肇論疏 1.103

1.103

Second, citing sūtras and treatises to substantiate and establish [the point]. First he cites the Madhyamakaśāstra, and then he cites sūtras such as the Chengju jing. Now, stating that 'things have neither this nor that' expresses the general intent of the Madhyamakaśāstra; it may also specifically refer to a gāthā in the 'Examination of Suffering' chapter. The gāthā states: 'If suffering is not made by oneself, / how could it be made by another? / If that other person makes suffering, / that is still termed self-made.' Here, this intent is taken as an indirect proof. Under 'This and that are not fixed to a single name': this is not definitively this, and that is not definitively that, yet the deluded consider this and that to be definitively existent. 'Certainly' (必然) means determined. 'Aspirations' (志) refers to thoughts of intention; since intention has record and imprint, it is termed 'aspiration'. 'Thus, this and that were never originally existent, yet to the deluded they were never non-existent': since this and that lack a fixed nature, he says 'not existent'; yet to the deluded, they were originally not non-existent. 'Once one has awakened to the non-existence of this and that, what thing could there be that could exist?': since this and that do not exist in things, there are also no things in this and that. 'Therefore we know that all things are not real, and that provisional designations have long been used': 'designation' (號) means name. Because they are not real and are provisional, they are called empty. Under 'Therefore, the text establishing and explaining names in the Chengju': he cites the Chengju jing and the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā to substantiate and establish it. First he cites the Chengju jing and Zhuangzi, and later he cites the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā. Here he cites the Chengju jing along with Zhuangzi to assist in establishing this principle. The Chengju guangming dingyi jing states: 'These phenomena have nothing that exists; names are arbitrarily forced upon them.' Zhuangzi states: 'To use a finger to show that a finger is not a finger is not as good as using what is not a finger to show that a finger is not a finger. To use a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as using what is not a horse to show that a horse is not a horse.' This meaning indicates: this person regards this finger as a finger and takes that finger to be not a finger; that person also regards that finger as a finger and takes this finger to be not a finger. The same applies to horses. When each possesses a 'this' and a 'that', then this and that are not fixed. When each possesses an assertion and a denial, then assertion and denial are not fixed. Mentioning 'the garden official' refers to Zhuangzi having been an official of the lacquer garden; hence he says this. 'In that case, where are profound and far-reaching words not present?': having neither that nor this is a profound utterance; the Chengju jing certainly already had it, and Zhuangzi also expressed this explanation. Under 'Therefore, the sage mounts the thousand transformations without changing': because all phenomena are empty, the sage transforms along with them without being defiled. 'Thousand transformations and ten thousand changes' expresses multiplicity in meaning. Transformations are not single, hence he says 'thousand transformations'. Delusions and inversions are not single, hence he says 'ten thousand delusions'. Although mounting the thousand transformations, going forth into birth and entering into death, he is not defiled by birth and death; hence he says 'does not change'. Although walking through the ten thousand delusions, leaving nothing undone, he is not obstructed by inversions and delusions; hence he says 'is always unimpeded'. Under 'It must be because things themselves are fundamentally empty': because phenomena are inherently empty, one does not rely on an external contemplation of emptiness; phenomena are originally empty. Under 'The sūtra says: "How wonderful, World-Honoured One!"': he cites the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā to substantiate and establish it. That sūtra states: 'The Tathāgata establishes sentient beings in the limit of reality (bhūta-koṭi).' The old version reads 'abiding place' (立處); here he quotes the text of the old Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā. It clarifies that all phenomena are the limit of reality, and can cause sentient beings to know that all phenomena are the true limit; hence it says 'establishing an abiding place for all phenomena'. Under 'It is not that he establishes an abiding place apart from the true': it is not that apart from the true limit one separately establishes sentient beings within the true limit; it directly clarifies that sentient beings are themselves the true limit, hence he says 'the established place is itself the true'.