肇論 1.15

1.15

《摩訶衍論》云：「諸法亦非有相，亦非無相。」《中論》云：「諸法不有不無者，第一真諦也。」尋夫不有不無者，豈謂滌除萬物、杜塞視聽，寂寥虛豁，然後為真諦者乎？誠以即物順通，故物莫之逆；即偽即真，故性莫之易。性莫之易，故雖無而有；物莫之逆，故雖有而無。雖有而無，所謂非有；雖無而有，所謂非無。如此，則非無物也，物非真物。物非真物，故於何而可物？故經云：「色之性空，非色敗空。」以明夫聖人之於物也，即萬物之自虛，豈待宰割以求通哉！是以寢疾有不真之談，超日有即虛之稱；然則三藏殊文，統之者一也。故《放光》云：「第一真諦，無成無得；世俗諦故，便有成有得。」夫有得即是無得之偽號，無得即是有得之真名。真名故，雖真而非有；偽號故，雖偽而非無。是以言真未嘗有，言偽未嘗無。二言未始一，二理未始殊。故經云：「真諦、俗諦謂有異耶？答曰：無異也。」此經直辯真諦以明非有，俗諦以明非無；豈以諦二而二於物哉？然則萬物果有其所以不有，有其所以不無。有其所以不有，故雖有而非有；有其所以不無，故雖無而非無。雖無而非無，無者不絕虛；雖有而非有，有者非真有。若有不即真，無不夷跡，然則有無稱異，其致一也。故童子歎曰：「說法不有亦不無，以因緣故諸法生。」《瓔珞經》云：「轉法輪者，亦非有轉，亦非無轉，是謂轉無所轉。」此乃眾經之微言也。何者？謂物無耶，則邪見非惑；謂物有耶，則常見為得。以物非無，故邪見為惑；以物非有，故常見不得。然則非有非無者，信真諦之談也。故《道行》云：「心亦不有亦不無。」《中觀》云：「物從因緣故不有，緣起故不無。」尋理，即其然矣。所以然者，夫有若真有，有自常有，豈待緣而後有哉？譬彼真無，無自常無，豈待緣而後無也！若有不自有，待緣而後有者，故知有非真有。有非真有，雖有，不可謂之有矣。不無者，夫無則湛然不動，可謂之無。萬物若無，則不應起；起則非無。以明緣起故不無也。故《摩訶衍論》云：「一切諸法，一切因緣故應有；一切諸法，一切因緣故不應有。一切無法，一切因緣故應有；一切有法，一切因緣故不應有。」尋此有無之言，豈直反論而已哉！若應有，即是有，不應言無；若應無，即是無，不應言有。言有，是為假有，以明非無。借無，以辨非有。此事一稱二，其文有似不同。苟領其所同，則無異而不同。然則萬法，果有其所以不有不可得而有；有其所以不無不可得而無。何則？欲言其有，有非真生；欲言其無；事象既形。象形，不即無；非真，非實有。然則不真空義，顯於茲矣！故《放光》云：「諸法假號不真，譬如幻化人。非無幻化人，幻化人非真人也。」夫以名求物，物無當名之實；以物求名，名無得物之功。物無當名之實，非物也；名無得物之功，非名也。是以名不當實，實不當名。名實無當，萬物安在？故《中觀》云：「物無彼此。」而人以此為此，以彼為彼。彼亦以此為彼，以彼為此。此、彼莫定乎一名，而惑者懷必然之志。然則彼此初非有，惑者初非無，既悟彼此之非有，有何物而可有哉？故知萬物非真，假號久矣！是以《成具》立強名之文，園林託指馬之況。如此，則深遠之言，於何而不在！是以聖人乘千化而不變，履萬惑而常通者，以其即萬物之自虛，不假虛而虛物也。故經云：「甚奇，世尊！不動真際為諸法立處。」非離真而立處，立處即真也。然則道遠乎哉？觸事而真！聖遠乎哉？體之即神！

The *Mahāyāna-śāstra* says: 'All dharmas are neither possessing characteristics nor devoid of characteristics.' The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* says: 'That all dharmas are neither existent nor non-existent is the supreme paramārtha-satya.' If one investigates this 'neither existent nor non-existent,' does it mean that one sweeps away the ten thousand things, blocks sight and hearing, and abides in vast vacuity and utter desolation before it can be paramārtha-satya? Truly, it is because by approaching things one accords with and penetrates them, so things do not run counter to it; by approaching the false one accords with the true, so their nature does not change. Because their nature does not change, though non-existent they are existent; because things do not run counter to it, though existent they are non-existent. Though existent they are non-existent, which is termed 'not existent'; though non-existent they are existent, which is termed 'not non-existent.' Thus, it is not that there are no things; rather, things are not truly things. Since things are not truly things, by virtue of what could they be treated as things? Therefore a sutra says: 'Rūpa is svabhāva-śūnyatā, not because rūpa is destroyed to become śūnyatā.' This clarifies that as for the sage's relation to things, he approaches the intrinsic emptiness of the myriad things; how could he wait to dismember them before seeking comprehension! Therefore, [the discourse delivered while] lying ill contains the discussion of the untrue, and *Chāoyue ri* contains the designation of approaching the empty; thus, though the texts of the Three Piṭakas differ, what unifies them is one. Hence the *Fangguang jing* says: 'In the supreme paramārtha-satya there is neither accomplishment nor attainment; because of saṃvṛti-satya there is accomplishment and attainment.' Now, 'having attainment' is merely the provisional title for 'having no attainment,' and 'having no attainment' is the true name for 'having attainment.' Because it is the true name, though true, it is not existent; because it is a provisional title, though provisional, it is not non-existent. Therefore, speaking of the true, it has never been existent; speaking of the provisional, it has never been non-existent. The two expressions have never been one; the two principles have never been different. Hence a sutra says: 'Are paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya said to be different? The reply is: They are not different.' This sutra simply distinguishes paramārtha-satya to clarify non-existence, and saṃvṛti-satya to clarify non-non-existence; how could it be that because the truths are two, things are bifurcated? Thus the myriad things indeed have that by which they are not existent, and have that by which they are not non-existent. Because they have that by which they are not existent, though existent they are not existent; because they have that by which they are not non-existent, though non-existent they are not non-existent. Though non-existent they are not non-existent, for non-existence does not terminate in sheer vacuity; though existent they are not existent, for existence is not true existence. If existence does not amount to the real, and non-existence does not obliterate traces, then though existence and non-existence are named differently, their import is one. Therefore the Youth praised: 'He expounds the Dharma as neither existent nor non-existent, for through causes and conditions all dharmas arise.' The *Yingluo jing* says: 'Turning the wheel of Dharma is neither having a turning nor having no turning; this is called turning that which has nothing to turn.' These are the subtle words of the various sutras. Why so? If one says that things are non-existent, then mithyādṛṣṭi would not be delusion; if one says that things are existent, then śāśvatadṛṣṭi would be correct. Because things are not non-existent, mithyādṛṣṭi is delusion; because things are not existent, śāśvatadṛṣṭi is incorrect. Thus, that which is neither existent nor non-existent is truly the discourse of paramārtha-satya. Therefore the *Daoxing jing* says: 'The mind is neither existent nor non-existent.' The *Madhyamaka* says: 'Things are not existent because they are from causes and conditions; they are not non-existent because of dependent origination.' Investigating the principle, it is indeed so. Why is this? If existence were true existence, existence would naturally be permanently existent; how could it depend on conditions before existing? Just as in the case of true non-existence, non-existence would naturally be permanently non-existent; how could it depend on conditions before being non-existent! If existence does not exist of itself, but depends on conditions before existing, we know that existence is not true existence. Existence not being true existence, though it exists, it cannot be called existent. As for not non-existent: non-existence is tranquil and motionless, and can then be called non-existent. If the myriad things were non-existent, they should not arise; since they arise, they are not non-existent. This clarifies that because of dependent origination, they are not non-existent. Therefore the *Mahāyāna-śāstra* says: 'All dharmas, because of all causes and conditions, should exist; all dharmas, because of all causes and conditions, should not exist. All non-existent dharmas, because of all causes and conditions, should exist; all existent dharmas, because of all causes and conditions, should not exist.' When we examine these words on existence and non-existence, how could they merely be paradoxical arguments! If they should exist, then they are existent and one should not speak of non-existence; if they should not exist, then they are non-existent and one should not speak of existence. Speaking of existence is provisional existence to clarify non-non-existence. Borrowing non-existence is to discern non-existence. This is one matter with two designations; their expressions seem different. If one grasps what is identical in them, there is nothing different that is not identical. Thus, the ten thousand dharmas indeed have that by which they are not existent, so they cannot be obtained as existent; they have that by which they are not non-existent, so they cannot be obtained as non-existent. Why? If one wishes to say they are existent, their existence is not truly produced; if one wishes to say they are non-existent, forms and phenomena have already taken shape. Once shapes have formed, they are not immediately non-existent; not being true, they are not real existence. Thus, the meaning of 'not truly empty' is revealed here! Therefore the *Fangguang jing* says: 'All dharmas are provisional designations and not real, like an illusory person. It is not that there is no illusory person, but the illusory person is not a real person.' Now, seeking things by names, things have no reality matching the names; seeking names by things, names lack the efficacy of grasping things. Things having no reality matching the names, they are not [true] things; names lacking the efficacy of grasping things, they are not [true] names. Hence names do not match reality, and reality does not match names. When name and reality do not match, where are the myriad things? Therefore the *Madhyamaka* says: 'Things have neither this nor that.' Yet people take this as this, and that as that. The other also takes this as that, and that as this. 'This' and 'that' are not fixed to a single name, yet the deluded harbor fixed assumptions. Thus 'this' and 'that' are originally not existent, and the deluded are originally not non-existent; once one awakens to the non-existence of 'this' and 'that,' what thing could there be that can exist? Therefore we know that the ten thousand things are not real, but have long been provisional designations! Hence the *Chengju jing* sets forth the text on 'forced names,' and the Garden [Master Zhuangzi] relies on the metaphors of 'finger and horse.' Thus, where are profound and far-reaching words not present! Therefore, that the sage mounts the myriad transformations without changing, and traverses the myriad confusions while constantly penetrating them, is because he approaches the intrinsic emptiness of the myriad things, without relying on emptiness to empty things. Therefore a sutra says: 'Most wondrous, World-Honoured One! The motionless realm of reality is the standing ground for all dharmas.' It is not that apart from the real there is an established ground; the established ground is itself the real. Thus, is the Way far away? Touch upon things and it is real! Is the sage far away? Embody it and one is spiritual!