning of the kalpa, things did not yet have names; for the sake of utility, noble ones established names for things, such as vase, clothing, and so forth. Emptiness and existence are also like this: when the Buddha had not yet appeared in the world, noble ones established names for emptiness and existence.' If so, whether the Buddha appears in the world or has not appeared in the world, the names of emptiness and existence both exist through the Buddha. Next question: The names of the truths from perspective are like this. From where does the truth from perspective arise? Explanation: There are two kinds of truths from perspective: first, the two truths from perspective of two conceptions; second, the two truths from perspective of conception and cognition. The two truths from perspective of two conceptions can be understood. Why? The two truths from perspective of two conceptions arise from the Buddha's teaching. It explains that the Buddha expounds the teaching of the two truths for sentient beings, but sentient beings do not understand and form two understandings of emptiness and existence, constituting the two truths from perspective; this 'perspective' arises from teaching.

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Question: By what cause do the two truths from the perspective of delusion and cognition come to exist? Explanation: One perspective has only one [truth]; one perspective has two. As for the one perspective having only one: ordinary persons are inverted, taking conditioned phenomena such as jars and robes to be existent. These things such as jars and robes are constantly existent from the perspective of ordinary persons, whether a Buddha is present or no Buddha is present. Just as the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Whether a Buddha is present or no Buddha is present, the nature and characteristics of the twelve links of dependent origination are eternally present.' Yet in the Hīnayāna, there are two masters who interpret this: the Vibhajyavādin says that it is an unconditioned, eternally present dharma; the Sarvāstivādin refutes this, saying that being constantly conditioned is eternal. Just like fire, which is constantly hot whether a Buddha is present or no Buddha is present—one cannot say that fire is hot when a Buddha is present and not hot when no Buddha is present; being constantly hot whether a Buddha is present or not is [its] eternity; the twelve links of dependent origination are also like this. Now it is explained that conventional truth is also like this: conditioned phenomena are constantly existent from the perspective of ordinary persons, constantly having conventional truth. As for one perspective having two meanings: this refers to the worthy and holy ones truly knowing that conditioned phenomena are empty, which constitutes the ultimate. Speaking of two meanings is explained in terms of the two senses of the fundamental and the trace. In the sense of the fundamental and the trace, it exists because the Buddhas appear in the world. When the Buddhas appear in the world, they know that the aforementioned inverted conditioned phenomena are empty of nature. In the sense of the trace and the fundamental, the dharmakāya of the Buddhas fundamentally knows that inversion is empty of nature. Therefore the Lotus Sūtra says: 'With the Buddha-eye I observe and see sentient beings in the six destinies'—this means that on the ground of the dharmakāya, it fundamentally knows that inversion is empty of nature. Briefly investigating the names of the two truths, their fundamental and grand purport is like this. However, regarding the meaning, one must grasp its root and understand its grand purport; if one does not grasp the purport, the meaning is of no use. Just as the preface to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states that people of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna did not understand the Buddha's purport in speaking of emptiness and existence, and so fell into error. Earlier, the preface says of the Hīnayāna: 'Those of dull faculties in the semblance dharma age seek determined characteristics in the twelve links of dependent origination, the aggregates, sense fields, and realms, not understanding the Buddha's purport and merely clinging to the written words.' Next, the preface says of the Mahāyāna: 'Hearing the teaching of ultimate emptiness, they do not understand by what causes and conditions it is empty.' For the sake of this meaning, Nāgārjuna appeared in the world and composed the treatise, elucidating the Buddha's intended meaning in the teaching. Since there is a clear model, we now begin to study it. Next question: Since there are the truth from perspective and the truth as teaching, with what intention did the Buddha speak of the truth from perspective and the truth as teaching? Explanation: The reason why the Tathāgata spoke of the two truths from perspective is because he wished to make sentient beings turn at one stage and turn at two stages, speaking of perspective to make them awaken to neither perspective nor non-perspective. Why? In the midst of that which is without names and characteristics, names and characteristics are forcibly spoken; speaking names where there are no names makes them awaken to names being without names, and also neither perspective nor non-perspective. Speaking of perspective for the sake of sentient beings is to make them awaken to perspective being neither perspective nor non-perspective. Therefore a sūtra says: 'Knowing that existence is not existent, the original nature is pure.' It also says: 'Wishing to make sentient beings deeply recognize the ultimate truth, he speaks conventional truth.' It also says: 'Thoroughly penetrating that all existent and non-existent phenomena are neither existent nor non-existent.' It is for this reason that he spoke of perspective, to make them awaken to neither perspective nor non-perspective. What is meant by 'turning at one stage and turning at two stages'? Turning at one stage means: speaking of existence being true from the perspective of ordinary persons, and speaking of emptiness being true from the perspective of holy ones. Making this kind of statement makes sentient beings turn away from existence and enter into emptiness. Why? Existence is existent from the perspective of ordinary persons; this existence is truly non-existent. Proclaiming that existence is existent from the perspective of ordinary persons makes them know that this existence is non-existent. This is precisely for ordinary persons: ordinary persons think that conditioned phenomena are truly existent, so now it is spoken that this existence is existent from the perspective of ordinary persons. If one knows that existence is existent from the perspective of ordinary persons, one immediately knows that this existence is non-existent; this, then, is awakening to non-existence by means of existence. The sūtra says: 'Knowing that existence is not existent.' The sūtra also says: 'Wishing to make sentient beings deeply recognize the ultimate truth, he speaks conventional truth.' The treatise also says: 'If one does not rely on the conventional, one cannot attain the ultimate.' Turning at two stages means: speaking of existence being real from the perspective of ordinary persons; in contrast to existence being real from the perspective of ordinary persons, speaking of emptiness being real from the perspective of holy ones—these are called the two truths from perspective. Since it is spoken that emptiness and existence are two from the perspective of conditions, one immediately knows that from the perspective of the two, they are non-dual; speaking of them from the perspective of the two reveals non-duality. Therefore the sūtra says: 'Thoroughly penetrating that all existent and non-existent phenomena are neither existent nor non-existent.' If properly explained: regarding the two from perspective, it clarifies that they are not two, not that there is a 'non-two'. If one says that perspective of the two is to reveal non-duality, this statement is mediocre and dull. If one has sharp understanding, regarding the two from perspective, it clarifies that they are not two, and it is not meant that there is a 'non-two'; one should also uplift it and must not suppress it. Uplifting it brings about dual detachment. Why? Being from the perspective of the two is not being two, which departs from the two; not meaning that there is a 'non-two' does not cling to non-duality. This is awakening to neither two nor non-two, neither one-sided nor non-one-sided, the pure and correct path. However, when spoken in this way, the truth from perspective is precisely the truth as teaching. Where else could there separately be a truth as teaching? Merely designating the truth from perspective in this way is precisely the truth as teaching; this is precisely preaching the Dharma by relying on the two truths. People hitherto have heard their masters speak of the truth from perspective and the truth as teaching and interpreted them as two truths, merely reciting words like a parrot's beak or a kite's feet. Now it is clarified that, as explained above, there is no separate truth as teaching; speaking of perspective is itself the teaching.

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Question: If so, how could previous explanations say that there are the truth from perspective and the truth as teaching? Explanation: From the perspective of the two sentiments, they are called the two truths from perspective; the Buddha preaching these two perspectives for sentient beings is precisely the truth as teaching. There are no other two [truths]; they are distinguished only in terms of meaning. Why? The truth from perspective is the object, and the truth as teaching is the agent; the two truths of perspective and teaching are distinguished in terms of agent and object.

2.9

Another question: For what reason are the truth from perspective and the truth as teaching spoken of? Explanation: There are two reasons. First, to interpret the sūtras and read the treatises, for both sūtras and treatises have these words. Second, to respond to others. Others explain that the two truths are natural objects, that there are these two principles. Now, the two truths being called objects and also called principles means: matching the two truths gives rise to two cognitions, so they are called objects; and in principle there are two truths, so they are called principles. In principle there are these two principles; in principle there are these two objects. Now, responding to them, we clarify that these are the two principles from perspective, and these are the two objects from perspective; it is not that in principle there are these principles and there are these objects. If so, at present there are two objects and two principles. The two objects are: first, the object from perspective; second, the object as teaching. The two principles are: first, the principle from perspective; second, the principle as teaching. For this reason, the truth from perspective and the truth as teaching are clarified. However, when the Tathāgata directly speaks of the two truths from perspective, there are generally three propositions: namely, correct, erroneous, and both correct and erroneous. If it is directly stated in this way, how is understanding attained? Now when the Buddha directly speaks of the two truths from perspective, how is it understood? Answer: Now it is clarified that the Buddha's exposition of the truth from perspective has three propositions: first, both correct; second, both erroneous; third, both correct and erroneous. As for 'both correct and erroneous': this refers to the previous two truths from perspective; conditioned phenomena are existent from the perspective of ordinary persons, and this existence is erroneous; the worthy and holy ones truly know that conditioned phenomena are empty, and this emptiness is correct. Showing their emptiness and existence makes them recognize correctness and error, makes them abandon existence to study emptiness, and transform from ordinary persons into holy ones. As for 'both erroneous': both are perspectives, therefore both are erroneous. Being existent from the perspective of ordinary persons: existence is already erroneous; being empty from the perspective of holy ones: emptiness is also erroneous. Why? Conditioned phenomena have never been empty or existent; from the perspective of ordinary persons they are thought to be existent, and from the perspective of holy ones they are thought to be empty. Just as a single form has never been empty or existent: a person of existent views thinks form is existent, while a person of emptiness contemplation thinks form is empty. A single form becomes empty or existent from the perspective of the two conditions of emptiness and existence; therefore, this emptiness and existence are both erroneous. As for 'both correct': merely knowing the two from perspective, one immediately knows non-duality; below this, all five propositions are pure. Being two from the perspective of conditions—how could it be two?

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Question: Regarding the two from perspective not being two, could it be neither two nor non-dual? Explanation: Regarding the two from perspective not being two, it clarifies that they are not two, not that there is a 'non-two'. Since they are neither two nor non-dual, the five propositions are all pure; this, then, brushes against the clouds above and plunges into the abyss below. Hitherto, people have only said that the two truths from perspective are both erroneous, not knowing that there are these three propositions. However, within these three propositions, there are two kinds of truth: the first two propositions are the truth from perspective, and the latter one proposition is the truth as teaching. The first two propositions are the object from perspective, and the latter one proposition is the object as teaching. The object from perspective is the untransformed object; the object as teaching is the transformed object. That the first two propositions are the truth from perspective and the untransformed object means: conditioned phenomena are truly existent from the perspective of ordinary persons; whether a Buddha is present or no Buddha is present, there is constantly this object. Since the object of existence is constantly present, the object of emptiness is also constantly present. The worthy and holy ones constantly know that conditioned phenomena are empty, so there is also constantly this object of emptiness. At present there is also a natural object, and there is also a natural cognition; there is constantly this object and constantly this cognition. These objects and cognitions are all objects and cognitions from the perspective of conditions; they are not objects and cognitions of transformed awakening. As for the object of transformed awakening: merely speaking of existence from the perspective of conditions makes one immediately know that existence from perspective is not existent; speaking of emptiness from the perspective of conditions makes one immediately know that emptiness from perspective is not empty. Recognizing that existence and non-existence from perspective are not existence and non-existence, one recognizes the teaching and awakens to principle. Awakening to principle immediately gives rise to the two cognitions of provisional and real; when the two cognitions arise, the teachings of emptiness and existence are then transformed and called objects, and therefore they are objects of transformed awakening.

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Question: There is still one doubt and obstacle. Why? Earlier it was clarified that of the two truths from perspective, one is correct and one is erroneous; the erroneous is those to be converted, and the correct is the converting agent. Now how can you say that speaking of emptiness from perspective causes awakening to non-emptiness? If speaking of emptiness from perspective causes awakening to non-emptiness, this would be those to be converted; how could it be called the converting agent? Explanation: Earlier it was clarified that of the two truths from perspective, emptiness is the converting agent because it guides ordinary persons to learn from the holy. Ordinary persons are inverted and consider things to be existent; the worthy and holy ones truly know that conditioned phenomena are empty, clarifying the converting agent of emptiness to make them abandon existence. If they are people of profound transformation, once they know that existence is not existent, they immediately know that emptiness is not empty; there is no need to speak of emptiness for them to make them awaken to non-emptiness. But people of dull faculties abandon the existence they see and learn the converting agent of emptiness. Having learned the converting agent of emptiness, they form an understanding of emptiness from perspective. For the sake of this person, it is declared: 'It is empty from your perspective; conditioned phenomena are truly not empty.' This is discussed in terms of gradual awakening: first making them awaken to existence not being existent, and next making them awaken to emptiness not being empty.

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Question: Others also clarify that there is an object truth and there is a teaching truth. They have the Dharma-jewel of the objective realm and the Dharma-jewel of spoken teaching; the Dharma-jewel of the objective realm is the object truth, and the Dharma-jewel of spoken teaching is the teaching truth. Since you have the teaching truth, others also have the teaching truth. You have the true and real words of the Tathāgata; could others lack the true and real words of the Tathāgata? If so, both have object and teaching—what difference is there in this? Explanation: There is a difference. Now we clarify that your natural object of the two truths is the error in the object from perspective of our school. Within the error in the object from perspective, there are immeasurable errors; this is the coarse error of our school, whereas subtle errors are beyond your reach. Therefore the sūtra says: 'The subtle signs of obstruction of bodhisattvas are not the realm of the two vehicles.' Now it is also like this: your natural object is the coarse error of our school, and therefore it is vastly different from theirs. For this reason, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'The tīrthikas and the Buddha-Dharma are profoundly different from each other, just like heaven and earth.' It also says: 'Heavenly food, sudhā, compared to foul human excrement. It is also like the milk of a donkey and a cow: when donkey milk is churned it turns into dung, but when cow milk is churned it becomes ghee.' Now it is also like this: what others consider correct is error for our school. This is precisely preaching the Dharma by relying on the two truths, where the two truths have the meaning of object.

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Another question: How is the teaching truth different? Explanation: To extract it tentatively: I have three kinds of two truths. The two truths you clarify are the first-stage two truths of my school. Provisional existence of the three designations is conventional truth, and the four eliminations are ultimate truth; these two truths are the first-stage two truths of our school. It is further asked: What do your teachings of the two truths express? They say: 'The two truths in turn express two principles.' If so, the two in turn express two, like a finger in turn pointing at a finger. Moreover, they only have the two and have no non-duality; thus they only have teaching and have no principle, and without principle there is no teaching. In our school, having principle means having teaching, being complete with principle and teaching.

2.14

The preceding [discussion] clarified the intention of establishing names; now next, the names are explained. Yet, although there are no names, they are named; for this reason, names are now explained. Therefore, Master Zhao says: "The nameless Way—where is it not named?" The Master said: "Amidst the absence of names and marks, one is forced to speak of names and marks." Since, being nameless, one is forced to speak names, it is to cause [sentient beings] to awaken to the nameless by means of names; names are spoken not to make sentient beings abide in names. If speaking names caused sentient beings to abide in names, these would still be sentient beings and could not be called Buddhas. Now it is clarified that, though there are no names, one is forced to speak names to make sentient beings awaken to the nameless by means of names. Yet one must know that these names are precisely the nameless; they are merely names for the nameless, and nameless yet named. When one knows the nameless names, one knows that names are nameless; this is to remove the old without creating the new. If one is an ordinary person from the past, then creating the new is never finished. Why? Originally there is the illness of body and mind; now, hearing the Buddha speak of ultimate and conventional, they subsequently form an understanding of ultimate and conventional: that there is an ultimate that can be ultimate, and a conventional that can be conventional; that having a name is different from being nameless, and being nameless is different from having a name—this is the meaning of [operating] with appropriation. Those with appropriation are called śrāvakas and are the retinue of Māra. The Xiangfa jueyi jing says: "They are the enemies of the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times." The Fozang jing says: "[Even if] a wheel of swords killed all [beings], a person with appropriation commits a transgression surpassing this." The Huayan [Sūtra] says: "Like hungry ghosts, and so forth." Therefore, the Treatise (Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa) says: "Since saṃsāra began, no one has been able to cure this illness." Now Master Xinghuang of Mount She has appeared in the world and broken through this illness, speaking names to cause sentient beings to awaken to names as nameless, abiding neither in names nor in the nameless. To give an analogy: it is like playing double-sixes (shuangliu) to conceal [pieces]; if they are struck and not concealed, they are struck by the other. Speaking the names of the two truths was originally to remove illness; if one abides in names, names turn back into an illness. Now it is clarified that the two truths are like playing double-sixes to conceal [pieces].

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Question: Why do you constantly make this explanation? Explanation: Simply because this illness constantly exists, this teaching is constantly made, just as all śrāvakas constantly obstruct the bodhisattva path. By what cause did the Master obtain such an understanding? He studied under the two treatise masters, Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. By what cause did the two treatise masters obtain this understanding? They studied under the Buddhas.

2.16

Question: In the sūtras there is establishing and there is refuting; how can you say all is refuting? Explanation: In the sūtras, whether establishing or refuting, all is to refute illness. Why? In the sūtras, if a single color or a single fragrance is spoken of, all is to reveal the Way. If it did not reveal the Way, it might not refute illness. Since both establishing and refuting reveal the Way, both refuting and establishing are to refute illness. Since the sūtras are like this, the treatise masters studied the sūtras, and the Master studied the treatise masters. Followers of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna have two illnesses, new and old; therefore, two treatise masters appeared in the world to refute them: Āryadeva refuted the old illness, and Nāgārjuna refuted the new illness. Since the treatise masters were like this, the Great Master was also like this, refuting these new and old illnesses, and therefore made such an exposition. The broad purport of the doctrinal meaning of the Way is indeed like this; one must obtain this intention: it is not that the doctrinal meaning of the Way is for establishing names, but that the doctrinal meaning of the Way is for putting names to rest. Because one intends to put names to rest, one must first explain names.

2.17

Explaining names has four propositions altogether: first, one name with one meaning; second, one name with immeasurable meanings; third, one meaning with one name; fourth, one meaning with immeasurable names. Names do not exceed these two kinds; meanings do not go beyond these two items. As for "one name with one meaning": one name is just one conventional name and one ultimate name; one meaning is conventional taking insubstantiality as its meaning, and ultimate taking reality as its meaning. Heretofore, only this one proposition has been grasped; now it is clarified as just one proposition among the four propositions. Next, as for "one name with immeasurable meanings": how is there one name with immeasurable meanings? Explanation: The one is the immeasurable one; how could the one not be immeasurable? This is the immeasurable as one, and the one as immeasurable. Therefore, the sūtra says: "In the one, one understands the immeasurable; in the immeasurable, one understands the one." If one produces it in turn, it is not genuine cognition; [if one understands this, one is] without fear.

2.18

Question: How does one name have immeasurable meanings? Explanation: It is explained in terms of four meanings: first, explaining according to the name; second, explaining with reference to causes and conditions; third, explaining by revealing the Way; fourth, explaining without fixed direction. Explaining according to the name: as conventional taking insubstantiality as its meaning, and conventional also taking custom as its meaning. This [second meaning] is fully found in both internal and external [teachings]; therefore, the Vinaya has country-vinaya: according to the place and country, customs differ. The Book of Rites says: "The gentleman conducts rites without seeking to change customs." Therefore, custom is its meaning. Heretofore, only the former explanation was grasped, and the latter understanding was absent.

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Question: What is the difference between these two explanations? Explanation: Conventional taking insubstantiality as its meaning is an explanation viewing [it in relation to] the ultimate. It clarifies that what the noble one knows is real, and what the ordinary person knows is insubstantial; it explains the conventional in contrast to the ultimate. If one explains conventional as custom, it explains the conventional in terms of the conventional itself: merely because the customs of places differ, it is called conventional; this has no reference [to the ultimate]. The former views the other; the latter pertains to oneself; self and other differ. Furthermore, the former is explained in terms of the sūtras, and the latter is explained in terms of the Vinaya. Hexi said: "The Buddha-Dharma does not go beyond the two piṭakas of Sūtra and Vinaya; the Abhidharma merely discriminates the Sūtras and Vinaya." Therefore, Sūtras and Vinaya encompass the Buddha-Dharma entirely. That the former explanation is in terms of the sūtras means: the sūtras clarify that all dharmas are insubstantial, because they have nothing existent. Explaining conventional as insubstantial is in terms of the sūtras. Explaining it as custom in terms of the Vinaya clarifies that within the Vinaya one cannot say that all dharmas are insubstantial and non-existent; one cannot say people are insubstantial or grass and trees are insubstantial. Why? In order to formulate precepts so that the Buddha-Dharma abides long. Therefore, one cannot clarify things as insubstantial and non-existent; one merely clarifies that the customs of countries differ. This is the difference explained in terms of Sūtra and Vinaya, which has also been unknown up to now.

2.20

Next, the second, explaining the meaning with reference to causes and conditions, clarifies the conventional as the meaning of the ultimate, and the ultimate as the meaning of the conventional. Why? If the conventional were not the ultimate, it would not be conventional; if the ultimate were not the conventional, it would not be ultimate. If it were not the ultimate, it would not be conventional: the conventional does not obstruct the ultimate; if it were not the conventional, it would not be ultimate: the ultimate does not obstruct the conventional. The conventional does not obstruct the ultimate: the conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning; the ultimate does not obstruct the conventional: the ultimate takes the conventional as its meaning.

2.21

Question: Previously, explaining according to the name had two meanings: first, explaining by viewing the other and pertaining to oneself; second, explaining in terms of the Sūtras and the Vinaya. In terms of what meaning is it explained now? Explanation: In contrast to obstruction and appropriation, it is explained in terms of non-appropriation and non-obstruction. If one says that conventional has the meaning of insubstantial and ultimate has the meaning of real, this is the understanding of ordinary persons and the two vehicles with appropriation. Now, clarifying the bodhisattva's meaning of non-appropriation and non-obstruction, it is clarified that conventional is the meaning of ultimate, and ultimate is the meaning of conventional. The other school does not have this meaning. Their conventional is determinately conventional, and their ultimate is determinately ultimate; three provisions are determinately conventional and cannot be ultimate, and the four abandonments are determinately ultimate and cannot be conventional; ultimate and conventional have obstruction—this is the śrāvaka's understanding of meaning. Now it is clarified that ultimate is the meaning of conventional, and conventional is the meaning of ultimate; ultimate and conventional are without obstruction—this is the bodhisattva's understanding of meaning.

2.22

Question: Why do you speak like this? Explanation: In contrast to their intrinsic nature, our causes and conditions are clarified. Causes and conditions shake their attachment to intrinsic nature. Therefore, the sūtra says: "First, shake with concentration; later, uproot with wisdom." Now, first, clarifying causes and conditions shakes their attachment to [intrinsic] nature; later, it will uproot it. But now, for the time being, clarifying causes and conditions shakes their intrinsic nature. They clarify insubstantiality as determinately the meaning of conventional, and reality as determinately the meaning of ultimate. For this reason, now having shaken them, it is clarified that conventional is the meaning of ultimate, and ultimate is the meaning of conventional.

2.23

Question: How is conventional the meaning of ultimate, and ultimate the meaning of conventional? How is emptiness the meaning of form, and form the meaning of emptiness? Explanation: The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā itself explains it. That sūtra says: "Form is emptiness; emptiness is form. The ultimate is the conventional; the conventional is the ultimate." Since it says that the ultimate is the conventional, how could the ultimate not be the meaning of the conventional? Furthermore, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "The dharmas arisen from causes and conditions, I explain as emptiness." Dharmas arisen from causes and conditions are existence; since they are emptiness, how could the ultimate not be the meaning of conventional? Explaining this verse fully explains the sūtra; the treatise cites the sūtra to explain, and the treatise is precisely explaining the sūtra. Furthermore, meaning is the reason for a name; the ultimate is the reason for the conventional; therefore, the ultimate is the meaning of the conventional. The sūtra says: "Wishing to cause sentient beings to deeply know the ultimate truth, the Tathāgata therefore preaches the conventional truth." Since preaching the conventional truth causes one to know the ultimate truth, the conventional is for the ultimate, and the ultimate is called the meaning of the conventional. Conventional truth being like this, ultimate truth is also so.

2.24

Next, the third, explaining the meaning by revealing the Way, clarifies that conventional is the meaning of non-conventional, ultimate is the meaning of non-ultimate, and ultimate-and-conventional is the meaning of neither-ultimate-nor-conventional. Ultimate-and-conventional and neither-ultimate-nor-conventional are name and meaning; neither-ultimate-nor-conventional and ultimate-and-conventional are meaning and name; ultimate-and-conventional and neither-ultimate-nor-conventional are teaching and principle; neither-ultimate-nor-conventional and ultimate-and-conventional are principle and teaching; these are provisional, horizontal and vertical, within name, meaning, principle, and teaching. Where is it spoken of like this? Explanation: Just as what is clarified in the Huayan [Sūtra]: with all dharmas of existence and non-existence, one thoroughly understands that they are neither existence nor non-existence. Because one understands that existence is non-existence, non-existence is the meaning of existence. Understanding that non-existence is not non-existence, not non-existence is the meaning of non-existence. It is also like thoroughly understanding light and ignorance, duality and non-duality; since one understands duality as precisely non-duality, non-duality is the meaning of duality. Thoroughly understanding ultimate and conventional as neither ultimate nor conventional, neither-ultimate-nor-conventional is the meaning of ultimate and conventional.

2.25

Question: Why clarify neither-ultimate-nor-conventional as the meaning of ultimate and conventional? Explanation: Previously, clarifying causes and conditions, the horizontal meaning shook [them]; now, ultimate and conventional as neither ultimate nor conventional, the vertical meaning uproots [them]. The horizontal meaning shakes, and the vertical meaning uproots; therefore, our school has always clarified the meaning of provisional subduing and middle-way cutting off. As for "provisional subduing": ultimate being the meaning of conventional, and conventional being the meaning of ultimate subdues their intrinsic nature. Having known the ultimate of causes and conditions, one knows that the ultimate is not ultimate; having known the conventional of causes and conditions, one knows that the conventional is not conventional. Awakening to ultimate and conventional as neither ultimate nor conventional, intrinsic nature is severed forever. For this reason, previously the horizontal subdued, and now the vertical severs.

2.26

Next, the fourth section, explaining the meaning without fixed direction, clarifies that conventional takes all dharmas as its meaning: a person is the meaning of conventional, a pillar is the meaning of conventional, saṃsāra is the meaning of conventional, and nirvāṇa is the meaning of conventional. Without fixed direction and without obstruction, all dharmas are the meaning of conventional.

2.27

Question: Why clarify that all dharmas are the meaning of conventional? Explanation: It arises from the preceding third meaning. The preceding third meaning says: conventional is the meaning of non-conventional, ultimate is the meaning of non-ultimate, and ultimate and conventional awaken to neither ultimate nor conventional; this is awakening to the unobstructed Way. Having awakened to the unobstructed Way, there is unobstructed function. Because unobstructed function is obtained, all dharmas are the meaning of conventional. The former was entering the Way from function; the present is bringing forth function from the Way.

2.28

Question: How are all dharmas together the meaning of conventional? For the moment, we cite analogies to resolve it. Your school has the meanings of specific relativity and universal relativity. Long and short, ultimate and conventional, cause and effect in relativity are specific relativity; long relative to not-long, conventional relative to not-conventional, this is universal relativity. Why conventional relative to not-conventional is universal relativity: it clarifies that, besides conventional, all are not-conventional; hence it is called universal relativity. All dharmas are not-conventional; not-conventional is relative to conventional; since not-conventional is the meaning of conventional, all are the meaning of conventional. Furthermore, it is a general sorting out of the meaning of relativity. Heretofore it was said that long and short are relative, cause and effect are relative, but the two effects of bottle and cloth cannot be relative. Now it is clarified that the two effects of bottle and cloth are mutually relative.

2.29

Question: High and low incline towards each other, and existence and non-existence generate each other—these may be in mutual dependence. How do the two results, pot and cloth, depend on each other? Counter-question: For you, are affirmed and denied in mutual dependence or not? Does 'pot' depend on 'non-pot' or not? The other replies: Affirmed and denied do depend on each other; 'pot' depends on 'non-pot'. If so, cloth is 'non-pot'. Since 'non-pot' depends on 'pot', cloth therefore depends on 'pot'. Since cloth depends on 'pot', pot and cloth are conditioned: cloth is the meaning of pot, and pot is the meaning of cloth. Since cloth is the meaning of pot, all things are the meaning of pot. Furthermore, explaining that all phenomena are the meaning of the conventional is clarified in terms of the meaning of suchness. The suchness of form is the suchness of all phenomena; the suchness of form is precisely the suchness of all phenomena, and all phenomena are precisely form. To cite an analogy: just as in refuting the Sāṃkhya view that great existence and a pot are identical, because existence and pot are not different, existence is precisely the pot; and since existence is not different from the myriad phenomena, the myriad phenomena are also precisely the pot. Here it is also like this: suchness is not different from the conventional, so the conventional is precisely suchness; suchness is not different from all phenomena, so all phenomena are precisely the conventional. Why is this? Because their essence is suchness. What does the Avataṃsaka mean when it says, "A single thought-moment is immeasurable kalpas; immeasurable kalpas are a single thought-moment"? It is like this because one embodies the Way. Why? A single thought-moment is precisely the Way, and immeasurable kalpas are also the Way; therefore, immeasurable kalpas are precisely a single thought-moment. Why is this? Because it is the unhindered Way. Because one embodies the unhindered Way, one obtains unhindered function: a single thought-moment is immeasurable kalpas, and immeasurable kalpas are a single thought-moment. Immeasurable kalpas as a single thought-moment is not a single thought-moment; a single thought-moment as immeasurable kalpas is not immeasurable kalpas. Being neither a single thought-moment nor immeasurable kalpas, yet a single thought-moment is immeasurable kalpas; this is because the horizontal and the vertical are completely unhindered within it. The sūtra says: "Within one, understand the immeasurable; within the immeasurable, understand one." However, these four meanings cannot be ordered as before and after. Why? The first explains the meaning with respect to the worldly-conventional: conventionality in the sense of insubstantiality and in the sense of custom—this is temporarily explained in accord with worldly sentiment. The second gradually deepens, clarifying the conventional as the meaning of the ultimate and the ultimate as the meaning of the conventional. The third enters into the neither-ultimate-nor-conventional from the ultimate and the conventional, entering the Way from function. The fourth, having awakened to the Way, gives rise to function from the Way; thus they successively generate each other. Explaining these four meanings with respect to the ultimate and conventional, by analogy all cause and result, persons and phenomena, etc., are also like this. The previous explanation of one name and one meaning, and one name and immeasurable meanings, is complete.

2.30

Now next we explain one meaning and one name, and one meaning and immeasurable names. Regarding 'one meaning and one name': taking the correct Way as the one meaning, the ultimate and the conventional are the one name. However, the correct Way has never had a name; for the sake of the one Way, one name is established, and one name is also established to reveal the one Way. Why? Since one name is established for the sake of the one Way, how could the one name not reveal the one Way? Therefore, it is called 'one meaning and one name'. Regarding 'one meaning and immeasurable names': again, the one Way is taken as the one meaning. As for 'immeasurable names', immeasurable names are established to reveal the one Way, and immeasurable names are established for the sake of revealing the one Way. Since immeasurable names are established for the sake of the one Way, how could the immeasurable names not reveal the one Way? Therefore, it is called 'one meaning and immeasurable names'.

2.31

Question: What are the immeasurable names? Explanation: Although the names are immeasurable, four kinds are briefly set forth: namely, worldly truth, conventional truth, ultimate truth, and truth of the supreme meaning.

2.32

Question: Are there only these four names or not? Explanation: The names are immeasurable: worldly truth, conventional truth, existence truth, ordinary truth, ultimate truth, truth of the supreme meaning, emptiness truth, and noble truth. Thus the "Chapter on the Four Truths" in the Avataṃsaka says: "In this Sahā world, there are four billion hundred-thousand nayutas of names for the four truths, not to speak of the designations throughout the worlds of the ten directions." Thus there are innumerable names, which cannot be cited in full. If cited in full, bamboo and silk could not contain them. For now, we will briefly explain the four names: worldly and conventional, ultimate and supreme meaning. However, these four names may be separated or combined. As for combining them: combining worldly and conventional forms one truth; combining ultimate and supreme forms one truth. Thus the sūtra says: "It is spoken because of conventional truth; because of the supreme real meaning, it does not exist." As for separating them, there are worldly truth, conventional truth, ultimate truth, and truth of the supreme meaning.

2.33

Question: Why are they sometimes separated and sometimes combined? Explanation: They are explained separately to preserve brevity, and clarified jointly because their meaning is identical. Although the names 'worldly' and 'conventional' differ, their meaning is the same; therefore, they are combined and called 'conventional truth'. The same is true of 'ultimate' and 'supreme meaning'.

2.34

Question: How do these names of the four truths differ from [the views of] others? Explanation: 'Ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature; 'worldly' and 'supreme' are designations based on praise and dispraise. Saying that 'ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature means: 'conventional' has the meaning of being insubstantial, its intrinsic nature being insubstantial; 'ultimate' has the meaning of being real, its intrinsic nature being real. Therefore, 'ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature. 'Worldly' and 'supreme' being based on praise and dispraise means: 'worldly' has the meaning of succession and differentiation, while 'supreme' has the meaning of nothing surpassing it. Since differentiation is 'worldly' and unsurpassable is 'supreme', therefore 'worldly' and 'supreme' are names of praise and dispraise. However, this explanation is incomprehensible, and we shall challenge it for a moment. If the conventional's intrinsic nature is insubstantial, the worldly's intrinsic nature is also differentiation. The essence of the conventional being insubstantial is already getting its name from intrinsic nature; the essence of the worldly being differentiation is also getting its name from intrinsic nature. If one then disparages the worldly as differentiation and not supreme, I would also disparage the conventional as insubstantial and not real. If the conventional really being insubstantial is not dispraise, how could the worldly really being differentiation suddenly be dispraise? Furthermore, between conventional and worldly: the worldly might rather be intrinsic nature, whereas the conventional should be dispraise. Why? Knowing that the world is differentiated, when one now says that the world is differentiated, how is that not intrinsic nature? Conventionally, one does not know it is insubstantial; now naming it insubstantial, how is that not dispraise? If so, how can one say that 'conventional' being insubstantial gets its name from intrinsic nature, while 'worldly' being differentiation is a designation of dispraise? Next we challenge 'ultimate' and 'supreme'. 'Ultimate' is real in its intrinsic nature; 'supreme' is also supreme in its intrinsic nature. If, in contrast to the ordinary, it is not supreme, one praises the noble as supreme; likewise, in contrast to the ordinary, it is not real, so one praises the noble as real. If one says that praising the ultimate makes it supreme, one also praises the supreme as ultimate; how can one say that 'ultimate' is intrinsic nature and 'supreme' is praise?

2.35

Question: Having challenged others like this, how do you explain it now? We now explain that 'worldly' and 'conventional' are names of the horizontal and the vertical. Why? The name 'conventional' is horizontal, while the name 'worldly' is vertical. The conventional being horizontal means: 'conventional' has the meaning of custom; everywhere there are customs and conventions. Hence it is said: "The exemplary person practices ritual propriety and does not seek to alter customs." All countries have their respective customs; therefore, the name 'conventional' is horizontal. The name 'worldly' being vertical means: 'worldly' is succession and differentiation, the shifting and changing across the three periods of time—how could this not be vertical? Both internal and external [texts] fully clarify this. The sūtras speak of "life after life, age after age (śeṣa)", and secular books say, "thirty years make one generation (se)." Even so, ultimately it is succession and differentiation that constitute the worldly; therefore, 'worldly' is a vertical name. However, both of these two names refer to intrinsic nature. The conventional's intrinsic nature is insubstantial; the worldly's intrinsic nature is succession. Before the world exists, the world already exists—this is succession and differentiation; before the conventional exists, the conventional already exists—this is insubstantiality. Since their intrinsic natures are insubstantiality and succession, how could there be praise and dispraise between them? Therefore, that is unacceptable. Next we explain them in relation to the ultimate. The treatise says: "Regarding conventional truth, all phenomena are empty of nature; worldly inverted delusion claims they exist, whereas the noble ones truly know that their nature is empty." Since conventional truth is an inverted delusion claiming existence, one should know that conventional truth is delusion and inversion. Since the conventional is like this, the worldly is also like that. In this case, in relation to the noble, both the worldly and the conventional are delusion and inversion. Within inversion, there are naturally the conventional and the worldly, the horizontal and the vertical. This contains both differentiation and non-differentiation. Viewed from the perspective of the noble, they are equally inversion, hence there is no differentiation; yet this does not negate the horizontal and vertical of worldly and conventional, hence there is differentiation.

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二諦義 — Classical Chinese