肇論 1.14

1.14

夫至虛無生者，蓋是般若玄鑑之妙趣，有物之宗極者也。自非聖明特達，何能契神於有無之間哉？是以至人通神心於無窮，窮所不能滯；極耳目於視聽，聲色所不能制者，豈不以其即萬物之自虛，故物不能累其神明者也。是以聖人乘真心而理順，則無滯而不通；審一氣以觀化，故所遇而順適。無滯而不通，故能混雜致湻；所遇而順適，故則觸物而一。如此，則萬象雖殊而不能自異。不能自異，故知象非真象。象非真象故，則雖象而非象。然則物我同根、是非一氣，潛微幽隱，殆非群情之所盡，故頃爾談論，至於虛宗，每有不同。夫以不同而適同，有何物而可同哉？故眾論競作而性莫同焉。何則？心無者，無心於萬物，萬物未嘗無。此得在於神靜，失在於物虛。即色者，明色不自色，故雖色而非色也。夫言色者，但當色即色，豈待色色而後為色哉？此直語色不自色，未領色之非色也。本無者，情尚於無，多觸言以賓無。故非有，有即無；非無，無亦無。尋夫立文之本旨者，直以非有非真有，非無非真無耳。何必非有無此有，非無無彼無？此直好無之談，豈謂順通事實，即物之情哉！夫以物物於物，則所物而可物；以物物非物，故雖物而非物。是以物不即名而就實，名不即物而履真。然則真諦獨靜於名教之外，豈曰文言之能辨哉？然不能杜默，聊復厝言以擬之。試論之曰：

Ultimate emptiness and non-arising are the wondrous purpose of prajñā's profound insight, and the ultimate principle of existing things. Unless one is sagely, brilliant, and exceptionally penetrating, how could one unite the spirit between being and non-being? Therefore, the ultimate man penetrates with a spiritual mind into the infinite, where no extremity can obstruct him; he exhausts eye and ear in seeing and hearing, where sound and form cannot constrain him. Is this not because he accords with the inherent emptiness of the myriad things, so that things cannot encumber his spiritual brilliance? Thus the sage mounts the true mind and accords with principle, so that nothing is obstructed and all is penetrated; he examines the single qi to contemplate transformations, so that wherever he meets things, he accords comfortably. Nothing being obstructed and all being penetrated, he can blend the mixed to achieve purity; wherever he meets things and accords comfortably, he encounters things and becomes one with them. In this way, though the myriad phenomena are distinct, they cannot differentiate themselves. Being unable to differentiate themselves, we know that phenomena are not real phenomena. Because phenomena are not real phenomena, though they are phenomena, they are not phenomena. Thus, things and self share the same root; right and wrong are of the same qi. So hidden, minute, deep, and subtle—it can hardly be exhausted by the sentiments of the multitude. Hence, recent discussions concerning the doctrine of emptiness have constantly differed. If one seeks agreement through differences, what thing could ever agree? Therefore, various theories have arisen in rivalry, yet their understanding of the nature of things has never been the same. Why is this? The "Mental Non-being" school has no mind toward the myriad things, yet the myriad things have never been non-existent. This succeeds in the tranquility of the spirit, but fails regarding the emptiness of things. The "Matter as Such" school clarifies that matter is not self-caused matter, so though it is matter, it is not matter. But in speaking of matter, one should just take matter itself as matter; why wait for matter to matter matter before it becomes matter? This merely says that matter is not self-caused matter, but fails to realize that matter is non-matter. The "Original Non-being" school has an inclination toward non-being, frequently interpreting words to favor non-being. Thus, 'not being' means being is just non-being; 'not non-being' means non-being is also non-being. But if one investigates the original intent of composing these texts, it was simply that 'not being' means not truly being, and 'not non-being' means not truly non-being. Why must 'not being' mean lacking this being, and 'not non-being' mean lacking that non-being? This is merely talk that delights in non-being; how could it be said to accord with and penetrate actual matters, or conform to the true nature of things? If one takes things as things according to things, then what is thinged can be thinged; if one takes things as things according to what is non-thing, then though it is a thing, it is not a thing. Therefore, things do not accord with names to reach reality, and names do not accord with things to fulfill the truth. Thus, paramārtha-satya rests alone in tranquility outside name and doctrine; how could literary expressions resolve it? Yet unable to maintain silence, I briefly set down words to approximate it. Let us attempt to discuss it, saying: