肇論疏 1.103

1.103

第二、引經論證成也。先引《中觀論》，後引《成具》等經。今云物無彼此者，通是《中論》意也，亦可別指〈觀苦品〉一偈。偈云：自作若不成，云何彼作苦？若彼人作苦，是亦名為作。今取此意反證也。此彼莫定乎一名下，此不定此、彼不定彼，而惑者謂為定有此彼也。必然者，決定也。志者，志意，意有記錄，故名為志耳。然則彼此初非有惑者初非無者，彼此無定性，故云非有，於惑者則元不無也。既悟此彼之非有又何物而可有哉者，彼此在物既無，彼此又無物也。故知萬物非真假號久矣者，號，名也。以非真是假，故名為空。是以成具立釋名之文下，引《成具》及《大品經》證成也。先引《成具經》及《莊子》，後引《大品》。今引《成具經》兼引《莊子》助成此義也。《成具光明定意經》云：是法無所有，強為其名也。《莊子》云：以指喻指之非指，不若非指喻指之非指。以馬喻馬之非馬，不若非馬喻馬之非馬。此意云，此以此指為指，將彼指為非指；彼亦以彼指為指，將此指為非指。於馬亦然。各有一彼此，則彼此無定。各有一是非，則是非無定也。而言園林者，莊子為膝園吏，故云爾也。如此則深遠之言於何而不在者，無彼無此，此是深言，《成具》固已有之，《莊子》亦作此說也。是以聖人乘千化而不變下，以萬法是空，故聖人變之而不染也。千化萬變者，意言多也。變化非一，故云千化。惑倒非一，故云萬惑。雖乘千化，出生入死，而不為生死所染，故云不變。雖履萬惑，無所不為，而不為倒惑所壅，故云常通也。必以其即萬物之自虛下，以法自空，不假將空觀，本空法也。經云甚奇世尊下，引《大品經》證成也。彼經云：如來建立眾生於實際。古本云「立處」，今引古《大品》文也。明一切諸法是實際，能令眾生知諸法皆是真際，故云為諸法立處也。非離真而立處下，非是離真際別建立眾生於真際，即明眾生是真際，故云立處即真也。

Second, citing sūtras and treatises to substantiate and establish [the point]. First he cites the Madhyamakaśāstra, and then he cites sūtras such as the Chengju jing. Now, stating that 'things have neither this nor that' expresses the general intent of the Madhyamakaśāstra; it may also specifically refer to a gāthā in the 'Examination of Suffering' chapter. The gāthā states: 'If suffering is not made by oneself, / how could it be made by another? / If that other person makes suffering, / that is still termed self-made.' Here, this intent is taken as an indirect proof. Under 'This and that are not fixed to a single name': this is not definitively this, and that is not definitively that, yet the deluded consider this and that to be definitively existent. 'Certainly' (必然) means determined. 'Aspirations' (志) refers to thoughts of intention; since intention has record and imprint, it is termed 'aspiration'. 'Thus, this and that were never originally existent, yet to the deluded they were never non-existent': since this and that lack a fixed nature, he says 'not existent'; yet to the deluded, they were originally not non-existent. 'Once one has awakened to the non-existence of this and that, what thing could there be that could exist?': since this and that do not exist in things, there are also no things in this and that. 'Therefore we know that all things are not real, and that provisional designations have long been used': 'designation' (號) means name. Because they are not real and are provisional, they are called empty. Under 'Therefore, the text establishing and explaining names in the Chengju': he cites the Chengju jing and the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā to substantiate and establish it. First he cites the Chengju jing and Zhuangzi, and later he cites the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā. Here he cites the Chengju jing along with Zhuangzi to assist in establishing this principle. The Chengju guangming dingyi jing states: 'These phenomena have nothing that exists; names are arbitrarily forced upon them.' Zhuangzi states: 'To use a finger to show that a finger is not a finger is not as good as using what is not a finger to show that a finger is not a finger. To use a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as using what is not a horse to show that a horse is not a horse.' This meaning indicates: this person regards this finger as a finger and takes that finger to be not a finger; that person also regards that finger as a finger and takes this finger to be not a finger. The same applies to horses. When each possesses a 'this' and a 'that', then this and that are not fixed. When each possesses an assertion and a denial, then assertion and denial are not fixed. Mentioning 'the garden official' refers to Zhuangzi having been an official of the lacquer garden; hence he says this. 'In that case, where are profound and far-reaching words not present?': having neither that nor this is a profound utterance; the Chengju jing certainly already had it, and Zhuangzi also expressed this explanation. Under 'Therefore, the sage mounts the thousand transformations without changing': because all phenomena are empty, the sage transforms along with them without being defiled. 'Thousand transformations and ten thousand changes' expresses multiplicity in meaning. Transformations are not single, hence he says 'thousand transformations'. Delusions and inversions are not single, hence he says 'ten thousand delusions'. Although mounting the thousand transformations, going forth into birth and entering into death, he is not defiled by birth and death; hence he says 'does not change'. Although walking through the ten thousand delusions, leaving nothing undone, he is not obstructed by inversions and delusions; hence he says 'is always unimpeded'. Under 'It must be because things themselves are fundamentally empty': because phenomena are inherently empty, one does not rely on an external contemplation of emptiness; phenomena are originally empty. Under 'The sūtra says: "How wonderful, World-Honoured One!"': he cites the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā to substantiate and establish it. That sūtra states: 'The Tathāgata establishes sentient beings in the limit of reality (bhūta-koṭi).' The old version reads 'abiding place' (立處); here he quotes the text of the old Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā. It clarifies that all phenomena are the limit of reality, and can cause sentient beings to know that all phenomena are the true limit; hence it says 'establishing an abiding place for all phenomena'. Under 'It is not that he establishes an abiding place apart from the true': it is not that apart from the true limit one separately establishes sentient beings within the true limit; it directly clarifies that sentient beings are themselves the true limit, hence he says 'the established place is itself the true'.