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二諦義 2.34

English (machine translation) 2.34

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English

2.34

Question: How do these names of the four truths differ from [the views of] others? Explanation: 'Ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature; 'worldly' and 'supreme' are designations based on praise and dispraise. Saying that 'ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature means: 'conventional' has the meaning of being insubstantial, its intrinsic nature being insubstantial; 'ultimate' has the meaning of being real, its intrinsic nature being real. Therefore, 'ultimate' and 'conventional' get their names from their intrinsic nature. 'Worldly' and 'supreme' being based on praise and dispraise means: 'worldly' has the meaning of succession and differentiation, while 'supreme' has the meaning of nothing surpassing it. Since differentiation is 'worldly' and unsurpassable is 'supreme', therefore 'worldly' and 'supreme' are names of praise and dispraise. However, this explanation is incomprehensible, and we shall challenge it for a moment. If the conventional's intrinsic nature is insubstantial, the worldly's intrinsic nature is also differentiation. The essence of the conventional being insubstantial is already getting its name from intrinsic nature; the essence of the worldly being differentiation is also getting its name from intrinsic nature. If one then disparages the worldly as differentiation and not supreme, I would also disparage the conventional as insubstantial and not real. If the conventional really being insubstantial is not dispraise, how could the worldly really being differentiation suddenly be dispraise? Furthermore, between conventional and worldly: the worldly might rather be intrinsic nature, whereas the conventional should be dispraise. Why? Knowing that the world is differentiated, when one now says that the world is differentiated, how is that not intrinsic nature? Conventionally, one does not know it is insubstantial; now naming it insubstantial, how is that not dispraise? If so, how can one say that 'conventional' being insubstantial gets its name from intrinsic nature, while 'worldly' being differentiation is a designation of dispraise? Next we challenge 'ultimate' and 'supreme'. 'Ultimate' is real in its intrinsic nature; 'supreme' is also supreme in its intrinsic nature. If, in contrast to the ordinary, it is not supreme, one praises the noble as supreme; likewise, in contrast to the ordinary, it is not real, so one praises the noble as real. If one says that praising the ultimate makes it supreme, one also praises the supreme as ultimate; how can one say that 'ultimate' is intrinsic nature and 'supreme' is praise?

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